[No. XXII-] THE tablet. No. XXII. ,< There are impertinent books as well as impertinent pen." rv firnie persons are prevented from acquiring I uftful knowledge by their intellectual inca itv • there are others, who pollefhng talents, ?•, nf'important attainments by wearing away 'ir t i m e in trivial studies. A person generally V Lfpshc cives a fatisfadlory account of employ ;!fbhnfelff when he can fay he has been enga -lin reading. He may however deceive hnn as well as others in this reipetft. It is not more common or more disagreeable to find men deficient in their ideas, from a neglect of books, than it is to observe them bloated with notions that are falfc or frivilous, by an injudicious choice of authors. An acquaintance of mine, who is celebrated for his literary tafle and ingenuity, invited me the othermorning to lookat his libra ry which is said to be an excellent one If no velty ?Wes a claim to merit, iny friend deserves irreat prajfe for his collection of books ; for he certain! v has filled his shelves with iuch perform ances as scarce any man but himfelf would ever think'of purchasing. After expatiating upon a variety of authors I had never heard of, and a still Jreater number I had never read, he told roe he had taken iuunenfe pains to ascertain evs - minutecircumftance relative to the building of Noah's Ark. No liiflory either facrecl or pro fane, that threw any light upon that interesting lubje'tft, had escaped his notice. It is, he said, to beregietted that the particulars of that celebra ted work of antiquity are not more generally known. The vast delight he had found- in his rclearches, lie allured me, were not to be descri bed. As I considered myfelf nfelefsly employed in hearing his my readers will make the fame remark, if this ellay communicates a conversation so unimportant. My friend inform ed roe of many other, what he called, curious discoveries or attainments ; and his pride i'eem edto coufift in knowing what none of his ac quaintance knew, or had any inclination to know. The design of reading is not so much to en creafe the quantity of our knowledge as the pio prietyand utility of it.—Men of leisure, who have patience otirive (ligation, may perhaps em ploy tliewfelyes in useless enquiries without pro ducing any hurtful effects ; indeed they may happen to ill ike upon foine difcovery,from which benefit will result. But where such an ardor of curiosity prevails to pufli people into refcarches, from which no practical advantage is derived, it difqualifies them for acftive pursuits in life. Itfhouli be an eftablil}ied rule with every per lon who rebels, to enquire of himfelf, when he lays aside his book ; firllly, whether he has gain ed any ideas at all ; and secondly, whether they are just and ufeful. To read, and yet to acquii e no ideas, is at any rate a inilpcnce of time ; but the mere loss of time is not io pernicious as to catch sentiments that are fallacious or trifling, t will close this number with an extract from a fen'ible author, who in touching upon this fub jeft makes the following remarks. " Did\ u/us the gramarian wrote four thou fan d biahi; wherein he is much concerned to discover where Homer was horn ; who was JEnc^s's true vioiher ; 'ud whether Anacreon was the greater whore tnafler or drunkard, with other fopperies, that a mart would ilhir to forget if he knew them Is it not an impor tant qucjiiou which of the two was firfl, the mallet or the tings ?■ Strwe people are extremely inquifttive to how ho-jj many oars Ulyjfes had ; which was firjl "Mitten, the liliads or the Odyffes; or if they were 'nth done by the fame hand. A man is never a jot ssre learned for this curiosity, hut much more trou 'ltftme. Am I ever the more jt'/i, the more moderate, valiant, or liberal,for knowing that Curius Denta tjiyes the fir J! that carried eltphanis in triumph ? l ach vie my duty to provide/zee, to my neighbor, and to Kyfelf ; to dispute with Socrates ; to doubt with 'tniifdes ; to set up my rtfi with /.picurus ; to mcf appetite with the Stoics ; and to renounce the "'ttJ vith the Cynic. What a deal of bufneji there "> W, to make Homer a pliilofopher ; andfecotid },i" tuhat clafles to range hint ? One will have him '^".ultoic, a friend to virtue, and an enemy to plea a P re -f tr '"g honesty even to immortality itfelf : "^f r '"akes him an Epicurean ; one that loves his I ! 'J e a,'dt'jfpend his time in good company : Some ' j in it, that he was a Peripatetic ; and "at e was a Sceptic. But it is clear, that Th r"j- a -l these things he was not any one «/' them, gi.'. opinions do not at all hinder as from th( main, that he was a wife man. ' rr f ore apply ourselves to those thtr.ps that dc and even let the reft ale ne.'' SATURDAY, June 27, 1789. SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF 1 CONGRESS. In the Houfc UNITED STATES Thursday, June 18, 1789. The question. Whether the Setretary of Foreign AJfairs Jhould he re moveable by the President? still under consideration. Mr. White. This question has occasioned a solemn debate,, tho' some gentlemen have confidcred it so clear or so trivial as to excite their surprise, that it has again been brought before the house. I consider it as the moil important question that has been yet considered ; the molt important that I ever had a voice in dif ufling or a vote in determining, except that of adopting the constitu tion itlelf in the convention of Virginia. I confidcr the day on which the sense of the house is to be taken on this fubjeft as a memorable day in the annals of America. Sir, Ido not consider it is limply whether the power (hall be vested in the President, or in the Preli rtent and Senate, The constitution has determined that point. Nor do I consider the question to be whether offices are to be held during good behaviour, or at the pleasure of thtfe who ap point them. I suppose that on a fair and necessary confti utlion oi the constitution, that matter is fettled. All arguments tending to (how that one or the other mode ot appointment or removal, is pro per or improper, or that they ought to be difpatced by impeach ment, are inapplicable to the present cafe. But the refpe£tabflity ot the characters who support these arguments entitle them to notice. I shall procecd, Sir, to enquire, whether we are bound by the constitution, or whether we may grant to others, or aliume to our lelves, powers which the constitution has not given in exprels terms, or by necessary implication? This I conceive to be the qutftion. It is not contended that the power proposed to be vested in the Prelident is given him in express terms, or thatit can be inferred from any particular clause of the constitution. It is fought for from another source, the general nature of executive power; it is 011 this principle the clause is advocated, or I mistake the gentle man's argument. It was said by the gentleman, who opened the debate in opposition to this amendment, that the constitution having vested the President with a general executive power, the're by allthofe powers werevefted which were notexprefsly excepted, and therefore he possessed the power ot removal. Sir, this is not to be learned in the American governments. Each state has an ex ecutive magifti ate ; but look at his powers and I believe it will not be found that he has, in anyone, the right of appointing or remov ing officers. In Virginia I know that all the great officers are appointed by the General Ailembly. Tlr.s is generally the fact in other states. If then the doCtrine of the gentleman is to be tup ported by examples, it mult be by thoft brought from beyond the Atlantic—We must also therelook for rules, by which the executive power, in the latitude of this principle, may be circumscribed, if indeed it can be limited. Upon this principle,fir, the fame power is given to thekgiflaturr—they will poflefsall powers not express ly excepted. If the President has all executive powers which are no,t expressly excepted, I do not know that there can be a more arbitrary government. The President, I conceive, will have all the power ot a monarch ; and the legiflatureall the powers of the most sovereign legislation. This I take to be a clear and necessary de duction from the principle on which the clause in the bill is founded- The President is limited in the appointment of ambaf ljdors,confuls, judges,and all other officers, and in making treaties. In these he is expressly limited, and no turther. Take from him these, and give him all other executive powers, as exercited in • monarchy, and fee what they will be. There are a!fo eXcep t '.oivs *o the legislative power ; tuch as that thev shall not tor a time prohibit the importation of slaves; that direct taxes (hall not be i-i id, but in a certain mode ; that taxes (hall be uniform ; '.it *.h( 'v shall grant no titles ot nobility, &c. Ihefe are the 1 xcepti.ins to the legislative : Now givethem all the powers of the parliament of Great-Aritein, and what kind of government will you have ? I can not describe it. It appears to me absolute and a$ extentive as any despotism. It you go once beyond the boundaries of the constitution where ran you draw a line with any precision ? and with what fafety to liberty canthe doctrine of thisclaufe be tupported. I understand our system different in its form and !pir:t from all other govern ments in the world. It is in part national and partly federal ; and though it is moreextenfivc in its powers than most other confedera ted governments, vet the Congrcfs is not to be compared to nati onal k giflatures.—To these, general powers aregranted, some with and some without any particular reservations in tavour of the body of the people'; and to those only will the gentleman's reasonings apply.—Here is no analogy.—This is * government constituted for particular purposes only ; and the Dowers which the people have thought proper to grant are tpecifically enumerated, and dis posed of among the various branches, if thete powers are inef ficient, or if they are improperly difttibuted, it is not our tauh, nor within our power to remedy. —The people must grant further power ;—organize those already granted in a more perte£t mannei, or fuilcr from the deteCt. Wc can neither enlarge nor modity them. vSir, this was the ground on which the friends of the govern ment have fupportrd it ;it was a fate ground,and I venture to la\ that it would not have been tupported on any other. In the State from which I came, it its advocates had not maintained this prin ciple, it would never have been ratified. Mr. White then read a part of the ratification by Virginia, in support of this afTertion. Sir, said he, how far the eftabli'hment of the principle con tended for may affect the completion of our Union, I will not undertake to fay : I will only remark that the State of North-Ca rolina has exprefled nearly the fame ientynents as Virginia, this difference, that Carolina would not adopt the constitution tnl it was Satisfied of this principle, that we could not by construc tive a£ts enlarge our powers, in order at a future day to dellioy the State governments, and with them the liberties ot the people, Sir, I could likewifc fugged to gentlemen the local situation ot that country. It is contiguous to kentuckey, which united to Carolina, form a territorv of amazing extent from the Atlantic to the banks of the Ohio. 'The people qf this trad are in such a situ ation as that, a single spark from this house would kindle a flame which it would be difficult if not impoflible to extinguifli ; and excite such a dread as would render them utterly irreconcilcable to our government. Sir, this is not a vain because the oppofers of the constitution founded their arguments upon it—They contended that you would make conftruitions in your favor, and atTume powers not intended to be vested in you by the people. I with, Sir, my apprehensions may be ill founded, and contradicted by the.event. The measure proposed, I acknowledge, is advocated by refpi ftnble friends to the Union within these doors, and by many without. But I believe much of this arifesfrom the clause in question conferring the power on a m an > whom all the world admires, and who they kilowwill not abufeit. But, Sir, on this occasion I forget who is President ; but I do not # forget that the worst of precedents are often cftablifhed in the best of turns. We may give the power to a particular man in office, because he will not abHie it: but we cannot take away that power from those who [Published on IV td/iefday and Saturday.] may fuccced him. Ido not mean to irifer from this, thai if the constitution had vested the power in the President, it would be improper he should have it. That is a question which I will not undertake to determine. It is unneccflary ; the true question be fore us being (imply a constitutional one. Without entering into a detail of the evili that may arise, as gentlemen have df>ne on both fides of the Houfej let us consider whether the greater evil will rtot arise from our explaining the con stitution at this time; Is there any neceflity for it ? If the condi tion has given the power to the President, can he not exercise it without our paflingan a&on the fubjett ? Will not the clause be useless ? It the constitution has not given it him, shall we go be yond the limits that are set usjin order to extend it to him ? I hope not. But it seems to be a doubtful point : Some think he has the power ; others not. Then, Sir, I would leave the construc tion to himfelf. If it should become necefTary to exercise the power, let him do it : The Occasion for the exercise of it will be a better comment than any we can give—lt will better explain it o the people, and reconcile them to it more perfectly than any law from the legislature* It the neceflity of the cafe compel him td exercise the power, even if wrong, the people will acquiesce. I will give you an ex ample, Sir: In Virginia, when the operations of the war requir ed exertions ot the chief magistrate, beyond the authority of the law, our late governor Nelson, wliofe name must be dear to eve ry triend to liberty, was obliged to iflue his warrants and impress supplies for the army. Though it was known that he exceeded his authority,- his warrants were executed ; his country was be nefited by this resolute measure, and he himfelf afterwards in demnified by the legiftature. Sir, I do not wish to encourage adts of this kind, but I lay it Would be better for the executive to assume the exercise of such a power on extraordinary occasions, than tor us to delegate to him an extraordinary power to be cx ercifed on all occasions; Some gentlemen have supposed that the constitution has made no provilion for the removal of officers; and they have called it an omitted caie, and a detect. They ask, if we inay not supply that defetk ? I answer, no. For if we can make any pofltble al teration, we may go on and make the constitution just what we please. But as a further anfvrer, I fay, it is not an omitted cale. F r the constitution havingdirefctcd by whom officers lhall be ap pointed, it does diredl alio by whom they (hall be removed. Ti.at doctrine was so well supported by a gentleman yefterdav, that I will not repeat. Sir, this must have been in the contemplation ok the gentlemen who formed the constitution. Is it probable that ihey never thought about the maimer in which an officer should be displaced ? When they provided that the judges ihould hold their offices during good behaviour, did they not intend that all others should be held during pleasure ? It is not then an omitted cafe. Gentlemen have supposed that the Prefid<*it may suspend, an.d that as he has a right to make a temporary ippointment, he has also a right to make a temporary removal. 1 think he has so, as it is correspondent with his power of appointing. But it has been said that it the concurrence of v the Senate is ncceffary, they may retufe to concur when a removal is necefTary.- Sir, it you are to» suppose that ihe government cannot be executed in its piefent form, there is no leinedy for such a misfortune; but we arc not to luppoie it—We are to presume that the Senate will do their du ty —You may go on without end in supposing. You may lup-* po£e that the JPrefident may not do what is rignt—You may even suppose that this House will not do what is rightr What is the contequcilce ? Why, our constituents must bear with us nil they have an opportunity for a remedy. But ihall we* becarufe the Senate may do wrong, give the Present a power ta att without them. We may as well, Sir, if the Senate retufe to concur m a favorite bill ot this Houle, proceed to pass the law without them. But it has been asked, whether a person in the elevated station ot* Piefident would probably abuse histruft? I presume he will not j neither do I ptefuine the Senate wilL A gentleman, Sir, in order to get over the obje&ions made to» the clause, had recurred to that part of the constitution, which lays, that Congress may bylaw vest the appointment ot inferior officers iu the President, in the courts of law, or heads of depart ments, and has interred that he is to be considered himfelt the head and center of all those departments. This comes from one whom I always hear with pleasure, on account of his found rea son and perspicuity of exprcflion, But, Sir, I must differ with him. Who are the heads of departments? We have a secretary for foreign affairs; another of the treasury,