[No. XXII-]
THE tablet.
No. XXII.
,< There are impertinent books as well as impertinent
pen."
rv firnie persons are prevented from acquiring
I uftful knowledge by their intellectual inca
itv • there are others, who pollefhng talents,
?•, nf'important attainments by wearing away
'ir t i m e in trivial studies. A person generally
V Lfpshc cives a fatisfadlory account of employ
;!fbhnfelff when he can fay he has been enga
-lin reading. He may however deceive hnn
as well as others in this reipetft. It is not
more common or more disagreeable to find men
deficient in their ideas, from a neglect of books,
than it is to observe them bloated with notions
that are falfc or frivilous, by an injudicious choice
of authors. An acquaintance of mine, who is
celebrated for his literary tafle and ingenuity,
invited me the othermorning to lookat his libra
ry which is said to be an excellent one If no
velty ?Wes a claim to merit, iny friend deserves
irreat prajfe for his collection of books ; for he
certain! v has filled his shelves with iuch perform
ances as scarce any man but himfelf would ever
think'of purchasing. After expatiating upon a
variety of authors I had never heard of, and a
still Jreater number I had never read, he told
roe he had taken iuunenfe pains to ascertain evs
- minutecircumftance relative to the building
of Noah's Ark. No liiflory either facrecl or pro
fane, that threw any light upon that interesting
lubje'tft, had escaped his notice. It is, he said, to
beregietted that the particulars of that celebra
ted work of antiquity are not more generally
known. The vast delight he had found- in his
rclearches, lie allured me, were not to be descri
bed. As I considered myfelf nfelefsly employed
in hearing his my readers will make
the fame remark, if this ellay communicates a
conversation so unimportant. My friend inform
ed roe of many other, what he called, curious
discoveries or attainments ; and his pride i'eem
edto coufift in knowing what none of his ac
quaintance knew, or had any inclination to
know.
The design of reading is not so much to en
creafe the quantity of our knowledge as the pio
prietyand utility of it.—Men of leisure, who
have patience otirive (ligation, may perhaps em
ploy tliewfelyes in useless enquiries without pro
ducing any hurtful effects ; indeed they may
happen to ill ike upon foine difcovery,from which
benefit will result. But where such an ardor of
curiosity prevails to pufli people into refcarches,
from which no practical advantage is derived,
it difqualifies them for acftive pursuits in life.
Itfhouli be an eftablil}ied rule with every per
lon who rebels, to enquire of himfelf, when he
lays aside his book ; firllly, whether he has gain
ed any ideas at all ; and secondly, whether they
are just and ufeful. To read, and yet to acquii e
no ideas, is at any rate a inilpcnce of time ; but
the mere loss of time is not io pernicious as to
catch sentiments that are fallacious or trifling,
t will close this number with an extract from a
fen'ible author, who in touching upon this fub
jeft makes the following remarks.
" Did\ u/us the gramarian wrote four thou fan d
biahi; wherein he is much concerned to discover where
Homer was horn ; who was JEnc^s's true vioiher ;
'ud whether Anacreon was the greater whore tnafler
or drunkard, with other fopperies, that a mart would
ilhir to forget if he knew them Is it not an impor
tant qucjiiou which of the two was firfl, the mallet or
the tings ?■ Strwe people are extremely inquifttive to
how ho-jj many oars Ulyjfes had ; which was firjl
"Mitten, the liliads or the Odyffes; or if they were
'nth done by the fame hand. A man is never a jot
ssre learned for this curiosity, hut much more trou
'ltftme. Am I ever the more jt'/i, the more moderate,
valiant, or liberal,for knowing that Curius Denta
tjiyes the fir J! that carried eltphanis in triumph ?
l ach vie my duty to provide/zee, to my neighbor, and
to Kyfelf ; to dispute with Socrates ; to doubt with
'tniifdes ; to set up my rtfi with /.picurus ; to mcf
appetite with the Stoics ; and to renounce the
"'ttJ vith the Cynic. What a deal of bufneji there
"> W, to make Homer a pliilofopher ; andfecotid
},i" tuhat clafles to range hint ? One will have him
'^".ultoic, a friend to virtue, and an enemy to plea
a P re -f tr '"g honesty even to immortality itfelf :
"^f r '"akes him an Epicurean ; one that loves his
I ! 'J e a,'dt'jfpend his time in good company : Some
' j in it, that he was a Peripatetic ; and
"at e was a Sceptic. But it is clear, that
Th r"j- a -l these things he was not any one «/' them,
gi.'. opinions do not at all hinder as from
th( main, that he was a wife man.
' rr f ore apply ourselves to those thtr.ps that
dc and even let the reft ale ne.''
SATURDAY, June 27, 1789.
SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF 1 CONGRESS.
In the Houfc UNITED STATES
Thursday, June 18, 1789.
The question. Whether the Setretary of Foreign AJfairs Jhould he
re moveable by the President? still under consideration.
Mr. White. This question has occasioned a solemn debate,,
tho' some gentlemen have confidcred it so clear or so trivial as to
excite their surprise, that it has again been brought before the
house. I consider it as the moil important question that has been
yet considered ; the molt important that I ever had a voice in dif
ufling or a vote in determining, except that of adopting the constitu
tion itlelf in the convention of Virginia. I confidcr the day on which
the sense of the house is to be taken on this fubjeft as a memorable
day in the annals of America. Sir, Ido not consider it is limply
whether the power (hall be vested in the President, or in the Preli
rtent and Senate, The constitution has determined that point.
Nor do I consider the question to be whether offices are to be
held during good behaviour, or at the pleasure of thtfe who ap
point them. I suppose that on a fair and necessary confti utlion oi
the constitution, that matter is fettled. All arguments tending to
(how that one or the other mode ot appointment or removal, is pro
per or improper, or that they ought to be difpatced by impeach
ment, are inapplicable to the present cafe. But the refpe£tabflity
ot the characters who support these arguments entitle them to
notice.
I shall procecd, Sir, to enquire, whether we are bound by the
constitution, or whether we may grant to others, or aliume to our
lelves, powers which the constitution has not given in exprels
terms, or by necessary implication? This I conceive to be the
qutftion.
It is not contended that the power proposed to be vested in the
Prelident is given him in express terms, or thatit can be inferred
from any particular clause of the constitution. It is fought for
from another source, the general nature of executive power; it is
011 this principle the clause is advocated, or I mistake the gentle
man's argument. It was said by the gentleman, who opened
the debate in opposition to this amendment, that the constitution
having vested the President with a general executive power, the're
by allthofe powers werevefted which were notexprefsly excepted,
and therefore he possessed the power ot removal. Sir, this is not
to be learned in the American governments. Each state has an ex
ecutive magifti ate ; but look at his powers and I believe it will not
be found that he has, in anyone, the right of appointing or remov
ing officers. In Virginia I know that all the great officers are
appointed by the General Ailembly. Tlr.s is generally the fact in
other states. If then the doCtrine of the gentleman is to be tup
ported by examples, it mult be by thoft brought from beyond the
Atlantic—We must also therelook for rules, by which the executive
power, in the latitude of this principle, may be circumscribed, if
indeed it can be limited. Upon this principle,fir, the fame power
is given to thekgiflaturr—they will poflefsall powers not express
ly excepted. If the President has all executive powers which are
no,t expressly excepted, I do not know that there can be a more
arbitrary government. The President, I conceive, will have all the
power ot a monarch ; and the legiflatureall the powers of the most
sovereign legislation. This I take to be a clear and necessary de
duction from the principle on which the clause in the bill is
founded- The President is limited in the appointment of ambaf
ljdors,confuls, judges,and all other officers, and in making treaties.
In these he is expressly limited, and no turther. Take from him
these, and give him all other executive powers, as exercited in
• monarchy, and fee what they will be. There are a!fo eXcep
t '.oivs *o the legislative power ; tuch as that thev shall not tor a time
prohibit the importation of slaves; that direct taxes (hall not be
i-i id, but in a certain mode ; that taxes (hall be uniform ;
'.it *.h( 'v shall grant no titles ot nobility, &c. Ihefe are the
1 xcepti.ins to the legislative : Now givethem all the powers of the
parliament of Great-Aritein, and what kind of government will
you have ? I can not describe it. It appears to me absolute and
a$ extentive as any despotism.
It you go once beyond the boundaries of the constitution where
ran you draw a line with any precision ? and with what fafety to
liberty canthe doctrine of thisclaufe be tupported. I understand
our system different in its form and !pir:t from all other govern
ments in the world. It is in part national and partly federal ; and
though it is moreextenfivc in its powers than most other confedera
ted governments, vet the Congrcfs is not to be compared to nati
onal k giflatures.—To these, general powers aregranted, some with
and some without any particular reservations in tavour of the body
of the people'; and to those only will the gentleman's reasonings
apply.—Here is no analogy.—This is * government constituted
for particular purposes only ; and the Dowers which the people
have thought proper to grant are tpecifically enumerated, and dis
posed of among the various branches, if thete powers are inef
ficient, or if they are improperly difttibuted, it is not our tauh,
nor within our power to remedy. —The people must grant further
power ;—organize those already granted in a more perte£t mannei,
or fuilcr from the deteCt. Wc can neither enlarge nor modity
them.
vSir, this was the ground on which the friends of the govern
ment have fupportrd it ;it was a fate ground,and I venture to la\
that it would not have been tupported on any other. In the State
from which I came, it its advocates had not maintained this prin
ciple, it would never have been ratified.
Mr. White then read a part of the ratification by Virginia, in
support of this afTertion.
Sir, said he, how far the eftabli'hment of the principle con
tended for may affect the completion of our Union, I will not
undertake to fay : I will only remark that the State of North-Ca
rolina has exprefled nearly the fame ientynents as Virginia,
this difference, that Carolina would not adopt the constitution tnl
it was Satisfied of this principle, that we could not by construc
tive a£ts enlarge our powers, in order at a future day to dellioy
the State governments, and with them the liberties ot the people,
Sir, I could likewifc fugged to gentlemen the local situation ot
that country. It is contiguous to kentuckey, which united to
Carolina, form a territorv of amazing extent from the Atlantic to
the banks of the Ohio. 'The people qf this trad are in such a situ
ation as that, a single spark from this house would kindle a flame
which it would be difficult if not impoflible to extinguifli ; and
excite such a dread as would render them utterly irreconcilcable
to our government.
Sir, this is not a vain because the oppofers of the
constitution founded their arguments upon it—They contended
that you would make conftruitions in your favor, and atTume
powers not intended to be vested in you by the people. I with,
Sir, my apprehensions may be ill founded, and contradicted by
the.event. The measure proposed, I acknowledge, is advocated
by refpi ftnble friends to the Union within these doors, and by
many without. But I believe much of this arifesfrom the clause
in question conferring the power on a m an > whom all the world
admires, and who they kilowwill not abufeit. But, Sir, on this
occasion I forget who is President ; but I do not # forget that the
worst of precedents are often cftablifhed in the best of turns. We
may give the power to a particular man in office, because he will
not abHie it: but we cannot take away that power from those who
[Published on IV td/iefday and Saturday.]
may fuccced him. Ido not mean to irifer from this, thai if the
constitution had vested the power in the President, it would be
improper he should have it. That is a question which I will not
undertake to determine. It is unneccflary ; the true question be
fore us being (imply a constitutional one.
Without entering into a detail of the evili that may arise, as
gentlemen have df>ne on both fides of the Houfej let us consider
whether the greater evil will rtot arise from our explaining the con
stitution at this time; Is there any neceflity for it ? If the condi
tion has given the power to the President, can he not exercise it
without our paflingan a&on the fubjett ? Will not the clause be
useless ? It the constitution has not given it him, shall we go be
yond the limits that are set usjin order to extend it to him ? I hope
not. But it seems to be a doubtful point : Some think he has
the power ; others not. Then, Sir, I would leave the construc
tion to himfelf. If it should become necefTary to exercise the
power, let him do it : The Occasion for the exercise of it will be
a better comment than any we can give—lt will better explain it
o the people, and reconcile them to it more perfectly than any
law from the legislature*
It the neceflity of the cafe compel him td exercise the power,
even if wrong, the people will acquiesce. I will give you an ex
ample, Sir: In Virginia, when the operations of the war requir
ed exertions ot the chief magistrate, beyond the authority of the
law, our late governor Nelson, wliofe name must be dear to eve
ry triend to liberty, was obliged to iflue his warrants and impress
supplies for the army. Though it was known that he exceeded
his authority,- his warrants were executed ; his country was be
nefited by this resolute measure, and he himfelf afterwards in
demnified by the legiftature. Sir, I do not wish to encourage
adts of this kind, but I lay it Would be better for the executive to
assume the exercise of such a power on extraordinary occasions,
than tor us to delegate to him an extraordinary power to be cx
ercifed on all occasions;
Some gentlemen have supposed that the constitution has made
no provilion for the removal of officers; and they have called it
an omitted caie, and a detect. They ask, if we inay not supply
that defetk ? I answer, no. For if we can make any pofltble al
teration, we may go on and make the constitution just what we
please. But as a further anfvrer, I fay, it is not an omitted cale.
F r the constitution havingdirefctcd by whom officers lhall be ap
pointed, it does diredl alio by whom they (hall be removed. Ti.at
doctrine was so well supported by a gentleman yefterdav, that I
will not repeat. Sir, this must have been in the contemplation ok
the gentlemen who formed the constitution. Is it probable that
ihey never thought about the maimer in which an officer should
be displaced ? When they provided that the judges ihould hold
their offices during good behaviour, did they not intend that all
others should be held during pleasure ? It is not then an omitted
cafe.
Gentlemen have supposed that the Prefid<*it may suspend, an.d
that as he has a right to make a temporary ippointment, he has
also a right to make a temporary removal. 1 think he has so, as
it is correspondent with his power of appointing. But it has been
said that it the concurrence of v the Senate is ncceffary, they may
retufe to concur when a removal is necefTary.- Sir, it you are to»
suppose that ihe government cannot be executed in its piefent
form, there is no leinedy for such a misfortune; but we arc not
to luppoie it—We are to presume that the Senate will do their du
ty —You may go on without end in supposing. You may lup-*
po£e that the JPrefident may not do what is rignt—You may even
suppose that this House will not do what is rightr What is the
contequcilce ? Why, our constituents must bear with us nil they
have an opportunity for a remedy. But ihall we* becarufe the
Senate may do wrong, give the Present a power ta att without
them. We may as well, Sir, if the Senate retufe to concur m a
favorite bill ot this Houle, proceed to pass the law without them.
But it has been asked, whether a person in the elevated station ot*
Piefident would probably abuse histruft? I presume he will not j
neither do I ptefuine the Senate wilL
A gentleman, Sir, in order to get over the obje&ions made to»
the clause, had recurred to that part of the constitution, which
lays, that Congress may bylaw vest the appointment ot inferior
officers iu the President, in the courts of law, or heads of depart
ments, and has interred that he is to be considered himfelt the
head and center of all those departments. This comes from one
whom I always hear with pleasure, on account of his found rea
son and perspicuity of exprcflion, But, Sir, I must differ with
him. Who are the heads of departments? We have a secretary
for foreign affairs; another of the treasury, <scc, Now are not
these the principal officers in thofo departments f If they arc, they
are the heads. Who are the inferor officers ? The chief clerks,
and all who may depend upon them. The gentlemen who form
ed the constitution would not, it seems, give to the President
at all events the power of appointing these inferior officers to
which that of removal is attached.
Sir, when I set out with faying that the constitution is the pre
cise limit to the deliberations of this body, it may, at fir ft view,
appear 111 onfiftent with what I have said refpe£ling conftru&ioos,
But, Sir, I fay that when a thing is granted in general terms, that
which in its own nature is attached to it, must go with it, with
out particular explanation. Without this principle, Congrefi*
could not execute the fy(lein. To make this clear, the conltitu
tion authorises the government to appoint supreme and inferior
judges. By natural and necessary conllruttion therefore, the le
gislature may fay, how many judges there shall be; how often
and where they shall hold their terms, and what their salaries
Ihallbe. These are natural and fafe conftru&ions —Butconftruc-
tions of every other kind are beyond the limits of the constitution.
Sir, I shall trouble the committee no longer. I should not
perhaps have troubled them so long ; but on a matter of such great
importance, one which lies so heavy on my mind, and for which
I am so anxiously concerned, I could not avoid exprefling my
sentiments fully. lam, Sir, ftiongly impressed with the idea,
that the giving powers, which are not within the letter of the
constitution, will be to the people a circumftancc of alarm and
terror. [Daily Ad.~\
Mr. Pace observed, that he had quite different ideas upon the
clause in debate from gentlemen who supposed that it would en
creafe the refpoufibility of the President—He conceived that ma
king the heads ot departments dependent on him, would in a
great measure, destroy that refponhbility—lt would encreafe
the number of his dependants who would all be interested in sup
porting his admiijiftration, whether according to the principle*
of the constitution or not—and thus he would be hedged in on
every fide—and what then becomes of his refponhbility i The
clause of the constitution which provides that officers shall be
removed for high crimes and misdemeanors, plainly includes all
those officers and crimes which it is contended for, to make the
President the sole judge of.—The Senate is the bulwark of the so
vereignty of the States—They ought not only to have a voice in
the framing laws, but ought also to Ice to the execution of those
laws.
The retaining this clause in the bill, will excite tenfold cla
mours for amendments—lt will be confidercd as making; the
President an independent monarch.
Mr. SsdcwicK: It is contended, that this question is already
fettled by the constitution—That the power which gives, is the
only power tovake away, is true, if the delegation of power sup-