DAHLGREN VS. GILLMORE

The Dispute Between Them.

The Navy Before Charleston.

The Capture of Morris Island.

The Siege of Sumter and Wagner Dahlgren's Version.

Sustains Sherman

Gillmore's Incapacity

Many of our readers will remember that during the operations against Morris Island and Fort Wagner, and afterwards, General Q. A. Gillmore and the officers under his command complained that they did not receive from the navy an efficient support. The blame for this was laid upon Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, who assumed the command of the South Atlantic squadron a short time previous to the attack on Morris Island, and military incapacity was not the least serious charge made against him by Gillmore and the officers of the army. Whether through his own fault or not, it is certain that Admiral Dahlgren did not make a distinguished reputation by his management of the fleet before Charleston, and his differences with Gillmore excited an intense feeling against him in the army.

Admiral Dahlgren's course, whether judi-

cious or otherwise, was approved by the Navy Department, and he was retained in command of the South Atlantic squadron until the conclusion of the war. We are not aware that he ever made any reply whatever to the accusations of General Gillmore, and the public have been somewhat in a state of uncertainty as to the exact nature of the quarrel between the two commanders. The following account of the naval operations before Morris Island and Fort Wagner is an extract from a brief but comprehensive sketch of the doings of the South Atlantic squadron while under the command of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, which was written by the Admiral a short time before his death for the second edition of Hamersly's "Records of the Living Officers of the United States Navy." This paper was prepared by the Admiral at the request of Mr. Hamersly, and it is interesting not only as a succinct account of the performances of the navy during the active operations against Charleston, but as an answer from the pen of Admiral Dahlgren himself to the accusations made against him by General Gillmore. It will be seen that the Admiral retorts upon Gillmore with the charge of incapacity, and according to his own statements the movements of the army under that officer's command were a series of blunders from the beginning, and that they were only saved from total failure by the efficient support which the navy gave at all times. This narrows the issue between the two officers down to a fine point; and if General Gillmore had any real grounds of complaint against Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, now is the time for him to state specifically what they were. The following is the naval side of the question according to Dahlgren:-

ADMIRAL DAHLGREN TAKES COMMAND. Rear-Admiral Dahlgren arrived at Port Royal on the 4th of July, 1863, and on the 6th relieved Admiral Dupont of the command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Having been told by Admiral Dupont that Brigadier-General Gillmore was very anxious to proceed with some operations against Morris Island, Admiral Dahlgren immedistely sought an interview with Gillmore and agreed to assist in the reduction of the island. He might well have demurred to the instant action required, for he had no instructions from the Navy Depart-ment authorizing him so to do, and the iron-clads were not ready for such service; the experience of the 7th of April had shown the necessity of strength-ening the pilot-houses and bases of turrets, and the work was in progress on three at Port Royal, the others being scattered at other ports.

THE ATTACK ON MORRIS ISLAND. Notwithstanding this disadvantage and that of never having seen the locality of the contemplated operation, the Admiral agreed without hesitation to oc-operate with Gillmore in the attack on Morris Island. The work was stopped at once on the monitors, and before daylight on the 9th of July (the day fixed) four of them were off the Charleston bar ready to enter, but the General would not be ready before the next day. It was still dark when the before the next day. It was still dark when the Admiral's flag was holsted on board the Kaatskill and the monitors began to move for the bar. The land batteries on Folly Island opened fire as soon as there was light enough, and the monitors crossing the bar were placed in position so as to enfilled the Rebel batteries that defended the south end of Morris Island, and so well, too, that some of the shot from our own batteries passed over the lead ing vessels. The effect of the naval fire was quickly seen to be decisive, and a column of our troops being landed the Rebels abandoned their works precipitately and fied in confusion up the island to Fort Wagner, more than two miles distant. The Admiral followed with the monitors, skirting the shore, and by 9 o'clock was in position of Fort Wagner, as near as the shoalness of the water would permit, opening fire on the work and sustaining it until 6 o'clock in the evening (excepting an hour for dinner) not with standing the excessive heat of the weather. General Gillmore did nothing more that day nor night than to secure possession of the deserted batteries. But next morning a note from deserted batteries. But next morning a note from him in pencil announced that "We attempted to carry Fort Wagner by assault this morning and reached the parapet, but the men recoiled and felt back with slight loss." The Admiral had not received the least notice in advance and thus was prevented from rendering any assistance. It will be perceived that the precious moments following the defeat of the enemy and the capture of his southern batteries were entirely legality of the fort Wagner could ever have been and the capture of his southern batteries were entirely lost, for if Fort Wagner could ever have been carried by assault it was on the 10th of July, when the southern works of the is and had been captured and the garrison had fied for shelter into Wagner. The force assigned to the position had proved inadequate—no reinforcements were coming, and none did come through the day, nor were they gotten there before midnight—the monitors were abreast of Wagner, enfilading its principal front towards the troops with a steady fire. It was only 9 o'clock in the morning, our troops had been but a few hours in movement, had met no resistance worth mentioning, and the distance to Wagner was inconsiderable. It was the enemy's weakest moment and our opportunity, that would rever present itself to us as it did then.

GILLMORE'S REASONS FOR NOT TAKING WAGNER. The reason for this unaccountable failure is thus given by General Gillmore:—"The heat being intense and the troops exhausted, offensive operations were suspended for the day." And yet, out of searly 11,000 men, it does not appear that more than 6000 or 1000 were employed in the direct attack and in the diversion up the Stono. Why the balance was not pushed forward, or the landing column, after a suitable respite and refreamment, is nowhere explained. That General Gillmore did believe assault to be practicable is clearly shown by his attempt next morning, after the garrison had been reinforced and the enemy permitted to recover from his defeat, enfortunately, too, without any notice for naval aid. And thus the best chance for taking Wagner by an off-Land assault was lost. It is true that sixty days The reason for this unaccountable failure is thus

of toll in the trenches and the iron-clads, of exposure of toll in the tremmes and the iron-clads, of exposure to sickening heat, death by disease and the built, did eventually bring us into possession, but could not compensate for the loss of time; for to have been masters of Wagner on the 16th of July was a very different result from being so on the 8th of September. The one would have found the enemy entirely unprepared to resist our further advance, either upon Sumier and the barbor, or upon the seaward extremity of Sullivan's Island, or upon James Island by the Stono river, and that with a military and naval force fresh and almost untouched. But the other did find us with soldiers, sailors, and iron-clads much the worse for wear, and far less efficient than at first, while the enemy had improved the same time by strengthening the defense in every respect.

There had been clearly no preparation by the General for the occasion, nor ready thought to use it when it offered; so the golden moments were lost, the enemy gained courage and reinforcements during the night, our solders were pushed at the work in the morning; those who led were not followed, and were promptly repulsed. No notice had been given to the navy, therefore its fire was not present to assist, and this dilatory, slight, and lily-prepared assault had just such a conclusion as might have been expected, to be paid for afterwards in the toil and waste of life that marked the next sixty days. THE ARMY NOT PREPARED.

days.

If this first part of the enterprise against Morris island had not been entirely a surprise, the enemy was certainly unprepared for the force and rapidity of execution, as they might have been, perhaps, for the impotency of the conclusion.

THE SECOND ASSAULT ON WAGNER. The General now decided to make a second assault in force and to cover it by some light batteries, established at distances varying from one thousand to seventeen hundred yards. While the preparations for this design were going on the monitors were daily at work keeping down the fire at Fort

were daily at work keeping down the fire at Fort Wagner, the gunboats assisting at long range.

On the 18th of July the batteries ashore opened fire violently on the fort, and the monitors took position as near as the state of the tide would allow, anchoring at 1200 yards; just outside of them was the frigate New Ironsides, and at long range the gunboats. As the tide rose, the Montauk, bearing the Advisel's and the Montauk, bearing the Admiral's flag, gradually closed in until within 300 yards of the fort, when grape was used. Unable to endure the severe raking fire from the vessels, the enemy kept out of sight—not a gun was fired in reply nor a man to be seen. About sunset a note from General Gillmore announced his intention to assault, and the Admiral perceived our men moving up to the work, but before they reached it the darkness hid them from view. Until this moment an incessent and accurate fire had been maintained by the sant and accurate fire had been maintained by the vessels; and now it became impossible to distinguish whether it took effect on friend or foe, and, of necessity, was suspended. Quickly came up from the darkness the rattle of muskery and the flashes of light artiflery, which continued without intermission until 2.30, gradually abated and then ceased. This attempt to "make manifest the real and concealed elements of strength" of Wagner (so styled by General Gillmore) cost us some 1500 men. The chief cause of the disaster must be found in the failure to assault on the 10th, immediately after the capture of the southern batteries, which would either have suc-ceeded or else have disclosed satisfactorily the real and concealed elements of strength, with much less loss to ourselves.

WHY THE NAVY CEASED FIRING. The naval fire was also placed in abeyance at the most critical moment by the lateness of the hour, which was the real cause of its suspension, and not, as General Gillmore states, "for fear of hitting our own men" when they "approached near the work;" and yet notwithstanding these disadvantages the troops got hold of and held the south east bastion for some time, when further mischance intervened. Colonel Davis. in his "History of the 194th Pennsylvania, says:—"Here we have the old story, that somebody whose luty it was to support the advance failed to come up in time, and in consequence the hard-earned advantage was lost."

A BLOODY AND DISHEARTENING FAILURE. Whatever the cause, the fact of fallure stood out in bloody and disheartening figures, and with it the conviction that the work must be reduced by the slow and laborious operation of siege, which, after the severe losses in men, amounting to 33 per cent., demanded reinforcements.

The trenches were accordingly advanced, always assisted by the flanking fire of the navy, in the course of which General Gillmore determined to batter Fort Sunter over Fort Wagner, with the intention of subduing the fire of the former and prevent its being used to aid in the defense of the latter.

THE ATTACK ON SUMTER. One month was consumed in the preparation, and on the 17th August the batteries opened fire upon Sumter. The official naval despatch says:—At the same time the Admiral moved up with his entire available force," leading with his flag in the Weehawken, followed by the Kaatskill, Nahant and Montauk, Passaic and Patapsco in reserve for Sumter; the Ironsides opposite Wagner and the gunboats at long range. By 9:20 the navy fire had silenced Wagner, and prevented its cannon and musketry from was consumed in the preparation, and ner, and prevented its cannon and musketry from troubling our men while pounding Sumter. In a few days this fort was in such a condition as to be unable the any further part with its guns in disturbing the advance of our trenches, an advantage gained at the expense of a greater, for in firing at so great a distance the flight even of rife-shot or shells was so much dispersed as to convert the regular wall into a mass of rubbish, on which little if any further impression was possible. It would have been far better, so far as the breaching of Sumter was concerned, if the firing at it had been postponed until our cannon could have been placed at Commings' Point, some 1300 yard from Sumter; then the gorge wall could have been cut through with regularity by the rifle-cannon, and when the rubbish began to accumulate, round shot and shell would have laid the interior of the work more fairly open to the view of our guns. The entire novelty of the feat did not allow it to be rightly appreciated at the time, and gave it a brilliancy which proved to be illusory. On this occasion the naval force sustained a loss difficult of repair and for the time of serious consequences. The monitor Catskill was disabled by a heavy shot, which crushed the top of the pilot-house and killed the gallant Captain George Rodgers, the Admiral's Fleet Captain. Neither he nor the monitor could be spared under the circumstances.

THE FALL OF FORT WAGNER. Fort Wagner finally fell on the 7th of September after a most pertinacious resistance, continued 57 days from the first assault made on the morning of days from the first assault made on the morning of the 11th of July. Soon after dark on the night of September 6 our sappers pushed by the south face of the fort, and next morning the final assault was to have been delivered. This was prejuded by a tem-pest of fire from the land batteries and vessels, which began at daybreak on the 5th, and was con-tinued 42 consecutive hours, in the course of which several thousand shot and shells were thrown into Wagner. The enemy rightly comprehending it to be no longer tenable, evacuated during the night, and abandoned Morris Island entirely.

And thus was accomplished the work agreed on by the Admiral and General at Port Royal some two months previously, and here also terminated the oint military and naval operations in front of

THE AID OF THE NAVY INDISPENSABLE. To what had been done the navy not only con-ributed, but was indispensable. All that General Gillmore did do was under cover of the navy can non. But for the presence of the iron-clads he could not have 'anded upon Morris Island on the 16th of July, nor have remained there afterwards, much less have operated against Fort Wagner. The safety of his troops would have been menaced by the three Rebel iron-clads in Charleston harbor, and being cut off by them from supplies of all kinds, would probably have become prisoners of war. General Gillmore seems to have been laboring under some such impressions when he wrote (page 13, 527 "that beyond the capture of Morris Island and the demolition of Fort Samter, the land forces num-bering scarcely eleven thousand men of all arms available for offensive operations, could not, unless largely reinforced, take the lead in any operations against the interior or land defenses of Charleston against the interior or land defenses of charlescon that involve their leaving their hold upon the narrow see islands, where on the one hand they had the co-ope-ration of the navy against the iron-clad rams and gun-boats of the enemy, and on the other practically impascable marshes, against which the well-known superior numbers of the enemy and their facilities for concentrating troops by railroad could be of little

- GILLMORE'S NERVOUSNESS. The exceeding nervousness of General Gillmore on every move of the enemy that seemed to have the slightest bearing upon this position, was evinced in several instances by his calls for assistance from the navy. For instance:—

Telegrams from General Replies from Admiral Dhhigren.

July 30—8 A. M.—The enemy firing muskerry monitor and a gunboat from Wagner, and inter-into action. Can you not help me to

All right.

A detachment of iron-

Aug. 11-2-35 A. M .-Please open at soon as possible; the enemy's fire is very heavy. Aug. 17-To save Samter the enemy may at- clads will be in position tempt a sirtle in the at daybreak.

morning. Can you get monitors in position as early as to-day? August 17-The enemy I have sent two montgun on the sea face of in Wagner.

August 19-If you could replace them (Whitworth guns) with 8-inch guns, and 300 or 400 rounds of ammunition for each gun, it would help us greatly.

August 21—My approaches to Wagner are suspended on account of the annoyance from the sharpshooters. enemy's

Can you not stop it?
August 21—The fire I am now going to from Wagner is very gall-move up with the moni-August 22 - Wagner has opened a heavy fire on our works. Unless the pavy succeed in silencing them, there is great dan-ger of their dismounting

August 22-Col. Tur-Orders have been ner telegraphs me from given, and the monitors the front that, unless the are moving up. navy opens speedily, two of our guns will certainly be dismounted. August 23—Can you let

I will try to do so.

I can let you have 250 shell and 100 shot; also, me have some 100-pound-shell and 100 shot; er Parrott shells? I am 100 Schenkl shells. entirely out. August 27—Can I take You can take the guns. another 8-inch gun and a 100-pounder Parrott from

All of these were outside of the ordinary work of co-operation, and were at times so pressing that the request was repeated before the iron-clads could get up their anchors and steam into position.

WHAT THE NAVY ACTUALLY DID. Some idea may be formed of what the mays did contribute to the reduction of Morris Island from the following summary:-Engagements of the United States Vessels of Charles-ton with Rebel Forts and Batteries in the Course of

Two Months' Operations.
July 10—With Fort Wagner; monitors Kaatskill (1998), Montauk, Nahant, Weehawken. July 11—Fort Wagner; monitors Kaatskill (flag-ship), Montauk, Nahant, Weehawken. July 18—Fort Wagner (during the assault); moni-tors Montauk (flag-ship), Kaatskill, Nautucket, Wee-hawken, Patapsco; frigate New Ironsides; gunboats Paul Jones, Ottawa, Seneca, Wissahickon.
July 20—Fort Wagner; iron-clad frigate Ironsides.
July 22—Fort Wagner; monitor Nantucket; gun-

out Ottawa.

July 24—Fort Wagner; to cover the advance of our shore batteries—monitors Weehawken (flag-ship), Kaatskill, Montauk, Patapsco, Nantucket; frigate fronsides; gunboats Paul Jones, Seneca, Ottawa, Dai-Ching.
July 25-Fort Wagner; gunboats Ottawa, Dai-Ching, Paul Jones.
July 28—Fort Wagner; monitors Weehawken,
Kaatskill; gunboat Ottawa.
July 29—Fort Wagner; iren-clads Ironsides, Pa-

tapsoo, Passaic. July 30—Fort Wagner; iron-clads Ironsides, Kaatskill, Patapsco; gunboat Ottawa.

July 31—Fort Wagner and other batteries on Morris Island; gunboat Ottawa. August 1—Fort Wagner; iron-clads Montank, Pa-tapsco, Kaatskill, Weehawken, Passaic, Nahant; genboat Marbiehead. August 2—Fort Wagner; gunboats Ottawa, Mar-August 4 -Fort Wagner; monitor Montauk; gun-

August 6—Fort Wagner; gunboat Marblehead. August 8—Fort Wagner; gunboats Ottawa, Marolehead, Mahaska.
August 11—Fort Wagner and vicinity; monitors Patapsco, Kaatskill.

August 13—Fort Wagner and other batteries on Morris Island; gunboats Dai-Ching, Ottawa, Ma-haska, Wissahickon, Racer. August 14—Fort Wagner and other batteries on Morris Island; gunboats Wissahickon, Mahaska, Ottawa, Dai-Ching; mortar-boats Racer, Dan

August 15-Fort Wagner; mortar-boats Racer and August 17-Fort Wagner and other Rebel bat-August 17—Fort Wagner and other Rebel batteries on Morris Island, in order to divert their fire from our land batteries, which were pounding Fort Sumter; iron-c'ads Weehawken (flagship), Iron-s'des, Montauk, Nahant, Kaatskill, Passaic, Patapsco; gunboats Canandaigua. Mahaska, Ottawa, Cimarron, Wissahiccon, Dal-Ching, Lodona.

August 18—Fort Wagner, to prevent assault anticipated by General Gillmore; iron-clads Ironsides, Passaic, Weehawken; gunboats Wissahickon, Mahaska, Dal-Ching, Ottawa, Lodona.

August 19—Fort Wagner; iron-clad Ironsides, August 19—Batteries on Morris Island; iron-clad

August 20-Batteries on Morris Island; iron-clad ronsides; gunboats Mahaska, Ottawa, Dai-Ching, Lodona. August 21-Forts Sumter and Wagner; ironlads Ironsides. Patapsco; gunboats Mahaska, Dai-

August 22-Fort Wagner; Iron-clads Weehawken. Ironsides, Montauk.

August 23—Fort Sumter (night attack); ironclads Ironsides, Weehawken (flag-ship), Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, Nahant.

August 31—Fort Moultrie; moniters Passaic, Patapsco, Weekawken, Nahant. Sept. 1, 1863—Fort Sumter and obstructions in channel (night attack); iron-clads Weehawken (flag-ship), Montauk, Passaic, Pataps 10, Nahant, Lehigh

Lehigh.
Sept. 2—Battery Gregg and Fort Sumter; ironclad Ironsides.
Sept. 5—Between Sumter and Battery Gregg;
iron-clads Ironsides, Lehigh, Nahant.
Sept. 6—Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg; ironclads Ironsides, Patapaco, Lehigh, Nahant, Montank, Weehawken, Passaic.
Sept. 7—Fort Monitrie and batteries on Sullivan's Island; iron-clads Ironsides (flagship), Patapsco, Lebigh, Nahant, Montauk. Weehawken got ashore. Sept. 8—Fort Moultrie and batteries on Sullivan's Island, to cover the Weehawken (ashore); iron-clads Ironsides, Patapsco, Lebigh, Nahant, Mon-tauk, Passaic disabled.

clads Ironsides, Patapseo, Lenign, Nanant, Mon-tauk. Passaic disabled.

Amounting to 34 days out of 60 in which the squadron was engaged with batteries of great strength, and continued through more or less of the day. In two or three instances the actions oc-curred at night. Besides these frequent contests with the heavy works of the enemy, the never-ceasing preparation and activity inseparable from the pursuit of a continued operation are to be considered, as well as a vigilant eye to the movements of the Rebel iron-clads, ready to use the first unguarded moment—especially at night—which required at least two monitors to be kept on ploket. All of this to be sustained within the contracted limits of iron-clads, and under the sweltering heat of a Southern summer—a duty most faithfully per-formed, and never understood or appreciated except by those who bore a part in it.

THE ABANDONMENT OF MORRIS ISLAND. The end came with the abandonment of Morris Island; and there also practically concluded the joint operation of the two arms in front of Charleston as arranged between the commanding military and naval officers early in July. No further plans being proposed by the former, the Admiral, in the absence of any positive instructions in regard to an indepenent movement, was left to his own judgment and

The enemy had rightly appreciated the consequences of our being established on Morris Island. On the 10th of July, sooner or later, the rest of Morris On the 10th of July, sooner or later, the rest of Morris On the 10th of July, sooner or later, the rest of Morris On the 10th of July, sooner or later, the rest of Morris On the 10th of July, sooner or later, the rest of Morris On the 10th of July, sooner or later, the rest of Morris On the 10th of July, sooner or later, the rest of Morris On the 10th of July, so the 10th of July, Island must be given up, and in all probability Sum-ter also. But so long as this could be postponed was ter also. But so long as this could be postponed was there opportunity of substituting other defenses for those thus lost, which was fully effected before we had possession of the island. Fort Johnson and other interior works were added or improved, and the Suliivan's Island batteries made very formidable. Even the ruin of Sumter was retained, contrary to all expectation. On the other hand, the naval resources had been materially impaired, the decks of the monitors had been badly scored by heavy shot, their side armor damaged, their bottoms so covered with grass and shells as to reduce the speed to the lowest available rate, and the boilers less able to raise or to bear steam. One of them had been temporarily disabled in the action of the lith of August, and was still in the hands of the mechanics. The experience of the last two months had nics. The experience of the last two months had also shown what resistance was to be expected from sand batteries, and how far our naval force could affect them. An advanced and almost isolated post affect them. An advanced and almost isolated post like Wagner had kept back the united force of troops and iron-clads for two months. What then could the naval force of itself achieve against the more powerful, more extensive, and more numerous works within, forming a system in which each was supported by its neighbors? Even the access to this concentrated force was barred at the entrance by the heavy batteries of Sullivan's Island, and by the obstructions which Sumter was still able to protect on its side. Had Sumter fallen with Morris Island these obstructions could have been removed. Island these obstructions could have been removed, and the vessels allowed to enter and withdraw if unable to remain. But the enemy loosened not his hold of Sumter, and Admiral Dahlgren perceived at once that his only chance lay in compelling him to lo so. He made instant preparation for the purpose,

As seen from our vessels, the rubbish from the gorge walk of Sumter produced by our fire formed a rough but regular ascent from the water apwards—a column of sufficient force should therefore be able to make its way into the work, and a detachment of four hundred men was picked from the different wooden vessels at hand. This body was to be covered by a monitor placed in the narrow vein effect where the week her north end of Morris Island and Sumter. Its fire would clear the breach in advance, and protect retreat if it became necessary. The night was preferred because the foot of the beach could be reached unperceived, and our men would afterwards be less exposed to the cross-fire from Forts Johnson and Moultrie. The judgment THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSAULTING SUMTER.

of the Admiral as to the practicability of an assault, and the time of making it, was fully approved by the action of General Gillmore, who it seems contemplated a proceeding almost exactly similar; on learning which the Admiral determined that his own column should only go forward in company with that of the troops. Some questions arose in adjusting the arrangements for acting in concert, which induced him finally to send his acting chief of staff to General Gillmore for a more prompt solution. to General Gillmore for a more prompt solution.

AN UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT. Meanwhile an unfortunate accident had deprived the assault of an essential aid. The monitor which was to afford a base to our column, and to cover its movement, grounded in the night in the shoal water near Sumter, and was discovered in this situation when the day broke, within fair range of the formidable batteries on Sullivan's Island. As the tide fell, the thin iron bottom below the armor became exposed, and in this helpless situation the enemy's cause opened. tors.
I will send up two or in this helpless situation the enemy's cannon ope a heavy fire upon the monitor. There was no remedy but to interpose the entire iron-clad force in older to save the monitor, which was accordingly done. After a severe cannonade of three hours, the enemy was beaten from his guns, and about 4 P. M.

THE ASSAULT ON SUMTER, Whilst the action was going on the arrangements whilst the action was going on the arrangements for assault that night were being made, as already stated, and about 11 o'clock the chief of staff having returned from General Gillmore, with full understanding as to the co-operation of the columns, left to take his place as a volunteer with that of the navy. Soon after the flag steamer was put in motion and steered for Fort Sumter to overlook the action, anchoring as near it as the shoal water permitted in the darkness of the place. anchoring as near it as the shoal water permitted in the darkness of the night. Just as the Admiral was about to step into his barge, a perfect blaze of light illuminated the fort, whilst the screeching of the shots from Joboson and Moultre, and an iron-clad inside, filled the air above. Nothing daunted, the leading scamen followed their officers, and ran up the slope, at the head of which they were stopped by the bare wall rising above the debris, that in all probability had been cleared away for the purpose. The repulse was complete; some of our men were The repulse was complete; some of our men were killed, some became prisoners, among them the gallant Williams, who went down with his ship, the Oneida, recently, in the bay of Yokohama, and Preston, who gave his life at Fort Fisher, Lieuteants Remy, Brower, Meade, and Bradford; Ensigns Porter and Dayton; Mates Hovey and McCarty; Engineer Harmony, and Mr. Brayton. The military column came not, when its presence had been so far relied on that the naval column would assuredly not have gone forward without it.

THE FAILURE. Thus failed the only effort in the Admiral's power to open the way into the haroor for his small and battered force of iron-clads, and with the additional damage so unexpectedly incurred, it was out of the damage so unexpectedly incurred, it was out of the question to make any further attempt, unless in concert with the army, or strongly reinforced, for the Passaic was nearly completely disabled, the Patapsco had been towed out of action, and the Weehawken had received some ugly damage under water, which could not be reached unless hauled up. The iron bottoms of all were now so foul as to diminish the speed too much for necessary maneuvres.

GILLMORE'S RIDICULOUS APPREHENSIONS. Pending this state of things, one of the monitors got into a difficulty that had liked to prove serious. On the 16th of November General Gillmore telegraphed the Admiral:—"The enemy have opened a heavy fire on Cummings' Point, Will you have some of your vessels move up so as to prevent an attack by boats on the sea-face of the point?" Nothing could have been more supremely ridiculous than the apprehension convered by this request. So certain apprehension conveyed by this request. So certain must have been the swift destruction of the enemy in making the attempt, that no move should have been made to preyent it. Imagine boats filled with troops, far away from succor, pulling for a beach lined with batteries, and close at hand numerous regiments—the water entirely controlled by our

THE MONITOR LEHIGH AGROUND.

As a refusal would have been misunderstood or nisrepresented, the Admiral sent a monitor (the Lehigh) to take care of Gilmore and his batteries. It being quite dark, and the water of the north point of Morris Island dangerous with shoals, the Lehigh grounded, and the next morning being discovered in this situation, became a target for the formidable line of batteries on Sullivan's Island. But three other monitors were present—the Passaic, Nahant, and Montauk. They were ordered up, one to help the Lehigh off, the other two to divert the enemy's fire. Under a storm of shot and shell a hawser was sent by a boat from the Nahant to the Lehigh. Both pressed their steam—the hawser parted. It was replaced by another, and then another effort with the steam—the hawser was shot away. Again renewed, and now the critical moment came. The tide was at its height, and would cease to flow in a few minutes. A monitor was called out of action and placed ahead of the Nahant. The enemy's shot were coming thickly, and seemed to fall within the space between the vessels. Steam was brought gradually on the hawser—it began to unstrand under the enormous efforts of the two monitors. At the last moment the Lehigh started suddenly as if launched, and floated in deep water, when the iron-clads quietly steamed out of range. The Lehigh had been hit five feet below the water, and the water came in so rapidly as to make it necessary to send her to Port Royal

THE END OF THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON. THE END OF THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON.

Late in February, 1864, the Secretary of the Navy signified his wish to see the Admiral at Washington, where he arrived on the 2d of March, only to hear, to his great disappointment, that no reinforcements could be sent. The new vessels were more needed elsewhere, and so ended the idea of entering the harbor of Charleston.

harbor of Charleston.

It is not to be supposed that without the aid of a suitable military force the vessels could have made any permanent impression, nor that this would have been the most judicious application of such a combined force, as it amounted to an attack on the strongest side and a neglect of the weaker. So ne of the ablest naval opinion could be offered in this respect. That of the great military strategist of the day will, however, be accepted as fully sufficient. General Sherman thus wrote Admiral Dahlgren:— GENERAL SHERMAN'S OPINION OF DAHLGREN. "From a residence at Fort Moultrie during the years 1842-3-4-5 and 6, I had acquired a knowledge

of the water and land round about Charleston Har-bor, and therefore feel competent to express an opinion on the points you make.
"I would not have advised you to run the iron-chad fleet past Fort Sumter, into the inner har-bor of Charleston, on the theory that by bringing the bor of Charleston, on the theory that by bringing the city under your guns, the enemy would have evacuated both city and forts. I don't believe the forts would have been evacuated, but that the fleet would have been subjected to a terrific fire from the circle of batteries that would have crippled every ship and rendered the fleet useless for other purposes. The enemy could well have afforded to exchange the city of Charles ton for the fleet."

"When you and I were in Savanuah, about Christ-mas of 1864, we discussed freely all these points, and you will recall my opinions then expressed most em-phatically:—First. That Charleston was a place of no military importance at all; that the labor spent in the attempt to reduce it was useless; that all the attacks from the sea front were playing into the hands of the enemy, who of course had reason to re-joice at every attack from that quarter, etc.

"I now thank you in person for not having made the hazardous experiment, for when the time did come to act seriously, your fleet was perfect, well manned, and admirably suited to aid me in the exe-cution of the plan which did accomplish the fall of Charleston, and more too."

FURNACES.

Established in 1835.

whenever and wherever exhibited or used in the UNITED STATES.

Invariably the greatest success over all competition

CHARLES WILLIAMS Patent Colden Eagle Furnaces,

Acknowledged by the leading Architects and Builders to be the most powerful and durable Furnaces offered, and the most prompt, systematic, and largest house in this

BRAVY REDUCTION IN PRICES, and only first-class work turned out.

N. B. SEND FOR BOOK OF PACTS ON HEAT AND VENTILATION. Corn Exchange Bag Manufactory

Nos. 1132 and 1134 MARKET Street,

PHILADELPHIA.

JOHN T. BAILEY, N. E. Cor. WATER and MARKET Sts

ROPE AND TWINE, BAGS and BAGGING, for Flour, Sait, Super-Phospinate of Lime, Bone Dust, Rtc. Large and small GUNNY BAGS constantly on hand, also, WOOL BACKS.

SUMMER RESORTS.

CAPE MAY. CONGRESS HALL.

CAPE MAY, N. J.,

Opens June 1. Closes October 1

Mark and Simon Hassler's Orchestra, and fuil Military Band, of 120 pieces, TERMS-\$3.50 per day June and September. \$4.00

per day July and August. The new wing is now completed. Applications for Rooms, address

J. F. CAKE, Proprietor

THE PHILADELPHIA HOUSE,

OAPE ISLAND, N. J.,

IS NOW OPEN.

The house been greatly enlarged and improved, and
fifers superior inducements to those seeking a quiet and
pleasant home by the ses side at a moderate price.
Address, E. GRIFFITHS, No. 1004 CHESNUT Street,
or Cape May 616 2m

UNITED STATES HOTEL, FORMERLY Sherman House, Cape Island. The undersigned respectfully informs the public that he has taken the above hotel, and will keep a plain, comfortable house, a good table, and the best wines and liquors that he can procure. Price of board, \$17.50 per week, The house is now open for visitors.

6 27 1m JERE McKIBBIN, Agt.

OCEAN HOUSE, CAPE MAY, N. J.—THE BEST table on Cape Island. Numerous home-like comforts, location within fifty yards of the best bathing on the beach, are the principal advantages possessed by this first-class family hotel. No bar on the premises.

6 30 1m* Proprietors.

TREMONT HOUSE, CAPE MAY, N. J.—
This House is now open for the reception of guests.
Rooms can be engaged at No. 1903 MOUNT VERNON
Street, until July 1.
MRS. E. PARKINSON JONES.

MCMAKIN'S ATLANTIC HOTEL, The new Atlantic is now open.
5 25 wim 8m JOHN McMAKIN, Proprietor.

S. W. CLOUD'S COTTAGE FOR BOARDERS FRANKLIN, opposite Hughes street, Cape 18land. ATLANTIC CITY.

UNITED STATES HOTEL. ATLANTIC CITY, N. J.,

Reduction of Twenty Per Cent, in the

Price of Board. Music under the direction of Professor M. F. Aledo.

Terms, \$20 per week. Persons desiring to engage rooms will address. BROWN & WOELPPER, Proprietors.

No. 837 RICHWOND Street, Philadelphia. 26 thetulm 6 26 dlm 7 26 thetulm SURF HOUSE, ATLANTIC CITY, N. J. is incw open for the season. Besides the advantage of location this house enjoys, and the fine bathing contiguous to it, a railroad has been constructed since last season to convey guests from the hotel to the beach. The house has been overhauled and refitted throughout, and no pains will be spared to make it, in every particular.

every particular,
A FIRST-CLASS ESTABLISHMENT.
611 2m
J. FREAS, Proprietor. IGHTHOUSE COTTAGE, Located between United States Hotel and the beach,

BOARD REDUCED. Open from June 1 to Outober 1. 6-12m JONAH WOOTTON, Proprietor.

ATLANTIC CITY, N. J.

THE WILSON COTTAGE,
ATLANTIC CITY.
A new and well-furnished Boarding-house on
NORTH CAROLINA Avenue, near the Depot.

Terms to suit, 76 1m* ROBERT L. FUREY, Proprietor. BEACH COTTAGE, ATLANTIC CITY.—NOW open. A first-class Family Boarding House, MICHIGAN Avenue, near the Beach. NO BAR. Terms to suit all. Apply to J. B. DOYLE, Proprietor, or E. F. PARROTT, No. 35 N. EIGHTH Street,

NEPTUNE COTTAGE (LATE MANN'S COTTAGE), PENNSYLVANIA Avenue, nrst house below the Mansion House, Atlantic City, is NOW OPEN to receive Guesta. All old friends heartily welcome, and new ones also.

MRS. JOHN SMICK, 6112m

Proprietress.

A TLANTIC CITY. - ROSEDALE COTTAGE, VIRGINIA between Atlantic and Pacific ave-A VIRGINIA between Atlantic and Pacific avenues, MRS. E. LUNGREN, formerly of THIR-TEENTH and ARCH, Proprietress. Board from \$10 to \$15 per week.

MACY HOUSE, MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE Atlantic City, is open the entire year. Situated near the best bathing. Has large airy rooms, with spring beds, Terms \$15 per week.

6 25 6w GEORGE H. MACY, Proprietor.

C E N T R A L H O U S E,
arthantic city, N. J.,
is NOW OPEN for the reception of guests.
611 6w LAWLOR & TRILLY, Preprietors. THE "CHALFONTE," ATLANTIC CITY, N J., is now open. Railroad from the house to the

ENGINES, MACHINERY, ETO. PENN STEAM ENGINE AND BOILER WORKS.—NEAFIE & LEVY, PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL ENGINEERS, MACHINISTS, BOILER-MAKERS, BLACKSMITHS, and FOUNDERS, having for many years been in successful operation, and been exclusively engaged in building and repairing Marine and River Engines, high and low pressure, Iron Boilers, Water Tanks, Propellers, etc. etc., respectfully offer their services to the public as being fully prepared to contract for engines of all sizess, Marine, River, and Stationary; having sets of patterns of different sizes, are prepared to execute orders with quick despatch. Every PENN STEAM ENGINE AND BOILER having sets of patterns of different sizes, are pre-pared to execute orders with quick despatch. Every description of pattern-making made at the shortest notice. High and Low Pressure Fine Tubular and Cylinder Boilers of the best Pennsylvania Charcoal Iron. Forgings of all size and kinds. Iron and Brass Castings of all descriptions. Roll Turning, Screw Cutting, and all other work connected with the above business.

Drawings and specifications for all work done the establishment free of charge, and work gua-

the establishment free of charge, and work gua-The subscribers have ample wharf dock-room for repairs of boats, where they can lie in perfect safety, and are provided with shears, blocks, falls, etc. etc., for raising heavy or light weights. JACOB C. NEAFIE,

JOHN P. LEVY,
BEACH and PALMER Streets. GIRARD TUBE WORKS AND IRON CO., JOHN H. MURPHY, President,

PHILADELPHIA, PA. MANUFACTURE WROUGHT-IRON PIPE and Sundries for Plembers, Gas and Steam Fitters. WORKS, TWENTY-THIRD and FILBERT Streets. Office and Warehouse, No. 42 N. FIFTH Street.

PROPOSALS.

PROPOSALS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A STEAM PROPALLER FOR THE REVENUE

TREASURY DEPARTMENT. TREASURY DEPARTMENT. \}
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1, 1870. \
The bids for the construction of an Iron Steam
Propeller of 350 tons, opened in this Department
June 30, being considered exorbitant, separate
sealed proposals will be received at this department
until 12 o'clock on FRIDAY, 29th July, 1870, for the
construction of a Steam Propeller of wood, of 350 General plans, conditions, and specifications can be obtained from the Collectors of Customs at Port-land, Me., Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.

Baltimore.

Renewed proposals are also invited for the same steamer of inon, upon the same plans, conditions, and specifications as were issued June 1. No bids will be considered except from parties regularly engaged in ship-building.

The Department reserves the right to reject any and all bids.

GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, 77 11 14 18 21 25 28 Secretary of the Freasury.

ASTON & MCMAHON, SHIPPING AND COMMISSION MERCHANTS,
No. 2 OCENTIES SLIP. New York,
No. 18 SOUTH WHARVES, Philadelphia,
No. 48 W. PRATT Breet, Baltimore.
We are prepared to ship every description of Freight to
Philadelphia, New York, Whinington, and intermediate
points with promptness and despatch. Carel Boats and
Steam-ings furnished at the shortest notice.

SUMMER RESORTS.

SUMMER RESORTS ON THE LINE OF PHILADELPHIA AND READING RAILROAD AND BEANCHES.

MAY 20, 1870.

MANSION HOUSE, MT. CARBON.

Mr. Caroline Wunder, Potzville P. O., Schuylkill TUSCARORA HOTEL.

Mrs. M. L. Miller, Tuneasona P. O., Schuylkill county.

MANSION HOUSE,

W. F. Smith, Mahanoy City P. O., Schuylkill county.

MOUNT CARMEL HOUSE,

Charles Culp, Mount Carmel P. O., Northumberland WHITE HOUSE,

F. Mayer, Reading P. O., Berks county.

CENTRAL AVENUE HALL.,

G. D. Dav Reading P. O., Berks county.

G. D. Dav Reading P. O., Berks county.

Jacob E. Br ist. Conshohocken P. O., Montgomery co.

EGVERTOWN SEMINARY.

LIVING SPRINGS,

George F. Greider, Listis P. O., Lancaster county.

LIVING SPRINGS HOTEL.

Dr. A. Smith. Wernersville P. O., Berks county.

GOLD SPRINGS HOTEL, LEBANON COUNTY,

Wm. Leren. Pine Grove P. O., Schuylkill county.

EPHRATA SPRINGS.

John Frederick, Ephrata P. O., Lancaster county.

PERKIOMEN BRIDGE HOTEL.

Davis Longaker, Collegeville P. O., Montgomery co.

PROSPECT TERRACE,

Dr. James Palmer, Collegeville P. O., Montgomery co.

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PROSPECT TERRACE,

Dr. James Palmer, Collegeville P. O., Montgomery co.

PROSPECT TERRACE,

Dr. James Palmer, Collegeville P. O., Montgomery co.

PROSPECT TERRACE,

Douty HOUSE,

Kacursien Tickets will be sold at Philadelphia to and from above points at reduced rates, good for same day issued, and on Saturdays good until the following Monday.

5 55 2m5

ATLANTIC HOUSE. Newport, Rhode Island,

BOARD REDUCED. This Hotel will be opened MAY 30, at \$3.50 per

day for transient boarders. Families may make special arrangements by the

WM. W. HAZARD. 4 11 mf4p PROPRIETOR.

BELMONT HALL,

SCHOOLEY'S MOUNTAIN, N. J.,

18 NOW OPEN. This favorite resort has been greatly improved and enlarged, and offers superior inducements to those seeking a healthy, quiet, and fashionable re-

treat for the summer at reduced prices. D. A. CROWELL, Proprietor.

KITTATINNY HOUSE. DELAWARE WATER GAP.

This delightful summer resort is now open, and much improved. Trains leave Kensington 7:30 A. M. and 3.80 P. M. Arrive at the Gap in less than 625 stuthim* WM. A. BRODHEAD & SONS.

AKE GEORGE-LAKE HOUSE, CALDwell, N. Y.—Best of accommodations for families and gentlemen.

Board per day, \$3.50; from June 1 to July 1, \$14 per week; for the season, \$14 to \$17.50, according to room; for the months of July and August, \$21.

Open from June 1 to October 20. Address 6 c 2m

H. J. ROCKWELL.

C H I T T E N A N G O. WHITE SULPHER SPRINGS,
Madison county, N. Y.
First-class Hotel, with every requisite.
Drawing-room and aleeping-care from New York city,
via Hudson River Hallroad at 8 A. M. and 6 P. M., without change. Send for circular.

BEESLEY'S POINT HOTEL, CAPE MAY CO., N. J., is now open for the reception of visitors W. D. WOOD,

PERSONAL.

NOTICE RELATING TO ARTIFICIAL LIMBS. WAR DEPARTMENT, SURGEON-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1870.)
Congress having provided, by acts approved June
17, June 30, and July 11, 1870, for the reissue every
five years of Artificial Limbs, or the value thereof in money, to officers, soldiers, seamen and marines who have lost limbs in the service of the United States, the following instructions are published for the benefit of those interested.

Applications should be made direct to the Surgeon-

Applications should be made direct to the Sirgeon-General, from whose office the necessary blanks will be furnished on request.

Upon applications for limbs in kind, orders will be given by the Surgeon-General, upon any manufacturer selected, who shall first have filed a bond in turer selected, who shall first have filed a bond in the sum of five thousand dollars, with two sureties, to furnish good and satisfactory limbs, without extra charge to the soldier, and make good all defects of material or workmanship without additional charge, subject in all cases to the inspection of such persons as the Surgeon-General may designate. Blank forms of bonds will be furnished by this

office.

Transportation to and from the place of fitting the limb will also be furnished upon a written request addressed to the Surgeon-General.

Applications for commutation will be certified by the Surgeon-General, and transmitted to the Commissioner of Pensions for payment, through the local register.

pension agents.

As full instructions will be forwarded from this office with the blank form of application, the expense of employing an attorney or agent will be in no case necessary.

J. K. BARNES,

7 23 41

Surgeon-General U. S. Army. INSTRUCTION.

DGEHILL, MERCHANTVILLE, N. J., WILL BE opened for SUMMER BOARDERS from July1 to September 15, 1870. The House is new and pleasantly located, with plenty of shade. Rooms large and airy, a number

of them communicating, and with first-case A few families can be accommodated by applying

For particulars call on or address

REV. T. W. CATTELL Merchantville, N.J. RIVERVIEW MILITARY ACADEMY, POUH-KEEPSIE, N. Y.
OTIS BISHEE, A. M., Principal and Proprietc.
A wide-awake, thorough-going School for oys
wishing to be trained for Business, for lollege, or for West Point or the Naval cademy.
7 16 stuthip

CHEGARAY INSTITUTE, Nos. 1527 AID 1528 SPRUCE Street, Philadelphia, will reoper on TUESDAY, September 10. Erench is the language othe ramily, and is canstantly spoken in the institute.
6 15 wim 6m L. D'HERVILLY, Principl.

H. Y. LAUDERBACH'S ACADEMY, ASSEMLY BUILDINGS, No. 108 S. TENTH Stiet. Applicants for the Fall Term will be received and after August 16. Circulars at Mr. Warburte's, No. 430 Chesnut street. 536

OLOTHS, CASSIMERES, ETO CLOTH HOUSE.

JAMES & HUBEL No. 11 North SECOND Stree,

Sign of the Golden Lamb, w receiving a large and splendid assortent of new styles of

FANCY CASSIMERES And standard makes of DOESKINS, CLOTHSnd COATINGS, 13 28 my AT WHOLESALE AND RETAIL.

USE CHAMBERS' STAR



VANS, STODDART & CO., No. 740 SANSOM Street

A LEXANDER G. CATTELL & O. PRODUCE COMMISSION MERCHANTS. No. 27 NORTH WATER STREET, PHILADELPHIA. ALPIADED G. CAPTELL BLUMB CAPTE.