THE NEW YORK PRESS.

EDITORIAL OPINIONS OF THE LEADING JOURNALS UPON CURRENT TOPICS.

COMPILED EVERY DAY FOR EVENING TELEGRAPH.

Congress and the Amendment.

From the Times.

The majority in Congress are no doubt right in interpreting the recent verdict at the polls as a warrant for vigorous and effectual measures of reconstruction, if the South persist in its rejection of the proposed Constitutional Amendment. But it would err if it assumed that this indirect and anticipatory approval of strong ulterior measures indicated a readiness to abandon the scheme of compromise embodied in the Amendment until after the South shall have had ample time for the reconsideration of the decision already rendered. This view is presented by influential journals, in connection with the discussion of the several plans of reconstruction before Congress, and it is corroborated by the prevailing import of the allusions to the subject which are to be found in the messages of the Republican Governors. It is well stated by the Albany *Evening Journal*, as follows:—

"The loyal people of the North have demonstrated their willingness to accept the proposed Constitutional amendment as a finality; and until the South shall have full and free opportunity to act upon that proposition, no other should be proposed as an ultimatum. It may be said that they have had this opportunity already. But this is only true in part. They have had sufficient time to act; but the attitude and declarations of the President have been such that the people of the South have been led to believe that they could attain to complete restoration without acquiescing in any interference with the ancient barbarisms of their section. But for this interference on the part of the Executive, there is reason for the opinion that the amendment would ere this have been accepted, and restoration under it accomplished. If this fact is conceded, it would show a want of good faith on the part of Congress if it should make haste to take advantage of the delay which has followed this delusion, and force through a proposition which looks to the total abrogation of the existing State organizations at the South. The people should not only be given time to act, but time to reconsider their action. They should not only be given to understand that Congress was in earnest when it proposed the Constitutional amendment, but that there is no power in the Executive Department of the Government to swerve it from its purpose."

The fact last mentioned by the *Journal* is one which the South hardly yet realizes. But fact it is, nevertheless. Congress, sustained by the loyal States, is master of the situation, and the South will commit an irreparable blunder if it act on the supposition that it may with impunity spurn the proffered terms of restoration.

Should Congress push forward other and more radical measures, without affording time for reflection, it would not only be chargeable with bad faith, but it would introduce elements of weakness into the Republican party, and impair the moral force of its policy. The hesitancy now felt by Union members touching proposed measures of reconstruction arises in no small degree from the opinion that the abandonment of the pending amendment is not at present warranted. There is still a chance—we fear a feeble one—that some of the Southern States will reconsider their course ere the period of grace comes to an end. It is also possible that, on a general and by no means irrational review of the case, the ratification by three-fourths of the represented States may be held to invest the amendment with constitutional validity, and thus to provide the guarantees which must precede restoration.

When these points shall have been disposed of unfavorably: when it shall be demonstrated that the amendment is unavailable, and that other measures are therefore a necessity—the satisfactory discussion of the forms and principles that should govern reconstruction will be greatly facilitated. Until the actual necessities of the case be settled, it will be difficult to persuade the Republican party that a radical change of policy is expedient. Let the necessity be demonstrated by the final failure of the amendment, and the party will march forward to the further point of reconstruction with an unbroken front. What Mr. Speaker Colfax said last session as to restoration is applicable this session to the programme of reconstruction:—We should "make haste slowly," that the intelligent judgment of the loyal States may keep step with their Congressional representatives in every stage of their action upon this momentous question.

Prospects at Washington.

From the Tribune.

The leading friends in Congress of a national Bankrupt law are entirely confident that the bill (Mr. Jenckes'), which has arleady passed the House, will soon pass the Senate. As it will have been considerably amended, it must return to the House for concurrence in the Senate's amendments; but it will not fail there. Unless vetoed by the President—and no reason, unless it be the force of habit, is suggested for such a veto—we shall be able to congratulate the country on the passage of a good Bankrupt law before the 1st of March. That law will emancipate at least one hundred thousand of our countrymen from a hopeless thraldom, enabling them once more to earn bread for their families, and contribute sensibly to the increase of our national wealth. Hasten the auspicious day!

The passage of a very fair Tariff bill—in substance, the House bill of last session as amended by the Finance Committee of the Senate—seems almost assured by the evident indisposition of Congress to contract and appreciate the currency. Manifestly, we cannot persist in importing largely in excess of our exports, and staving off the evil day of payment by sending abroad some $200,000,000 per annum of bonds—mainly those of our Government—which we sell for sixty up to eighty cents on the dollar. Somehow or other, this must come to a halt; and as the solid (not stolid) Northwest opposes and prevents a resumption of specie payment (for the present, it says; but its logic plainly condemns and deprecates resumption at any time whatever), it is morally impossible that the enactment of a higher tariff should be successfully resisted.

True, some two or threescore of members who zealously oppose resumption as zealously oppose protection; but their repugnance to resumption is powerfully helping us to protection; and we thank them for the good they do without intending it. By one means or another—through wise legislation or through national insolvency—we must stop buying more than we can fairly pay for; and this is every day more widely realized. We hope to chronicle the passage of a pretty good tariff bill by the Senate before the 1st of February.

Should the President veto the bills admitting the new States of Nebraska and Colorado, the former will pretty certainly, the latter probably, be passed over the veto.

The idea of impeaching and removing President Johnson has more strength in the House than we had supposed, and seems to be gaining supporters. However, is is not likely to be definitely acted on at the present session.

All manner of Mexican jobs and projects are hanging about the committee-rooms and looking in at the lobbies of the two Houses—one of them proposing a modest loan of $50,000,000 to Juarez (whereof so much as $20,000,000 might—and might not—get out of Washington); and there is an Ortega loan of like amount lying around loose; but it is quite unlikely that either of them will ever get launched in the shape of a bill. If $50,000,000 were lent to Mexico by our Government, her military banditti would doubtless have a good time while it lasted; but, "except these bonds," there would be no trace of it in existence next year.

—As to reconstruction—but that is too grave a matter to come in at the heel of other topics, and must have an article by itself.

The Remedy of Impeachment—The Cases of John Tyler and Andrew Johnson.

From the Herald.

The proceedings which have been commenced in Congress looking to the impeachment of President Johnson are denounced by the Southern Rebel and Northern Copperhead journals as unprecedented, despotic, and revolutionary. We are warned, too, that this impeachment, if pushed too far, will result in a Presidential *coup d'etat*, and in another civil war, in which the Rebel States will this time be actively supported by the fighting Northern Peace Democracy at the call of President Johnson. This, we know, is only theatrical lightning and thunder; but it betrays the programme expected of Mr. Johnson by his present supporters, and so far it will have its effect upon Congress. The movement for his impeachment is, however, a plain constitutional proceeding, although, in the length and breadth of the issues involved, it is without a precedent, and without anything approaching a parallel case in the history of this or any other country.

On the 10th of January, 1843, the Hon. John Minor Botts, of Virginia, in the House of Representatives, impeached President John Tyler, elected Vice-President on the Whig ticket of Harrison and Tyler in 1840, and advanced to the White House on the death of President Harrison in April, 1841, as Vice-President Andrew Johnson was in April, 1865, on the death of President Lincoln. Mr. Botts, in his charges against John Tyler, accused him of various "high crimes and misdemeanors," including "gross usurpation of power and violation of law in attempting to exercise a controlling influence on the accounting officers of the Treasury Department," "wicked and corrupt abuse of the power of appointment to and removal from office," "aiding to excite a disorganizing spirit in the country" by proclaiming his disregard of a law of Congress which he himself had approved, "retaining men in office for months after they had been rejected by the Senate as unworthy, incompetent, and unfaithful," "withholding his assent to laws indispensable to the just operations of the Government," "an arbitrary, despotic, and corrupt abuse of the veto power," "shameless duplicity, equivocation, and falsehood with his Cabinet and Congress," "creating offices and investigations, and making payments of money without authority in law," and in "withholding information called for by Congress."

Upon these charges the motion of Mr. Botts for a special committee of inquiry, after a lively day's debate, was finally rejected—yeas 83, nays 127, and this was the end of the impeachment movement against John Tyler. All things considered, the union and peace of the country at that time, the dominant influence of Southern ideas and Southern politicians at Washington, and the fact that Tyler had been only following in the footsteps of Andrew Jackson and Van Buren, and the utter hopelessness of this impeachment in the Senate, the vote for the resolution was something remarkable. Had the Whigs possessed a two-thirds vote in each house, as the Republicans now possess, the result would have been different. We dare say that had they possessed a good, solid, working majority in the House and two-thirds in the Senate, in the stormy financial conflict with Old Hickory, even he would have been impeached and removed, for such things, for instance, as the removal of the Government deposits of specie from the United States bank and its branches to his pet State banks without authority from Congress. The simple truth, then, is that if neither Jackson, Van Buren, nor Tyler, nor poor Pierce nor Buchanan, was impeached and removed, it was only because the opposing party lacked the requisite majorities in Congress for the work. Buchanan, for example, in pleading the plea to Congress that he could find no authority in the Constitution to resist the secession of a State or the organization within the jurisdiction of the United States of a foreign and rebellious confederacy, clearly laid himself open to impeachment and removal from office.

It does not follow, then, that the charges of impeachment raised against John Tyler, in being rejected, establish a precedent for the escape of Andrew Johnson. But in addition to the schedule of Botts against Tyler other and more serious charges will be made against Mr. Johnson; and there is the requisite vote, and the will and purpose in each house, yea, the necessity to carry them through. Some of the vetoes of Mr. Johnson were good and perfectly legitimate, such as the veto of the Montana mining monopoly bill, the first Freedmen's Bureau bill of the present Congress, and the Colorado State bill. But in his veto of the Civil Rights bill he made a mistake, and in his course of opposition to the pending Constitutional amendment, he has passed beyond the line of safety in assuming the right to enforce his peculiar policy against the constitutional authority of Congress and the expressed will of the people.

But behind this lies the still graver charge of his persistent efforts to deny, contest, and usurp the authority of Congress in his programme of Southern reconstruction and restoration. Considering the frightful costs and sacrifices required to put down the late fighting Southern Confederacy, and the legitimate issues of the war gained by the loyal States, the efforts of President Johnson to supersede the authority of Congress and the will of the loyal States cover a charge of usurpation of the most fearful import. Compared with this charge all the other charges against him are mere bagatelles, including the whole Tyler catalogue and more besides. In the scale with this accusation his 22d of February folly, his Canterbury pilgrimage to the grave of poor Douglas, and his melancholy excuses for the New Orleans massacre are but dust in the balance. The highest functions of Congress in the matter of Southern reconstruction, the sovereign national legislative power over States and Territories, whether in the Union or wrested or purchased from a foreign power, have been assumed by Mr. Johnson, and are still exercised as belonging not to Congress, but to the President, whose special business it is to see that the laws of Congress are faithfully executed.

Against this sweeping charge of usurpation the tonnage and poundage assumptions of King Charles the First of England dwindle into trifles, as do the grievances of the American Declaration of Independence against King George the Third. The powers which the President has claimed and exercised in reconstructing and restoring South Carolina and Texas, he could just as well claim over Cathuahua or Sonora, if those Mexican States were brought within our limits by conquest or purchase to-morrow. Why, then, has Congress so long delayed in bringing this conflict to the test of an impeachment? We presume that Congress has been waiting for a vindication of its course from the people, and that, having obtained it in the election of the new Congress, President Johnson will surely be impeached, convicted, and removed. The "irrepressible conflict" has come to this test—Congress must stand aside for two years longer, or Mr. Johnson must be set aside; and, as the case and the parties stand, Mr. Johnson will have to return to Tennessee.

Congress and the Supreme Court.

From the World.

The leading radical organ of the West—the Chicago *Tribune*—makes the most elaborate and ingenious attempt we have seen to discover a method of circumscribing the authority of the Supreme Court. The great importance of the subject is manifest from the fact that Congress cannot advance another step in hostility to the South, so long as the Supreme Court stands ready to declare their acts void. Impeachment is the only path out of the difficulty, but impeachment of the President is so harsh and groundless a proceeding, that it is no wonder the more thoughtful radicals try to devise some other method of reaching the Supreme Court.

The first and fundamental position of the Chicago *Tribune* is, that Congress can circumscribe and limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court at pleasure. It supports this position by the following reasoning and authorities:—

"The first clause of the second section of Article III defines the cases in which the United States tribunals shall have jurisdiction, and the second clause of the same section declares that 'in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned' (*i. e.*, all other cases of which a United States Court may take cognizance), 'the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.' The only limitation placed upon the power of Congress to distribute the jurisdiction created by the Constitution is, that the Supreme Court shall have *original* jurisdiction in the cases of ambassadors, etc.; and *appellate* jurisdiction in other cases; but this appellate jurisdiction is, in so many words, made subject to any exceptions or regulations that Congress may see fit to make or establish. In other words, the cases in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction are enumerated by the Constitution, but the appellate jurisdiction is altogether subject to the will of Congress. It was said by the Supreme Court, in the case of Durousseau vs. the United States, 6 Cranch, 314, 'the appellate powers of the Supreme Court are given by the Constitution; but they are limited and regulated by the acts of Congress.' 'And (United States vs. Curry, ibid 113) must be exercised in the mode therein prescribed.' Thus it will be seen that the power of Congress is without limit so far as the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is concerned, and that tribunal has no other than appellate jurisdiction except in cases 'affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be party.' Nearly all the business of the Supreme Court is under its appellate jurisdiction—the cases in which it has exercised original jurisdiction are very few comparatively—and all the most important cases in which the constitutionality of the acts of Congress have been called in question have been appeal cases. It is necessarily so, owing to the limited class of cases in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction; and that tribunal has itself decided (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137) that Congress has no power to confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court 'in other cases than these enumerated in the Constitution.' It is thus made evident, by the almost unlimited power which the Constitution gives Congress over the organization and jurisdiction of this tribunal, that the fathers of the republic had no intention of permitting it to become a political power to thwart the will of the people."

Even if we were to admit all that is here contended for, it is nothing to the purpose. Congress can, to be sure, make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; but if they should withdraw all questions affecting State rights, what would be the consequence? All laws are a dead letter without appropriate judicial machinery to enforce them; hence to except any particular statute from the jurisdiction of *all* tribunals, would virtually repeal it. A law of which no court can take cognizance, is a law which, for all practical purposes, does not exist. All that could be done, then, under the clause of the Constitution on which the Chicago *Tribune* relies, would be to declare that the class of laws with which the radicals are unwilling to trust the Supreme Court shall be finally adjudicated upon by the District and Circuit Courts, without appeal. This would only transfer the difficulty, and aggravate it; for it shows a gross misconception of judicial functions to suppose that it is only the Supreme Court that can pronounce on the constitutionality of laws. This function is not conferred on any of our courts by statute, but inheres in them all by necessity. *No court can decide any case* without deciding what is the law that governs it; and if there be two contradictory laws, it must decide which of the two is binding, or it cannot decide the case at all. Hence, in every country where the Legislature is limited by a written constitution, every court, high or low, which finds a law in conflict with the constitution must necessarily treat the law as void; the judges being all sworn to support the constitution, which, by its own nature, is paramount. Now the kind of laws the radicals wish to run into the Southern States past the blockade of the Supreme Court, would not operate oppressively on the North, and cases arising under them would not be brought into the Northern Courts. In the South, the District and Circuit Courts would pronounce them unconstitutional with as much certainty as the Supreme Court; and as no appeal could be made, these decisions of the Southern judges would be final. If the radicals wish to try this remedy, we congratulate them on their hopefulness.

The whole idea of thus limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exquisitely preposterous. The purpose of having a Supreme Court at all, is to secure a uniform interpretation of the laws. But if the most important cases are forbidden to be carried up, they will be subject to as many jarring interpretations as there are different inferior courts. What, then, it may be asked, does the Constitution mean when it declares that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make?" It is a precaution against flooding the court of last resort with multitudes of petty cases, to consume its time and waste the energy of its judges on minor questions. It was so understood by the first Congress, which, in passing the Judiciary act, excepted from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court suits where the matter in controversy is less than two thousand dollars. Limitation of the facility of appeals is also necessary to prevent appeals being dishonestly resorted to for postponing the execution of the judgments of the inferior courts. It is under the same clause of the Constitution that appellants are required by Congress to give security for the payment of judgments and costs, and that the time is limited within which appeals can be brought. This kind of regulation is reasonable and necessary, and is properly entrusted to the discretion of Congress; but the idea that Congress can screen any class of laws from being set aside if they are repugnant to the Constitution, by withholding them from the jurisdiction of the court, is supremely absurd. The Supreme Court would set aside the very law making the exception.

Advancing from the Chicago *Tribune's* general principle to its particular application, we fail to discover any connection or coherence. The superstructure might as easily have been raised on any other foundation, or on none. Here are the specific practical recommendations:—

"It having been made apparent by two recent decisions that it is the deliberate purpose of the Supreme Court to thus usurp the legislative powers of the Government, to defeat the will of the loyal men of this nation in the interests of a rebellion crushed by military power, the question arises, what remedy Congress has within the limits of the Constitution to protect the country from its mischievous designs—designs which, if carried out, will either prove fatal to liberty and the Union, or plunge the country into another civil war. We believe the remedy is simple. The power of Congress to fix the number of judges that shall constitute a quorum in all cases, or any given class of cases, is unquestionable. The first Congress fixed it at four. At present it is five. We believe a law should be passed immediately, requiring the presence of eight judges to constitute a quorum, whenever the constitutionality of any act of Congress is called in question. It is equally within the province of Congress to say what number of voices shall be required in order to set aside any act of Congress as unconstitutional. At present, a bare majority of those present (three Judges if a bare quorum is present) may do this. We think the time has come for Congress to pass a law requiring the concurrence of three-fourths, or at least two-thirds of the whole bench, to pronounce authoritatively against the constitutionality of any act of Congress. Both of these measures would be clearly within the constitutional power of Congress; both are clearly required by the menacing attitude of that tribunal, which seems to have joined hands with a corrupt and treacherous Executive to give victory to the Rebellion, and to reinstate the inhuman and barbarous laws of slavery, which that Rebellion was inaugurated to uphold. Unless a remedy is applied, the state of things pictured by Mr. Lincoln in the extract above given will be realized, and the people of this country will cease to be their own rulers—the legislative functions of Congress will be usurped by the Supreme Court, and the Rebellion will become as victorious as though Grant and Sherman had surrendered to Lee and Johnston, and Jeff. Davis himself were in power at the Capitol."

The recommendation about a quorum is objectionable only on the score of convenience. If more than one judge should happen to be detained from attendance by sickness or accident, important suits might be unreasonably delayed; but the delay would not be likely to benefit the radicals. The kind of suits in contemplation would come from the Southern States, being appeals from judges who had decided certain laws unconstitutional. Until such judgments were reversed, the laws in question would remain suspended, and the radicals would be welcome to the delay. The recent decisions were rendered by a full Court, and in cases so important judges are not likely to be absent without necessity. The recommendation of eight for a quorum is of little consequence.

We come now to the gist of the proposed reform; which is, that no law shall be declared unconstitutional except by the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of judges. Such a recommendation could have proceeded only from a momentary oversight of the nature and functions of a court of justice. Every suit brought into court is a suit *between parties* who stand to each other (under some legal name or other depending on the stage of the suit) in the relation of plaintiff and defendant. Between these parties, every court which is not a scandal to public justice stands neutral and impartial. The court declares what the law is only as the means of meting out justice to the parties. A decision *for* one of them, is a decision *against* the other; and justice does not hold her scales even unless she gives them an equal chance. But to enact that, in a court of eight judges, it shall require the concurrence of six to decide for one of the parties, while two suffice to decide against him, would be making the chances as three to one against his obtaining justice. It would be loading with heavy weights one of the scales of a balance which ought to be held even. The Chicago *Tribune* does not seem to regard the court in its essential character as an arbiter between litigant parties, but rather as an arbiter between Congress and the Constitution. But even in this latter aspect its proposal is a flagrant absurdity. Instead of giving the Constitution and a law contravening it an equal chance in the court, it gives the law three chances to one against the Constitution, although the latter is confessedly of paramount authority. It is absurd to make any distinctions in favor of either, except such as the evidence may give it in the reason and conscience of the judges.

This proposal, and all similar proposals, are devices for changing the Constitution without the formality of regular amendments. The Constitution makes amendments not easy, but difficult. They require the concurrence of three-fourths of the States. But the proposal under discussion requires the concurrence of three-fourths of the Supreme Court to *prevent* changes. It is, in effect, a proposal to enable Congress to make any alterations in the Constitution they please, and to establish such changes as valid unless three-fourths of the judges agree to reverse them. We might as well have no Constitution to bind and restrain Congress, as for Congress to be enabled to erect barriers against their acts being declared unconstitutional. And, in fact, all the current arguments in favor of the supreme control of Congress over pending public questions are arguments against constitutional government. The moment you make Congress the final judge of the extent of their own powers, you abolish the Constitution.

PROPOSALS.

PROPOSALS FOR PAPER FOR THE PUBLIC PRINTING.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT PUBLIC PRINTING, WASHINGTON, January 18, 1867.

In pursuance of the fourth section of the act entitled "An act to further regulate the printing of the public documents and the purchase of paper for the public printing," approved on the 27th of July, 1866, Sealed Proposals will be received until WEDNESDAY, the 18th day of February, 1867, at 12 o'clock, for furnishing the Paper for the Public Printing until the 31st day of December, 1867, the said Proposals to be opened before and the award of contracts to be made by the Joint Committee of Congress on Public Printing, to the lowest and best bidder for the interest of the Government.

The subjoined schedule specifies, as nearly as can be ascertained, the quantity of each kind of paper that will be required; but contracts will be entered into for all that may be needed during the year, and no more:—

CLASS 1.—UNCALENDERED PRINTING PAPER.

22,000 reams of fine Printing Paper, uncalendered, measuring 24x38 inches, and weighing forty-five pounds to the ream of 500 sheets.

CLASS 2.—CALENDERED PRINTING PAPER.

8000 reams of superfine calendered Printing Paper, measuring 24x38 inches, and weighing fifty-three pounds to the ream of 500 sheets.

CLASS 3.—SIZED AND CALENDERED PRINTING PAPER.

1000 reams superfine Printing Paper, hard-sized and super-calendered, measuring 24x32 inches, and weighing forty-five pounds to the ream of 500 sheets.

CLASS 4.—MAP PAPER.

1000 reams superfine map paper, sized and calendered, of such size as may be required, corresponding in weight with paper measuring 19x24 inches, and weighing twenty-one pounds to the ream of 500 sheets.

CLASS 5.—WRITING PAPERS (TO BE OF ANY REQUIRED WEIGHT).

3000 reams Quarto Post, 10x16 inches.
3000 reams Flatcap, 13x16½, or 14x17 inches.
2000 reams Double Cap, 16½x26, or 17x28 inches.
2000 reams Demy, 16x20½ inches.
2000 reams Double Demy, 20½x32 inches.
2000 reams Folio Post, 17x22 inches.
2000 reams Double Folio Post, 22x34 inches.
1000 reams medium 18x23 inches.
1000 reams royal, 19x24 inches.
500 reams super royal, 20x28 inches.
500 reams imperial, 22½x31 inches.
5000 reams of any required size not enumerated above, and not exceeding 21x40 inches.

CLASS 6—PAPER FOR POST OFFICE BLANKS (ENGINE SIZED).

400 reams measuring 22x34 inches, weighing 40 pounds per ream.
1700 reams measuring 26x32 inches, weighing 46 pounds per ream.
1200 reams measuring 25x36 inches, weighing 52 pounds per ream.
100 reams measuring 18x18 inches, weighing 22 pounds per ream.
400 reams measuring 18x24 inches, weighing 24 pounds per ream.

Proposals will be received for the whole quantity or any portion, not less than one thousand reams, of the papers designated in Classes 1 and 2, and for the whole quantity or any portion of the papers designated in Classes 5 and 6, being not less than one-fourth. Samples of the quantities of all the papers, in all the classes, will be furnished upon application at this office, and the successful bidders will be required rigidly to conform to the samples furnished.

Each class will be considered separately, and be subject to a separate contract, but bidders may offer for one or more of the classes in the same proposal.

No proposal will be considered unless accompanied by a guarantee that the bidder or bidders, if his or their proposal shall be accepted, will enter into an obligation, with good and sufficient sureties, to furnish the articles proposed for; and each proposal must be accompanied by satisfactory evidence that the person or persons making said proposal are manufacturers of or dealers in the description of paper which he or they propose to furnish.

All the paper in the several classes must be delivered at the Government Printing Office, in the city of Washington (except Class 6, which must be delivered at Buffalo, N. Y.), in good order, free from all and every extra charge or expense, and subject to the inspection, count, weight, and measurement of the Superintendent, and be in all respects satisfactory.

The supplying of an inferior article in any of the classes, or a failure to supply the quantity required at any time, will be considered a violation of the contract

Blank proposals will be furnished upon application at this office, and no proposal will be considered which does not conform exactly therewith.

Proposals will be endorsed on the envelope "Proposals for Paper," and addressed to the Joint Committee on Public Printing, either to the care of Hon. H. B. Anthony, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Printing; Hon. A. H. Laflin, Chairman of the House Committee on Printing; or C. Wendell, Esq., Superintendent of the Public Printing, Washington, D. C.

By direction of the Joint Committee of Congress on Public Printing.

C WENDELL,
1 21 20t Superintendent of Public Printing.

GOVERNMENT SALE.—The property known as the GOVERNMENT TANNERY AND STEAM SAW MILL, with seventy-five acres of land, near SAN ANTONIO Texas.

Sealed proposals, in duplicate, will be received up to the first day of March, 1867, for the purchase of 75 acres of land, more or less, together with the buildings erected thereon, and the appurtenances appertaining, that is to say:—

One Tannery, containing twelve stone lime vats, fifty-two wooden vats, seven stone pools, and capable of tanning 15,000 hides per annum.

One Steam Saw Mill, capable of sawing 3000 feet of lumber daily.

One small Stone Building.

The above property is situated about two miles above San Antonio, on the San Antonio river, and the water is conducted to the establishment by a race of hewn stone, laid in cement.

The land was purchased and improvements made by the late so called Confederate Government, and are estimated to have cost $150 000 in gold.

The property has been under lease for the year 1866, at a monthly rent of $500, payable in advance. A secured title in fee simple will be given by the United States Government.

Proposals will be marked, "Proposals for Government Tannery and Saw Mill," and addressed to

J B. KIDDOO,
Bv't Maj.-Gen. Asst Com'n, Bureau R. F. and A. L., Galveston, Texas. 1 11 7w

PROPOSALS FOR CONTINUING DELAWARE BREAKWATER.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE, No. 209 SOUTH SIXTH STREET, PHILADELPHIA, January 7, 1867.

Sealed Proposals, in duplicate, with a copy of this advertisement attached to each, will be received at this office until the 21st of February, 1867, for stone to the amount of $67,000 (sixty-seven thousand dollars) for the Delaware Breakwater.

The stone to be of the hardest and most durable quality; the delivery to commence on or about the 15th of May, and to be completed by the 15th of September, and the weekly delivery to be as nearly as possible uniform.

Of the total amount of stone, four-fifths are required to be in blocks of not less than two tons, and one-fifth in blocks of upwards of one-fourth of a ton.

The stones will be subject to rigid inspection, and will be received or not, as the Engineer, or his agents shall find them to accord, or not, as to quality and size, with the above description.

Each bid must be guaranteed by two responsible persons, whose signatures should be appended to the guarantee, and who should be certified to as being good and sufficient security, by the United States District Judge, Attorney, or Collector, or other public officer.

A reservation of ten per centum on partial payments will be made during the delivery of the stone.

Envelopes to be endorsed, "Proposals for Stone for Delaware Breakwater."

Bids will be opened at 12 o'clock M. on THURSDAY, the 21st of February, 1867, and bidders are invited to be present.

For further information. apply at this office.

C. SEAFORTH STEWART,
1 8 tuths 6w Maj. Eng. and Bvt. Lt.-Col.

CITY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, PHILADELPHIA January 19, 1867.

Sealed Proposals for BLANKS, BOOKS, STATIONERY, and PRINTING required by ordinance of City Councils, approved December 29, 1866, making an appropriation to this Department for the year 1867, will be received at this office No. 11 STATE HOUSE ROW, until 11 o'clock A. M. on MONDAY, January 28 1867, at which time said proposals will be opened, and the contract awarded to the lowest bidder.

Printed schedules, on which the bids must be made of the articles required, will be furnished upon application at the City Commissioners' Office.

THOMAS DICKSON,
DAVID F. WEAVER,
HENRY CONNER,
1 19 3t City Commissioners.

PROPOSALS

PROPOSALS FOR ARMY TRANSPORTATION.

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D. C., January 15 1867.

Sealed Proposals will be received at this office until 12 o'clock M., on the 28th of February, 1867, for the transportation of Military Supplies, during the year commencing April 1, 1867, and ending March 31, 1868, on the following routes:—

ROUTE No. 1.

From Fort McPherson, Nebraska Territory, or such parts as may be determined upon during the year on the Omaha branch of the Union Pacific Railroad, west of Fort McPherson or from Fort Laramie. Dakotah Territory, to such posts or depots as are now or may be established in the Territory of Nebraska, west of longitude 102 deg., in the Territory of Montana, south of latitude 40 deg., in the Territory of Dakotah, west of longitude 104 deg., in the Territory of Idaho, south of latitude 44 deg., and east of longitude 114 deg., and in the Territories of Utah and Colorado north of latitude 40 deg., including, if necessary, Denver City.

ROUTE No 2.

From Fort Riley, State of Kansas, or such points as may be determined upon during the year on the Union Pacific Railroad, E. D., to any posts or depots that are now or may be established in the State of Kansas or in the Territory of Colorado, south of 40 degrees north, and to Fort Union, New Mexico, or other depot that may be designated in that Territory, and to any other point or points on the route.

ROUTE No. 3.

From Fort Union or such other depot as may be established in the Territory of New Mexico, to any posts or stations that are or may be established in that Territory, and to such posts or stations as may be designated in the Territory of Arizona, and in the State of Texas west of longitude 105 degrees.

ROUTE No. 4.

From St. Paul, Minnesota, to such posts as are now or may be established in the State of Minnesota and in that portion of Dakotah Territory lying east of the Missouri river.

The weight to be transported during the year will not exceed, on Route No. 1, 30,000,000 pounds; on Route No. 2, 20,000,000 pounds; on Route No 3, 8 000,000 pounds; and on Route No. 4, 3,500,000 pounds.

Proposals will be made for each route separately.

Bidders will state the rate per 100 pounds per 100 miles, at which they will transport the stores in each month of the year, beginning April 1, 1867, and ending March 31, 1868.

Bidders should give their names in full, as well as their places of residence, and each proposal should be accompanied by a bond in the sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars, signed by two or more responsible persons, guaranteeing that in case a contract is awarded for the route mentioned in the proposal to the party proposing, the contract will be accepted and entered into, and good and sufficient security furnished by said party in accordance with the terms of this advertisement.

The contractor will be required to give bonds in the following amounts:—

On Route No 1, $250,000.
On Route No. 2, $200,000.
On Route No. 3, $100,000.
On Route No. 4, $50,000.

Satisfactory evidence of the loyalty and solvency of each bidder and person offered as security will be required.

Proposals must be endorsed "Proposals for Army Transportation on Route No. 1, 2, 3, or 4," as the case may be, and none will be entertained unless they fully comply with the requirements of this advertisement.

The party to whom an award is made must be prepared to execute the contract at once, and to give the required bonds for the faithful performance of the contract.

The right to reject any and all bids that may be offered is reserved.

The contractors on each route must be in readiness for service by the 1st day of April, 1867, and will be required to have a place of business or agency at which he may be communicated with promptly and readily for Route No. 1 at Omaha, N. T.; for Route No 2 at Fort Riley, Kansas; for Route No. 3 at Fort Union, New Mexico; for Route No. 4 at Saint Paul, Minnesota, or at such other point for each of the several routes as may be indicated as the starting point of the route.

Blank forms showing the conditions of the contract to be entered into for each route can be had on application at this office, or at the office of the Quartermaster at New York, Saint Louis, Fort Leavenworth, Omaha, Santa Fe, and Fort Snelling, and must accompany and be a part of the proposal.

By order of the Quartermaster-General.

1 19t F28] ALEXANDER BLISS,
Brevet Colonel and Assistant Quartermaster, U.S.A.

PROPOSALS FOR CAVALRY HORSES.—

DEPOT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, BALTIMORE, Maryland, January 9, 1867.

Sealed Proposals are invited and will be received at this Office until THURSDAY, 12 o'clock M., January 24, 1867, for the delivery in the City of Baltimore of forty-eight (48) Cavalry Horses.

The horses will be subjected to careful inspection before being accepted. They must be sound in all respects, well broken, in full flesh and good condition, from fifteen to sixteen hands high, from five to nine years old, well adapted in every way for cavalry purposes.

The ability of the bidder to fulfil his agreement must be guaranteed by two responsible persons, which guarantee must accompany the proposal.

The horses must be delivered within twenty (20) days from the date of acceptance of any proposal

The Government reserves the right to reject any or all bids. Payment to be made on completion of contract.

Bids will be endorsed "Proposals for Cavalry Horses," and addressed to the undersigned, Baltimore, Md.

By order of the Quartermaster-General.

A S KIMBALL,
Captain and A. Q. M., U. S A,
1 11 11t Depot Quartermaster.