Remaind roj Wedntjduy-s Debate.
But, Sir, another lpecies of argument has been
urged againlt the claufe—lt has been laid that it
is improper or at lealt unneceflary to come to any
decillon on the lubjedt. It has been laid that it will
be officious in this branch cf the legislature to"
expound the conllitution, so far as relates to
tliediviiion of power between the President and
Senate. Sir, it is undoubtedly of as much im
portance to thjs branch as to any other, that the
constitution Ihould be preserved entire : It is our
duty as well as interejl to take care that its prin
ciples be adhered to. A breach of the conllitu
tiou in one point may lead toabreachin another.
A breach in this point may destroy that equilibri
um in the government, by which this House
maintains its Share of authority.—l do not think
we can be charged with officious interference, as
this bill before it can have effect, is to be Submit
ted to both those branches who are particularly
intercfted in it. The Senate may negative it—
The President may objedt to it.
Sir, an objection Strongly urged is, that the
legislature itfelf has 210 right to expound the
constitution ; that whenever its meaning is doubt
ful, you mult leaye it undecided till the judiciary
Shall be called on to declare its meaning. I con
ceive, that in the ordinary coutfe of things, the
exposition of the conllitution devolves on the ju
diciary. But I beg toknow 011 what principle it
can be contended that any one department de
rives from the conllitution greater powers than
another, in declaring what are the true limits of
the conllitution. We have a great charter which
afligns certain great boundariesand fences to the
Several departments of government; if these conr
ftitutional boundaries be brought into quellion,
I cannot conceive why any one of those inde
pendent branches has npt a right to exprel's its
sentiments.
This is perhaps an omitted cafe ; there is no
one government that I know of, in which provi
sion is made for a particular authority to deter
mine the great conftitutionaj limits, and the great
division or power between the branches ot go
vernment. In all systems there are points which
must be fettled by the branches theinfelves, and
to which no other power is competent. If they
cannot be, there is no resource left, but the will
of the community to be colle<fted, cither by the
mode which our conllitution provides, or by a
mode dictated bynecelfity. It is therefore a fair
quellion before us, whpthertjie great point may
not as well be decided by the whole legillaturc as
by a part —by us, as well as by the executive or
the judiciary. As it will be equally conllitution
al,it canrtot belefs fafe that the explanation Should
come from the legillature, particularly as it com
prehends all those branches whose powers can
be effected by it ; belides, Sir, Ido not fee, how
the queltipn could be brought before the judges
were the right of determining alfignedto them.
If there is any part of the government from
which an opinion on this capital point can come
with lingular advantage, it is this house, who be
ing not so immediately interelled can form their
opinion, and express their sense with less bias
than any other. My conclulion from these re
flections is, that the clause is perfedly constitu
tional ; that it exprefles the meaning of the con
llitution as a fair conltruction mull explain it,
and that it is not only conlillent with liberty, but
more favorable to. it than any other poilible in
terpretation.
Mr. Gerry was clearly of opinion with the
gentleman last on the floor, that it was of impor
tance to decide the quellion on its true princi
ples. He declared that he Ihould be ready to op
pose every encroachment of the legillature 011
the jull rights of the executive. He considered
hin.Self bound not only by an oath, but by an o
bligation equally Strong, that of honor. Gen
tlemen had laboured to prove the conlliturion
ality ps the clause. —He said he had lillened to
the;r arguments, and was convinced that the
clause was as mconfiltent with the conllitution as
anv fee of wprds which could be inserted in the
bill.
There appeared to be two questions. One,
whether the people had delegated to the govern
ment at all the power of dilinilfing at pleasure.
The other was, to whom it belonged As to the
firlt, he agreed that the power had been delegat
ed. It seemed to be proved by the arguments of
the gentlemen, that otherwise the clause in the
constitution respecting the judges was nugatory.
As to the Second quellion, it was agreed that the
power mull reft in some department. He believed
that gentlemen in Support of the clause would
agree that the house did not poilefs the power,any
more than the judges—lt lay therefore either with
the President, or the President and Senate: And
if so, it appeared to him, that the clause in ei
ther cafe was nfelels.—For if the Senate would
a (lent to the clause when sent up by the House,
they would aflent to the provifton contained in it
when the President Ihould exercise it. If the Se
nate thought the power ought to be veSted in the
supreme executive, they would freely confentto
his using it; if not, they would re ject this clause.
11l either cale {he clause was nugatory.
Mr. Gerry argued that by the operation of the
clause there would be a claffiing of powers, and
some which the Senate were allowed to pollefs
would be rendered of no efte<ft. Their power of
appointment would be defeated in its object, by
the power of the Prelident to remove ; and the
power of judging on impeachments, would be
rendered vain by the power of difiniffing ; for
a power of judging implied a power of acquittal,
which would in its operation, be totally infigni
ficajir, if the President could immediately dis
place an ofliccr whom they had judged and de
clared innocent.
He infilled that as to the danger of abuses, the
remedy againll them,which had been mentioned,
that is, the power of impeaching the President if
he difiuifled a good man, involved an absurdity.
How could the House impeach the Prefident,when
they had declared that he could lawfully do as he
pleased ? Would they impeach him for exercising
a difcrpticn which they had given him in a molt
unlimited manner ?
If the legislature gave him an unlimited con
troul over all officers, he would have, he faid,the
absolute controul over the treasury. We might
as well give him the appropriation of monies ;
for it would be of little consequence to make
laws, when the President by looking at an officer,
could make it his intcreft to break that law. It
must be expected that from this general controul,
there would rife up a government of revenue in
llead of a government of Jaws. It would be easy
for the President to cover all his crimes by an
application of the revenue to those who were his
judges, and such an application would certainly
be made, in cafe of a corrupt President ; and cor
ruption in him was what it was necellary to guard
againll,
Mr. Gerry further observed, that giving the
President the power to remove, would virtually
give him a considerable power of appointment,
independent of the Senate; for if the Senate
ffiould rejedt his favorite, and agree to his nomi
nation of one less agreeable to him, he might
immediately remove the latter on the recefsof
the Senate, and introdnce the favorite ; for the
conltitution had veiled him expressly with the
power of appointing in the recess of the Senate.
It had been observed, he said, that this was a
cafe omitted ; and that Congress had a power of
supplying thedefedt— But they ought to consider
on what ground they Hood. An attempt to sup
ply such a cafe might appear an attempt at an
amendment to tUp conltitution. The fyltcin had
provided a mode of making amendments—The
legislature could pursue that alone. Any attempt
to obtain amendments in another form, would
be a high crime and mifdeineanor; perhaps some
thing worse. Gentlemen, he said, appeared to
be leading them 011 to what might be deemed
treason agailt the conltitution. The lyltem, it
could not be denied, was in many parts obfeure
and unintelligible. Ifit was once determined that
Congress might explain and declare what the con
ltitution was, it could not be denied that they
could change it at pleasure. This obfeurity had
been one of the great arguments againll accept
ing it. It had been urged that it was remarka
bly obfeure—lt was indeed, he said, moll ftudi
cdly obfeure. By this very a<ft, the House were,
he afierted, ailumiug a power to form a conltitu
tion. If the people of the United States suppo
sed that it is in the power of the legislature to
give conltruCtions to the conltitution, they would
revolt from it. Ihe idea of the legislature ha
ving a right to make any alterations in the con
ltitution was repugnant to the feelings of every
freeman, and to the principles of the revolution.
He then took notice of the argument that the
legillative and executive ought to be kept dif
tinift; and asked what department the Senate was,
when acting with the President ? clearly an exe
cutive one. If so, the argument fell to the ground.
—If they acted as legislative, it would be absurd.
They were a conllitutional council to the Presi
dent, and were completely executive.
If the power was veiled in the Senate, it had
been said the executive would be a two-headed
monlter; but it was already a two-headed mon
ster, and if it was the delire of gentlemen to
make it less monstrous, it ought to be made a
confdlent monller. He thought it would be mon
llrous indeed to give the Senate the power of ap.
pointing, and deprive them of that power of
difmifling officers.
He concluded with aliening that the clause in
debate was useless and unueceflary, and incon
sistent with the conllitution. It was an officious
interpolition of the House in a bufmefs which did
not properly come before it.
Mr. Benson supposed there was a power in
the legislature of supplying the omission in the
conllitution, and determining by what power
officers fliould be removed.—The conllitution
had given the power to the government general
ly to remove at pleasure : for it could not be ra
tionally contended that all offices ffiould be held
during good behaviour.
Could the gentleman be serious, he afkedy
when he fuggellecl that this was a cafe to be pro
posed to a convention of the people for an amend
ment to the conllitution ? Did die gentleman
suppose that when ever a doubt arofc reject,-,,*
any part ot the conllitution, it Ihould be refer"
a convention, aud th at the different doub>t
of different individuals should aH be fettled in
this way f Did he suppose that no part of the
conllitution was to be taken by conftrinSion ►
It was unqueilionable, he said, that no confix'
tion or law could pollibly be formed which would
not involve the necessity of conftruAion.
Mr. Benson proceeded to provethe impropri
ety of veiling the power in the Senate, by shew
ing the difficulty and embarrassments which
would refuk. He would put the cafe ofthe offi
cer to which the bill related. To him were to
be committed the negociations with foreign mi
nillers ; a very delicate trull. The supreme ex
ecutive, in controuling this department, would
frequently be obliged to acft on suspicion, and
that of the inoft delicate kind, and the circum
flances on which it was founded, not proper to
be explained. He would be in a situation which
would render it improper to make ufeoftheevi
deuces of his fufpicion—Was'it to be supposed
then that the Senate would implicitly submit to
his will and his proposal. They would not; they
would certainly require the reasons. Suppose
he should tell them that he fufpe<fted the man's
fidelity, they mull then proceed fafther and in
fill on a full communication. Was it not to be
supposed that this officer would have at leafl one
friend in the Senate, who would contend for a
hearing, and a fair trial ? The President was then
to be the complainant, and a subordinate officer
the defendant; and the Senate would fit in judg
ment between the chief magillrateof the United
States, and one ot his officers. He begged gen
tlemen to tell him if this absurd scene looked like
good government. In every inilance of a propo
rtion tor removal, on account of incapacity, or
any other cause, an enquiry would take place,
for a man would always have some friend to de
mand this in his favor. All tliefe inconvenien
ces "would be done away by giving the President
the power to remove the officer.
One argument, llrongly urged, he said, was,
that the fame power which appoints, Ihould have
the right to remove. But a dillin<ftion properly
took place here. If the President and Senate
were to be confidercd as one body deliberating
together in the business of appointments, and if
the appointment itfelf was their joint ast, and
each individual had aright tomake propositions,
the reasoning might hold good. But on the con
trary, they a<fted as diflinA bodies; the Senate
had only a Ample negative or affirmative ; and no
member had a power to offer an original propor
tion— I he moment this simple principle was de
viated from, the power in the Senate which was
only intended as a check, would become an ori
ginal authority, and the executive department
would be split, divided, and diflratfted.
But it had been proposed that the President
should have the power of suspending. What
would be the consequence of this ? If the Senate
should 011 their convening reflorethe officer, the
President would have a man forced on him whom
he considered as unfaithful, and who was disa
greeable to him ; a man who was properly his
meer instrument. How would business be con
ducted ? What communication—what confidence
could exist between the President, and the re
inflated officer ? The executive administration
would become impracticable ; it would be made
up ol discordant materials, and its operations
would be f'ubjeJt to perpetual divisions and jar
ring—ln short, it appeared to him indifpcnfiblf,
to the exercise of the authority which theconfti
ution had veiled in the President, that he should
have the power of removal; and he was convin
ced that the liberties ofthe people would not de
rive a particle of additional security from re
training or witliolding any part of this power.
Mr. Smith (S. C.) entered into a general re
ply to the arguments in favour of theclaufe, and
was anfwerecl by Mr. Vining. This concluded
the business of Wednesday.
[Being unavoidably prevented from attending the debates on Wcintjwp
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TWENTY-SIX
LETTERS,
upon INTERESTING SUBJECTS,
RESPECTING THE REVOLUTION or AMERICA.
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By his Excellency JOHN ADAMS,
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