No. XIII-
CitrWe are happy to lay before our readers the sentiments
ned in the following No. of the TABLET, on the bulinefs
""smuggling, or defrauding Government of the Revenue—and
''otibt not their meeting the approbation of every friend to the
I'nited States.]
the TABLE T. No. XIII.
« Thtre is no kind of di/bonefty into which good people
'< more eaflly and frequently full, thai.\ thai of de
« landing government of its revenues by J'mug
u'liug, or encouraging smugglers by buying their
** goodi"
When a nation is beginning its political cx
iitence, it has the lame occalion to form
rood habits, as an individual when he is entering
Wo life. It is not only requilite, that suitable
i ws Ihould be enaifted, and enforced v. .th penal
ties; but it will have an admirable effect, if the
people v ill enter into aiibciations and take mea
res among themfelves,for co-operating with the
views of government. By manifesting their zeal
and patnotifm in this way, they may produce a
moral tontrottl over the actions of men, and lead
[hern into a difpontion to obfeive le ; ;al in! ; .cu
tions. * The iuetficacy of aflbciatians will be ur
led as an gument agaiidi '• uian experiment.
But one should not decide toohaftily in this mat
•er. If the execution of ti:c l.nvj re Iked w h tly
on that footing, their operation would be feeble
indeed ; lb on the other hand, where obedience
is expected only by the rigor of penalties, the law
will be evaded, and its objecft defeated. It is of
impoitance that government ihould engage dif
ferent paflions of the human mind,in its service.
tear of pimifhment is one v cry pov, cvful i elh aint
from disobedience. But it will not do alone.—
Men, who pretend that an appeal to the fears of
people is the belt, or the only method of making
them virtuous citizens, mult el; her be igno. anc
of human mature, or take . plcafure in degrading
it. In a free government, and more especially
in its firft organization, no individual will have
real'on to fear the laws, unless the bull: of the
neopie love and regard them. Wlkll a man ca:;
violate a law without any compunction of con
fidence, or injury to his cnaraoter, there is noth
ing more certain, than that lie can elude punifit
ment. If he faveshis character, he prefer'ves his
friends, and does not counteract the wiflies of the
community. There are so many, who are tacitly
his accomplices, that it is difficult to find unbiafs
edteftimony, for fnpporting a pi ofecution.
It will be alledged, that men, who have princi
ple enough to aflociate in favour of collecting the
revenue 1 , will be lioneft enough to oppose smug
gling, without any such allociation. There is
I'ome fallacy, 1 think, in such a fuggellion. Many
people annex the idea of infamy to the dilcoverer
of a fraud, committed 011 the public revenue.
This will prevent many perfous,w ho are difj -.eel
to pay the duties punctually, from complaining
of others, whom they know to be diflionelt in this
reipect. It is evident, that if a n umber of worthy
persons entered into an agreement to discounten
ance (inuggling, the objection of infamy againit
informing, would be removed. If no other rea
son could be aUigned for afibciating again ft smug
glers ; this would be a striking on*, that such a
measure would check confederacies in favour of
Smuggling. The ' principal complaint against
voluntary combinations is, that their force and
;>bfervauce are of short duration. Itis unqueftion
ably true, that they have a temporary effec't, in
favor of the object intended. In the present in
stance ftothing more is required. If the laws can
have a favorable introduction, they will derive
iome energy from that very circumltance. The
power ofhabit is universally felt and acknowledg
ed. It has even a stronger influence,in producing
obedience to the laws, than a fear of puniibment,
where the penalties are tigorous, and exactly in
flicted. Both thefecaufes united give a peculiar
efficacy to government. They will, by their 11a
tural progrels, create that additional tie, that is
mipofed by a sense of duty, and a r to cha
racter. 3 h
Why have mankind. in general discovered a
. onger inclination to defraud the public, than
mdividuals > lc"is probably owing in some degree,
to their being able to do it, with less sting of
j ietice and less loss of reputation. But why
onotthe character and the confcienceof a man
' e< juir e him to be honest to the public, as wellds
0 individuals ?It is,no doubt,becaufe people have
tot ieen accullomed to feel so ftrongan obligation
w.the one cafe, as the other. 'But why do we
P'auically make this diftinc r tion, when there
no . lnL i infic difference ? The most obvious rea
lifel' lat Blen ' n t * le cr ' 11110,1 intercourse of
- e fi ( ' 't greater inconvenience,in countenanc
g tilhonefty ir. pi ivate, than in public tranfac •
From SATURDAY, May 25, to \V EDNES DA Y, May 27, 1789.
tions. This circumftanc® induces a common con-
Tent, in favor of the practice of private justice ;
and fixes a stigma upon the violators of it. It
seems then that common consent, or to give ir
another name, public opinion is.one powel'iul tie,
that holds men to their private duty. The fame
< aufe, did it equally exist in public affairs, would
operate nolefs powerfully, kautft liaveanexill
enee, before it can have an application or an effetft.
Has the public opinion, in times past, been in
favor of rendering to government,what was due
to it? In many inftancesthe reverse has been the
cafe, and people have, without any feelings of
lhame orremorfe, evaded public obligations, l!
goverment has been generally defrauded, the
fa(t itfelf proves, that the common consent ol
mankind was not witheld from it : For had the
public mind been opposed to the fraud, it could
not well have happened, or at any rate,would have
been detected and punished. It requires a con
liderable degree of force to counteract the current
ol'popular fciuiment. Few violators or the rules
of pi ivate honor and justice elcape reproach, it
L hey dopiinidinient.
There is no natural propensity in merchants
0 defraud the publi - of its revenues, anymore
than there is to deceive their cullomers, in the
weight and measure ol' goods. The reason, as
was before suggested, why they are lionelt in one
;al'e and not in the other, is that their reputation,
.hei;* interest and their conscience do not equally
require it, in both cases. One feels a confidence
:hat his 1> inker, though he is not strictly watched,
will render anesact account of the caih committed
to his care. Government woyld have the fame
lecurity, that justice would take pluce in public
a Hairs , if the habits and feelings of the people
were equally favorable to public hoilelty. The
trader durst not impose on his cuftome;-s, if he
wiihed to do so, because he knows he will sustain
1 greater inconvenience, in the loss of custom,
than he gains benefit, by a particular deception.
I once more repeat, that if it would equally hurt
his character to cheat or injure the public, he
would be equally restrained from doing it.
As the influence o* public opinion is known to
be so forcible ; and Cts- the honor and prosperity
of our country require, that the laws and regula
tions fiiould have a good beginning, it is worth
while to bestow some pains,in predifpoling the peo
ple to give their aid and countenance, in carrying
into effect the measures of government. Many
persons pretend that luch a determination alrea
dy exilts. It feeii'S not to be queitioned, even by
any refractory individual, but that a revenue mult
be raised, aijd that it must proceed from imposts
and excises. The current of opinion, it will be
said, is now fufficiently in favor of such a fyltem.
But let us not be deceived. Those, who set their
hearts at reft, in thisftage of the business, are in
a delusion. The public discernment has suggest
ed the eligibility of an impost ; but still the pub
lic temper is not I'ufKciently roused into indigna
tion againll smugglers, and other defrauders.—
Men may be led by reflection to judge with pro
priety of a measure, before they feel a disposition
to exert theinfelves, in favor of its execution. In
some cafes,a change ofprinciplesprecedes acliange
of manners ; and men think of a Aibjedt a great
while, before they art upon it, at all. The firft
difficulty is surmounted. We are in a right way
of thinking ; andit only remains, that we take an
lioneft, spirited way of acting. Let its not only
give the laws a kind reception, but fuffer them,
and even aid them to proceed,with vigor and fuc
cefe.
When the system is ripened into a proper state of
maturity, the temptation to defraud the public
treafuiywill become weaker and weaker. Our
opposition to the collection of impost under the
british government,was occasioned in part, by cir
cumftances resulting from the cafe, and which no
longer have an existence. Men do not transgress
till they are often tempted ; and they will not be
tempted to do wrong, when the balance of mo
tives is in favor of doing l ight. It fliould be a
leading object of legislative care to destroy, 01
rather counteract the temptation to fraud, by en
creasing the causes, that induce men to think, an
honest conduct is the most eligible. In proportion,
as men have been habituated to any vicious prac
tice ; or, as they will derive advantageby indulg
ing the vice,fhould the restraints be multiplied to
prevent it. Before this can well be effected, ii
ihouldbc known,what reasons 01 iginally operated,
in ellabliihing the habit; and whether the fame
causes still continue. For it must be observed,
that we do not always relinquish a practice, pre
cisely when the circumftanc j, that led to it,is re
moved. Our having been accustomed to it, be
comes of itfelf a reason for its continuance. If we
apply these reasonings to our present situation,
wiili reipecc to the collection of the revenue, it
will lead us into the following enquiry. AVliat
causes formerly induced us to connive at frauds
on the public revenue ? Are these causes now in
operation ?—We (hail find they are not wholly
taken away. The itnpoutions were then uncoil
ftitutional. That objection to the payment of the
duties now ceases. But there are established cau
ses, that render the collection of public monies, in
ail situations, a little precarious and difficalt. The
origin of the evil is not to be traced to any natur
al desire in men to cheat the government, merely
for the fake of cheating it. It refultsYrom temp
tations,that are suggested by the practicability and
fafety of the thing. Our desire to gain advanta
ges over the public treasury is not counteracted,
by so many causes, as relt rain us from o vereaching
private p_-rfons. The inclination of people '»>
promote their own interest is the fame,in both ca
ses. From this view of the subjeCt, I hope the re
in arks, that have been offered in support ofaflo
ciations, in the present crifisof affairs, will not be
deemed unintetefting or foreign from the point.
I persuade mylelf also, that a few observations,
that will convey fouiehints to the Legislature ref
peCiing their proceedings, will not have too great
an appearance of presumption.
The penalties, annexed to revenue laws, {hould
be offuch a nature, as will fixadifg. ace upon the
characters, on whom they are inflicted. There is
an aptitude in certain punishments to restrain cer
tain ciimes. Great rigor does not produce the
effect, that is proposed. This is apt to mitigate
the abhorrence against the offence, and foften it
down into pity towards the offender. The human
mind is so conll tuted, that different affeCtions
counteract each other. There is an habitual tem
per of revenge,in laany minds,againft government
for its This can only be controuled byex
citing, in an higher degree, a detestation agtiinlt
crimes. Exceflive fines,long iniprifbnments,&:levere
corporeal punishments, indicate a very depraved
state of society. The laws fnould appeal to the
feelings of men, in such a manner aj> to induce
a sense of lhame, for the coiifequences of the
punishment, no lefsthan a lively fear of endi.ring
the it. This end'may partly be pro
moted by stigmatizing offbudei*, in the stile of
the laws, by .epithets that imply odium and in
famy. Men involuntarily aflociate their ideas ;
and words, that have usually conveyed an op
probious meaning, will continue to make similar
imprellions. I do not entertain a doubt, that
great utility may be derived, from couching the
laws against smuggling, in a contemptuous lan
guage.
The defrauders of the public should likewise
be debarred,from holdingany ofHce, or perform
ingany fervice,that; implied confidence or refpeCl.
Such an exclusion would stamp ideas of indignity
on the public lAind, against tliofe who evade the
payment of duties. If they were prohibited from
serving on jury ; or if their oaths w ere rendered
invalid, it would have great effeCt in restraining
the pra(ftice of smuggling. The receivers of
smuggled goods should have a /hare, in the dis
grace and puniihment. Indeed the whole regu
lations, that relate to the collection of the reve
nue, should carry the marks of legislative disap
probation of every species of collusion. The
contempt of government, exprefled in a pointed
manner, will be more efficacious than its resent
ment.
It would much contribute to excite general de
rision against public dishonesty, if the law should
direCl a Register to be published annually, con
taining the names of all, who had been deteCted
in smuggling, or that any way advised or aided,
in defrauding the revenue. The minds of men are
differently wrought upon; and by diverfifying the
punishment and frowns of government, the feel
ings of molt people will be iuterefted in observing
che laws.
In my next number, the subjeCt fhallbe refum
edai.d placed in another point of view.
EXTRACT FROM " AMERICAN ESSAYS."
On the SUBJECT of COMMERCE.
THE whale and cod fifheries have been long in a
declining state ; they are our natural, principal,
and best liurferies for seamen, and the most cer
tain source and support of our naval strength;
an objeCt of the last importance to all commer
cial countries, and in which the United States are
all equally interefled.
That we could afford to undersell the French
and English at every market, fuppofmg a trade for
our cod-fijh equally fafe and free, cannot be con
troverted. The English consume very little of
their Newfoundland fifh, almost all being carried
from America direCllv jo oilier markets in Eu
rope ; and if, as is generally supposed, there is
110 friendfhip in trade among individuals of the
TRICE SIX PENCE.