Vfrftcd in The Prefictcnt are declared—hut 110 such power as this
io pointed out—so tar trom it, the mode of removal is particular
ly fpecified, and that is upon conviction, after impeachment be
fore the Senate : As the constitution is thus express, it follows,
that this house can have no right to confer the power defignatcd
in the clause.
Th» reason for giving this power is the neccflity of removal in
cases of incapacity ; but for what cause can a man be removed
from office, but for mal-praftices or misdemeanors ? Is sickness
or ignorance a fufficient reason ? and who is to judge of incapa
city or ignorance, nnlefs by reason of either some offence is com
mitted ? In that cafe the removal is not for incapacity, but for the
offcncc, ana let me a(k for the instance of difmtflton for the former ?
This clause invests a power in The President, which will be
liable to great abuses ; for we are not always to expefl a chief
magistrate in whom such intire confidence can be placed as in the
prelent—the splendor of whose virtues, some gentlemen, appear
to befo dazzled with, as to lose fight of a proper refpeft to futu
rity. The conilitution is not calculated upon the idea of having
Hie chair always so well filled ; checks and guards are therefore
provided—this is our onlydire£lory : An officer who ia fuhjetled
to the whims of a capricious man, will be in an abject, dependent
state : a mere (lave ; what is the consequence ? we fubjeft a fellow
citizen to lose his reputation, his property, his living without a
trial; men of independent principles will be cautious of placing
themf lvesin such a situation ; as a President ifright have round
him thole who envious of the honors and emoluments of persons
in office, would be constantly intriguing and insinuating fufpici
011s to effe£l their removal.
To be removed from office without a fpecified crime, of with
out a trial is contrary to the spirit of the conilitution; is contrary
to the free sentiments of this people : Some gentlemen hare sup
posed that the present cafe is one of those to be provided for by
legislative regulations; it appears however from the foregoing ob
ligations, that the mode proposed is unconstitutional ; and upon
the whole it is evident, that as the power is not given to the Pre
sident by the conilitution, it ught not to be delegated to him.
Mr. Huntington followed Mr. Smith, and made afeweb
fervations upon " refponfibilitv," Ihewing that its importance
was principally derived from the charatler in which it was fixed
and not from the idea in itfelf considered—he wis opposed to
the clause as dangerous.
Mr. StDCWiCKadvcrted to several cases, which would render
removals from office necessary, which were not provided for by
the conilitution—and which the mode by impeachment from
the length of process, and various difficulties always realized,
■would be found totally inadequate to remedy—he pointed out
the necclity of speedy and prompt decision, when a man had be
come odious and unpopular in his office, without committing a
positive offcnce when his talents were found deficient, and there
was an incurable negligence and indolence in his attention to
the duties of his office—when his political principles were become
odious to the pesple, and his talent>, instead of being exerted for
the public good, were direrted toprofecuting fchemesof persona 1
aggrandizement, in such and similar cases, it would be necessary
to adopt something more summary than the flow, desultory pro
cess by impeachment.
Upon the principle of gentlemen, opposed to the clause the
Senate must be always in feflion—This he hoped would not take
place—but in the absence of this body, what was to be done?
mud the public interest be {acrificed? must justice be delayed, !>v
keeping an unworthy officer in his poll, till the Senate could be
collected from the extremities of this continent ?
The danger of abuses had been enlarged upon; but was their
110 danger on that account ffom the Senate? the argument in Ins
opinion, applied with equal force—and the ptiwer in the hands
of a body chosen from various parts of the union, under the lm
preffion of various and different principles, was as liable to abufc
if not more so, than if placed in the hands of the man, whom the
united voice of the people should call to the office of chief ma
gistrate.
Mr. Madison coincided with Mr. Smith, so far as thai we
ought to adhere llri&ly to the spirit and meaning of the conilitu
tion—He was however opposed to the motion for striking out the
clause.—The preftni quellion was considered in various points
of view ; it therefore came properly before the legislature to de
cide upon it •„ If the proposed clause ismerelya declaration of the
conilitution, it tan do no harm ; If it relates to a doubtfui part, it
lays with the whole legislature to give an explanation : And if the
conilitution is totally silent, Congress may use its discretion ;
The power is a high and important one ; and therefore a decision
merits a tull and tree difcuflion of both fides of the quellion :
When it is considered, that the chief magistrate is to be felc£led
from the mafsof the citizens, by the united fuffrages of three mil
lions of people ; notwithstanding the weakness incident to a po
pular election, he could not suppose that a vicious or bad chara£ler
would be chosen.
If there is a country upon earth in which an effectual fecuritv
is provided against the elevation of an unworthy man to the firft
feat in government, it is the United States. It is evidently the po
licy of the Conilitution, that great responsibility ffiould be lodged
iri The President, with refpeft to the executive department ; but
tlus responsibility is abated or deftioyed so saras the officers to
whom the duties of tlus department are committed, are not ame
i.aole to him : Should the Senate bealTociated with The President
in the power of removal, the officers would very probably reft the
retaining their places upon the favor of the Senate, in preference
to that of The Prtfident, and would accordingly consider them
ielves as accountable principally to the Senate ; in that cafe all exe
cutive responsibility would be impracticable, or the exportation
ot it, unjull.
The officers may by connecting themselves with the Senate in
a cabal againil The President, lay a foundation for perpetual dis
cord, and in that way effectually deflroy his responsibility, and
defeat Che expectation of the people from the inltitution of an in
dependent executive branch.
From an attentiveexamination of the Conilitution upon its true
principle, it is at lcaft problematical whether the House is not
tied down to the conftruflion adopted in this clause of the bill.
So tar as particular powers are inverted in different and particu
lar departments, a different appropriation of those powers is not
warranted by the constitution ; it will therefore be highly im
proptr to blend thofepowers: Iftheexecutive powers are invest
ed 111 The Prefident,the legislature may not interfere in the exercise
ot those powers.
No gentleman will fay, that the judicial power should be veil
ed in anybody, other than that defeated by the constitution •
The executive power is in the hands of The President, and is
there any particular exceptions to this general principle ? There is
an exception : The conilitution hasdeclared. that in the appoint
ment ot officers, the Senate Ihall have a voice, unless in cases of
interior officers, the law fhail othrrwife direfl.
Has Congress a rightto extend this exception? No. Ifthe
constitution has in general vefttd all executive powers in one
branch, the legislature has noright todiminiffi or modify them
any farther than is expressly provided by the constitution.
Trie quellion resolves itfelf into this : Is the power of difplac
mg oiii'fii an execufve, or legislative power ? I conceive (said he)
thar. no powercan be more compleady executive than thatofap
poinung, infoefting and eontrouling those, who have the im
mediate admmiftration of the laws. If the conilitution had tint
provided, that in the appointment of officers, The President
lhould have the advire and coivfent of the Senate ; would it not
beevident that he being poffefled of the executive powers would
have a rightto appoint them ? Could Congress in this cafe, have a
right to fay that the coucurrence of the Senate Ihould be necessary
in such appointments ? Molt certainly not : And if not how can
it be said with propriety, that Congress has a right to sffociate
thcfc.bianchts, in cider to dismiss them.
This claufc may therefore be considered as explanatory of the
conflitution, and if theforegoing reasoning is just, it comports with
its spirit and meaning ; but if it is a doubtful point, it is the du
ty of the legislature to decide upon it.
Mr. Vining observed, that he was sorry that this queflion
was again made the fubjeft of difcuflion.
The committee who brought in the bill, (of which he had the
honor to be one) thought themselves obliged by the former deci
sion of the House to inlert the clause now objected to : TheHoufe,
(said he) has determined that the power of removing officers, (hall
be lodged where the responsibility resides : The circuitous rout of
impeachments has been well pointed out by the gentleman from
Maffacl>trfcK,s, (Mr. Sedgwick) the flow, dilatory and inefficient
procefsby th>at mode, is dcmonflrated by universal experience.
The dafe of Warren Hallings is an eternal itigma upon the fyilem
of'lmpeachments : What delays ! what suspension of the public
service !
Suppofea fecretaryof foreignaffairs in this situation :Thc forms
of a full trial ; the collecting of evidences ; the charges and ar
guments of the parties, and a deliberate decition, may perpetu
ate the bufincfs for years.
It certainly could not be in the contemplation of the Senate to
take away the responsibility of The President: Incapacity is not
impeachable : Mull the public service fufler by depriving The
President of the power to remove an officer thus cii umftanced ?
I trull, Sir, the clause will not be (Iruck out*
Mr. Whir e supported his motion—He considered impeach
ments unnecessary to be applied to upon all occasions : They were
proper as they refpefted officers who were to hold their places
during good behavior : these were The President, Vice-President,
and the Supreme Judges ; but as the principle, that the power of
removal ought to reil with the power that appointed did not ap
ply to the two firfl, there was no mode of removal for them, but
by impeachment before the Senate.
He had no idea that such an officer as the Minister of Foreign
Affairs (hould not be removed but by impeachment : It might be
highly inexpedient to have the reasons of his difiniflion publicly
known : In that cafe, The President, with advice of Senate, might
have power to remove him without afligning any cause : The con
flitution implied this, as it provided that the Judges only Ihould
hold their places during good behavior.
He differed from his colleague in the principle which he had
advanced, That the whole executive power was vested exclusively
in The President in all cases where the Conflitution had not fpeci
fied an exception : The Conllitution had given the Senate a voice
in the appointment of officers, and they ccrtalnly had a power to
dilmifs from office.
It had been urged, that the power could be more fafely entrust
ed with The Prendent ; but the House was bound to adhere to
the Conflitution, that prefetched certain limits, which the legifla
turecould not excecd : No officer could be legally dismissed with
out a trial ; upon the clause in debate, an officer might be retained
in office, contrary to the sentiments of the Lcgiflature.
To obviate the difficulties which it had been suggested would
arifeupon the plan which he thought the conflitution pointed out,
he supposed that The President might be invested with the power
of a temporary suspension and appointment of officers in the recess
of the Senate ; but anabfolute power for those purposes cannot be
given confidently with the Conllitution.
Mr. Boudinot was in favor of the clause; he observed, That
much had been said upon the fubje£l; but its importance was so
great, as rendered a full discussion necessary. and could not be con
sidered as time loft. It the power contended for, could in the
least infringe the Conflitution, or the rights ot the several branches
of the Legislature, he would moll heartily oppose it. But the clause
he considered as a legislative conftru£lion of the Conllitution, which
it was highly necessary to fettle at the present time. Nothing can
be (hewn to prove that removals are to take place only by im
peachments. 1 he reasoning of thole who contend for the power's
being invefled in 1 he President, does not conclude against the re
medy by impeachment ;it only proves that there is another mode
provided in the Conllitution.
It is proper and necessary that the power of removal should re
udc somewhere ; but diis power does not prevent impeachments of
any officer, however protested by the favor of him in whom that
power is vested. Ihe Conflitution fays, that an officer shall be
removed by impeachment; but it does not fay, that he shall not
be removed withoutimpeachment: The Conflitution does not fay,
that that shall be the only mode ; It has given the Senate a voice
in appointing; but this by no means implies a right of removing.
Suppose the President (hould complain to the Senate of the mifcon
dutfc of an officer, what would be the consequence, if the Senate
Ihould take upon themselves to be judges ? Would they not call
upon the accused to Hate the reasons ol his condua ? Would not
such an mveftigation place the President in a situation inferior to
the Senate ? And Ihould the Senate decide in favor of the officer,
what would The President's situation then be ?
He considered the Senate as the only security and barrier between
the House and the President, and in this view, as a Court of Judi
cature, to operate as a check between them. This security ought
to be in a situation always to be appealed to, and to guard against
his mifconduft: If the Senate is not this independent body, there
I j°° r< " leltto the House :If the President was unduly attach
ed to an officer, who was obnoxious to the people, and was deter
mined to support him ;if in consequence ofthe public clamor, he
Ihould be compelled to bring the matter before the Senat , and
they mould decline reinoviug him—would they be unbiassed and
unprejudiced to hear the impeachment that ffiould be made by the
House ? They would be improper judges, having pre-judged and
pledged themselves to acquit the offender: The fame difficulty
might occurin an attempt to impeach the President for refufin K to
dilmifs an unfaithful and odious officer.
In cales oi lickncfs orincapacity, if the President is not inverted
with apower of removal, will the people submit to such officers?
Divest the Piefidcnt of this power, and you deltroy his responsi
bility : We ought not to leave this matter to the flow operations
of law : The government in this cafe would fuffer an interregnum-
We mull leave this responsibility with The President, or we fhali
cnectually defeat the operation of the Conflitution.
Mr Smith (S. CO in reply observed, That gentlemen on the
opposite fide ol the queflion were not confident with themselves.
Some contended that the power of removal was t»iven by the Con
flitution ; others that this House ought to give it ; the queflion
therefore recurred, either the Couftitution has given the power to
the President when it is unnecessary; or it has not given it, in
which cafe it is improper for this House to do it. Gentlemen
have that it is the duty of the Legislature to conflrue this
point ; but this House has no right to expound the Conflitution—
neither hat the Senate : It will be an infringement of the rights of
the Juaiciary ; If one House has this right, the other is equally en
titled ton, and on a queflion in which each was concerned, they
would fee with different eyes, and disagree in their expositions.
Much mifchtef has anfen in the several States froth legislative con
itrucli ns of their Constitutions. It appears to me (Mr. Smith
tj Urt r? r rvc "') House has no more right to foveft the
President with this power, than we have to invert oui selves with it
The mode of impeachment for crimes willnotbe fotedious and
dilatory as some gentlemen seem to suppose : There will be 1.0
juries in such cases ; and to be proteaed from the summary modes
ln foreign despotic countries, is the glorious privilege ef free
men. G' ntlemen have said that the Conllitution makes no pro
vision for cases of delirium, incapacity, &e. let the law then pro
vide tor such cases. The power contended for is not drawn from
precedent; there is no such power given by the State Constitutions
upon the principles of which, the fyilem under which we are now'
deliberating is founded. Mr. Smith concluded by adverting to
several hiflorical faas—and by observing that the forms of law
were deftgn-d to secure the rights of the fubjeQ, and might prove
highly necessary to -uard a oehiving odicei fiom iniultice and
popular p'.irenzy. J >
Mr. Ge» ry was opnoftd to the clause— fie futnnf J ,
invcft a power >.i the President to annul the most cifcntia a ?
of the Conftuution : He thought that if it was considered j.„
iy a quclt.on ot expediency, there was danger of uiakin. a
in the conftuution ; if it ,s a conftitutioual quelf'.on X,r„ !
of expediency should be abandoned. He was for a ffrift ]
rence to the constitution ; lie conceived that no conftruftl' ,
that, would warrant delegating s uch a power to tiie I'refT ,
It was conceded by fomc gentlemen in favour of the clauf I :
the conftuution was not definite upon the fuUft auj if ,h, 1
a aouLt, it did not allow the liberty ofadifcretiondryconlJffi!!'
Mr. Ames observed, that every question which touches the cm'
ftitutiou is a fenous question : In order to obtain the ..H. „„
which are to be expetfed from the conftuution, powers i»jf L
S^ td ' A. To ,? U ? rd a s ainft abuses, checks are provided ■ Than
officer (hould be removed', when the reasons which ave ,T
his appointment, no longer ex,ft, will not be d.fpu,e°d •h„ *
question is, how this is to be done ? There is no roveh'J.
which the officeis hold their places during good behaviour • Th!
officers of the judiciary, from the nature and peculiar delicacvnf
their trust, were formed into a diftinfl branch, and h u ;dl;
°k d S rj"" that , te,mre i but ,n rc fp c « to othery, acting i n aid <rf
the Prefideut, who were appointed upon differed principles ]„*
for different purposes, it is neccifary that thev ftould hold'th,,,
places during pleasure : The confidence which the Mverrm™.
has in the virtues and abilities of an officer, (houid be the ml
giound of his appointment, and the only bond of conrteftion J
tween him and his principal; when that confidence ceases rk
power under whofedireaon he acts, fnoul deertainly have6,U
to displace him. ' rr
There may be numerous and various caufcs of removal which
do not amount to a crime : If it is admitted that officers ought
to be ailmiiled when their continuance operates to the injury of
government, whether innocent or not of any crime, the onlv
queltion then is, how and by whow they shall bedifplaced ? Im
peachments are not the only mode to be resorted to. Jn the Bri"
tifh government officers are removed immediately when thev be
can no longer lender fercice to the public-
V\ hile the forms of impeachment are preparing, the mifchict ir.av
be done : It may as frequently be neceffrry to prevent as to pun.
llh crimes. The lituation and advantages of the supreme execu
live, will furnifli him with the means to deteel a villainous deli™"
before it is ripe for execution ; he might, for example, difcovcJ
in the officers of the a project lor embezzling the public
money ; some sudden and decisive remedy would in fueh cafe be
indispensable.
It is generally agreed, that removals will be a proper remedy •
the quellion is by whom ? If the constitution is against the pow
er's, ueing vested in The President, there is an end of theenquirr
The committee ought to be clear that the constitution is opposed'
The gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison) has made so many
just remarks to prove the constitutionality of this power, that it
is unnecessary to go over the ground again.
If it Ihould be granted thatthe constitution is silent, it certain,
ly comes within the cognizance of the Legislature. The powers
of the several branches ought not to be blended. The President
is the executive ; this is confeffedly an executive power : It is not
creating a new power; it already exists, and is as great now as it
will be when particularly appropriated. Officers should have
the terror of pumfhment constantly held over their heads for de
lmquency.—-The immediate influence and controul of the Presi
dent over his assistants is necessary, it is the eflence of good go
vernment. That responsibility which is so important andabfo
lutely necessary, can never be found in the Senate : besides, the
blending of diltin& powers always produces a corruption of those
powers ; for this reason the Senate should never have the power
of interfei ing : Protection for protettion in office, will be the
consequence, and a numerous train of evils more easily forefeen
than remedied.—Upon the whole, there appears to be three opi
nions upon the fubjeft before the committee, the firft is, that in
verting this power in the President, is against the constitution—the
lecond, that it is not—and the third is, that the constitution is
nlent with refpeft to it: It is therefore necessary that the House
jnould come to a declaration ; if that declaration is right, it will
become a rule ; if not, the Judges will determine it.
Mr. Li verMOKe was opposed to the clause, and urgedfeve
ral reasons for finking it out. Adjourned. '
Wednesday, June 17
In committee of the whole, upon the bill for eftablifliing the
department of foreign affairs—the question whether the clause
which inverts the President with the power of removing officeis
fnould be struck out, still under consideration, and was largely
debated ; but no decision was had upon the question when the
committee rose, and the House adjourned.
Thursday, June 18.
A petition from Robert FrazieU was read and laid on the
table.
1 he Senate sent down the bill upon tonnage, in which they have
oncurrcd with amendments—thele amendments being read, the
order of the day was called for, when the House went into a
committee of the whole ; and the fubjeft of yeflerday's debate
was resumed : The committee fat nntil near four o'clock,and then
rose without coming to a vote upon the question.
Friday, JUNE 19.
House met agreeably to adjournment, and formed itfelf into *
committee of the whole, upon the bill for cftablilhing the Depart
ment of Foreign Affairs. The motion which had been under de
atc since Tuesday, for striking out the clause which empowers
j c ' President to remove officers, still under consideration. Leng'hy
ebates ensued—sketches of which shall appear in our next. The
question upon the motion being at length taken, it parted in the
rae ß?' lve » 33 kcing in favor of retainingthe clause, and 20 against it.
The committee then proceeded in the discussion of the bill.
Mi. Benson proposed the following clause for insertion, viz.
rhat the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs imme
diately after his appointment, be impowered to take into his cus
tody all the books and papers belonging tothelate Departmentot
oreign Affairs established by the United States in Congrefsaf
fembled : This clause was adopted.
The further difcullion of the bill produced some alterations and
amendments, which being completed, the committee rose, and the
c lairman made his report. The Speaker having taken the chair,
a message was received by the Secretary from the Senate, with the
import bill, informing the Honorable House that they infiftedon
°me of the amendments which they had proposed, and receded
from others.
The Secretary also informed the Honorable House, that the
committee appointed to view the rooms in the Federal Hall, had
proceeded in that business and made a partial report, which was
now sent down for concurrence. Adjourned until Monday.
[The Debates of the Hon. House oj Representatives of theUritiiStatu
upon the Clause in the Bill for eflablifhing the Department of Fort'p
Affairs, which empowers The President to remove the Officer at the W
oj that department, without advice of Senate, have been highly inteT(fl~
in i, animated, and ingenious. The galleries hqve been unusually erod
ed, notwithflanding the heat of the weather ; and the mcjl profound ottcn
tion observed. The zeal and earnejlnejs, with which the several
ers have supported the argument on both fides of the quejlion, filly '
monflrate the deep contiElion which they felt of the importance oj the
J ft. This discussion has served to unfold and explain the principle C J
the Conjlitution \ and the extreme anxiety which has beenfhcv:n to dahtrt
to its fpint and meaning, by every one of the Speakers, evinccs thit tka
all consider it as the only rule of their Faith and PraElice- in the to l l'
of their Political Exiflence.~\