[No. XXI.] THE table T. No. XXI. , . I.lamented that men will be making themfehes greaterfools " H turc intended theyJliouU be, by endeavoring to make them/elves jif BE jre fame minds that are naturally fa weak or wrong ■ -J that every attempt to improve them Iccms only to 1 ale their inherent fmperfeftions. When a man of this (tamp "Ta li to a labonous occupation, his mental crookedness and •f'J " so concealed, that he may be a fool all his life, withou. anv ftrikin? demonstrations of his folly. But ihould it so r« that he is born to better fortune, as he will call it, he will P1 aiveraine further and further from realon and propriety as ®° he lives We will iuppon his understanding to distort or adulterate every idea, noon which it is exercised. His discernment is so dcfe&ive, that rverv error, he adopts from prejudice or caprice, becomes a per octual one It is incrcdible what a mass of incongruous opinions, rod ill-formed images can enter into a finale mind, where there is not natural iagaeity to correct falfe impreflions by experience. But it may be supposed that these error-makinz people have an opportunity of acquiring ftich information, as results from feeing •he world, in walks of life that are fafhionable and elevated. Here it raav be expected they would adopt a juftcr way of thinking. The event however will prove otherwise. It mult be confeffed, t]iey sometimes have capacity to learn how to regulate their ex terior deportment, by some rules of lafhion and propriety ; though I have known instances, where their natural perverfenefe prevail ed even in this refpe&. To lay nothing more of their manners, we will turn our attention to the course of then sentiments. These, it will be found, are perpetually (luftuating, but never change for the better. If they are laughed out of some foibles, they are du ped into many vices and follies, and every new turn is worfc than the laA. Their want of penetration unavoidably dire&s them to a bad choice of examples. Truth always eludes them ; and their minds bccomc the receptacle of polite errors, inftcad of the liter ary ones I have been delcribing. Such men never judge right of anything they observe; and the Jess they fee, or the lets they know, the less deformed does their understanding appear. Wlfen foch men return from their travels, forthey probably will travel we can form no idea, without being in their company, wbat (illy and ufclefs psattlc they bring home. They determine noth ing by any tcft of intrinsic merit, and will run into an extravagance ofapplauicupon trifles too vain to be noticed ; while they deal in aaecdoles too improbable to be believed, or too urfinterefting to be regarded. Their indigeftcd opinions and half-ftattd fads con vince every pcrfon who fees them, that such wrong-headed, or weak-headed travellers encreafe their folly fafler than their infor mation. Where such an imbecility or obliquity of judgment is deeply root?tj io nature, 1 question whether it admits of any remedy. OMcurnymay hide it, but fludy and obfervationcan never improve it. SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS. h\kHwfe (/REPRESENTATIVES /A*UNITED STATES Wednesday, June 17, 1789. The qutftion, Whether the Secretary of Fmtign Affairs fliculd be re turnable by the President ? still under consideration. Mr. Ha&tle'y advocated the principle. He made some in troductory observations on the neccflity and importance of the office under consideration, and its intimate connexion with the executive department; and maintained that in whatever hands this department was placed, the ottice ought to beimmediately depen dent on, ardcontroulable by it. This was the policy of the con stitution, and was the pra&ice, he believed, of all nations with whom he was acquainted. It could not be confidercd an office held during good behaviour. The constitution had particularly pointea out those who held their places by this tenure; they were ■ 'le judges alone. He conceived that the gentleman trom South Carolina deviated widely from juil conftruftion, in ftippoftng that the clause refpeding impeachments extended to every office in the government. This principle would be inconvenient, mif chievousanddeftru&ivetoalldecifion in the administration. The fane gentleman had,he said, contended that every man had a pro perty in his office. This idea he hoped would never find ad vocates in this house. In Great-Britain it had prevailed to a pernicious degree. It wasthe practice there to give a man a pension who was removed f rom office, in consideration of the inter eft which he was deprived °f. He hoped we should never admit this corrupt and ruinous practice among us. The gentleman, he observed, had qucftioned the right of the legislature to make a conftrudion on the constitution, or in cafe it wasfilent, to supply the defeat.—He could not agree to this. The ■oftronect had expressly given it the power to make all laws recefiaryto carry the constitution intrt etfe&. If it was silent therefore, in any point ncccflary to be fettled, in order to put it in operation, the inference was clear, that Congress had a right to fopply the defefi. He concluded with Come observations to prove that the power wcuid be more fafely lodged with the President than the Senate, , that the conferring the power of removal on the Senate would j-cpnvcj the President of some of the most important executive it ions, which few as they were, ought not to fuffer the least diminution. Mr. Laurance observed, that it had been obje&ed against "C clause, that the powers which it vested were unconstitutional, 311 not only so but unnecefTarv, M the constitution rauft contain ,n >t.tlf somewhere the power under consideration which it had fjiun to some man or tody of men. And therefore that it was un - fiect ary (or a law to interfere, which could norther enlarge, di : lni '' or this power. If it was unconstitutional to give r o e . >rc ' l^ent i *1 VOv)4 only be because it had been vested in • ™e other body ; it had not been contended that the constitution vested it in the senate ; and otherwise it could not be with ccrtainty that be uucouftitutional for thclegi ore to declare that the President Ihould have it ; but the ob iw 3 ecnco^c &cd from the nature of that body who Hid n ?PP°' ntments > and from the clause in the constitution ja lr ,S 'ppcachments. The constitution he observed, declar lf thit 1 Jr®®* fiiould hold their officcs during good behavior, there U ° U asto an >' cfFeft, it certainly must imply that 01 ior UC [ ° ero ® cers who held their placcs during plcafure, good be! t ' me »or ofticers held their places during we I r wei c removenble only by impeachment, then »u c was ufclefs. The perfou have jtjifbehaved before WEDNESDAY, June 24, 1789. he could be impeached. But if he were infirm or incapable, he could not be impeached, but mufton this principle be perpetuated •n office. But it had been urged that we -were to fcek for the power of removal in\he nature of the authority which appointed. H re he would be willing to meet the gentleman, if it were necelfary to reft the cause on this point alone. He would a(k who, by the onftitution, had the power of appointing. It was true, it had iven the Senate an advisory power, but it had considered the ap pointment to be by the President. It had expressly defclared, that he (hould nominate and appoint, though their advice was rendered necelfary. This was given in the strongest language. ' he appointment was in the President, and in him (hould be al 'o the removal. But it had been obje&ed that it would be an ex tenfionof the executive power. This was not true ; or if there was any weight in the argument, it would apply against the rea soning of gentlemen in favour of veiling the power with the Pre sident and Senate conjointly. If it could be said, that the Prefi iident's functions and powers ought not to be extended, it could also be said that t'nofeof the Senate could not. The constitution he said was lilent on this fubjefl; it was also iilent refpedling the removal of those whole appointment it had enabled the legifiature to veil in the Piefidcnt, in the heads of departments or n the courts of law—but nothing about their re moval. Now the legifiature, having in pursuance of this autho rity, veftcd the power of appointing in the President, could the (.onftitution becarried intoeffett if the legifiature had no right to determine in whom the powcT of difmiifing Ihoulc reside ? What was the consequence? Why, in those cases, the power of remo val muftbe in the President, and the Congress mull, from the ne celfity of the thing have the right to determine this. Of course, in cases where the constitution had originally given the power of appointment to the President, he mull for the fake of consistency have the power of r?moval. Certainly noperfon would pretend that if the legifiature should give the President the sole power to appoint in certain cases, and there was no special limitation of the otftce, that he (hould not in those cases have the sole power to re move. Thus then, he said, stood the business. There was no ex press words prohibiting the power ; and all the ideas collected from inference pointed out the legality and propriety of investing the President with the power ; at Icaft they proved that he had every constitutional right to it, which the Senate, together with the President could claim. , This had, he said, been called a cafe omitted : But in omitted cases in which a certain provifionwas absolutely elfential to the acitniniftration, who was to make this provision and supply the defe£l ? Undoubtedly the legifiature. It was the only authority in any measure competent to it. Mr. Laura nce a(ked if any gentleman supposed that the pow er of expounding the constitution and of providing for the remo val from office could be more securely trailed to the wildom and integrity ot one branch of the legifiature than the whole; or if it would be more fatisfaftory to tnc people to have the power of displacing officers in the Senate than in the President? He said the people looked up to the legislature as their great security and the center of political wisdom. They naturally supposed that where any provisions were neceftary to be made, conftru£live and declarative of the constitution, that from this source, and this alone they ought to From all thcfc circum fiances, he conclu ded that the Congrcfs had the right, and that it was their duty to supply the deficiency in the constitution.—The fame constitution, which had given them the power of eftablilhing offices, had gi ven them a right of making all the particular provisions, whene ver the constitution was nlcnt, which were neceiTary to carry that general power into effett. In the contemplation of the constitution, he observed the heads :>f the executive departments were mere servants and aids of the President. He had the superintendence* the controul, and the nfpe£lion into their conduct. They were not only to perform the regular duties of their function, but, to aflift the President with their occasional council, and to answer all questions which he (hould put to them refpe&i'ng the execution of their offices. Thefecircuijiftances would give him such advantages of discove ring the secret delinquencies, the faults, the deficiency of abili ties or know lege of those whom he employed, that he alone could b-competent to an able excrcife of this authority. Under such :ircumftanccs, would gentlemen deprive him of the power of pursuing the; intereftso! the United States. But it had been urged, said Mr. Laurakce, that the trust cvas fubjett toabufes; that there might be wanton changes of of ficers, and revolutions in all the departments, on the acccffion o! "very new President.—He contended that changes were proper, when he who was the only judge' of their necef&ty thought them expedient. A new President ought to have the power on hisac ceffion, to bring forward those men, in whom he was sure he :ou!d place the highest confidence. Underthe guards and checks under which the chief mag-.ftrate acted, it whs to be presumed hat changes would not take place from capricious motives, but from principles of policy, and propriety. He said he did not make his calculations of the fafety of the ad ministration upon the merit of the present chief magistrate, whoft talents and virtues were the admiration of the world, but he had the heft grounds to ptefume, that no man would ever be elected to that exalted office, who had not given abundant proofsof his anilities, integrity, and other great qualities requilite for such a sta tion. He begged gentlemen to consider that the President was liable to impeaehmcnr, for ha\ ing difplaccd a good man who enjoyed the confidence of the people. But it was not proper he said to view the fubjeft on one fide alone—the difficulties on one fide as well those on another, ought to be contemplated.—He here mentioned the nece(fity, on the gentleman's plan, of the Senate being perpetually assembled, or of the President's convening them for the purpose of a removal, from the extremes of the continent. He instanced the cafe of a foreign minister negociating and intriguing to the injury of his country, who before a sentence of recal could be procured from the Senate, might have completed his machinations, and involved the republic in ruin. Mr. Jackson conceived this to be altogether a constitutional question. He was convinced of the neceflity of energy in the executive, but he was sure the liberties of the people deserved equal attention and care. Of two evils it was proper to chose the lenft. It had been mentioned, that in all governments the exe cutive necessarily had the power of difmifling officers under him. That might hold good in Europe, but it did not apply to our con stitution, by which the President had not the executive powers exclusively. The Senate was aflociated with him, and investing them with any particular authority could not impair the energy of the executive. If this arrangement was wrong, the fault was only in the constitution, and it could be remedied only by amendment. He dreaded the dangers to which this power would expose us .It would eftabHfh a fatal system of influence in the government. We (hould have a treasury bench, and a croud of the President's crea tures in the house. His ministers would intrude here, and lead and govern the measures of legislation. The gentlemen, he said, had contended that there might be cases where the officer was unfit for his station ; by reafonof infnrmity, \Publijhed on Wednesday and Saturday. incapacity, and other qualities not punishable—He might fink into dotage* or be seized with a fit of lunacy. It was proper, therefore, that some filcnt remedy should be applied. It was t rue this might happen, and so it might happen to others, whom there was n » mode of removing. Suppose the President should be taken with a fit of lunacy, would he not continue in office during his four years ? Suppose the Senate Ihould be seized, or the representatives rhemfelves become lunatics, would not the people be obliged to submit to this mad Congress ? We had alreaty, he faidj seen * King of Great-Britain a lunatic, and the fame might be the cafe with our President ; and although it was improbable that a majority of this house should be lunatics, it was by no means impoflible. It was also urged, that the judges alone were to hold their offices during good behaviour. It was admitted that they ought to. Bun was not a judge, as well as other exceutive officers, liable to the ast of God, which might deprive him of his faculties and his le gal knowledge ? Yet he must continue in office till impeached and convicted of some crime. Was it politic, he asked, to place the officers in such a situation as to deprive them of all their independency and firmnefs ? Had not the Prefidentthe command of the army, and would he not have the treasury undrr his thumb ? Thefecretiry of the finances would never dare oppose him, and would leave him unchecked to exer cise his powers. Then, he said, we might bid adieu to liberty, and all the blessings of genuine republicanism. He begged gen tlemen to consider the deadly influence of the crown in England, where offices were held during the pleasure of the King. Let gen tlemen turn their eyes to Sweden, and behold the monarch (hut ting the doors upon his Senate, and compelling them to submit to his despotic ordinances. He affirmed that the error of gentlemen lay in calculating upon the merit of the present chief magillrate, as if he was to continue for ever. With him he was confident every power might be lodged But he was not immortal ; the period must come when he would be taken from us. Could we be sure who would fuccced him ? Might not a man come into the office who carried a Pandora's box in his breast. The business of conftru&ion, he observed, was a dangerous busi ness. One of the favorite amendments proposed to the constitu tion was, a provision that all power which was not expressly given to the Congress, was retained. Under this idea, the conftitutioh was adopted ; and was it proper now to construe the constitution, so as to give extraordinary powers not before vested? The legisla ture had nothing but the letter of that compact to go by, and the moment a deviation was made from this* the House was making! an arbitrary stride towards an arbitrary government. Mr. Jackson v/as willing to confcnt that in cafe of a recess of the Senate, the President might have power to make a temporary sus pension. If an officer was guilty of any misdemeanor, he truftcd that there would be always virtue enough in the house of repre sentatives to impeach him. Mr. Clymek remarked, that were he to give his vote merely as it refpefted the conilitution, he should be indifferent whether the words were ft ruck out or not; for he was clear that the exe cutive had the power of removal as incident to his department— With refpcfl to appointments, the Senatt was only a check on the Picfident, to prevent his filling offices with unworthy men. In Uie cafe of removal there is not such a neceflity for this check ; for suppose a worthy man should be difmifed, what great danger or ineonvcnience would follow from it f Mull he not consult the Senate in filling the vacancy ? and would he have a better chance of procuring their consent to advance an improper chara&er, than in the firft appointment ? The prcfumption therefore, only waft that one good man would be changed for another. If the power was not given to the executive, he would want the btft power of doing good. He would be an inefficient officer ; would only a£l by the agency of others, and would be,deftitute of responsibility. It would be entirely frivolous, he faidj to call the people toge ther every four years to choose a President, if when chosen, he ihould be a mere cypher in the government, to nominate for the Senate to appoint ; and to propose in order for the Senate to re move. It would be as proper to give the whole executive autho rity to the senate at once. If this power was denied the President, he declared that the government would be as destitute of energy as any in the universe* Mr. Pace was infavor of the motion. He contended that the clause would cftablifh a dangerous power in the hands of the Pre sident, and was in dirett opposition to that clause in the consti tution which provides for the impeachment of officers. He af fcrted, that the clause contained in it the feeds of royal preroga tive. It appeared to him that everything which had been said inlhe House refpefting energy in the executive, might he carried to the deftru6tion of a free govercment. This very energy so much talked of, had led many patriots to the Baftile, to the block, and to the halter* If the President might take a man from the hejid of a department without assigning a reafon,he might as well be vested with a power, on certain occafvons, of taking away his exiflence. The idea was not confonart to the principles of a free go vernment, where no man ought to be condemned unheard; nor till after a fair and solemn trial, He would rather fuffer for a time the mifchiefs arising from the adminiftratiofl of a bad offi cer* than to fee a dangerous prerogative vested in the chief magi strate, which might lead to despotism. He knew that gentlemen supported the principle from honest motives : He knew they were friends to the g©vernment, but he thought they were in an unhappy error. Mr. Sherman wasoppofed to the clause.—He conceived that the paragraph in theconftitution refpefting appoirrtmens, was pro vided for some ufeful purpose; but it appeared to him that on rhc conftruttion of the gentlemen, it would be defeated. He thought that the concurrence of the Senate was as necessary to the very nature of an appointment, as the nomination of the President.— They were mutual checks and had each a negative. He consi dered it as an established principle,that the appinting power should have the right to remove, except where there was an express re tyriftion, as in the cafe of the judges, who held their places du-* ring good behaviour. Were it not for that reftriftion, the Pre sident and Senate might displace them. It was, he said, a gene ral principle in law as well as reason, that the fame authority was necclfary to repeal as to establish. It was so in legi flat ion, 1 he several branches whose concurrence was requisite to pass an a£t, must also concur to repeal it. He supposed that if a lav/ was parted, giving the Prefidentthe exclusive appointment of certain inferior officers, he would also have the power of removing them. Butthis was not an inferior officer. Hewas placedat the head of a great department, and his appointment was constitutionally vested in the President and Senate. If gentlemen would suppose that this was a subordinate officer who was to be in aid of the Pre sident, there a question might arise, whether his appointment could not, by law, be vested in the executive ? For being an executive officer, and the President being the great executive, the President might be supposed to be properly the head of that de partment. This realoning however was not to be admitted—He was an officer within the meaning of the constitution, who might have authority given him to make subordinate appointments, and therefore it was necessary that the Senate should have a voice in his appointment. As the office was a mere creature of the legislature, it might b« limited in its power and duration: the officer might