Remaind roj Wedntjduy-s Debate. But, Sir, another lpecies of argument has been urged againlt the claufe—lt has been laid that it is improper or at lealt unneceflary to come to any decillon on the lubjedt. It has been laid that it will be officious in this branch cf the legislature to" expound the conllitution, so far as relates to tliediviiion of power between the President and Senate. Sir, it is undoubtedly of as much im portance to thjs branch as to any other, that the constitution Ihould be preserved entire : It is our duty as well as interejl to take care that its prin ciples be adhered to. A breach of the conllitu tiou in one point may lead toabreachin another. A breach in this point may destroy that equilibri um in the government, by which this House maintains its Share of authority.—l do not think we can be charged with officious interference, as this bill before it can have effect, is to be Submit ted to both those branches who are particularly intercfted in it. The Senate may negative it— The President may objedt to it. Sir, an objection Strongly urged is, that the legislature itfelf has 210 right to expound the constitution ; that whenever its meaning is doubt ful, you mult leaye it undecided till the judiciary Shall be called on to declare its meaning. I con ceive, that in the ordinary coutfe of things, the exposition of the conllitution devolves on the ju diciary. But I beg toknow 011 what principle it can be contended that any one department de rives from the conllitution greater powers than another, in declaring what are the true limits of the conllitution. We have a great charter which afligns certain great boundariesand fences to the Several departments of government; if these conr ftitutional boundaries be brought into quellion, I cannot conceive why any one of those inde pendent branches has npt a right to exprel's its sentiments. This is perhaps an omitted cafe ; there is no one government that I know of, in which provi sion is made for a particular authority to deter mine the great conftitutionaj limits, and the great division or power between the branches ot go vernment. In all systems there are points which must be fettled by the branches theinfelves, and to which no other power is competent. If they cannot be, there is no resource left, but the will of the community to be colle<fted, cither by the mode which our conllitution provides, or by a mode dictated bynecelfity. It is therefore a fair quellion before us, whpthertjie great point may not as well be decided by the whole legillaturc as by a part —by us, as well as by the executive or the judiciary. As it will be equally conllitution al,it canrtot belefs fafe that the explanation Should come from the legillature, particularly as it com prehends all those branches whose powers can be effected by it ; belides, Sir, Ido not fee, how the queltipn could be brought before the judges were the right of determining alfignedto them. If there is any part of the government from which an opinion on this capital point can come with lingular advantage, it is this house, who be ing not so immediately interelled can form their opinion, and express their sense with less bias than any other. My conclulion from these re flections is, that the clause is perfedly constitu tional ; that it exprefles the meaning of the con llitution as a fair conltruction mull explain it, and that it is not only conlillent with liberty, but more favorable to. it than any other poilible in terpretation. Mr. Gerry was clearly of opinion with the gentleman last on the floor, that it was of impor tance to decide the quellion on its true princi ples. He declared that he Ihould be ready to op pose every encroachment of the legillature 011 the jull rights of the executive. He considered hin.Self bound not only by an oath, but by an o bligation equally Strong, that of honor. Gen tlemen had laboured to prove the conlliturion ality ps the clause. —He said he had lillened to the;r arguments, and was convinced that the clause was as mconfiltent with the conllitution as anv fee of wprds which could be inserted in the bill. There appeared to be two questions. One, whether the people had delegated to the govern ment at all the power of dilinilfing at pleasure. The other was, to whom it belonged As to the firlt, he agreed that the power had been delegat ed. It seemed to be proved by the arguments of the gentlemen, that otherwise the clause in the constitution respecting the judges was nugatory. As to the Second quellion, it was agreed that the power mull reft in some department. He believed that gentlemen in Support of the clause would agree that the house did not poilefs the power,any more than the judges—lt lay therefore either with the President, or the President and Senate: And if so, it appeared to him, that the clause in ei ther cafe was nfelels.—For if the Senate would a (lent to the clause when sent up by the House, they would aflent to the provifton contained in it when the President Ihould exercise it. If the Se nate thought the power ought to be veSted in the supreme executive, they would freely confentto his using it; if not, they would re ject this clause. 11l either cale {he clause was nugatory. Mr. Gerry argued that by the operation of the clause there would be a claffiing of powers, and some which the Senate were allowed to pollefs would be rendered of no efte<ft. Their power of appointment would be defeated in its object, by the power of the Prelident to remove ; and the power of judging on impeachments, would be rendered vain by the power of difiniffing ; for a power of judging implied a power of acquittal, which would in its operation, be totally infigni ficajir, if the President could immediately dis place an ofliccr whom they had judged and de clared innocent. He infilled that as to the danger of abuses, the remedy againll them,which had been mentioned, that is, the power of impeaching the President if he difiuifled a good man, involved an absurdity. How could the House impeach the Prefident,when they had declared that he could lawfully do as he pleased ? Would they impeach him for exercising a difcrpticn which they had given him in a molt unlimited manner ? If the legislature gave him an unlimited con troul over all officers, he would have, he faid,the absolute controul over the treasury. We might as well give him the appropriation of monies ; for it would be of little consequence to make laws, when the President by looking at an officer, could make it his intcreft to break that law. It must be expected that from this general controul, there would rife up a government of revenue in llead of a government of Jaws. It would be easy for the President to cover all his crimes by an application of the revenue to those who were his judges, and such an application would certainly be made, in cafe of a corrupt President ; and cor ruption in him was what it was necellary to guard againll, Mr. Gerry further observed, that giving the President the power to remove, would virtually give him a considerable power of appointment, independent of the Senate; for if the Senate ffiould rejedt his favorite, and agree to his nomi nation of one less agreeable to him, he might immediately remove the latter on the recefsof the Senate, and introdnce the favorite ; for the conltitution had veiled him expressly with the power of appointing in the recess of the Senate. It had been observed, he said, that this was a cafe omitted ; and that Congress had a power of supplying thedefedt— But they ought to consider on what ground they Hood. An attempt to sup ply such a cafe might appear an attempt at an amendment to tUp conltitution. The fyltcin had provided a mode of making amendments—The legislature could pursue that alone. Any attempt to obtain amendments in another form, would be a high crime and mifdeineanor; perhaps some thing worse. Gentlemen, he said, appeared to be leading them 011 to what might be deemed treason agailt the conltitution. The lyltem, it could not be denied, was in many parts obfeure and unintelligible. Ifit was once determined that Congress might explain and declare what the con ltitution was, it could not be denied that they could change it at pleasure. This obfeurity had been one of the great arguments againll accept ing it. It had been urged that it was remarka bly obfeure—lt was indeed, he said, moll ftudi cdly obfeure. By this very a<ft, the House were, he afierted, ailumiug a power to form a conltitu tion. If the people of the United States suppo sed that it is in the power of the legislature to give conltruCtions to the conltitution, they would revolt from it. Ihe idea of the legislature ha ving a right to make any alterations in the con ltitution was repugnant to the feelings of every freeman, and to the principles of the revolution. He then took notice of the argument that the legillative and executive ought to be kept dif tinift; and asked what department the Senate was, when acting with the President ? clearly an exe cutive one. If so, the argument fell to the ground. —If they acted as legislative, it would be absurd. They were a conllitutional council to the Presi dent, and were completely executive. If the power was veiled in the Senate, it had been said the executive would be a two-headed monlter; but it was already a two-headed mon ster, and if it was the delire of gentlemen to make it less monstrous, it ought to be made a confdlent monller. He thought it would be mon llrous indeed to give the Senate the power of ap. pointing, and deprive them of that power of difmifling officers. He concluded with aliening that the clause in debate was useless and unueceflary, and incon sistent with the conllitution. It was an officious interpolition of the House in a bufmefs which did not properly come before it. Mr. Benson supposed there was a power in the legislature of supplying the omission in the conllitution, and determining by what power officers fliould be removed.—The conllitution had given the power to the government general ly to remove at pleasure : for it could not be ra tionally contended that all offices ffiould be held during good behaviour. Could the gentleman be serious, he afkedy when he fuggellecl that this was a cafe to be pro posed to a convention of the people for an amend ment to the conllitution ? Did die gentleman suppose that when ever a doubt arofc reject,-,,* any part ot the conllitution, it Ihould be refer" a convention, aud th at the different doub>t of different individuals should aH be fettled in this way f Did he suppose that no part of the conllitution was to be taken by conftrinSion ► It was unqueilionable, he said, that no confix' tion or law could pollibly be formed which would not involve the necessity of conftruAion. Mr. Benson proceeded to provethe impropri ety of veiling the power in the Senate, by shew ing the difficulty and embarrassments which would refuk. He would put the cafe ofthe offi cer to which the bill related. To him were to be committed the negociations with foreign mi nillers ; a very delicate trull. The supreme ex ecutive, in controuling this department, would frequently be obliged to acft on suspicion, and that of the inoft delicate kind, and the circum flances on which it was founded, not proper to be explained. He would be in a situation which would render it improper to make ufeoftheevi deuces of his fufpicion—Was'it to be supposed then that the Senate would implicitly submit to his will and his proposal. They would not; they would certainly require the reasons. Suppose he should tell them that he fufpe<fted the man's fidelity, they mull then proceed fafther and in fill on a full communication. Was it not to be supposed that this officer would have at leafl one friend in the Senate, who would contend for a hearing, and a fair trial ? The President was then to be the complainant, and a subordinate officer the defendant; and the Senate would fit in judg ment between the chief magillrateof the United States, and one ot his officers. He begged gen tlemen to tell him if this absurd scene looked like good government. In every inilance of a propo rtion tor removal, on account of incapacity, or any other cause, an enquiry would take place, for a man would always have some friend to de mand this in his favor. All tliefe inconvenien ces "would be done away by giving the President the power to remove the officer. One argument, llrongly urged, he said, was, that the fame power which appoints, Ihould have the right to remove. But a dillin<ftion properly took place here. If the President and Senate were to be confidercd as one body deliberating together in the business of appointments, and if the appointment itfelf was their joint ast, and each individual had aright tomake propositions, the reasoning might hold good. But on the con trary, they a<fted as diflinA bodies; the Senate had only a Ample negative or affirmative ; and no member had a power to offer an original propor tion— I he moment this simple principle was de viated from, the power in the Senate which was only intended as a check, would become an ori ginal authority, and the executive department would be split, divided, and diflratfted. But it had been proposed that the President should have the power of suspending. What would be the consequence of this ? If the Senate should 011 their convening reflorethe officer, the President would have a man forced on him whom he considered as unfaithful, and who was disa greeable to him ; a man who was properly his meer instrument. How would business be con ducted ? What communication—what confidence could exist between the President, and the re inflated officer ? The executive administration would become impracticable ; it would be made up ol discordant materials, and its operations would be f'ubjeJt to perpetual divisions and jar ring—ln short, it appeared to him indifpcnfiblf, to the exercise of the authority which theconfti ution had veiled in the President, that he should have the power of removal; and he was convin ced that the liberties ofthe people would not de rive a particle of additional security from re training or witliolding any part of this power. Mr. Smith (S. C.) entered into a general re ply to the arguments in favour of theclaufe, and was anfwerecl by Mr. Vining. This concluded the business of Wednesday. [Being unavoidably prevented from attending the debates on Wcintjwp l"JI, rue are inileht d to Me Daily Advertiser for theforegmV importance of thefubjeß to which t/ie\allude, wtll, uie trujl, apologM Jor the republication.— A. B.—Americanus. —Price Currenl— and mm\ oth fr articles omitted, will appear in our next. This Day is puHiJhed, (Prices/6) And tn be fold by Berry & Rogers, Hanover-Sijuarr, by Robert Hooct, Cornerof King and Oueen-Street, and by , the Edi tor .hereof; TWENTY-SIX LETTERS, upon INTERESTING SUBJECTS, RESPECTING THE REVOLUTION or AMERICA. Written in Holland in the Year M,DCC,L AAA. By his Excellency JOHN ADAMS, WHILE HE WAS SOLE MINISTER PI.E N 1 FOT £HT IA R Y f R nNI THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FOR NEGOCIATINR A PEACE, AND A TREATY OF COJ!ME»C J > WITH GREAT-BRITAiy. A'ever before publijlied. r Complete fctts from the beginning, of the GAZETTE OF ' UNITED STATES, mix at any time be obtained by those v)ho chvfc fubferibe for that publication, at the Editor's Office, fio. 9> Mai™"' Publiflicd by JOHN FENNO, No. 9, MaiP£>'" Lan s, near the Ofvcego-Uarket, NiW-YoRR. —f r - er> 'J
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