6
AN IMPORTANT HISTORY.
1, UTTER PROM flP.NKIlAL JOKKPn K. .I01ISST05
' ing FIRST RATTLE OF MANARflAH IMPORTANT
HIKTOKK'AIi ERRORS CORRECTED WHAT THE
l-OWPKIT.UATE V1CTORT . A'OM PLWH KO WHt
, '. WAHtllNOTOM CITY WAS WOT CAPTDRRT), BTC. F.TC.
Srlma, March 21. Kditors of lid ma Daily
JUessenttr: Ueutlomen: The "Life of Lieute-nant-0neral
(Stonewall) Jackson," by a
member of Lis staff, will evidently be gene
rally read In the South. It ia, theroforo, im
portant to me to endeavor to cor
leet the errors relating to myself
which 1 observed In glancing over that
part of the work preceding and referring to
' the battle of Manassas. On that account I
respectfully ask the publication of what fol
lows, in your paper:
l'Bpes 106-7: -When Ceneral Johnston, how
ever, arrived at narper's Ferry, and claimed to
relieve Colonel Jackson of his command, the
latter had received no directions from the Btnte
Government to surrender his trim. And here
arose a temporary collision between the two
authonlies, which displayed the Inflexibility of
Jackton's character. He replied that ho hd
been entrusted by Major-Jeneral Lee, at the
command of the State of Virginia, with this
charge; and he could only relinquish it by hn
orders. In this position he was, waile respectful,
immovable; and as tho Confederate commander
was equally firm, a unnchievons mtrite was anx
iously leured. But very soon the mails brought
an application from some person pertaining to
Colonel Jackson's command, upon which was
indorsed, in the hand writing of Major-Ueneral
Le, a reference to the authority of General
Johuston, as commanding at Harper's Ferry.
This nimished Colonel Jackson all the evidence
which he desired, to justify the surrender of the
trust." .
I think that this statement magnifies the
circumstance in question, and does injustice
to General Jackson's character. The fUato of
Virginia had joined the Confederacy and trans
ferred the control of its military afl'airs to the
President several weeks before my arrival at
Harper's Ferry, on the 2:5d of May, 1SG1.
Within an hour after my arrival General (then
Colonel) Jackson came to see me, and the
order assigning me to the command he had
leen exercising was shown to him. On the
following morning my order assuming the
command was sent to him, with a request, in
writing, that he would have the necessary
number of copies made and distributed to the
troops. After acknowledging my note and
order he wrote : " Until I receive further
instructions from Governor Letcher or General
Lee; I do not feel at liberty to transfer my
command to another, and must, therefore,
decline publishing the order. Meanwhile, I beg
you to be assured that it will give me pleasure
to afford yourself ami the other officers named
every facility in my nower for obtaining appro
priate information relating to the post and de
partments of the service connected with it."
Major Whiting, who fell in defense of Fort
Fisher as Major-General, a West Point asso
ciate of (ieneral Jackson, at my request repre
sented to him that the authority of the Con
federate Government was paramount in the
case, and the manner of transferring the com
mand in accordance with military rule. He
soon reported General Jackson convinced.
The whole affair occupied little more time than
was consumed in going twice and back from
my quarters to General Jackson's. There
was no display of inflexibility on his part, nor
exhibition of firmness on mine. There was
nothing in the affair to call forth these quali
ties. If there was any " collision between the
two authorities" I was not conscious of it, as
well as of the danger of " mischievous strife.'
Paf?e 201: "On this expedition Colonel Jack
son was ordered by General Johnston to destroy
the locomotives and cars of the Baltimore Rail
roud at Martiusburg. At this village there were
vast workshops for the construction and repair of
theecars; and more than forty of the finest
locomotives, with three hundred burden cars,
were now destroyed. Concerning this he writes:
'It was a sad work; but 1 had my orders, my
duty was to obey. If the cost of tlie pronw'y
could only have ben expended iu disseminating
the Gospel of tho Prince of Peace, how much
might have been expected !'
"That this invaluable property should have
been withdrawn to Winchester Dy the way of
Harper's Ferry, betore this point was evacuated,
is too plain to be argued. Whose was the bluu
dcr cunnot be ascertained; that it was not Colo
nel Jackson's appears from the extract ot his
letter just inserted."
The letter quoted does not refer to the re
moval of the property, and, therefore, fur
nishes no evidence on the subject. It only ex
presses the natural regret of a good man at a
great destruction of property, rendered neces
sary by a state of war. If Colonel Jacksua
liad thought the suggested removal right, lie
whnld have attempted it while in command at
Harper's Ferry, between the 2JUh of April and
24th of May, as I should have done between
the last date and 15th of June. Colon d
Jackson's course was probably prompted ly
the consideration that directed mine, and gives
the authority of his great character to my
course. It would not have been right on our
part to seize the property of the road beforo
the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, nor politic
s to commit suh an act of war against citizens
of Maryland, when we were receiving so much
aid from that State;' and hoping for so much
more. The seizure or destruction of that pro
perty by us could have been justified only by
the probability of its military use by' the
enemy. That probability did not appear until
about the time when Colonel Jackson received
the order in question; then, being unable to
remove, we were compelled to destroy it.
But the most valuable part of this property,
the engines, could not have been removed in
the manner pointed out. I'p, o the time of
evacuating Harper's Ferry, we were removing
the machinery for manufacturing small arm,
as fast as it could be transported on the rail
road, to Winchester. To expedite this work,
I proposed to borrow engines from the Haiti
more and Ohio Railroad, but was assured ir
the engineers of both roals that that to Win
chester, especially near Harper's Ferry, where
it was supported on trestles, was not strong
enough to bear those engines, which were
much heavier than those for which it was
constructed, and that if brought upon that
road they would inevitably crush it. This
would have stopped the removal of the ma
chinery from Harper's Ferry, which was far
more valuable to the Confederacy than all the
rolling stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Koal.
Page 211: "Accordingly, on the forenoon ot
Tnursdav, the luth, the Army ot me vauey,
numbering about 11,000 men, was ordered under
arms."
Pages 212-13: "The forced march of thirty
miles brought the army to IMeilmont station, at
the eastern bine of the' Blue Kidge, wheuco they
hoped to reach their destination more easily by
railroad. General Jackson's infantry was
placed upon trains there on the forenoon of
Friday (tne 19th of July), while the artillery
and cavalry contiuued their murch by tne coun
try ruaas.
'The president of the ra'.lroal company pro
lYiim-d that the whole army should be Iran.
nnrtrd on gnccesstve trains to Manassas Junc
tion by the morning of Saturday; but by a col
lision, which was, with great appearance of
attributed to treachery, the track wa
obstructed, and all the remaining troops de
tained without any provision for their suoslst
fnr two nrecious days. Had they been
nrovided with food, and ordered to continue
their loiccd march, their zeal would have
brought the whole to the field long before the
commencement of the battle."
THE DAILY EVENING TELEGRAPII. PHILADELPHIA, WEDNESDAY,
It is . twenty-three, not thirty miles from
Winchester to PiednAmt, and thirty-font
hence to Manassas. Jackson's brigade reached
Piedmont early on Friday; but the other
troops arrived at the usual time of ending a
day's march making two marches of this
distance twenty-three miles. At that rati,
the thirty-four miles remaining would have
consumed nearly three days, and the troops,
if they had marched on with the least practi
cable delay, would have arrived at the scene
of pction the day after the jattlo. Jackson's
might have reached it on Sunday night. The
author said bis army amouuted to 11,000 men.
More than K'OO of them were in the battle,
conveyed on trains, the tirst of which arrived
at Manassas on Friday evening, and the last
aabout noon on Sunday. The detention of the
remainder was uue to tne wretchoa mismau-i
agement of the railroad trains. The only col
lision occurred on Saturday night, of a train
bearing the 0th North Carolina Regiment and
an empty one returning. The regiment was
carried on, readied Manassas Station on
Sunday morning, and took part in the
battle. Klzey's Brigade, on another train
passed over the place of collision soon
after the occurrence, and reached Manassas
Station soon alter noon on Sunday. The facts
prove that the track was not obstructed, at
least not seriously. None of the troops were
left without any provisions for their subsist
ence. If any of them suffered for want of
food, it was in consequence of throwing away
their rations, then not unusual on a march.
We left Winchester with as much provisions
as we had the means of transporting, ami
had enough for two days after the arrival of
the troops at Manassas, on Monday. The
author asserts that all the remaining troops
(Jackson's infantry being placed on trains)
were detained at Piedmont two days without
food. These troops got to Piedmont on Fri
day afternoon, and the battle began on Sunday
morning, not .much more than one marching
day alter the arrival at Piedmont. About
MOO of the 11,000 at which he estimates the
Army of the Shenandoah, were engaged in
the battle; therefore but 2700 could have
been detained at Piedmont. The fact that
these troops were two days in marching
twenty-three miles from Winchester to Pied
mont, shows that they could not have marched
thirty-four miles from Piedmont to the scene
of action in less thpu two days, and that the
only hope of getting them into the battle was
by the railroad.
Papes 21.")-1G: "The plan ol battle which was
adopted, after the Uesigus of the enemy were
iiilly disclosed, was worthy of the genius of
Beauregard, who sugeeted, and of Johnson,
who accepted it. Tnis was to send the two
reserve brigades which were at hand to sustain
the shock upon the lelt, and to enable that wins
of the army to bold its ground for a time, while
the centre and riuht were advanced across Bull
Kurj, and swims around into a position parallel
to the enemy's line of march towards the Stone
Bridae, with the view of aseailine their rear
guard and their lice of communication at On
trcville." "The plan of battle," so extolled by the
author, was made impracticable by McDow
ell's turning movement, and, therefore, was
abandoned when tho "designs of the enemy
were fully disclosed." The movements of
Bee and Jackson to the left, so far from being
the consequence of the disclosure of the
enemy's plans, preceded that discovery;
indeed, it was Bee's encounter with the
F'ederal army which revealed to me its designs,
and "such reinforcements as could be spared
from the centre and right" were then ordered
to hasten to the firing. The plan the author
supposes and admires would have kept our
centre and right (six brigades) out of action,
and enabled the Federal army to crush the
other three. Ceutreville was three and a half
miles north of our centre on Bull Run, aud
the Held of battte was a mile and a half south
of our original left on Hull Run; so that it is
clear that the troops which might have moved
to Centreville in the beginning of the action
could by no possibility have reached the iield
in time to take part in it, but would have
assisted McDowell in his turning operation,
and made it impossible to prevent his seizure
of our depot at Manassas.
rase 216-17: "The two generals despatched
the order for this movement to the commanders
oi the right aud centre, and then galloped for
the scene of action."
Not orders for the movement supposed, but
countermanding it, and directing troops from
the centre and right to march rapidly to the
light.
Pace 217:" and Beauregard, after
Ii3teniiij' iu anxious suspense to hear his guns
open upon the heiahts of Ceutrevide. until the
day and the buttle were too far advanced for
any or her resort, lelinquished the movement.
The only tactics which remained for the
Coufederato Generals were to bring up such rein
fcrcenitnts as could be spared from the centre
aud r ii; ht successively."
General Beauregard could not have listened
for the opening of guns on the heights of Cen
treville, for none had been sent ' there.
McDowell's turning movement was revealed
by Bee not earlier than 1(H. If the centre and
right had then been ordered to Centreville, as
the author states, they could not have reached
it much, if at all, before 2 P. M. If those
troops had been ordered into the action,
they could not have joined in it, it would
have heen too late. As it was, with the three
and a half brigades ordered up, two were too
late, although those orders were despatched
at least as early as 11 o'clock A. M.
This account of the battle does great injus
tice to (ieneral Beauregard and to Bee's and
Earlv's brigades and their commanders.
General Jackson's great fame is iu no degree
enhanced by such disparagement of his asso
ciates.
Pase 330. "The pursuit ol the enemy wa? not
continued beyond '.'eutreville, and tats wa the
lirst error wiiicli nraae tue laurels of the Con
federate army, s lar, to the eye, barren of sub
stautia) irun. It was accounted lor, iu part.
by the paucity of cavalry; but this excuse was
no justification, because the cavalry iu hand,
of which only two companies hud been ensaeed
in tno factual combut, was not pertinaciously
presi-cd arter the fugitives, but paired even r.
tore it met with any solid resistance among
The "substantial fruit" of this victory was
the preservation of the . Confederacy. No
more could have been hoped for. The pursuit
ui me enemy was not continued, because our
cavalry (a very small force) was driven back
by the "solid resistance" of the United States
intautiy. Its rear guard was an entire divi
sion, which had not been engaged, and was
twelve or fifteen times more numerous than
our two little bodies of cavalry. The infantry
was not require to continue the pursuit, be
cause it would have been harassing it to no
purpose. It is well known that infantry, un
encumbered by Imeeasra t.i., ,. ..Veil,,
escape puisumg miautrv. K,iunia
scape pursuing infantry. N3nf!lnn', vi'. t.
nes ot Luuen and Bautzen are strong in
stance. I maintain that, considering th.,
relative strength of the belligl,rent90 the
Southern people could not have hoped br
more "substantial fruits" of this victory The
defeat of the Confederate army would have
involved the immediate overthrow of the
Confederacy.
Page 230: "Ano'.her causa of the interrunted
pursuit vi an a rmi'or brought at sunset to tne
coninisDdinu Generals by fomo alarmed acout
who tau seen some bewildered picket of the
enemy wandering through the country, thai a
powefinl Federal force wa about to attttck
the lines of Bull Ituu near Union Mill, wtvre
they were now denuded ot dolfndcis. This
caused thorn to recall the fresher regiments
from tho chase, and send them upon a lorced
march of seven or eight miles, to meet an
imnemwry enemy, and to return next morning
to the held of battle."
We had, of course, but one commanding
general myself. The story of the "alarmed
scout" and "bewildered picket" is doubtless
intended for sarcastic surmise, not fact. It
is out of place in a biography of Jackson. No
troops "were recalled from the chase and sent
seven or eight miles by night" or day "to
meet an imaginary enemy." Holmes' brigade,
which arrived too late to join in the battle or
i . . t .lit... . .
pursuit, anu J. wen s, reported, vy us comman
der to be four miles off after the fight was
over, were ordered to return to their camps,
for the comfort of the men, and to spare
Kwell's a needless march. The latter, iu his
conversation with me, said that the Federal
troops, which had been facing our centre and
right during the day, were reported to be ad
vancing. He agreed with me, however, that
if this was true, they would soon be recalled
to serve as a rear guard. Still, he and Holmes
were cautioned to be on their guard. No sol
dier was ordered by me to march, in conse
quence of this report, or exposed to diseom
iort or fatigue. No troops were ordered to the
"Held of battle" next day, except those de
tailed to collect the arms, etc. Our infantry
which pursued the enemy from the field, find
ing their pursuit ineffectual, soon aban
doned it.
Page 231: "It was expected that the Confede
rate commanders would at least pursue the
enemy to the gates of their intrenchments
before Alexandria and Washington; and ft was
hoped thut it might not he impracticable, in tho
agony of their confusion, to recover the Vir
ginian city, to conquer tho hostile capital, with
its immense spoils, and to emancipate oppressed
Maryland by one happy blow."
These expectations and hopes were ex
pressed at the time, not by military men who
understood the state of affairs, but by the
same military critics of the press who had but
a little while before heaped denunciation on
me for the measure which averted the capture
of our army in the valley, and enabled it to
preserve the Confederacy at Manassas the
abandonment of Harper's Ferry. Such a pur
suit would have been fruitless. We could not
have carried the intrenchments named by
assault, and had none of the means to besiege
them. Our assault would have been repulsed,
and the enemy, then become the victorious
party, would have resumed their march to
Richmond. I!ut if we had captured the
intrenchments, a river a mile wide lay between
them and Washington, commanded by the
heavy guns of a Federal licet. If we had
taken Alexandria, which stands on low and
level ground, those guns would have driven
us out of it in a few hours, at the same time
kiljjiig our friends the inhabitants. We could
not'eross the Potomac, and, therefore, it was
impracticable to "conquer the hostile capital"
or "emancipate oppressed Maryland." The
failure of our invasions in 18U2 and 1803,
with far greater means, might convince the
Southern people, I think, that the author's
expectations were extravagant.
Page 231: "The toiling army, which had
niarctied and fought all along the hill9 of Bull
Bun through the long July day, demanded, with
enthusiasm, to be led after the flying foe, and
declared they would march the sole9 off their
feet in so glorious an errand without a mur
mur." My information of the disposition of tho
army was very different. According to it,
the troops believed . that their victory
had established the independence of the South
that all their country required of them had
been accomplished the war ended, and their
military obligations fulfilled. They therefore
left the army in crowds, to return to their
homes. Such was the report of the generals,
colonels, staff officers, and railroad officials.
The exultation of victory cost us more than
the Federal army lost by defeat.
Page 231: " But more than this; the morn
ing alter the battle saw an aggregate ot ten
thousand tresh men, composed of the remainder
of the Army of the Valley, who had at length
reached the scene, and of reinforcements from
Richmond, arrive within the intrenchments at
Richmond irom Manassas Junction, who were
burning with enthusiasm, and expected nothing
else than to be led against the enemy at once."
I have no records: but, according to my
recollection, the Sixth South Carolina Regi
ment constituted the only reinforcement from
Richmond at the time referred to. On page
211 the Army of the Valley is estimated at
11,000. So that less than 2700 men of that
army must have arrived the day after the
battle, as more than 8300 were engaged in it.
1 am confident that if we had marched a few
days after the battle to "conquer Washing
ton" and "emancipate Maryland," we should
not have brought 20,000 men to the banks of
the Potomac. Our men, as has been already
said, believed the contest decided their ob
jects achieved and were more disposed to go
home to enjoy the independence and glory
they had won than to renew the war on
Northern soil.
1 Pages 231-232: "In a few days Jthe patriotic
citizens ot Alexandria tent authentic intelli
gence of the condition ot the beaten rabble
there and in Wahmaton, which a true military
sagacity would have anticipated, as Jackson
did, without actual testimony."
( No snch intelligence was sent to me. Nor
were the Federal troops south of the Potomac
a rabble. Mansfield's, Miles', and Runyan's
divisions, a larger force than we could have
brought against them, had not been beaten or
engaged, and the reports of the commanders
of the brigades engaged show that they en
tered the intrenchments organized, except
those who fled individually from tho field.
These latter undoubtedly gave an exaggerated
idea of the rout to the people of Washington;
as those from our ranks met by the President
before lie reached Manassas, on his way to the
lieirt, convinced him that our armv had been
defeated.
Page 232: "For days there was neither orora-
nrzaiion or o'.iedience, nor thought ot resistance
on the South side ol the Potomac."
This assertion is unfounded. It is dis
proved by the reports of the Federal general
officers, and the fact that General Scoit, who
had near 2.1,000 men idle within twenty-four
hours of Washington, brought up none of
mem, ana mat, tne rresiuent, Cabinet, aud
members of Congress seem to have been un
conscious of danger, or such a state of things
as that described.
IPago 233: "Now. then, said the more leflecl
lnu, was tho time lor vieorous audacity. Now
a Nspoleonlc genius, were be present, would
make ttiiB another Jena in its splendid
fruiis. He would firmly press upon
the disorganized masses; he would thunder at
the gates of Washington, and, replenishing his
exhausted equlomeuti with the mighty spoils,
rush blazing, like the lightning that shinetli
from one part under the heaven to the other,
through the affrighted North." .
The author surely does not expect rational
readers to believe that Una bombast was
really uttered in the army, or that our sol
diers condemned their General for not being
"a Napoleonic genius," when but one is found
in all history. The "splendid fruits" of the
battle of Jena were due to the fact that Napo
leon, with about equal force, turned the Prus
sian army before defeating it. Had it lxen
able to take refuge in intrenchments covering
the passage or a river a mile wide, those
"Irmts" wotim have been less than ours
which were, the preservation of the Confe
deracy, for the time.
The masses referred to were less disor
ganized by defeat than our army by triumph.
liy "gates oi yasmngton" is meant, 1 sup
pose, the fortifications upon which skilful en
gineers, commanding the resources of the
United States, were engaged for several
months manned by double our numbers,
half of whom had not seen the battle and a
river a mile wide, commanded by the guns Of
the United States lleet. We attempted invasion
in 1H62, and again in 18(i.'t. First, after Gen.
Lee's victories over McClellan and Pope, ami
Jackson's over Banks, Fremont, and Shields.
The second timo, when the way was supposed
to have been opened by the effect of the battles
of Fredericksburg and Cbancollorsville.
On these occasions, the forces defeated were
ten times as great as those repulsed on tho
21st of July, 1SC1, and their losses twenty
times as great. Yet those defeated armies met
us at Sharpsburg and Gettysburg, so strength
ened in numbers and spirit as to send back
the war into Virginia. These events show
how far, in July, 18iil, our army could have
"rushed blazing" through the North (and. it
could have crossed the Potomac), and how
much the North would have been "frightened."
The failure of invasions conducted by Lee,
aided by Longstreet and Jackson, and at
tempted under such circumstances, proves
that the Confederacy was too weak for offen
sive war, and is a conclusive argument in
favor of the course against which tho author
declaims so vehemently.
Page 23,!: "He (General Jackon) was then
conn clled to sit silent, and see the noble armv.
with its enthusiastic recruits, withering away in
inaction on the plains of P.ull Run. nowdoublv
pestilential irom the mliisuia of the August
heats, and the stoneh ol the battle-field; under
camp fevers ten-loin more latai tnan ail toe bul
lets ol the enemy. Regiments dwindled, under
the scourge, to skeletons; and the rude, tempo
porary hospitals acquired trains of graves far
more numerous and extensive than those upon
the hills around the Stone Hidge."
If General Jackson had seen this state of
things described above, he could not have been
compelled to "sit silent." He would have
done his duty by protecting his brigade from
the effects of such wretched incompetence, by
remonstrating to the General, and if that
proved ineffective, by appeal to the Govern
ment. His silence proves that he did not see
the evils his biographer describes.
It is well known that large bodies of new
troops are sickly in all climates. Our sick
reports were larger iu the healthy climate of
the valley than at the time referred to. No
troops were then encamped in the valley of
Bull Run, or nearer to the "battle-field" than
four or five miles. The dead had been buried,
so that the ladies visited the held without in
convenience. The writer's own estimate and
General Beauregard's very strongly contradict
this account of our great losses by disease.
He estimates the army of the valley at 11,000
when it left Winchester. General Beauregard
reported his to be about 21,000, including
1500 mounted men, and the garrison of Manas
sas (2000 soldiers and seamen), in all about
32,000; deducting 18D3- lost in battle, leaves
30,107 not estimating the thousands who
went home in the belief that their victory had
terminated the war. On page 239 the author
says, after "forces had grown to about 00,000
men," the Confederate generals "pushed
their lines forward to Munson's and Mason's
Hills." This was early in September.
According to this the army had then
been increased by the difference between 60,000
and "J0,107 2!,8!)3. If my recollection is
correct, it had received since the battle ten
regiments one from South Carolina, one
from North Carolina, one from Texas, one
from Alabama, two from Mississippi, and four
from Georgia, averaging less than UOO men.
So that these reinforcements amounted to not
more than C00O, leaving 23,893 as the growth
of the regiments represented to have "dwin
dled, under the scourge, to skeletons." But
these assertions that our regiments dwindled
to skeletons during August, and that the army
had grown to about G0,000 men early in Sep
tember, are altogether incorrect. I have con
trasted them to show the carelessness of the
author's accusations. The battle and its con
sequences reduced our army to about 27,000
men. When its advanced guard occupied
Munson's and Mason's Hills early in Septem
ber, it had received since the battle not more
than 0000. So that its strength then was
little more than half of the biographer's esti
mate. Paae 23C: "The wearied Confederate soldiers
did hot find the rain any the les dreary on the
next day, because they were either counter
marched up and down Bull Ruu, or left to
crouch on Ihe battle-held in fence corners,
without tents, instead of engaging iu the in
spiring putsuit of the enemy."
None of our troops were countermarched
up and down Bull Run the next day. None
were on the battle-field but those detailed to
collect arms, etc. Beauregard's troops had a
full supply of tents, and those from the Val
ley a partial one. Pursuit would have been
fruitless, and, therefore, anything but in
spiring. Page 236: "The country was then teeming
with supplies; herd of bullocks were feeding
in the pastures around Centreville, and the
barns oi the larmers were loaded with grain."
The country between Bull Run and Wash
ington is poor and thinly peopled, and never
teemed with supplies. If there were ever
herds of bullocks iu the pastures around Cen
treville, any Southern man can tell how many
would have been left by a FederaLarmy of four
divisions (near 40.000 men), encamped there
from the 17th to 21st of July); and if there was
ever abundance between that place and Wash
ington, those who have seen the country
through which a Federal army has marched
once, can judge 6f the abundance lelt where it
has passed twice.
Page 23G: "A march? of twenty-flve miles
could surclv Lave been accomplished without
baopage or rations, especially when the hort
effort might lead them to the spoils of a wealthy
capital."
It is about forty miles from the field of
battle to Washington by'the main road through.
Alexandria perhaps four less by Munson's
Hill. At the end of that march a broad navi
gable river would have separated our army
from "the spoils of a wealthy capital."
J. E. Joiinstox.
Note. The numbers given above express
the effective force.
HE NOVELTY."
jH M M'tESiOID IOTIIKS WKISfGKB
HAS FOUH COG-WHKEI.S, two on each end, and is
iu reality the ON L Y RELIABLE ONE ever wads.
Don't buy betore seeing Ihls. WHOLKSALE AND
b S. MACFEItltAN,
HOLE AO ENT,
APRIL 10, 18G7.
FINANCIAL.
EV GT ATE LOAN.
THE NEW SIX PER CENT.
STATE LOAN.
Frco from all State, County,
and Municipal Taxation,
Will be furnished in sums to suit, on applica
tion to either of the undersigned:
JAY t'OOKE CO.,
481m E.W..iBHECO,
JEVV STATE LOAN.
THE NEW SIX PER CENT.
STATE LOAN,
Free from all State, County,
and Municipal Taxation,
Will be furnished In sums to salt, on appllca
tlon to either of the undersigned:
ALEX, BENSON A CO.
JOHN E. FOX A CO.
CHARLES EMOUY A CO.
FREDERICK STEER.
DE HAVEN A BKO.
OEENDENNINO A DAVIS.
HERTZ A HOWARD.
BIOREN A CO.
EDWARD ROBINS A CO,
CiEORGE J. BOYD,
BARKER, BROS. A CO.
HNICiHT A GRAFF.
ISAAC C. JONES, JR.
II CLE dc NORTH.
4 3 lm H. HARVEY THOMAS.
E W PENNSYLVANIA
6 PEll CENT. LOAN,
FOR BALE IN SUMS TO SUIT.
DE HAVEN &: BROTHER,
4 21m4pJ NO. 40 S. THIRD STREET.
EW STATE LOAN
For Sale, Without Coninilsslon,
BY
J. E. RIDGWAY.
BANKER,
3 lm NO. 57 NOCTII THIRD STREET.
EV STATE LOAN,
THE NEW S PER CENT. STATE LOAN,
FREE FROM ALL TAXATION,
Will be furnished In sums to suit, by
COCHRAN & GOWEN,
BANKERS AND BROKERS.
4 31ml NO. Ill NOI TII THIRD STRUCT.
7 3-10s,
ALL SERIES.
CONVKKTillD 1JSXO
Five-Twenties of 1865,
JANUARY AND JULY
WITHOUT . CHAEGE.
BONDS SJJVKJ JLSQttHJIATElI.
DE HAVEN &BROTHER,
A U C U 6 T
SEVEN-THIBTY NOTES,
CONVERTED WITHOIT CHARGE ffifl
INTO THE
MEW F1VE-TWENTT INTEREST
Larfie Bouda delivered one. Small Bonds fur
nlBba m aoon ( received ttom WMWugton.
jAV cookk A CO.,
UH N. 1HS. THIRD STREET.
FINANCIAL."
E W 23,000,000 0 AN
OF TDK
:; --l
STATE CF PENNSYLVANIA
For sale In amounts to suit pnrehasers.
C. T. 1ERKES, Jr., & CO.,
4 3 Ira NO. 10 KOt'TH Till RI (tTRF.ET,
JEV7 STATE LOAN
iron sale.
SO COMMISSION UIAltGt:n.
STEELING, LANE & CO.,
4r.'.2tr fit, 1IO fcOITII THIRD ST.
BANKING HOUSE
OF
J ay Cooke & Co.,
Il AND 11 1 S. THIRD ST., PHIEADAH
Dealers in all Government Securities,
OLD 5-SOa WANTED
IN EXCHANGE FOR NEW. ,
A LIBERAL DIFFERENCE ALLOWED.
Compound Interest Notes Wanted.
INTEREST ALLOWED ON DEPOSITS.
Collections made. Stocks bought and sold on
ConimlMslon.
(special business accommodations reserved for
ladles. 3 24 3m
U. S. SECURITIES
A SPECIALTY.
SMITH, RANDOLPH & CO.,
BANKERS AND BROKERS,
N0.16M THIRD ST.,; NO. 3 NASSAU ST.
PHILADELPHIA. j NEW YOBK.
NEW STATE LOAN
FOR SALE AT LOWEST PRICE.
CONVERSIONS MADE OF
7'30s WITHOUT CHARGE. !
ORDERS FOR STOCKS AND GOLD EXE
CUTED IN PHILADELPHIA AND NEW
TORS.
7 3'IOS. SEVEN - THIRTY NOTES
CONVERTED WITHOUT CHARGE INTO
THE NEW
G - O is.
BONDS DELIVERED AT ONCE,
COMPOUND INTEREST NOTES wanteM Aim
market ratea. ,
WM. PAINTER & CO.,
8 268m NO. 8 SOUTH THIRD ST
p. S. PETERSON CO.,
No. 39 8. THIRD Streets
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OF AL
HINDS AND STOCKS, BONDS, ETC
Philadelphia and New Tork Boardi of Broker
COMPOUND INTEREST NOTES WANTED
DRAXTS ON NEW TORK
Aiwaya for sale In aums to anlt purchasers, TS2 t
RATIONAL
BANK OF THE REPUBLIC!
No. 809 and 811 CHESS UT Street,
, PHILADELPHIA.
CAPITAL, 9500.000-FULL PAID,
DIRECTORS,
Jos. T. Bailey, IWilllam ErTleu.lSam'l A. Blspnam,
Kdw. B. Orne. Osgood Welab, Fred. A. Hoyt,
KaUian UUlea.lB. liowland, JrWm. H. Hliawn.
- PRESIDENT,
WILLIAM H. RHAW3.
CAHHIIB,
JOSEPH P. MUMFORDj CI M tOt
FUHflliUnt, BEDDING, ETC
I b a ve a large stock oi ever variety ol
TT T 1 1 ? ,T T T T T 1 i Tn
valk ut cii am Ti k it u Irs auim,.
l-AiiLOK St ITS IN VELVET PLUSH, v
PAJriLOK BUJT8 JN HAIR CLOTH
Lit it i.ki.u b.I a 1.- i m l .
oust, MaULrettttbs, Louugea, tic. tic. 0U6a Book
B mm t.
H W.K. corner BKCOND and RACK Street.,
ESTABLISHED 1705.
A. S. norm,! cnj
French Plate Lookins-Giasscs,
IT KH! T k Vivr1 U Mi vi .
jiiwo,i-AiajjMU8,DriAffIN08 ETC. 1
MjmnfaoHia.A.1. -ti .
L00KINQ-QLASS, POBTSAlt, AD FICTTJS
rRlVVI rn
No. OlO OIIESNUT STREET
THIRD TJOftli A Dnvn nvr.
w a jijv i in JIUXAL,
rHILADKLPHIA. J