G
THE DAILY EVENING TK LEGK A I'll PHILADELPHIA; TUESDAY; AUGUST 30, 1870.
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY
Views of the Count de Paris.
A Kemnrkablo Article by the
Head of the House of Orleans
Prussian Supremacy and
its Hanger to Enrope
A Sharp Review of
the Policy of
Bismarck.
About a year after, the close oT the Austro
Frassian war of 18i a remarkable article,
entitled "Germany and its New Political
Tendencies'' appeared in the Revue des
Deux Mondcs, the leading Orleanist journal
of Paris. This article was written in the
guise of a letter from a French traveller, and
was published under the sponsorship of Mr.
E. Forcade, one of the editors of the Revue,
who called attention to it not only as the first
dissertation published on "New Germany,"
but for its ingenious discrimination and scru
pulous sincerity. It was understood at the
time that it was written by the Count de
Faris, the head of the House of Orleans, and
created a great sensation not only on that
account, but by reason of the bold views
which it advanced. At the present crisis the
article in question possesses unusual interest,
and we therefore present a translation of it
entire, as follows:
I write you in fulfilment of my promise to
give you my views on Germany, but my
journey through the comntry has been so hur
ried, and my impressions, in many respects,
so vague, I might almost say so contradic
tory, that I fear I may exceed the reasonable
limits of a letter. The people here have, in
fact, not yet quite calmed down from the
excitement into which they have been thrown
by the events of last year. Situations, ideas,
even principles, have been so confounded
that scarcely any one seems to have made up
bis mind whether the new order of things
should be looked upon with favor or dis
favor. RESULTS OP THE BATTLE OF SADOWA.
One thing, however, is accepted as an ac
complished fact the unity, of Germany
under the supremacy of Frnssia. Whether
willingly or unwillingly, every one submits
to this. A diversity of action and interests
among the States has become a thing of the
past, and will henceforth take its place beside
the historic records of the Germanic empire
and its ancient constitution. Doubtless the
unity of Germany is not yet complete; it is
certainly not definitively established. Still
there is nothing to warrant us in concluding
that the Southern States will not, in due
course, enter into the bosom of the Germanic
nation, and the Germanic possessions of the
House of Austria have, at no distant day,
A L ' 1 ' 1 " 1 - 1- A " - ' i
meir iegiumtiie weigus iu us councils. i. russia
decapitated at Sadowa the hundred-headed
hydra with which the people had been
content to bear since the days of Lafontaine,
and victorious, although unaided, drew after
it in its train the whole Germanic body with
its hundred-tailed dragon. Such brilliant
success fascinated all Germans. It was less
the triumph even of Prussia which delighted
them than the combination of forethought
and audacity which characterized the policy
of her statesmen and the strategy of her
generals. They compared these rare qualities
with the inertness, imprudence, and gloomy
anticipations of the Court of Vienna, and
with the sheer impotence of the Germanic
Diet; and their love of Fatherland, which in
later years had suffered such humiliations,
made them cry out "There is our guide !"
causes of bismarck's popularity.
It is scarcely possible for a Frenchman to
estimate how much Germanio self-love has
had to endure for many years. Up to 181'J
the liberal movement, at first under a legal
form, and afterwards revolutionary in charac
ter, bad been the expression of their aspira
tions for unity. Since that time it has been
suppressed, whilst Germany has in vain
aspired to that dignity abroad which despotic
governments never fail to promise their sub
missive subjects. Every time that a great
European question found its solution without
Germany being consulted they regarded
themselves as personally insulted. 'During
the Crimean war their sympathies were
with us; but they saw their influence
neutralized, owing to the antagonism
of Prussia and Austria. Subsequently,
in 18.10, they wished to interfere against us,
but it required months to put the wheels of
the Confederation in motion, and when they
were ready to act, Austria, always jealous of
Prussia, deprived them of the opportunity by
signing the peace of Yillafranca. Since,
however, Bismarck was placed at the head of
affairs, Germans have felt there was such a
thing as a German policy to be recognized.
From this source sprung that statesman's
popularity. The Holstein question, stripped
of the legal forms which had hitherto encom
passed it, was clearly placed before them as
an object of national ambition, and was
solved by force of arms in spite of the pro
testations of almost all Europe. Indifferent
to the mode in which it was effected, the Ger
mans hailed its violent solution as a clear.re
venge for the treaties of 18."ji and 18.")!).
There was henceforth a political Ger
many; but who shall be. its represen
tative? Austria, as ambitious though
less powerful than Prussia, pretends to take
that position. That it might not leave that
role to its rival, it closed the struggle with
France after the battle of Solferino; made a
great effort at Frankfort to place itself at the
head of the movement for a united Germany;
and, in 1804, entered into an understanding
with Prussia to discard the Germanic Diet as
a cloak already too much worn to cover any
longer the two athletes who fought under its
folds. The time had come for them to en
gage in the inevitable struggle. Upon the
day when the forces of these two adversaries
encountered each other, the German Con
federation, shaken by their strokes, fell to
the ground, and the battle of Sadowa defini
tively broke up the equilibrium upon which
Germanio interests had hitherto depended.
Since then M. de Bismarck has been able to
give Germans that which they most of
all ambitioned the satisfaction of see
ing themselves taken into aocount in
the affairs of Europe. The haughty manner
of Prussia, insupportable to the Hermans
themselves when they were forced to submit
to it, flattered their pride when they found it
practised towards other nations. Formerly,
citizen of Thurisgia, or of one of the prin
cipalities of lteubs, felt himself humiliated
in the presence of Frenchmen or Russian,
believing them elevated so far above him by
the greatness of their nation. To-day, while
cherishing a vague, poetio affection for his
own limited territory, he is proud to bear the
burden of a federal government, which makes
its influence felt in the councils of Europe,
believing himself rendered thereby much
more worthy, personally, of inspiring con
sideration, respect, or fear. Those even who
have lost most by the formation of the new
confederacy share this feeling, and find it a
compensation for the sacrifices they have
been forced to make.
SHALL GERMAN! BE PRUSSIANIZED ?
The unity of Germany must, then, be re
garded as consummated; but will Germany
absorb Prussia, or will Prussia absorb Ger
many ? Such is the important question which
now turns up. By Prussia we mean the
Prussian government with-its bureaocratio
traditions and its old absolutist principles,
together with its army, which, although re
cruited in a manner somewhat democratic, is
commanded by a body of officers essentially
aristocratic a government active and intelli
gent, but formal and despotic in desire, and
greatly disposed to range itself under the
standards of the school of "Cuarisui." By
the Prussian people we are to understand the
best educated in Enrope, active and indus
trious, possessing in the highest degree the
spirit of association, and appearing little
likely to become consolidated under a govern
ment so far from being conformable to their
manners and feelings.
GERMAN FEDERAL FEELINGS.
Federation in Germany has been a failure.
The spirit of federalism exists there under
the pedantio name "particularismus." It re
presents not only ideas and traditions, but
above all powerful and varied interests. It
constitutes the local life and preservation of
those numerous small centres of intelligence
and policy which have largely contributed to
the progress of Germany. It exists even in
Prussia, for a Westphalian or a citizen of the
Rhenish provinces has nothing of the Prus
sian about him except the name and uniform
which he adopts in the service of King Wil
liam. They are very sectional and at the
same time very German, and although the
Prussian administration has as yet permitted
them to retain, contrary to the advice of
centralizers, the laws they inherited from
France, they see nothing in the rule under
which they are placed except a disagreeable
change, and look forward with anxiety to the
time when the name of Prussian shall give
way to that of German.
Our future relations with the most power
ful of those nations which border France will
depend upon the way in which this question
will be solved between Prussia and Germany.
Should Germany absorb Prussia, then the
centre of Europe would belong to a nation
whose interests, habits, and ideas tend
towards the support of liberal institutions,
who will probably set ns an example in this
respect, or certainly follow us with enthu
siasm, should we fortunately precede them.
It would form a social body possessing all
the requisites for making a free people, but
having interests too diverse to be ever
aggressive a nation .probably more
military and less bellicose ' than ours.
Its internal prosperity developed, and
its. legitimate influence recognized Abroad,
would in time become the pledges of peace
in the future. I think we should accept such
a result with a good grace, although we might
feel some regret for the extinction of its
ancient landmarks. Wo certainly should pre
fer such an arrangement to a division, pure
and simple, of Germany between Prussia and
Austria, as this would have the effect of
placing on our frontiers two powers always
ready to compromise us in their quarrels, or
unite against us, lest the one might appear to
be less German than its rival.
THE DANGER TO GERMANY OF PRUSSIAN ASCEN
DANCY. On the other hand, the absorption of Ger
many by Prussia would be the establishment
of "Cfi'sarism" in Central Europe. The oner
ousness of the rule, so contrary as it would
be to German feelings, the numerous interests
it would trample upon, the necessity it
would feel placed under of quieting liberal
aspirations by flattering the people with ex
aggerated ideas of national importance, would
all combine in obliging it to adopt towards
other nations a restless, threatening, and ag
gressive poliey. It would at all times be a
standing danger to the peace of Europe and
a serious obstacle to the cause of liberty.
POLICY OF BISMARCK TOWARDS THE MINOR STATES.
In what sense, then, will this question be
solved? Without pretending to foretell its
future solution, one can indicate the different
elements which exist. ' The Prussian system
has in its favor the prestige of success, the
right of victory, confidence in the future, and
the dissension which exists among all those
parties who are opposed to it. The sncoess
of M. de Bismarck has not only disorganized
parties in Prussia but in all Germany. That
minister sapped the foundation of the party
even which he represented. One can easily
imagine the aversion of the Prussian
legitimists for the tortuous policy of suoh
a statesman as he; but, then, obedienoe
to the King being their leading principle,
when they found M. de Bismarck sustained
by him, they felt it their duty to follow his
guidance. Hostile to all that they designate
as revolutionary; hostile to the Italian king
dom; hostile to the aggrandizement of Prus
sia, which must weaken their particular influ
ence, they have seen themselves ignored by
him whom they themselves had carried into
power. M. de Bismarck then turned upon
the liberal party, taking out of their hands
the arms with which up to that time they
had combated. During three years he had
braved with impunity the Chamber of Depu
ties, in which the liberals had a majority.
It made no response except by ineffec
tual words to a Minister who trampled
upon its constitutional privileges. Regard
ing liberal ideas as a mania or which the
nineteenth century was the victim, he never
theless recognized the necessity of flattering
this mania, end to accomplish this he chose
the hour of his triumph. The day after the
battle of Sadowa, when the country, still un
der the excitement of war feeling, had refused
ita suffrages to men who up to that time had
constantly advocated their rights, one could
see M. de Bismarck going in to demand from
the Parliament a bill of indemnity. It was a
retrospective homage by which the Prussian
Minibter purchased the subservience of bis
former. adversaries. The bill was passed,
and a step further taken a large donation
granted in his favor. Going utill farther in
that direction, he made an appeal - to
universal suffrage for the election of mem
bers. By this means be disarmed the
liberals. Accustomed as they had been to
fruitless and abstract discussions, they were
incapable of distinguishing between forms
and principles, and had so abused the words
"universal suffrage" and "national anity"
that they were unable to see how much cap
tiousness there was in the proceedings of the
Prussian Prime Minister. The party which
railed itself liberal and national found itnelf
almost entirely under his control. The power
ful association of the National- Verein became
in the hands of M. de Bismarck a blind aad
ready instrument for his purposes. At the
same time he endeavored to out up by the
root those governments which, by giving
them certificates of their continued exist
ence, he induced to enter into - the
sew Confederation. lie destroyed their
popularity by imposing upon them
the same military charges as were laid on the
Prussian provinces. The minor German
States thus found their expenses almost tre
bled at one stroke. The duchy of Saxe
Cobourg had entered into a convention with
Prussia, some years before, for a military
contingent, paying annually to Prussia 80
thalers or JiOO francs for the support of each
of its men; but this figure was a reduction
accorded the duchy as a sort of inducement
to others, when Prussia still dreaded Aus
tria's outbidding her for influenoe with
them. To-day Prussia requires from the
duchy 170 thalers or G !7 francs 50 centimes
for the same support. The contingent
imposed by the Germanio Confederation upon
the grand duchy of Saxe cost about 210,000
thalers, or 5)00,000 francs a year; to sustain
the new military state will entail upon it an
expense of 800,000 thalers, or 3,000,000 of
francs. The small German Governments
bad known how to conciliate the population
by letting them escape those crushing
charges which pressed so heavily on their
more powerful neighbors. The first care of
Prussia has been to deprive them of this ad
vantage, and this reason for their continued
existence.
AVERSION OF THE MINOR STATES TO THEIR AB
SORPTION BY PRUSSIA.
In the midst of such a state of things, the
Prussian system, colliding in the force of its
organization, presents itself as a necessity
which is imposed upon Germany. It will
have, however, to contend against two move
ments, quite dissimilar, but equally opposed
to its domination, the one in the North, which
is averse to centralization, the other in the
South, which contemplates a new confede
ration. ,
The nature of the former is easily explained.
The present position of Germany satisfies its
national self-love. This position gained, it
does not see the necessity of sacrificing all
its traditions and local institutions, its par
ticular interests, to the uniformity 6f the
Prussian system. Those who have the most
ardent desire to see Prussian heyemony esta
blished, find it advisable sot to push the
matter further at present. Annexation,"pure
and simple, has to-day fewer partisans in the
smaller States than- it had when they
entered, willingly or unwillingly, 'nto
the Confederation of the North. They
know what their capitals would lose by becom
ing Prussian sub-prefectures. The universi
ties,)even, although they have always been the
chief foci of the desire for unity, do not wish
to lower their flag before Berlin, whilst in
the armies of these States you will find senti
ments of jealousy and sometimes of ranoor
towards the Prussian army. In fine, the mem
bers of these administrations are fully aware
that the result of . such would be to remove
them from their present position, and prevent
them from ocoupying other than inferior
places, leaving the more important to
functionaries of. Prussian origin. So
far as the masses are ooncerned,
they hesitate. Prussia seems to say to
them, "Since you have to bear all the bur
dens of Prussian subjects, is it not better
yon should participate in all the advantages ?"
but they dread the despotio tendencies of the
administration, and the difficulties of every
kind which it has had to enoounter in the
provinces it annexed are not encouraging to
the friends of annexation in the adjacent
countries. There does not exist, in fact, in
the minor states of the Confederation of the
North that great administrative machinery
necessary for the establishment of a central
ized despotism, nor will it be established
either easily or rapidly.
SHALL THERE
BE A SOUTHERN
FEDERATION ?
GERMANIC OON-
Opinion tends in a contrary direction in
the Southern States of Germany, upon whom
the isolation in which they have been placed
by the treaty of Prague weighs heavily. The
"Line of the Main," traced in all sincerity
by M. de Bismarck, who was afraid of dilut
ing the Prussian element, has never been re
garded as a serious proceeding by the Ger
mans. ' It would not have been possible ex
cept with Prussian factions on one bank of
the river and Austrians on the ether; but
the power of Austria once got rid of, the sti
pulations of Prague were for the South
nothing more than a sort of penance, a stake
at picquet, as collegians say, from which
sooner or later they must be relieved. Would
the people of the States of the South be
able . to contend against the military
power of Prussia v by making themselves
the champions of the "liberal cause" in Ger
many, and imitating the Swiss and Belgians,
who, placed by the side of powerful neigh
bors, have compensated for their material
inferiority by the superiority of their institu
tions? This is doubtful. A certain amount
of wind is necessary to float a flag even the
flag of liberty and no breath of air would
come to unfold that which the States of the
South would raise in the face of Prussia. In
no case, however, have their governments
dreamt, for a moment, of trying so hazardous
an experiment. The Germany of the North
and that of the South must, in fact, become
one and the same nation. It is not the ques
tion of religion which divides them.
GERMANY, NORTH AND SOUTH, MUST ULTIMATELY
t BE ONE.
Take, for example, the Valley of the lthine
and the adjacent provinces; in the South, the
country of Baden, Darmstadt, and Wurtem
burg are chiefly Protestant, while, in the
North, Westphalia and the Khenish Provinces
are almost entirely Catholic. The south of
Germany lives by means of its connection
with the north. Its quasi capitals, Carls
ruhe, Stuttg&rd and Munich; its imperial
cities, RatUbon, Augsburg, and even in
dustrious Nureniburg; its sole University of
Heidelberg, do not suffice to give it an inde
pendent existence. In a commercial point of
view, the South would have no advantage in
separating from the North, with its great and
prosperous cities, the centres of industry and
the openings for maritime enterprise; it
would be still less desirable in an intellectual
point of view, for from thence it derives all
its inspirations. All these are inducements
for the South to unite itself with the North;
it wishes it at any price, and is for the time
being content to acoept the supremacy of
Prussia rather than remain situated as it is at
present. The hasty demand for a rectifica
tion of the frontier, addressed by Franoe to
Prussia .in August last, has sufficed to make
the Governments of the South feel how much
they need the protection of the latter power,
and the necessity of concluding with it such
an alliance as will place all their military
forces at ita disposal. ' When the ques
tion of reconstituting the Zollvereign
was agitated, rather than renounce it,
the southern States accepted . ail . the
conditions of Prussia; among others the
veto which it hod reserved in the future
customs congress. That customs union is
only a temporary arrangement preparatory to
the intimate union of North and South.
Berlin has had the exceptional privilege of
seeing itself possessing at the same time
three parliaments, representing for the Prus
sian citizen three countries: Its own par
ticular country, Frussia; its political country,
the Confederation of the North; and its great
country, Germany, disguised under the name
of the Zollverein. A platform like this can
not stand, even in Germany, and the Parlia
ment of the Confederation will soon see itself
seated on the benches of the representatives
of all Germany. It is Prussia whioh to-day
wishes to defer that moment. It is in haste to
have the vote taken on the constitution of the
new confederation, so that it may have only
to discuss the question with . that portion
of Germany which has been already admitted,
and have the power afterwards of imposing
it as a whole on the States which will join it.
The security, however, is not sufficient. The
Government of Berlin cannot venture openly
to oppose the movement which draws the
South towards it, but it wishes to retard it
until it has Prussianized its present confede
rates. It wishes to eat the artichoke leaf by
leaf. It knows well that the admission of the
Southern States would bring into the coun
sels of the confederation such support to the
resistance it has already to oontend against,
as, instead of being able to make the law,
would compel it to submit. Looking at the
matter from a French standpoint, we should
wish, for the same reasons, to see the union
completed as soon as possible. In fact, so
far as European affairs are concerned, it is
already effected by the treaties entered into,
but still more by the force of circumstances.
The Southern States now feel themselves
obliged to be auxiliaries of Prussia in what
ever war it chooses to inaugurate. By a
political union with the South, Prussia would
not gain an additional soldier, whilst it would
find in such union a restraint upon, and a
counterpoise to, its influence in directing the
ail airs oi uermany.
IS GERMANY ANXIOUS FOB WAR ?
But to the' end that these elements of re
sistance may be able to organize and oppose
the efforts which I'russia will make to absorb
Germany, a foreign war does not seem neces
sary. Can we, however, hope for the mam
tenance of peace? The Luxemburg question
put the matter clearly before us a few months
ago, and caused, all those who believed us
then on the eve of a great war to give the
matter serious consideration. A false step
on the edge of the abyss makes all the differ
ence between prudence and temerity. This
has been exemplified in the case of England
and the United States, who, having failed to
quarrel over the Trent affair, have become
more circumspect towards each other. At
times, however, a people, ill at ease with
themselves, feel anxious for a quarrel
witn their neighbors, as a diversion from
their misery. Such is not, however, the dis
position to-day of the people of Germany.
The last war, it is true, soon terminated, but
the sufferings it caused cannot be effaced by
a dash of. the pen. The victims of bullets
and cholera have been' numerous among all
classes of society, and every household has
been in mourning. The draft upon able-
bodied men at that time affected agriculture.
industry, and commerce to such an extent
that the consequences are felt to this day.
The prospect of a new war has become more
repugnant to the Germans, since they have
experienced in the last what miseries follow in
its train. . The thirst of battle which it is
supposed ought to animate every soldier
is by no means general in German armies.
The remembrance of that last campaign is
still too fresh in the minds of those who then
fought against the Prussians to make them
desirous of serving to-day under their orders
So far as the Prussian army is concerned, it
boasts less of Sadowa in 1807 than of Duppel
in 18.; tne reason being that, until the
latter year, its. valor, of which it felt a con
sciousness, was not generally recognized in
Europe. It needed a chance of proving
it, and had not found an - opportunity ' of
doing so alone in any great. European
war. The more meagre the laurels reaped
in Denmark were the more it felt the need
of proving to the world its valor. To
day, on the other hand, although it has
gained a battle the most decisive since
Waterloo, and is the point of aim for military
men throughout tne world, knowing at the
same time by experience how great are the
hazards of war, its language is changed. In
fact, takins the German nation as a whole.
those who hope for some advantage by a new
struggle are greatly in a minority. Those
who gained by late events wish for leisure to
enjoy the fruits, while those who suffered are
anxious for the maintenance of peace as a
means to repair their losses.
JEALOUSY OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.
But if the Germans wish to accomplish in
peace the work of completing their national
"unity," they arenevertheless, very jealous of
any intermeddling with their internal affairs.
The idea of seizing Alsace and Lorraine, or
annexing Holland, hae never been looked
upon by them as other than a fanoy originat
ing in the brain of some professor of history;
still they nave also their "Monroe dootrine
"Germany for the Germans," and whoever
makes an attempt to appropriate any
portion of this territory, which constitutes
their "great country, or even interferes
in their internal affairs, will be .certain to
make them all against him. This is
fact which it would be useless and absard to
dissemble. Of this susceptibility the Prus
sian Government can at any moment avail
itself, should it seek occasion for a quarrel
When M. de Bismarck, after having approved
of the purchase of Luxemburg, freed himself
from his pledge by alleging that German
.opinion was opposed to it, he .was aooused of
bad faitn, and some believed that such opin
ion was fictitious and improvised by himself
to suit the occasion. In this instance he was
calumniated; the explosion of feeling was
real; it was, perhaps, the day when M. de
Bismarck promised his consent that he was
insincere, for be knew well that German sen
timent would pronounce energetically on the
point, and force him to break his word.
THE CONVICTION THAT FRANCE DESIRES WAR.
' The Luxemburg ouestion has been settled
There are probably very few in Germany who
look upon the evacuation of that fortress as
a national humiliation; but the recollection of
the matter has strengthened an idea long
entertained m uermany, and which may one
day or other become dangerous to the main
tenance of peace; it is the conviction that
the Emperor Napoleon has decided upon
making war, and only awaits a fitting oppor
tunity. This idea has taken firm hold of
every person since 1850; previous to that
time the author of the Crimean war had been
looked upon as the champion of the oppressed,
as the protector of Germany against Russia.
The feebleness of the French government in
18CG did not shake this conviction; it was
known to be not ready, and the Germanio dis
trust of It was, soon confirmed by the yarn
efforts of the Cabinet of the Tuilcries to ac
quire succensively Mayence, Landau, or Lux
emburg, 'ine Germans, latterly much occu
pied with their own affairs, have known less
about franco for some years. The distin
guished eloquence of M. Thiers has naturally
attracted much attention beyond the Rhine,
but the Germans have remembered little of
his speeches except his remarks against the
movement lor Uerman "unity." without
thinking that ; they would have been,
without doubt, very different, if the move
ment had not had force and violence as its
auxiliaries; or taking into acoount the posi
tion in which the great orator was placed, or
the rest of the discussion illustrated by his
words. After having searched for the views
of the Government in the articles in the
Consiiiutionnel, the Germans believe they
have found In the columns f some sheets
lately issued in Paris what constitutes the
universal sentiment of ' all shades of the
liberal party in France. They have believed,
and still believe, that the Emperor is per
sonally anxious to make war on Germany,
and that he is equally urged to do so by the
bellicose passions of the French people, and
they say then, if war be inevitable, it is better
it should take place at once, it is better
to make it short and decisive, and thus
get rid of this stake of inquietude, rather
than purchase a temporary peace by conces
sion to a neighbor upon whose good faith no
reliance can be placed. Here there is no de
sire to provoke a war, but there is no spirit
of conciliation to prevent it. Deploring all
this, they resign themselves to it as a neces
sary evil, and when once commenced, that it
may be finished soon, they will strike with
passionate eagerness. Germany does not
push M. de Bismarck into war; it would be
even thankful if he avoided it, but it places
in his hands the means of kindling it and sus
taining it.
THE PEACE OF EUROPE DEPENDENT ON PRUSSIA.
The peace of Europe, then, depends to-day
upon the interests of Prussian policy. What
is that policy ? M. de Bismarck wishes it to
be believed that he used his influenoe to its
utmost limits to prevent war from being
declared in the case of Luxemburg. Even
last year he tried to persuade the sovereigns
deposed by Prussia that ' the plundering of
them had been done by the orders of the
King in spite of his remonstrances. With
reference to this point it is somewhat diffi
cult to separate what is farcical from what is
true. But be it as it may, the motives which
might have made him anxious for
war in the spring and the rea
sons he may have had for question
ing its prudence are easily understood. The
condition of the Prussian forces, better pre
pared and armed, more numerous than ours,
with the prestige of victory attached to them,
and the desire to cement the "unity" of Ger
many by fire in a foreign war seemed to coun
sel him to precipitate the crisis. However,
after much hesitation the Prussian Govern
ment felt desirous of peace. It felt that it
would be oppressive to Germany to Impose
upon it bo soon a new and great war. Onoe
excited, public opinion, however, did not
calm down until the instant when the conflict
seemed imminent. The States of the South,
Eressed to sign the treaties of alliance, were
y no means prepared to fulfil the stipula
tions.' They had not yet transformed their
military force, except by disorganizing it,
and were not ready to take their part in an
effective union. Hanover had suffered from
an extensive conspiracy, to develop which
the presence of the French flag at the mouth
of the Elbe appeared only "needed. It would,
doubtless, have proved abortive, or suocumbed
to the national sentiment, which was so hostile
to foreign interference, but it was impossible
not to see the symptoms of grave disasters in
the event of meeting reverses. The avowed
enemies of Prussia were those who then ap
peared most anxious for war, as if they ex
pected a defeat on the Rhine and the over
throw of its domination. Here was matter
for reflection; the war was avoided. The
situation will be the same next year. Prussia
will have the same difficulties to meet, the
same problems to solve. The States of the
South will certainly be better organized, but
their progress will not compensate for that
of the French army during the same period.
Prussia will have no greater interest in mak
ing war then than it has had in the past three
months; on the contrary, the reasons for
avoiding it will be stronger. The Govern
ment will be perhaps led to it by a chain of
events, but it is jar from having resolved.
War is then possible, but by- no means cer
tain; I hesitate to say even probable.
RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS IN PRUSSIA, AND
DUTY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.
If war, however, should be declared, it
might overthrow the edifice of Prussian domi
nation by undermining it; but its first effect
would be to put an end to all resistance to
that domination, and accomplish the union
of North and South, not to the advantage of
Germany, but solely to that of Prussia, as
the representative of the national military
power. If, on the other hand, owing to the
maintenance of peace, and the prompt admis
sion of the States of the South into the con
federation, Germany might find itself suffi
ciently strong to hold its head above the
Prussian system, and absorb Prussia, instead
of being absorbed by it, it is in the name
of and by means of liberal ideas alone
that it could accomplish this fortunate
result. It is only around the
liberal party, reformed and strengthened,that
the elements of resistance to Cuaarism can
rally.' The party has been disorganized, bat
it has not for all that been destroyed; and in
the midst of the conflict of so many diverse
opinions and interests which' the Constituent
Assembly has faithfully reflected, their course
is strictly defined. To form that assembly
M. de Bismarck has had recourse to universal
suffrage direct, of which he expected more
favorable results than from the system
adopted in the Prussian constitution. This
mode of election, as is everywhere evident,
has sent to the new assembly men belonging
to opinions the most extreme, and those hold
ing intermediate shades Lave found them
selves reduced to an insignificant minority.
The old Liberal party, which was in the as
cendant in the Prussian Parliament, has been
completely broken.
. In the ancient provinces of Prussia the
rural colleges, under the twofold pressure of
the large proprietors and the administration,
have named conservative deputies, whilst
almost all the cities have elected radical or
republican candidates. The city of Berlin
itself, regardless of the advantages of posi
tion which the events of last year secured it,
had the courage to refuse its votes to M. de
Bismarck aad General de Roon, and gave
them to two men well known for the role
they played in 1848 in the ranks of the
republican - party. In the new Prussian
provinces, Nassau perhaps excepted, the ma
jority of the deputies eleoted have been hos
tile to the Government. An aversion to their
new master has made the liberals and old
conservatives act in concert. In the Con
federated States the different Governments
Via-oa lfif nnivAKal fiiiflfraorA talrA ita frm
course, and it haa naturally given vcxious
results. The city of Hamburg has shown ' ,
itself in favor of annexation; in Mecklenburg -universal
suffrage took place in the midst of
a feudal system religiously preserved; and
there the peasants, still suffering under rem
ttants of slavery, supported the candidates j,
whom they believed would best please their
masters. They would have naturally chosen
radicals. ' In general, particular interests have
shaped their political opinions; but the result ,
of the elections in all the countries which had
not been under Prussia previous to the battle
of Sadowa has been to give ft strong majority
against M. de Bismarck.
HOW BISMARCK MANIPULATES THE PARLIAMENT.
Thanks, however, to the ancient Prussian -
Erovinces, the two parties are very nearly "
alanced in the Constituent Assembly. - M.
de Bismarck, who cannot fully rely on either
party, manoeuvres with them as he did in the
Prussian Chambers.' To the conservatives,
who regard him as a renegade, he points out
the will of the King; to the liberals he has his
plans ready to submit, and points out to them
the constitution. "You can," he says, "unit
to vote against me, as you are left free to do;
but you will never agree when it is necessary
to do anything, and your impotence onoe
made evident, all Germany will hold yon re
sponsible for the confusion into which it will
be thrown by your cramping its organization."
In fact, his good fortune has given him in
such an emergeny the case of Luxemburg, n
of which he always takes care to avail him- .
self when he wants to shut the mouth of his t
adversaries in the name of the national honor.
These tactics have made the constitution act
almost as M. de Bismarck intended it should;
but they have not been able to prevent
all the elements, as yet soaltered, of a
strong opposition from drawing nearer
each other and reckoning their strength. The
victory of the Prussian Prime Minister has
been incomplete, and in spite of the defec
tion of a portion of the liberal party, some of
the Parliamentary debates to which the hur
ried discussion of the Constitution has given
opportunity are full of good augury for the
future. M. de Bismarck has found again con
fronting him that famous military question,
the cause of his prolonged quarrel with the
Prussian Chamber, and the warmth with
which it has been debated proves that it will
yet be for Germany the touchstone to dis
tinguish constitutional Governments from
absolute Governments. This question is, in
deed, highly important; for upon its solution
depends the supremacy of despotism or of
liberal ideas. . ,.' , .
SHALL PRUSSIAN RULE BE CONSTITUTIONAL OB
DESPOTIC?
The question at issue is to decide whether
the military contingent shall be fixed by the
constitution, and, if once so fixed, whether
the king shall have power, without the inter- ..
vention of Parliament, to levy annually the
men and money necessary for the mainte
nance of . the army; or whether the contin
gent and war budget shall be annually voted
by the Parliament, as has been the practice
in the Parliaments of the minor States. It
is a final test of strength between the Parlia
ment and the executive, between the will of
an individual and the will of the people, be
tween personal government and national
government. Upon a platform so large 1
Prussia has not been able to render sacred
the prinoiple of absolutism by means of the
assembly, notwithstanding tho tactics it had '
recourse to. ' By a pro seeding which has only
postponed the question without settling it, '
the military law has been voted for five years.
This affords safeguards for the future of the
liberal party, and in five years, if it have .
gained support, it can, upon the basis thus
arranged, bring about the definitive triumph
of its principles.
The partial success it has gained to-day
proves it is not dead; that it can rally and
again enter the arena 'stronger than it has
yet been, owing to the unification of Ger
many and the onerous and difficult task thus
imposed upon it. To this end, it can calcu
late on support upon which it had no right to
count last year. The conservative party has
been even still more disorganized. Many
upright men, wounded in their feelings and .
disturbed in their convictions by the policy
of the King of Prussia, whom they had re
garded as the personification of their ideas,
have frankly avowed themselves liberals. Im- ,
port ant interests demand aid and protection
to the liberal cause against the encroachments
of Prussian despotism. The princes depend
ent on King William can, if they act oppor
tunely and in good faith, secure to them
selves by this means what still remains to
them of their authority and prestige.
WHAT SHOULD BE THE POLICY OF FRANCE.
Such are the various elements which begin
to develop themselves in the midst of the
confusion produced in Germany by the late
war. What appeared possible last year, what ',
France would have desired, and what would
have then been acceptable to our neighbors,
is to-day in turn discarded. The unity of
Germany, long contemplated, is not only
accomplished, but accomplished by force and
military prestige. Complications abroad or
occurrences at home may hasten or modify
the course of events. A war may burst forth
and suppress that resistance whioh, springing
up, fetters to some extent the domination of
the Prussian system. A revolutionary wind
may blow over Germany, , and, after
having served all parties in turn, with
out inspiring confidence in any, the
King of Prussia may learn one day that he
has not elevated himself so high as he antici
pated when he removed with his own hands
the natural props of his throne. If, on the
contrary, a lengthened calm succeed the
tempest of Sadowa, one may then conjecture
that, even in the midst of the changes in
Germany, liberal ideas will revive, find their
ancient defenders, gain new ones, and resist
the extension of "Ctesarism" over Central
Europe. . If they receive popular support,
who knows but they may even calculate upon
having M. de Bismarck one day among their
most zealous defenders?
Be it as it may, it is not possible to pene
trate to-day a future so full of uncertainty.
Our part, however, has never been that of
blind worshippers of success. In the pre
sence of so great a revolution as that through
which Germany is passing at thi? moment,
without fatiguing ourselves in trying to
fathom th.e darkness of a douhtf ul future, or
in vain regrets for what is past and irrevoca
ble, ought we not rather endeavor to estimate
properly the present ? Perhaps even now we
could see to what side, as Frenchmen, as libe
rals, and, I would add, as sincere friends of
Germany, we ought to give our sympathies.
FIRE AND BURGLAR PROOF 8AF
TTp-H J. WATSON A SOW, fl
Win - UU Brm of EVAJ,S WATSON,
FIRE AND BURGLAR-PROOF
SAFE STOKE,
No. 83 BOUTII FOURTH STREET,
1211 AlM4omftbeTCfcasDmttt..rbUtd,'. t