be annually ele&ed, and displaced for certain crimcs,:vS negle£tor duty. ' Mr. Stone (Maryland) considered it the duty of the House to determine on the question. He was oppoied to the leaving it so; the decision ot a court of law or any other power than the legisla ture. When the qneftion was brought forward, his mind, he said, wa in doubt. He had reflected upon it, and had formed an opinion which was entirely fatisla£tory to himfelf. He thought thatevery officer should be immoveable by the power that appointed him. Jt was in the very nature of things. The power ot appointment ?rofe from a powerover the fubjett on which the officer was to ast ; it was founded on an inttreft which the principal posT fled in the tranfa&ions of his agent. Therefore in general, appointing offi cers appeared to be nothing more than authorizing agents for the dispatch of bufinefc. This was in his opinion an eltablifhed prin ciple, and it would operate from a Minister ot State down to a tide -waiter* The constitution, it had been admitted, recognized this principle, and it could not be denied but that when general appointments were made, they were during will and pleasure ; that where appointments weic made during good behavior, they were exceptions from the general rule, in which the cxercife of the creating power was limited. He would examine whence originated the power of Congress rcfpe&ing these offices. He presumed that if it was veftcd in Con grefsj by clear deduction from that inftrumcnt, to ere£fc depart ments,thr-t no gentleman would consent to diminish it, or rcftritt them in theexereife of it. The Congrcfs had power to levy and collett tiixcs. This would include to ellabhfh an office ot trea sury—to regulatecommerce with foreign nations, and with Indian tribes. This comprehended a power ofere6fing a board of trade, &c. and in order to carry these powers into execution, they were to make all laws neceflary to carry the constitution into efTefh Now it appeared to him that the eftabliihment of this department was clearly w ithin'ftie constitution, and that as Congress, in their Jegiflative capacity, had an interest in, and power ovef the whole affairs of the department, they might appoint and displace its of ficers. But again, the constitution had limited the legislature "with refpeft to appointments, and given them to the President and Senate. The question then wa? whether the Senate, having a ihare in appointing, did not possess the power of removal as inci dental to it. Mr. S:one asked, what qualities were necefTary for an appoint ment that were not requisite for difmifTing ? Information, impar tiality, and judgment in the business to be condu&ed. Were not the fame qualities neceflary in order to dismiss ? He was not able tofubferibe to the principle, that the executive in its nature com prehended a neceflary power of appointing or removing officers. Why did it imply it r* The appointment of officers lequiring qua lities which are neceflary to judge of the meritsof men—fothe dif mifTing them—to know what was necefTary for an executive offi cer—what for a judge, See. Thisknowlege was acquired by experience, and might belong to one body of men as well as another. In the nature of t!:in~s, therefore, there was no necefTiry connexion between the executive functions, and the power of removal. That body whieh could best judge of the qualities necefTary to tranfa6l business, were the most proper dilpoftrs of offices, and if it was contended that the executive magistrate was in the belt fitnation, and under the belt advantages to judge of these qualities, still this was a mere matter of fa6t, whicli might depend on circumltances ; and the nature of the office did not neceflarilv involve the capacity of 'lidding, or imply the power of exercising that judgment. Mr. Stone then took notice of the principles which had been contended tor, in another view, as it applied to the fnuation of other nations where a hereditary monarch was eftabliihed, who had a personal property in the government and administration, aud who was considered as the natural fountain of honor and of fice. It wasfuppofed that he had neceflarily the power of choo fmg and controling those who were to manage his property Eat this had no application to ourcountry, where the chief magistrate had nofpecicsot property in the government, and was not the master ; but the great fervantof the people. These circumitancci concurred to prove that the President of the United States had no natural right to be the sole judge of the mer its of officers ; and as tar as he could conclude from examining the constitution. it never intended to beflow itupon him. It therefore struck his mind that all coptroul of officers inde pendent of the agency of the Senate, was confined to the cafe of I'uch inferior officers, the appointment of which the constitution hid enabled the legislature to vest solely in him. It flru6t him al io that as to the power of pardoning, the President should be pre cluded from the exereife of this* power, in cafe where the Senate had convitted an offender. So that it appeared to him, that the Senate were a body to whom the constitution had given great weight in the executive scale, and in the administration of govern ment. In determining whether it was proper on the score of expedien cy to give the p wertothe President, or to him with the Senate, the degree or confidence which was to be placed in those bodies were to be considered : Was it more probable, he asked, that one man should do wrong, or that a number of men, chosen with equal care, and atting tinder the fame obligations, should do wrong ? Where were the greatest obstacles? Who would have the grcatcft objects to attain ? He concluded with proposing that the President should have the power of suspension, in order to remedy a difficulty which had been fuggefled in cafe of a rccefs of the Senate, when it became necefTary to punish i-n officer by removal. Mr. Madison : I feel the importance of the question before us, as our decision will be a permanent cxpofition of the constitu tion in this point, and as on this decision will depend, in a great degree, the genius and character of our government. On the de termination which will uow take place, will depend perhaps the preservation of the government on that equal balance which the constitution defigncd. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we weigh the fubje6l with the most cautious deliberation. I own to you, I feel an anxi ty on thi-s fubje£t. I feel anxious, becaufel am called on to give my voice on a question which may cfle£t the fundamental principles of the government. I3ut all that I can do on an occasion of this kind, is to weigh the argu ments which have been advanced 'on both fides, with an honest defireto discover the truth, and to form my opinion under the influence of an attachment to that spirit of liberty, which this con ititutioii is happily calculated to preserve. Several conftru£tiors have been put on the constitution, rela tive to the point in question. It has been contended that the power of difplacmgfrom office is fubje&to o legislative difcreti ori, which is to create and to modify.—At firft fight, Sir, this <lo6lrine appears considerably plausible. But wh n I consider that a prime object of the constitution was to maintain a marked diftin£ri«tn between the legislature, executive, «md judicial de partments. and when I consider that the legislature, on this principle of discretion, may transfer at their pleasure, powers from one department to another—that they may narrow the ex ecutive, confer new powers on the Senate, and enlarge the gene jal mr.fsoft eir own authority; when I consider the confequcn ces of this do&rine, and compare them with the true objects o! theco' ftitution, I own I cannot subscribe to it. Another do&rine, which has a very rcfpeftable patronage, is that when an officer is appointed, he can be removed only by im peachment, for some mifdemcanor in office. This would give a permanency to the executive system, which would be more in compatible with the genius of repubheanifm thnn any principle that could be advocated. The danger to liberty, the danger of despotism has never been found to spring so much from the diffi culty of procuring virtuous men to fill the officcs of government as the difficulty of displacing those who have been found un worthv of trull. If it be said that an officer when once appoint ed, should not be removed without a crime and eonvi&ion, I would be clad to know what security there would be for a faith rul administration of the government. —Every individual between the highest aud lowest link irt the long chain of executive magif racy, would find a security, which would gteatly relax his fide lity in the discharge of his duty. Ado&riiie which Hands most in opposition with the principle we have contended for, is, that the power to make appointments mplies in its own nature a power of removal as incidental to it. If nothing more was said in the constitution than that the Presi dent, with the Senate, should appoint officers, there would be forcein the observation, that the power of difmifling results from the power of appointing. But, Sir, there is another part of the onftitution as explicit as that on which the gentlemen found their doctrine : It is that which declares that the executive power lhall '»e vested in the Prefidcnt of the United States. The afl'ociation of the Senate with the President in the exercise of one particular executive function, is an exception to this gen-r il principle; and xceptions to general rules are ever taken ftri&ly. But there is still another part of the constitution. which in my judgment, clearly favors the conftruflion I give. The Prefidcnt is required, Sir, to take care that thelaws be faithfully executed. Ifthefaith ul execution of the laws be required at the hands of the executive magistrate, it should seem that in general the constitution mull have intended that he should have that species of power m all its extent, which is necessary toaccompliih the purposes of the de partment, and'to enable him toanfwer for their accomplishment. Now, if the officer, when once appointed, is not to depend tor his official exiftenceupon the Prefidcnt, but upon a diftiuft body, tor wherethere is a mutual negative, either alone can secure this dependence) I do not fee how the former can provide for the ex ecution of tlie laws. It is true, that by a circuitous mode he may obtain an impeachment, and gain the concurrence of the Senate ; but will not this deprive him of that controul which is essential to a refponfibilitv for the administration ? There is another maxim which ought to direst us in expounding the constitution. It is the opinion of all great civilians and po litical writers, that the great departments of government ought to he prefervedfeparatc and diftinft. That in anycafe wheretliey are blended together, it ought to be under special reftri&ions and guards. fhis is iaid down as essential to liberty. When there fore .we review the fcveral parts of the constitution, which provide that the legislative powers lhall be vested in two Houses, and the executive in a President, with certain exceptions, wemuft con clude that the intention of the constitution was, that these de partments should be kept perfectly separate, where they were not exprefjly mixed, and that we oughtto conftru6l the inftrumcnt in such a manner as to confound them as little as poflible. Sir, every thing which relates to the merits of the qucftion, as distinguished from a constitutional question, fecms to turn on the danger of such a power vt (led in the Prefidcnt. But when I con* fider the checks which will attend the President in the exercise of it, I confcTs, I feel no appreheniions. If there are any dangers incident to that power, th§y must belong to it wherever it exists, whether you place it in one body or another. I will not repeat what has been said with refpeflt to the mode of the Prefidcnt's cleft.ion, and the extreme improbability that any citizen will he lelefted from the common mass, who is not dift nguilhed by his virtue and worth. In this alone we have an unusual security for the faithful exercise of the power. But leaving that out of the question, let us confidcr the obligations and restraints he will feel when placcd in that exalted responsible station. Perhaps, as has been observed, the great danger arises from the continuance of un worthy men in office; but so is the fyftein contrived that though the President may be vested by la,w with a power of removal, he is restrained and prevented from continuing a corrupt officer. For if an unworthy man be not displaced by the supreme executive, the House of Representatives may at any time impeach him, and he may be removed in fpiteofthe Prefidcnt. But it is contended that the danger confiftsin this, that the President may remove from office a man whose merit requires that he Ihouldbe continued in it. Let us confidcr what motives he can have for such an abuse of pow er, and what will be the checks on him. In the fiift place, he himfelf will be impeachable for the wanton removal of a merito rious officer, and will himfelf be removed from his high trust. -Again, what can be his motive for displacing a worthy man? It must be with the expectation of filling the vacancy with some un worthy favorite. Can he accomplilh tlvis himfelf? Must he not conlblt the Senate? They may rcjeft the pcrfon he nominates. Sir, )e can have no security forfuccefsin his projects. The Senate will judge of them by the merits and character of the pcrfon removed ; and having been guilty of one obnoxious measure, he will him felf thereby fumifha check tf> his own delign : But let us confidcr the confeqnence. The injured man will be supported by the pub lic opinion. The community at large will take fide against the i relident—and combinations will be oroduccd which may effec tually prevent his re-election. To displace a man of high merit, an one who from his station may be supposed a man of extensive influence, will excite jealousies, and create an intereftcd oppositi on in the fyfbm, and in the people. He will have his friends, his dependents, and the public sympathy on his fide,' and if it should not give birth to an impeachment in the legislature, it would pro bably produce a fatal impeachment before the community at large Butfuppofe the perfccuted individual lliould not be able to ac complish t.ie object of his resentment in thi way, there are other modes in which he can be very troublesome to the President. Ii he has not influence enough to direst the vengeance of the who! community, in all probability he will be able to obtain appoint ments in one or the other branch of the legislature, and poir fling weight and talents, he will be able at least to give him confidera e dl<lu [ We have seen in the history of other nations, ex amples that.juftify the remark I now make. Though the preroga iveo t ie Bntifh King is great, and his resources of influence ex tenhve and commanding, there have been examples of his miin- Ms jcing opposed, and removed by the decision of one branch of nn(T fTf '. hlsbC the cafe wlth a hTedicary monarch, P? - nd ot luth hl S h Prerogatives, and furnilhed with such mean, ,I™' can we luppofe that a President of the United States, Ii .V ? Ur n on the popular voice,irapcach- ; V ' and not perhaps distinguished in point.of wea ior ptronal talent* from the head of the department him can we luppofe, I fay, that in drfianceof all these confldcra tions, lie will prcfume wantonly to dismiss a meritorious and vir tuous officer from his service? 1 own it is an abuse of power which exceeds my imagination, and of which I can form no ration.il conception But let us not contemplate the dangers onlv on one lide. V til this power m the Senate, jointly with the President, and in my opinion you destroy that great principle of refponlibili t>, which was intended so, the security ol liberty itfelf. Vrft the power m the President, the chain of dependence is this—The ol 'l, •m ? W .' ft grade, the officer ,of the middle and higher oeoole' T b ' aCP "' a ; n, 0n lhe President, and he again on the people— 1 he chain of security therefore terminates in the general community, who will possess,, in aid of tlieir great original pow t,o„rh,w!." Ve Cr ' Vn l at J rnpeach ment. Take the other fuppofi cin i h k P ° WCr ° U l !d r be veftcd in thc *<•'«»•> the prin o?w-r t o .Power to displace is necelfarily conneftcd with the The h'-.rl"r t T >ln; ' appointments may depend upon the headsoi departments—and they must tUt refore remove I fee re V fo ry nfibMTT P '^ nl Where lhall we find the refponfibilityi \\ here does it terminate? If you begin with an ml. nor officer, hejs dependent on his fupcrior, and'he again or 'frf"r c T :othe a permanent °V y , (• y ' the lingular mode ot their eleflion, existing in power wh CV b ri h a A* that poffeflts that portion of aristocratic ,r I I ! theconll,tut,on has Wifely eftablilhed. Shall we . nate rather than the whole community? For though Senators will not hold theiroffices for life, yet the fact is, that hey will not pofTcfs any responsibility whatever, which will make it lafeto trust them with such a power. Cut, Sir. what an afpeft will it give to the executive depart. ment? Infte3d of keeping it diiliiift from the legilLtive fer its bell powers to a bodvin which the conftitution'never'.ft' ed it ; you render the executive merely subservient to thr nil branch, you destroy its refponfttrility and defeat the purnof-, f which an executive was eftabhrtied. Sir, the laws cannot be « ecuted but by officers chosen lor the purpose; and the contm.i over the officers mud be in the executive power. If anv th doctrine be admitted, what is the consequence? certainlyV that you may go on with equal reason and let the Senate at head of the executive department. You may dcclare thai ?1I o ft" cers should hold their places during the pleasure of either brarrh of the legislature. And by this means you may link to-ethe branches which the preservation of liberty requires to be°ai ' ftantly feparatcd. [For the remainder ofWednefday's Debate, fee laji Page.'] Monday, June 22, 1789. The resolve which came down from the Senate, refp?6li n <r appropriation of the rooms in the federal hall—was read° 2 nd concurred. ' The order of the day being called for, the bill for eflablifl,. ing the department of foreign as rep »rt d from t - committee cf the whole, with the several amendments, were read and the amendments agreed to by the House. Mr. Carroll proposed aclaufeto limit the duration of the bill: Among other reasons for the motion, Mr. Carroll observed that he conceived the necelfity of such an officer would ceafeina (hort time, by reason of the gradual withdrawing of our inter course witli European countries; and in the course of a very few years all political connexion with thole powes will be at an end which would render the fitiblifoment a fuperfluous expencc. Mr. Pace feconcied the motion—and added, That he could not conceive the propriety of gentlemen, who were elected only for two years, wifhlnj to extend" the laws of their to a period beyond the time, when the use and design of fuchlaws should exist, and thus perpetuate the power and influence of the House. Mr. Ames opposed the addition of the clause as it would be unfavorable to the liability of government; and was lirtle better than infufmg a prematureprinciplc of mortality into the executive department. Mr. Gerry was in favor of a limitation : He supposed, that if the expiration of the bill was not provided for, at theprefent time, it would be extremely difficult to effe£l its rcdu&ion, when the officers of this department shall have formed connexions with foreign courts; and by means of those connexions, an extensive fphereof bufmefs uninteresting to the United States, (hall be created. The vote being taken, it patted in the negative. Mr. Benson proposed an amendment, which he conceived would more fully expfefs the sense of the committee, as itrefpe&ed the conllitutionality of the decision which had taken place: The amendment wa«, to flrike out in the second clause of the bill, these Words, u In cafe cf vacancy in the fiid office of Secretary of the i>l ted States \ for thr department of foreign affairs-" and toinfert in hen thereof the followin r, " Whenever thefaid principal officer, ffiall be removed by the President, or a vacancy in anyother way shall happen." I i is produced some debate, and the ayes and nays being called for, it was determined in the affirmative, as follow, viz. [ Meflieurs Ames, Baldwin, Benfon, Brouin, Burke, Car. | rot, Cixmer, Center, Fitzftmons, Gilman, Goodhue, Grijfin, Ayes qo. J Hartley, lleifler, Laurance. Lee, Leonard, Madison, . Moore, P. Muhlenberg, Scot, Sedgwick, Seney, Sinnick . fori. Smithy (Maryland), Sylvefler, Thatcher, Trumbull, Wadfworth. —Thirty. f Meflieurs Cadwallader, Coles, Gerry, Grout, Hathom, Nays 18 J Huntington, Livcrmore. Matthews, Page, Parker, Pat- I r2 dge, V a " RmfcUaer, Sherman, Smith, fS. C.) Sturgis, ISumpter, Tucker, White.—Eighteen. It was then moved to llrike out these words in the firfl clause, " removable by the President of the United States." The principal reason afiigned for firiking out these words was, that as the bill now Hands, it appears to be a grant of power; whereas it was presumed to he the sense of the committee, that the power was veiled in the President by the Constitution. A recapi tulation of arguments upon this point ensued, and the queflion was finally determined by ayes and nays.—Some gentlemen voted in the negative, supposing that retaining the words, would be an additional evidence of the sense of the House that the power was veiled in the President. f Meflieurs Ames, Baldwin, Benfon, Brown, Burke, j Cixmer, Coles, Gerry, Goodhue, Griffin, Grout, liathorn, Ayes 91 J Huntington, Leonard, Livermore, Madison, Matthews, , Moore, P. Muhlenberg, Page, Parker, Patridge. Van I Ranjellaer, Scot, Sherman, Stnnicfon, Smith, (S. C.) [.Sturgis, Sumpter, Vining, White.—Thirty-one. f Meflieurs Boudinot, Gidwallader, Carrol, Contee, Fitz- Nays jq J simons, Gilman. Hartley, Heifler, Laurance, Lee, Sher } man, Sedgwick, Seney, Sm'th, (Maryland), Sylvejler, L Thatcher, Trumbull, Tuckrr, Wadfworth. —Nineteen. I hefe addititional amendments being compleated, the bill ed to be cngrolfed for a third reading to-morrow. And then the House adjourned. Tuesday, June 23. The committee appointed for that purpose, brought in a bill 'or f-curing to authors and inventors the benefits of their refper tive publications and inventions—which was read and laid on the table. 1 he order of the day was then called for—and the engroffcd bill for eftablifliing an executive department, to be denominated the department of foreign affairs, was read a third time. Mr. Sumpter moved, that the final consideration of the bill mould be pollponed. Mr. White piopoled, that the bill should be re-committed to 1 committee of the whole, iu order that the other departments might be added, and one system formed, which {hould embracc the whole—this motion after a ffiort discussion was negatived. Mi Sumpter then renewed his motion for poflponement, and that the bill lhould lie on the table till to-morrow. —The vote upon this motion paflVd in the affirmative. Mr. Laurance moved, that the House should take into con udcration the amendments to the impost bill, which were yet to he decided—this motion was adopted.—And the enabling clause as amended by the Senate being read, which is in these words. Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives," &'• r ' 1 hatcher proposed, that <{ House of" should be mferted imme diately before Representatives—this motion was agreed to. The next amendment which the Senate had not receded from was, to llrike out the clause which makes a discrimination in the duty injpofed on distilled spirits imported from countries with whom the United States were in treaty, and from those with whom no treaties had been formed—lt was moved and seconded, that the Houfje should accede to the amendment : This produced an animated debate, m which many new observations occurred, and those which had been adduced in the former discussion, wer*- peated : The vote being taken, it palled in the negative—twen ty-five being in favor ot acceding, and twenty-seven againlt it. So the discrimination remains as it originally flood. The House then'adjourneded. It is a pleasing reflection, that the attention of Congress to pub lic bulinefs, has not been interrupted by any unfavorable incidents. It is near three months fmce the feflion commenced, and only one member has fallen sick—an evidence of the salubrity of the a. > and healthiness of the situation of this city.
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