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## SPIRIT OF THE PRESS.

Editorial Opinions of the Leading Journals upon Current Topics-Compiled Every Day for the Evening Telegraph.

THE WAR.

From the London Spectator.

Germany has rushed together with a clang That is the first, and for France the worst. result of the declaration of war. The Emperor Napoleon, with that strange incapacity to comprehend popular feeling which he has betrayed throughout his career, which made him fancy that England would alter her laws to protect his throne from plots, that the North would give up her struggle with the South, that Mexicans would rise for an Austrian archduke, that Tuscany would accept a Bonaparte for a sovereign, that Italy would give up Rome, that the ignorant "gentlemen" of Austria would beat the "mere professors" of Berlin, had evidently imagined that the "conquered" States of Germany would welcome an invasion that might relieve them of their chains. Exiles embittered by undeserved misfortunes told him so; envoys accustomed to live among the limited class which, partly from tradition, partly from cosmopolitan training, hates the stern regime of the Hohenzollerns, repeated the same tale; the Ultramontanes, savage at the rise of a Protestant power, endorsed the envoy's despatches; and finally, the secret agents, mixing only with men who are to Germans what Fenians are to Englishmen, struck the impression home. The war must be directed against Prussia alone, and then Hanover would rise; Saxony would rebel; Schleswig-Holstein would demand its Prince; Wurtemberg would declare war on Prussia: Bavaria would accept Austrian advice: Germany would melt down like a waterspout under the concussion of the cannon. War was declared, war intended to crush down the German oppressor, and all Germany at the oppressor's summons rushed together if the Hohenzollern already wore the imperial crown. Particu-larist and Ultramontane, noble and Particuburgher, the classes which love the past and the traders who dread military conscription, all laid aside their grievances to defend the united Fatherland. Bavaria declared war on France. Wurtemberg declared war on France. Saxony demanded "energetic action" against the French, and formally claimed her place in the vanguard of the battle. Hanover proclaimed in great meetings her devotion to the Federation. Bremen rose in insurrection against a merchant who criticized Prussian "arrogance." Hamburg sent volunteers, and doubled the money asked. The Universities on the Rhine were deserted, all students hastening to the ranks. The Opposition, so jealous of the purse, so hostile to the new military system, voted £25,000,000 to bring that system to perfection. The wildest fa-natics of liberty, with Karl Blind at their head, called on the Soldier-King to defend Germany with the sword. The very emigrants flying from conscription, and safely arrived in New York, returned to bear in the "slavery" they hated their share in the com-mon duty of defending Germany from subju-gation. From Posen to Italy, from Silesia to Cologne, the German people rose in arms. As these words reach our readers, the mobilization will be complete, and the great Teutonic people, double the number of those who won le American war, stubborn as Yankees and as educated, organized like Frenchmen, full of knowledge and burning with zeal, with a million of trained soldiers as their advance guard, are pouring down on France, to settle once for all whether Teuton or Latin is to be leader of the world. Let our readers think but for five minutes of the power which that race can exert, of its numbers and its history, of its weapons and its education, of its Carnot, Von Moltke, and its geographical position, and judge whether Repoleon will in six weeks be at Berlin. That the Emperor of the French wields a terrible weapon is true, for he leads France; and France is as great as Germany, and as homogeneous, as full of soldiers, as ardent, as well prepared, and far more likely to develop leaders of the true destructive-warrior type. No race has ever existed in Europe, not even the Roman, which could pretend to meet the Gaul in battle without a doubt of the result; nor is there one, except the English, which has not time and again been forced to sue to France for peace. There may be, as some observers think, disquiet among the peasantry; but Frenchmen, once at war, know only the glory of France; and the army, which is France, is as enthusiastic as if it were, as it half believes itself to be, a Providence to itself. But even France, with all her genius for war, her courage, and her patriotism, even the army which won Magenta, may be over-taxed; and unless we misread all modern history, this march to Berlin will overtax her. It is not an army, but an armed nation, which is in the road. Besides, why do we assume that the march must be towards Berlin, and the Germans the defendants? Why should it not be towards Paris, the French being the defendants? It is a curious proof of the ascendancy which French genius and daring exercise over all minds that the supposition should seem monstrous; but Prussia is as close to France as France to Prussia, she has easier modes of ingress, not having to cross the Rhine, and she is led by men whose first if not greatest characteristic is military audacity, who crossed the Carpathians to seek an army which all Europe expected would destroy them, and who have announced publicly a fixed belief that war, to be short, should be fought upon the hostile soil. That an invasion would raise to its height the ardor of France is true, that it would summon all France into the field cannot be doubted: but ardor, whatever its height, can but make men disregard death, which Frenchmen do even when not excited, and the French army, under its present organization, is France in the field. That such a march should succeed may, nay does, appear incredible but it may succeed as well as a halt -may produce, that is, a drawn battle, and at a cost of far less suffering to States which it will be the policy of Prussia to exempt as far as may be from the horrors of war. Wurtemberg will be most German while Germans are marching on France. It is argued that Prussia is not so prepared as France, and that seems true; but the immense magnitude of the contest, involving as it does more men than Napoleon gathered from half Europe upon the Niemen, has compelled the Emperor to delay his spring until Prussia is just so far prepared that advance might make the remaining preparations easier. During the Austrian war the second line was formed behind the invading army. By to-morrow Prussia should be as ready as she was in 1866, and though the French, with their splendid energy and speed, may anticipate her debouche, and fight the first grand battle on Prussian soil, this, we feel sure, will be the leading idea of the cam-

hither or thither side of Saarbruck, be won by Prussia, she will flow into France; if by France, Prussia will fall back, fighting step by step, until her chance opens to her once more. To predict the resuit of such an engagement would be folly, but the great French soldiers who have studied Germany know well how nearly equal the resources and the courage and the enthusiasm of the two armies are, and they at least do not, as most of our contemporaries do, forget Leipsic to remember only Jena, or conceal from themselves that France, with all her brilliant staff, has not yet discovered the equal of the great Italian who, at Jena, at the head of her troops, struck Prussia down. That sense of equality, existing on both sides, manifested in the Emperor's long prepara-tions as in King William's address to his Parliament, in the French exultation in the mitrailleuse as in the Prussian pledges to fight to the last, will of itself make the first great battle unspeakably important, for it will tend to make the generals on both sides dread a numerical inferiority, not only for the effect it may exercise on their strategy, but the effect it is certain to produce on the imaginations of their men. Soldiers must be very contemptaons of their foes to be careless about being outnumbered, and at heart neither Prussian nor Frenchman is contemptuous of the other. Add that in Germany society is almost disorganized by the mobilization of the army, and that in France speedy victory is politically almost as important as victory itself, and every consideration will be seen to point to a battle on a prodigious scale. That it should be a decisive one is, we imagine, beyond either bope or fear. The countries engaged are too powerful, the army reserves too strong, the interests at stake too great for a battle to secure a peace; but, nevertheless, the result of that battle must be so great that all previous study of the situation may well be postponed. All alliances will depend on its result, and so, it may be, will the very meaning of the war. Which-ever wins, the other will feel that it fights almost for independence, and will offer to every available ally terms now pronounced absurd. The map of Europe, if not its fate, will depend upon that engagement.

If that battle, be it fought on the

paign. hither

THE CHANCES OF FRANCE AND PRUSSIA. From the Pall Mall Gazette.

Although many of the data for a detailed comparison of the chances under which the beligerents will enter the field are still wanting, some of the conditions on which the ultimate success of either side must more or less depend may already be pointed out. First of all, it must be borne in mind that the war will be as original in character as any war ever was. The new armaments change the whole tactics of the past, and even to a considerable extent affect strategic principles. Assuming that France and Prussia can at once bring into the field pretty nearly the same number of land forces, let us see on which side the balance of advantage is shown by a review of the general conditions. The Danish war, the Austro-Prussian war, as well as the last Italian campaign, in all of which the new arms were only partially introduced on one side of the contest, give no trastworthy ground for such an estimate, which must therefore remain to a considerable extent a speculative one.

On the whole, the belligerents appear to be equally well armed; but, asfar as it is known, the Chassepot nas a slight advantage over the needle-gun; the former being lighter, less liable to get ont of order, and shooting a little quicker. The respective merits of the French and the Prussian soldiery as marksmen, which may very easily counterbalance or increase the difference in their arms, remain to be decided on the field. The gans of the artillery may be taken as equally good, but the French gunners ought to be better trained, because the men and horses remain permanently in the ranks, while in Prussia only two-thirds of the effectives remain on service in time of peace. The French battery. also, has two guns more than the Prussian; thus it may be that a smaller battery, with a considerable number of raw horses and fresh men, will often have to act against a larger one, in which officers, men, and horses are uniformly up to their business. But as the Austrian and Danish war happened only a few years since, it may be calculated that Prussia will be able to bring at once into the ranks many an artilleryman who has been actually engaged. and thus this disadvantage will be remedied. to a certain extent at least. There remain as probable advantages to France the mitraillense and the new revolving cannon. True, the merits of the latter arm are by no means established at present; of the former there are several batteries in the French army and none in the Prussian, we believe. But even this arm is known only by reports of French experiment, and its real importance remains also to be ascertained. With regard to cavalry, the advantage will probably be on the side of Prassia, whenever there is an opportunity of heavy attack in more or less considerable masses. which opportunities, however, may not be very frequent. And should the mitrailleuse batteries prove really effective, and if they are well distributed among the various French corps, the massive action of the Prossian cavalry will be considerably paralyzed; for, supposing even that the mitrailleuse has no very deadly effect beyond 1000 yards, it will still avail to frighten the horses beyond due control. Moreover, for action in small bodies, and for reconnoissances, the French cavalry is at least as effective and as well trained as the Prussian. With regard to the command of the two armies nothing can be said yet, as even the names of the generals who are to play the prominent parts are not all or accurately known To be sure, Prince Charles is a better general than the Emperor Napoleon; but it remains to be shown how far the military abilities of Count Moltke are preferable to those of Canrobert, McMahon, or Bazaine. The tactical and strategic aspects of the conflict remain to be considered. If the telegrams conveying the promises of belligerents to preserve the neutrality of the adjacent countries be trustworthy, there will be little choice but for the French to go to Barlin or for the Prussians to go to Paris. Uader such circumstances the war would probably be finished very soon; for two or three decisive battles would settle the matter, unless the conflict widens into a European war. If, on the other hand, the neutrality of certain States is disregarded, the war may take a turn which will quite overset calculation. However, all this is very problematical and quite out of our present purpose. Confining ourselves to the purely military aspect of the question, we are inclined to say that the issue of the war will depend as much upon the Emperor Napoleon as its declaration did. Whatever the King of Prussia or Count Bismarck may have done towards provoking the war, they will have comparatively little influence over its conduct; in other words, the Prussian military authorities, and especially Prince Charles, will have far greater freedom of action than the French marshals. The Em-

peror Napoleon, taking the chief command of the army, will listen to the advice of his generals only as far as he is inclined to do so; and the more anxious he may be personally to sustain the military reputation of his uncle, the more likely are the French to be ultimately defeated. It must be borne in mind that the Pressian army is much more capable of acting in large bodies than the French is; the entire organization of the two armies, their whole discipline, lead to this capital difference. It may be fairly said that in the Prussian army the most independent man is the captain of the company. Between him and the commander-in-chief all the intermediate authorities are merely links transmitting orders. Consequently, if the commanding officers of the company are intelligent men, the largest army can act with the greatest possible unity; and one of the best means of disorganizing the Prussian army during battle would be to shoot all the captains. In the French army, on the other hand, the fundamental body is the battalion, whose commanding officer is a person of sufficent rank to imagine himself-and to a certain extent really to be-an independent commander. The battalion, amounting in France to something like 750 men, and often acting on its own account, makes the French army in the long run much more fit for acting in detachments of a moderate size than in large corps. Their comparatively less stringent discipline has also acted in that direction. And if the Emperor Napoleon intends to give a gr-r-rande bataille under his personal command, he is very likely to be beaten.

Another point on which much will depend s connected with the question of who will take the offensive and who the defensive. The new weapons make offensive action exceedingly disadvantageous. For if the attacked corps is even much weaker in numbers than its adversaries, it can, if it profits by the various cover which the position may afford, so much reduce the attacking forces during their advance that the chances of further fighting will be greatly reduced. If the French take the offensive they will probably attempt to neutralize this disadvantage by using great masses of artillery both before and in conjunction with advancing columns, as they have often done before. But then the Prussian needle-gun will operate on the batteries, in all cases when it can reach them, and thus one of the greatest advantages of France over Prussia, that of a perfectly trained artillery, may be greatly lessened after any battle of this sort. These disadvantages of offensive action must be still greater for Prussia than for France, for the Chassepot is pretty sure to act more efficiently than the needle-gun, and the French infantry soldier more than any other is likely to prove a better marksman from behind field works, as a bush or a mound, than when he has to shoot and advance at the same time. It has been said that the Prussian military authorities were lately of opinion that in case of a war with France a direct and audacious march to Paris would give the best chance of victory: but we must confess we do not quite. comprehend the grounds of such an opinion. The only advantage that Prussia would seem to have in invading France is that the

French people are likely to be, as they have shown themselves to be, very indifferent fighters at home. Led by the prestige of glory they will go impetuously to the end of the world; but when they see foreign soldiers in their own country they give up everything for lost, and lose their heads and sometimes even their courage. With the Germans it is almost the reverse. They fight better at home than abroad, although it is not impospossible that when brought to the French frontier every soldier will be as furious to cross it as Blucher was when, about to cross the Rhine, he said that he would cross it alone if the allies confabulated any longer on the subject. These peculiarities of national character ought to be well kept in view by the respective commanders; and it is not improbable that the most fortunate general during this war will be that one who shall prove to be not less versed in the management of military forces than in the knowledge of the peculiarities of the national mind. From a purely military point of view, perhaps, the better plan of a campaign would be for the French to occupy at once the Rhine provinces, and to hold themselves there on the defensive. While for the Prussians the better plan would be to draw the French as far as possible into Germany, to give them there battle, and, if successful, to push their enemies before them on to Paris.

gent in regard to the building of ships, and | confer too large an authority on the Secretary of State, and that their general effect would be injurious to the shipbuilding interests of the country. The question at issue between Mr. Harcourt and the other Commissioners may be shortly stated: -There is no dispute as to the obligations of international law in this matter. It is deemed lawful to build ships of war for belligerents, but not to equip or despatch them when built. Mr. Harcourt thinks it will be enough if we extend our municipal law so as to meet these obligations, it being admitted that at present our municipal law is defective in that respect. On the other hand. the Commissioners argue that, as a matter of domestic convenience, and for the sake of giving our Government proper facilities for fulfilling the international duty of preventing the equipment and despatch of armed vessels, it is necessary to carry the municipal law a step beyond the international law, and strike at the building of any ship for an unlawful purpose. Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone in announcing that a bill would immediately be introduced on this subject, afforded no indication how far the Government are prepared to go in the direction of the Commissioners' report. No one will deny the gravity of the considerations raised by Mr. Harcourt The shipbuilding trade is an important element both in the strength and commercial prosperity of this country; and we are bound to be cantious lest we injure it by any undue restraints. At the same time national interests must necessarily override those of any class, and the interests involved in these questions of neutrality are of a magnitude which do not admit of being trifled with. It is idle to pass a law on this subject which shall not be thoroughly effective; and without the power of arcesting any vessel which is being built for the use of a belligerent, with the intention of being armed and equipped for such service elsewhere, we should still be exposed to a repetition of the difficulties which occurred during the American war. As to the powers to be given to the Secretary of State, they are no doubt very large and arbitrary, and capable of being turned to mischievous account, but it might, perhaps, be possible to modify them, or, at least, to surround them with certain checks in addition to the greatest check of all-the vigilance of public opinion and the jealous scrutiny of political opponents.

GERMANY.

From the London Saturday Review. The King of Prussia is at the head of the troops of United Germany. That Germany should be united, and that the King of Prussia should without the slightest struggle or jealousy be able to lead into the field all the troops of every German power, is a truly wonderful event. For the moment at least the Germans are one people, and nothing like this, or even approaching to this, has ever before been seen in modern Europe. The German people have got rid of Austria, they have got rid of their princes; they are united, and they have a leader. For this they are mainly indebted to themselves. It was the people who got up the War of Liberation; it is the peo-Liberation; it is the peo-who have clung to the idea of ple

unity amid the jealousies of courts and the intrigues of ministers. It is the people who have formed themselves into what they are by the educational and military system of North Germany. Count Bismarck has done as much as any one man could do to make a nation, but nations are not to be made by

then shifted backwards and forwards, and then have joined France. A string of ques-tions addressed to the French representatives in Wurtemberg has lately been published, from which it appears that the French Government relied upon internal dissensions in the South German States, and calculated upon the assistance a French party in those States would give it. Even at Berlin it would seem as if surprise as well as delight was felt at the extreme readiness of South Germany to make cause with the North. In old days, too, if one German prince did make up his mind to aid another, he always insisted on making his assistance as ineffectual as possi sible, and on jealously retaining a separate command. Now, without a sign of remonstrance or unwillingness, the States of South Germany obey the command to place their forces at the disposal of the Crown Prince of Prussia. Their soldiers are to all intents and purposes part of the Prussian army, and glory in being so. They feel a confidence in being guided by the conquerors of Sadowa which they would not feel if local generals and princes were to command them. Hesitation has always been hitherto diplomathe bane of German tists and German commanders. the German nation has grown wise, and has detarmined to escape this great source of danger. There has not been a trace of hesitation in German diplomacy; for the German nation has asserted itself, and has taken its fortunes out of the hands of diplomatists. And we may be sure that in the military operations of the German army there will be as little hesitation; and that every fortress will be ready to do its utmost service, and every regiment will be called into play, in exactly the manner, and exactly the time, which the strategists of Berlin consider to be most advisable.

Whether the issue of this war will be like the issues of the disastrous wars in which the First Napoleon humbled Germany, no one can say: but what is certain is that every condition of the struggle is altered on the side of Germany. In those days France held Belgium and Holland as her own. Now Germany is covered on her long Rhenish frontier, from the Moselle to the Waal, by nations determined to uphold their neutrality. Prussia betrayed the left bank of the Rhine below Strasbourg to France on the promise of an indemnity to be gained at the expense of the small German Ltates. Now the trans-Rhenan parts of Germany are not only the property of Prussia, but are evidently Prussian; and the strips of precious territory which Prussia got under the second peace of Paris, in compensation for what Russia took in Poland, are protected by strong fortresses. and will tax the power of France to rend them from their present possessors. There were scattered over Germany in the time of Napoleon many fortresses of some celebrity. Bat they were of little use, for he was always rendering them useless by getting them betrayed to him. Now Mayence, for example, which Austria sold to him at Campio Formio, is one of the strongest places in all Europe, and it is quite certain that united Germany will never give it up until it is wrested from her by sheer force. For fifty years the wealth of Germany has been lavished in making the safeguards against France safe. Throughout the wars of the First Napoleon there were always Germans who wished that the German Powers should be beaten, or were at least indifferent whe her France won or not. Prussia attached scarcely any value to the left bank of the Rhine, and let France do as it pleased in order to profit by the final partition of Poland. Austria did not so much wish to beat France as to get hold of Bavaria, while Bavaria brought about the calamities of Ulm and Austerlitz, and became virtually a province of France, in order to defeat the projects of Austria. Germany deserved most thoroughly the humiliation to which it was subjected; but even then it took the military genius of Napoleon to beat the Germans. His lieutenants often sustained reverses which, if the German troops had been under decent management, might easily have proved fatal to the invaders. Too much, indeed, is often made of Leipsic on the one side, as too much is made of Jena on the other. For it was under the shelter and with the co-operation of Russie that Germans made their first successful stand against Napoleon, as they might have made it long before but for the inconceivable folly of the King of Prussia. Leipsic is noticeable, not as a victory of Germans, but as the first battle in which the German people, as apart from the Ger-man sovereigns, fought for their independence. Leipsie was the beginning of that movement which now arrays all Germany as one man against Louis Napoleon; and from that day to this the movement has never ceased. The symptoms of the growth of a nation are not always very pleasant to witness, and the common sense of Europe justly condemned the foolish fury of the students which ended in the murder of Kotzebue, as thirty years later it condemned the idle revolution which for a moment set up a mock empire at Frankfort. But in spite of everything, in spite of France. in spite of its princes, in spite of its own faults, Germany has grown, now slowly, now quickly, for half a century, until at last it is a nation and challenges France in arms on terms which make the Emperor of the French, and all of his subjects who do something more than shout and swear at Prussia, feel that, after all France can do to prevent it,

pepper. This is one of the undesirable results of pulpit popularity. Another is its tendency to take the virility out of a man. The same admiration which leads the women of the society to present worsted slippers to the pastor, until he has enough of them to stock a Broadway shop, gives rise to an ap-prehension that his brain must be softening. that his lungs are weak, that he is in danger of a confirmed bronchitis. Tenderly he is asked, ten times a day - "Does Gastrodynia's tiny gimlet bore?"-only the kind and fair querists say dyspepsia instead of using the classical word. No wonder that he falls into Fichte's condition, when that philosopher wrote to a friend:-"You know that before leaving Zurich, I became somewhat sickly; either it was partly imagination, or the cook ery did not agree with me." But for all his felicities of coddling, the

clergyman days a heavy price. He is bothered by women; he is criticized by men; once in seven days he is weighed in a balance, or discussed by the retiring crowd; if he be a man of brains and culture he is in continual danger of preaching over the heads of his congregation; and, if he be a man of oulture without brains, he must laboriously work upon most of the secular days at his warping and woofing of a brilliant cento for next Sunday. If he be a man of ardent piety, he is continually worried by the tepidarean concontinually worled by the tepldarean con-dition of his society. "Alas!" he cries, "if they would only be hot, or, at any rate, cold!" If a pastor thus worked and worried demands leave of absence, and runs away from the fold for a time, there is nothing in his bolting which is in the least to be wondered at. The main difficulty, we venture to suggest, is too much sermonmaking. The congregation is critical by habit, and knows, by a sort of instinct, a good sermon from a bad one. We do not say that this is an intelligent knowledge, for it reminds us, we confess, of Jeremy Tay-lor's rustic audience gaping with delight at his Latin and Greek quotations. But church-goers soon come to recognize an able preacher, without any proper appreciation of his ability. They may not comprehend, but they cannot be cheated. For an old sermon, they have the keenest of memories, and they all mention to each other as they walk home to dinner that Dr. — preached that dis-course about two weeks after he was ordained. The poor clergyman who fishes in the very bottom of his barrel for an MS., good enough for tenantless pews upon a summer Sunday, may be sure that there will always be somebody present who will find him out, and take the greatest pleasure in telling those of slower recollection.

Now, if the reader will but consider the matter fairly, he will see that it is almost an impossibility for a pastor to write one hun-dred and four excellent new sermons yearly. If put to such a task, especially if he be dyspeptic, he will either break down or he will break through the bindings of his books, and desperately steal, or else he will dispense the mere sugar-plums of rhetoric to hungry souls. He must be a pretty good worker who can write, let us say, a dozen really first-rate sermons in a year, for these will demand for their preparation study, reflection, castigation, and a good deal of re-writing. It must be re-membered that we are speaking of sermons which are sermons—really great works of art like those of Jeremy Taylor, or Dr. South, or Robert Hall, or Channing, or Chalmers. The late Dr. Wayland was fond of telling his class how many drafts he made of his renowned sermon on Missions, and he may well bave been a little proud of it, for it laid the foundation of his subsequent fame. Doubtless his congregation would have liked two such sermons every Lord's day, but they might as well have expected a stated supply of archangels to preach to them. Fortunately, or unfortunately, at least among Protestants, preaching sermons has become the most important function of the priestly office, with certain results which are to be deplored, and with others which are to be commended. But wardens and vestrymen and standing committees may be assured that they will in the end lose nothing by allowing the brains from which they expect so much an occasional season of repose and recreation. No organ of the human body so rejoices, after hard work, at an interval of rest as that pulpy prisoner within the walls of the cranium; while there is no organ which so rapidly and satisfactorily achieves recuperation It is quite wonderful to find how casy brain-work is made by a week or fortnight of perfect rest-of rest from think ing, and writing, and constructing, and from all reading except that of travels and biogra phies, of novels and newspapers. Wherefore we beseech clergymen, when they desire a furlough, not to talk about their throats or stomachs, but to say boldly that they want rest, because rest is a good thing in itself.

#### THE ENGLISH NEUTRALITY LAWS. From the Pall Mall Gazette.

It is not creditable to the Government of this country that a question like that of the neutrality laws should, after our grave experience of the imperfection of those laws during the American war, have been allowed to remain so long in suspense, and have now to be taken up amid the heat and excitement of a European conflict. There is the less excuse for delay in dealing with the subject, since a Royal Commission of high personal and legal authority examined it in 1868, and embodied their conclusions in a report which supplied all the materials for legislation. By the seventh section of the Foreign Enlistment act it is a misdemeanor to equip, furnish, fit out, or arm any ship with intent that it shall be employed by any foreign belligerent against any friendly power, or to attempt to do so, or knowingly to aid, assist, or be concerned in such equipment; it is also a misdemeanor to issue or deliver any commission in her Majesty's dominions to any ship to the intent that it should be so employed. The proposal of the commissioners was that the following acts should also be considered misdemeanors: -"To fit out, arm, despatch, or cause to be despatched, any ship, with intent or knowledge that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service" of any belligerent against any friendly power; also "within her Majesty's dominions to build or equip any ship, with intent or knowledge that the same shall, after being fitted out and armed, either within or beyond her Majesty's dominions, be employed as aforesaid;" also to "commence, or attempt to do so, or aid in doing so." With a view to enabling the Government to carry out these provisions, and especially the last, the commissioners recommended that on the Secretary of State being "satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship which is within the limits of her Majesty's dominions has been, or is being, built, equipped, fitted out, or armed contrary to the enactment, and is about to be taken beyond the limits," it should be lawful for him to issue his warrant for the apprehension of the ship, whereupon the burden of proving that it was not intended for any unlawful purpose would be cast upon the owner. With one exception, the Commissioners

were unanimous in adopting these recommendations. The exception was Mr. Vernon Harcourt, who in a supplement to the report explained his reasons for dissenting from some parts of it. The gist of his objections is that the proposed provisions are too strin-

one man. The secret of the new strength of Germany lies in the consciousness of worth and strength which possesses the Germans. They feel that they and their country have a right to exist. The intrigues of ministers or the successes of generals cannot create a spirit like that which now breathes through the whole German nation. It was the people of Bavaria and the people of Wurtemberg who determined in an instant that South Germany should work with North Germany in defense of the Fatherland. It is the peasants of the Rhineland who know that ruin stares them in the face, and who court rain that even at that price the Fatherland may be their country. No greater conquest of ideas has been seen in modern Europe. France may succeed in rending Germany asunder. She may tear away from Germany provinces that long 'o be German. But for the moment at least Germany exists as a great, compact, concordant whole. And France has been one of the chiefest means of bringing about the unity of Germany. The first Napoleon taught Germans what are the terrible calamities to which they must be subjected if they are divided. The second Napoleon has taught Germans that the danger to which want of division exposes Germany is perpetual. France is going, if it can, to crush or destroy them because they venture to unite, and under the threat of France they have become altogether united. Even in the provinces that until lately hated Prussia as a rapacious and insolent aggressor there now only one feeling, the desire to let France know, once for all, that Germany is determined to exist. Hanover is no more represented by the loafing adventurers who slope along the Bouvelards under the name of the Hanoverian Legion, than England was represented by the exiles of St. Germains. If patriotism ever showed itself in a noble and striking manner, it is showing itself now in such a manner at this moment in Germany; and it may surely be said that it would be a terrible loss to humanity, and to Europe, if a patriotism of so high a degree were to show itself in vain, and if brute force and the mitrailleuse were to scatter it into dust.

The French, too, are intensely patriotic, and it is not to be questioned but that in some strange way they have convinced themselves that right is on their side, and that they are entitled to say that German patriotism is an injury and an insult to them which they cannot endure. But when we judge between the combatants, we observe that the Germans are quite willing that French patriotism should endure and have free play so long as it keeps itself to itself and allows its neighbors to live in peace. And then German patriotism is something so new; and it is refreshing to find that a new great patriotic nation has sprung into existence. Of all men the Emperor of the French was the most interested in ascertaining whether its existence was a reality or not; and he evi-dently calculated wrongly. He had no notion that South Germany, which must bear the first brunt of the war, would at once proclaim itself identified with Prussia and the North. He thought he could make his quarrel one with Prussia only, and that Prussia was undermined by the disaffection of her involuntary subjects. That within a week after the declaration of war, the Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg would be receiving the thanks of their subjects for letting them fight against the French, would have seemed to him as improbable as anything could be. If history could be trusted as a guide, it South Germany would ar first have hesitated,

CLERICAL VACATIONS. From the N. Y. Tribune.

Germany may still be Germany.

The Methodist clergymen of Chicago were, at the date of our last advices, engaged in considering the important query, Whether a minister should travel for his health in hot weather, leaving his sanctuary shut up or his pulpit to the mercy of a chance supply? In this city the matter (however it may be in Chicago) does not seem to be one of much importance. When the sheep have wandered to the seaside or up the mountains, or have taken ship "strange countries for to see," it is hardly worth while for the shepherd to linger at home merely to read prayers and sermons to "dearly beloved Roger," the sexton. Parsons who are accustomed to full houses never exhort at their best to a beggarly account of empty pews. This is one of the inevitable results of the prominence which has been given to the sermon at the expense of the service. If people go, to church simply for the sake of intellectual gratification, or merely follow the crowd to listen to a popular speaker, then a numerous auditory is just as necessary in a church as it is in a play-house. Indeed, one cannot sometimes help remembering that the *pulpitum* in the Roman theatre was the place where the actors exhibited themselves. A preacher accustomed to the stimulus of "a sea of upturned faces," to the gratification of congregational applause, to the assurance of many accordant voices that the sermon just onunciated was perfectly beautiful, soon finds that the flavor might have been confidently expected that of his preaching is lamentably depen-South Germany would ar first have besitated, dent upon this particular kind of

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