

THE SOMERSET HERALD.

AND FARMERS' AND MECHANICS' REGISTER.

TWO DOLLARS PER ANNUM,
HALF-YEARLY IN ADVANCE.

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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1847,

Vol. 5.—No. 14.

WORDS OF CHEER.

Be firm and be faithful,
Desert not the right;
The brave become bolder,
The darker the night!
Then up and be doing,
Though cowards may fail,
Thy duty pursuing,
Dare all and prevail!

If scorn be thy portion,
If hatred and loss,
If stripes, and if prison,
Remember the Cross!
God watches above thee,
And He will requite—
Sooner leave those who love thee,
Than God and the right!

TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS.

SECOND SESSION.

SENATE.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1847.
THANKS TO GEN. TAYLOR.

After a few remarks from Messrs. SPEIGHT and EVANS in relation to the private calendar—

The joint resolution of the Senate giving the thanks of Congress to Gen. Taylor and the army for their gallantry at Monterey came up; when—
Mr. A'HERTON moved that it be referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Mr. CRITTENDEN hoped that course would not be pursued. He thought it better to lay this resolution on the table for the present, and take up the resolution from the House; which suggestion having been adopted—

The House resolution was taken up, and having been read, as follows:

RESOLVED, unanimously, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress are due, and are hereby presented to Major General Zachary Taylor, and through him to the brave officers and soldiers, both of the regular army and of the volunteers under his command, for their courage, skill, fortitude, and good conduct in storming the city of Monterey, defended as it was by a force more than double their number, and protected by the strongest fortifications, which resulted in a most brilliant victory to our army, and reflected imperishable honor upon our arms, engaged as it was and still is in a war commenced and forced upon us by Mexico, and continued by us in defence of the honor and vindication of the just rights of the United States, assailed as both had been by repeated and flagrant acts, on the part of Mexico, of insult, outrages, and finally of invasion of one of the States of this Union. PROVIDED, That nothing herein contained shall be construed into an approbation of the terms of the capitulation of Monterey.

RESOLVED, That the President be requested to cause to be struck a gold medal with devices emblematical of this splendid achievement, and presented to General Taylor, as a testimony of the high sense entertained by Congress for his judicious and distinguished conduct on that memorable occasion.

RESOLVED, That the President of the United States be requested to cause the foregoing resolutions to be communicated to General Taylor, and through him to the army under his command.

Mr. SPEIGHT moved to amend the resolution by striking out the proviso.—He would state, he said, in very few words, his reason for making this motion. He was not one of those who were at any time forward in returning thanks to any man for doing his duty; but, when he did so, he was not willing to present thanks with one hand and a censure with the other. If that part of the resolution should be retained, he would be obliged to vote against the resolution itself. He was not at present prepared to determine—

—for he was not a military man—nor had he the facts before him to enable him to determine, whether Gen. Taylor did his duty in regard to that affair or not; but, if thanks were to be voted to him, they should be voted in the usual manner, and not accompanied by any thing that would imply a reflection upon his conduct.

Mr. ATCHISON said, if it were in order, he would move to lay this resolution on the table, to be taken up when the resolution offered by the Senator from Tennessee came up again, so that they might both be referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

This motion was, upon a division, negatived—ayes 21, noes 25.

On Mr. SPEIGHT's motion the yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. SEVIER held that there was no censure expressed in the proviso. It was calculated merely to prevent a conclusion that might be drawn if that proviso were not attached; to prevent the conclusion that Congress, in adopting the resolution, approved the armistice that was made at Monterey. It was not censuring Gen. Taylor at all. It was merely leaving the question free; so that those who were disposed to vote thanks could do so without expressing any opinion in regard to the capitulation. He considered that those who regarded the armistice as

ill-advised and wrong, ought not to be drawn in to express their approbation of that which they could not sanction.

Mr. JARNAGIN remarked that there was not a solitary word in the resolution about an armistice.

Mr. SEVIER. There is about capitulation.

The resolution was again read by the Secretary.
Mr. JARNAGIN repeated that in the body of the resolution there was not a word about an armistice or capitulation. He perceived, however, that it was embraced in an amendment which had been inserted by way of proviso, and that proviso clearly implied a censure upon Gen. Taylor which he could not consent to sanction.

Mr. SEVIER said he had no desire to censure Gen. Taylor. He knew him to be a gallant officer, who had fought bravely for his country. All that he desired was to avoid giving a vote approving of the capitulation to which he (Gen. T.) had consented.

Mr. JOHNSON, of Louisiana, said that he considered the proviso an implied censure, and if it were retained in the resolution, he could not vote for the resolution itself.

Mr. J. M. CLAYTON desired that the Senator from Arkansas, as he had said that he disapproved of the armistice, and that he considered it objectionable, would tell them the reasons for his disapproval.

Mr. SEVIER said it was not his purpose to be drawn into a discussion upon this matter with the Senator from Delaware. He was no military man, but he had a right to an opinion nevertheless; and he had merely expressed that opinion, without any intention, upon an occasion like this, of entering into any discussion at all upon the subject.

Mr. ARCHER said he wished to superadd to the inquiry put by the Senator from Delaware one other inquiry. He desired to know why the Senator was for connecting the subject of the capitulation with the resolution of thanks?

Mr. SEVIER said he would tell the Senator in one word, if he would allow him; that he found, upon the last reading of the resolution, that it was not contained in it, and therefore he had ceased to say any thing about it.

Mr. CRITTENDEN said that it seemed to him, from the character of this resolution, that there was a kind of feeling existing against Gen. Taylor, arising no doubt from that sort of party spirit which interposed itself through every thing, and with which all persons were more or less imbued. A matter of this sort, he thought, ought to be treated irrespective of party. Gen. Taylor, as the leader of the forces of the country, had nothing to do with party. He was above all party. He sought for no party approbation. He desired the approbation of his country. He apprehended that, if it were known how little Gen. Taylor busied himself about parties, parties, or political operations—how exclusively devoted he was to the service of the country—the knowledge of that fact would shield him from every unkind suspicion on the part of any honorable member of that body. Gen. Taylor was far from being a political partisan, much less was he actuated by that sort of spirit which seemed to give complexion to this resolution. The whole country had received the intelligence of the surprising achievements of our little army under the gallant leading of Gen. Taylor with satisfaction mingled with surprise at the singular success which had attended those operations. Conducted, as they were, under circumstances of extreme difficulty and embarrassment, he believed they were not surpassed by any thing of the kind that had ever occurred in the history of the world. And now, when the councils of the country were called upon to express the public gratitude, called forth by those great achievements, why should they give way to that sort of spirit which would prompt them to look for some circumstance that would dim the glory of the achievements, and to qualify their expression of approbation in such a manner as to make it doubtful in the construction and the opinion of the world, whether they did not intend to dim the lustre of his renown, and to drag the very cap which they were holding to his lips. He was sure such was not the feeling of his honorable friend opposite—he was certain that he was acting with perfect candor; but he would humbly submit to him that he had taken too much of a party view, and therefore an erroneous one. It was not usual to stop to inquire, after a great victory had been won, whether the action could have been better fought if managed in some other way. It was enough that a victory had been gained, no matter what the order of battle might be, whether gained by the superior exertions of the centre, or of the left wing, or of the right wing. Gen. Taylor had done all that was expected of him. He had evinced all the skill of an accomplished general, and all the courage and valor of a perfect soldier. Then why examine the matter with so critical an eye to endeavor to find something which would diminish the glory of his achievements—to find out some little circumstance, and to grasp at it in order to

convey a sentiment of disapproval? He did not speak of the motives of gentlemen. He spoke of the resolution and of the interpretation which would be put upon it by the world. It would bear upon its face evidence that they did not approve of the armistice. And pray what did they know about that armistice which would enable them to determine whether it should be a subject of approval or otherwise? Some gentlemen whom he had heard converse upon this subject, not in Congress but out of it, seemed to entertain the expectation that Gen. Taylor, with his slender forces, exhausted by a three days' battle, should have rushed upon thousands of their entrenched adversaries, and have forced them to an unconditional surrender. Would any of those who cavilled here have done so? Gen. Taylor had but about 5,000 disposable troops at the end of the battle, and it was expected that those brave fellows, exhausted with three days' fighting, would have rushed, bayonet in hand, upon the enemy, 9,000 in number, strongly fortified as they were, and have made them prisoners. It was an easy matter to talk of these things at their firesides, but he would venture to say that the opinions of those who were upon the spot—the opinions of such men as Worth, Davis, and Henderson, as well as of Gen. Taylor himself—were worth more than any judgment that might be formed by those who were not connected with the battle, and had no participation in it! In regard to the armistice, what could have been done more than had been done if the armistice had not been agreed upon? After such a victory and such a battle, the army could have done nothing for two months at least, whilst the armistice would have the effect of paralyzing the enemy, if it were faithfully observed during the time of its continuance. The very fact of assenting to an armistice, on the part of Gen. Taylor, proved him to be a man of sound judgment as well as of humane feeling. The armistice afforded him time for obtaining supplies, and restoring the vigor of his own little army, while it afforded to the women and children of the beleaguered city time to escape the horrors which would attend the sacking of a town by a triumphant soldiery. There was nothing to find fault about. What would their army have done if no armistice had been agreed upon? They required time. Military men were the best judges of this matter; they who stand upon the point of honor, who were trained in that sentiment, who lived and died for honor, and who appreciated above all things honor that was conferred upon them by their country. What would they think of this obliterating compliment? This uncertain mark of approbation? How would such a hesitating compliment be received by the army after winning such a battle as that? How would it be thought of when it was perceived that Senators here were endeavoring to qualify the matter so as to go against Gen. Taylor or in his favor according as the tide of war or the tide of politics might turn? When they perceived them taking a sort of neutral betwixt and between position, ready to take shelter under the armistice and to vote approval and disapproval at the same time? How was the army likely to receive this thing, which they intended, not only as a reward for past good conduct, but as an incentive to further achievement and further victories? Would it be so? The next time they fought; the next time they accomplished a brilliant achievement, what thanks would they have to expect? If an expression of approbation was to be of any worth or of any value at all, it must come entirely free and unrestrained. It must come to them as freely as the rain falls from heaven. If they attempted to qualify the matter, they would destroy the compliment. It would turn that which they intended as a compliment to very dust and ashes. He hoped the proposition of the Senator from Mississippi to amend the resolution would be adopted.

Mr. SEVIER said that the Senator from Kentucky did him no more than justice when he said that he would be the last man to cast a censure upon Gen. Taylor. He had known that officer personally, and, as the honorable Senator had remarked, there was not a braver or better officer in the army. He had hoped to escape this debate, but it would be proper for him to make a short reply to what had been said. The Senator from Kentucky had said that all the military men at Monterey were in favor of this capitulation, and he had mentioned the names of some of those officers, among whom was General Henderson. Now he had some faint recollection of having seen in the public papers a letter from Gen. H. on this subject, in which that officer stated that the capitulation was made by order of Gen. Taylor, and that he (Gen. Henderson) and, he believed, also Gen. Worth were opposed to it.—And, besides this, all the facts had been reported to the Government here; and this capitulation—this armistice—had undergone review and had been disapproved of. This was notorious to the whole country. Such had been the decision in regard to this capitulation and this armistice when the subject was laid before the proper authorities in this place. They

were disapproved of, and he had been under the impression that this disapproval was embodied in this resolution until he heard it read the last time; but, as it was not, he did not know that he should have any great objection to the proviso being stricken out.

How had it been in respect to another military man when it was attempted to pass a little bill returning to him a thousand dollars which had been taken from him? They found every Whig Senator endeavoring to attach to that bill a proviso equally objectionable with the present. This showed that Senators could change with circumstances. He was not disposed to say a word in relation to the armistice. His only object was to leave it an open question. Was it asking too much, when passing this vote of thanks, that they should be permitted to leave this point an open question, especially as this capitulation and armistice had been reported to the Department; and, whether rightfully or not, disapproved of?

Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland. Does the Senator say that the capitulation was disapproved of?

Mr. SEVIER said he so understood.

Mr. EVANS. There is no evidence of it.

Mr. SEVIER said he had no documents on the subject in his possession; but he had been informed that it was disapproved of.

Mr. JOHN M. CLAYTON said that the Senator from Arkansas seemed now to be reconciled to striking out the proviso. But he regretted very much that the honorable Senator, in the course of his remarks, had thought proper, upon an occasion like this, when they were about to pass a vote of thanks to the commander of our army, to talk of this side and the other side of the chamber, as if there were or could be different sides among them in regard to this matter. He trusted and believed that gentlemen on the opposite side of the chamber were just as ready to return thanks to the gallant soldiers of our army as they were upon this side. The honorable Senator, he thought, was mistaken entirely when he said that the Department had disapproved of the capitulation. They disapproved of the armistice, and directed General Taylor to terminate it, and he did so in pursuance of the order of the Department. But he believed that it made at last a difference of only about four days; for only about four days remained of the armistice that had been agreed upon at the time the notice of its termination was given in obedience to the Executive order. No injury, then, was done by the armistice; and as to the capitulation, he had never heard before that the Department had disapproved of it.

Mr. SEVIER said he had the impression on his mind, and that impression was confirmed by General Taylor's letter, that the capitulation was embraced in the disapproval, as well as the armistice.

Mr. J. M. CLAYTON said he did not so understand General Taylor's letter.—He understood from it that direction had been given by the Government to terminate the armistice; but he did not understand that the capitulation had been disapproved of.

He would be very sorry that such a proviso as was annexed to this resolution in the other House should be retained, on account of its moral effect, not only upon the country but upon the army. What would be the inference from retaining such a proviso? What was there wrong in the capitulation? After three days hard fighting, when much blood had been shed, the general of the opposite army asked for an interview with the commanding general of our army; and in that interview, in order to save the needless effusion of blood, it was agreed that the city should be surrendered, and that the officers of the opposite army should be permitted to march out with their side arms. What would gentlemen have had Gen. Taylor to do under such circumstances, reduced as his forces were, with perhaps not more than 5,000 men fit for service? Would they have had him attack an army of twice their number, strongly entrenched, and attempt to drive them from their fortifications and make prisoners of them? And for what? What could he have done with them after had been made prisoners? General Taylor was badly supplied with provisions; he could not have fed them for ten days; he could not have retained them as prisoners of war. They could have liberated themselves at any time. With these facts staring them in the face, he repeated the question, what would gentlemen have had Gen. Taylor to do? Would they have had him storm the fortifications, regardless of the lives of his own soldiers? And for what purpose? For the purpose of gaining additional glory and honor for having slain so many hundred Mexicans in battle? Were they to have no regard for the loss which our army must sustain in storming their fortifications, when the enemy had every advantage against us? Would gentlemen have had it that Gen. Taylor should have stormed and sacked the town? Were they acquainted with the consequences attending upon the sacking of a city, and of letting loose a soldiery hardened by warfare, hard of heart, with bloody hands to murder and to pillage

the inhabitants? Gen. Taylor told them that he had a regard for the safety of the women and children, who would inevitably have been sacrificed. Looking back upon these things, he honored Gen. Taylor as much for the terms of the capitulation as for the bravery he had displayed in battle. He gloried that an American general had shown himself thus humane.

If they adopted such a proviso, what would be its moral effect upon the army? The soldiers would understand from it that humanity was not considered by Congress to be a virtue; and when the next battle was fought—when the next town was taken—they would suppose that they were expected to come red with the slaughter of the innocent lives within that town; that they were to sack, and pillage, and destroy—to revel in carnage and in blood. He was not willing to teach them any such lesson. He would have no hand in it; and he repeated, that he honored the gallant general as much for his humanity as for his bravery.

General Taylor now stood probably in such a position before the country as that no such side blow could affect his reputation. He had no idea that if the proviso were retained in the resolution that he would on that account stand the less firm in the affections of the American People. He had attained that position by his bravery, not merely in this battle, but throughout the whole campaign, and especially in those glorious engagements at Resaca de la Palma and at Palo Alto. He believed that no side blow like this could do him injury. It would be more likely to arouse the popular feeling in his favor. He was now the military hero; he was the proud soldier on whose breast fame had placed the inscription, "This is a man worthy of his country's highest honor."

Mr. BUTLER said he could not be mistaken in thinking that a resolution of thanks of this kind should not be mingled with any foreign matter; and with this view, he entirely concurred in the motion that the proviso should be stricken out.—A vote of thanks should have no qualifications or reservation attached to it. He agreed with the Senator from Mississippi when he said that he had no idea of holding out with one hand a mark of approbation, grateful to the soldier's heart, and with the other a mark of disapprobation towards a blundering general. He did not know that this reservation went so far as this; but, if there were a reservation at all, he would be compelled to vote against the resolution. But he would go further; when they had it in their power in some measure by their acts to control the future history of the country, justice seemed to require that they should do nothing that would pervert the opinion of posterity; and above all, that they should not form or express a judgment that would be hereafter reversed. Now, it was said that it was not intended to convey a censure upon General Taylor. But, to a man of sensibility, though the dagger might be sheathed with flowers, its point would still be felt. He was not himself prepared as one of this tribunal, to consent to pass a judgment upon the conduct of General Taylor at this time; neither was he prepared to sustain the view of those who thought that he was censurable for having agreed to the armistice. They ought to come to no decision upon that matter; it ought to be left free and open for future reflection, assisted by the proper means of information. And, above all, he would say, (as he should vote differently perhaps from those around him,) in regard to Gen. Taylor, the breath of party should not be blown upon his reputation; for, like some of the inflammable gases, it would but make the flame burn with the greater brilliancy.

Mr. BAGBY remarked that he should not have said a word on this subject, but, inasmuch as the capitulation at Monterey had been made the subject of debate, and inasmuch as he understood that this resolution of thanks embraced a reservation in regard to that subject, he wished to state, once for all, that from all he had seen and heard in relation to it, he disapproved, out and out, of the terms of that capitulation. He disapproved of it, not only because he believed it improper, in so far as related to the army and the Government of the United States, but he disapproved of it more strongly in view of that which an honorable Senator on the other side seemed to value so highly; he meant the evidence, as that honorable Senator contended, which General Taylor had given of his great humanity. He differed with that honorable Senator in terror. If the battle of Monterey had been the last battle to be fought in Mexico, the views of the honorable Senator might be correct. But, as the war was not to be then terminated, did the Senator not see that further battles would grow out of that capitulation?

And there was another peculiarity. He did not know of any other instance in which a defeated army had been permitted to prescribe the terms of capitulation. What had been the consequences resulting to Mexico and the United States from that capitulation? What was it that constituted the Mexican army at this day? The very troops who had been permitted thus to retire. What did they gain by the victory? It was said that a monstrous effusion of blood had been saved. It was preventing an effusion of blood at one time to occasion a greater effusion hereafter. But this capitulation had been passed upon by the Government; and were they, for the mere purpose of paying an empty compliment, to put themselves in direct conflict with the Government? He considered the proviso as one of the soundest and most essential features of the resolution. The Senator from Delaware, in endeavoring to avert what he called a side-blow aimed at Gen. Taylor, was inflicting a side-blow in another direction. If the proviso conveyed a censure upon Gen. Taylor, what would the striking it out do in reference to the Government? Gen. Taylor entered into a capitulation; the Government disapproved of it. Believing, as he did, that the capitulation was unfortunate in its results, he would vote cheerfully against the motion to strike out the proviso.

Mr. WEBSTER said that he regretted exceedingly that when they were about to render a tribute of respect to a military man abroad, any thing should occur, or any thing be proposed to be connected with it which would break the entire unanimity of Congress. To be valuable, the tribute of respect must be unanimously bestowed. It must appear to flow from a general sense of what was due to the occasion and to the officer; and always, so far as he knew, or as he remembered the history of the Government, he believed the thanks of Congress, when tendered at all to a military man, were tendered by a distinct proposition, free and clear from all other considerations whatever. Propriety and the gracefulness belonging to the occasion required that they should be tendered. He held in his hand a resolution which passed this body last year. It was in these words:

"That the thanks of Congress are due and are hereby tendered to Major-General Zachary Taylor, his officers and men, for the fortitude, skill, enterprise, and courage which distinguished the late brilliant military operations on the Rio Grande."

He proposed to frame a resolution in these very words, and to adapt it, so as to make it a real substantial tribute of respect to General Taylor and the army under his command. And he had only further to say, that he could vote for no resolution, in the present state of things, which contained any sting towards Gen. Taylor, or any censure upon his conduct in any respect, or which implied any doubt or hesitation. He desired to leave out every thing of that nature; and he did not suppose that gentlemen could have contemplated the tender of the thanks of Congress to Gen. Taylor in a manner to be acceptable to him—that is, in a manner expressive of the unanimous consent of Congress—with such provisions as were inserted here by way of preamble or dissertation upon the Mexican war.—He would vote for nothing which in any shape tended to bring in question the course pursued in the conduct of that war; and if he should withhold his vote, as he would most assuredly do, from the resolution in its present form, there was not a soldier in the army, who could read, who would not understand the reason why he withheld it. When they were about to do an act of gratitude—when they were about to unite in grateful homage to valor—was it generous, was it manly, to set traps, by way of preamble, to screw out of gentlemen an expression of views which, perhaps they did not entertain; and, if they did, which, perhaps they did not think proper, on this occasion, to express. Why should they not act with the generosity which became them? Why should they not give to Gen. Taylor and our brave little army this tribute of approbation in the ordinary way in which the thanks of Congress were always expressed? Why should they couple with it any thing that might in any degree produce reluctance in any one who was to vote for it, or in any degree mitigate the sense of gratification with which those in whose honor it was passed ought to receive it? He was very clear that this should be an unembarrassed vote of thanks—such as it was honorable to Congress to give, and honorable for the army to receive; and if he could not get the resolution separate and distinct, he would be under the necessity of voting against it.

Mr. CALHOUN said he should vote for striking out this proviso; and he would briefly state the grounds upon which he would so vote. He would do so, in the first place, upon the ground, which had been stated by his honorable colleague, as a matter of taste and propriety; and, in addition to that, he would vote for striking it out because he considered that a vote of thanks, when accompanied by the slightest censure, was entirely cancelled. He would vote for striking it out because, to his mind, there was a palpable contradiction between giving a vote of thanks and a medal to Gen. Taylor and the army, and

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He proposed to frame a resolution in these very words, and to adapt it, so as to make it a real substantial tribute of respect to General Taylor and the army under his command. And he had only further to say, that he could vote for no resolution, in the present state of things, which contained any sting towards Gen. Taylor, or any censure upon his conduct in any respect, or which implied any doubt or hesitation. He desired to leave out every thing of that nature; and he did not suppose that gentlemen could have contemplated the tender of the thanks of Congress to Gen. Taylor in a manner to be acceptable to him—that is, in a manner expressive of the unanimous consent of Congress—with such provisions as were inserted here by way of preamble or dissertation upon the Mexican war.—He would vote for nothing which in any shape tended to bring in question the course pursued in the conduct of that war; and if he should withhold his vote, as he would most assuredly do, from the resolution in its present form, there was not a soldier in the army, who could read, who would not understand the reason why he withheld it. When they were about to do an act of gratitude—when they were about to unite in grateful homage to valor—was it generous, was it manly, to set traps, by way of preamble, to screw out of gentlemen an expression of views which, perhaps they did not entertain; and, if they did, which, perhaps they did not think proper, on this occasion, to express. Why should they not act with the generosity which became them? Why should they not give to Gen. Taylor and our brave little army this tribute of approbation in the ordinary way in which the thanks of Congress were always expressed? Why should they couple with it any thing that might in any degree produce reluctance in any one who was to vote for it, or in any degree mitigate the sense of gratification with which those in whose honor it was passed ought to receive it? He was very clear that this should be an unembarrassed vote of thanks—such as it was honorable to Congress to give, and honorable for the army to receive; and if he could not get the resolution separate and distinct, he would be under the necessity of voting against it.

Mr. CALHOUN said he should vote for striking out this proviso; and he would briefly state the grounds upon which he would so vote. He would do so, in the first place, upon the ground, which had been stated by his honorable colleague, as a matter of taste and propriety; and, in addition to that, he would vote for striking it out because he considered that a vote of thanks, when accompanied by the slightest censure, was entirely cancelled. He would vote for striking it out because, to his mind, there was a palpable contradiction between giving a vote of thanks and a medal to Gen. Taylor and the army, and

tes from that capitulation? What was it that constituted the Mexican army at this day? The very troops who had been permitted thus to retire. What did they gain by the victory? It was said that a monstrous effusion of blood had been saved. It was preventing an effusion of blood at one time to occasion a greater effusion hereafter. But this capitulation had been passed upon by the Government; and were they, for the mere purpose of paying an empty compliment, to put themselves in direct conflict with the Government? He considered the proviso as one of the soundest and most essential features of the resolution. The Senator from Delaware, in endeavoring to avert what he called a side-blow aimed at Gen. Taylor, was inflicting a side-blow in another direction. If the proviso conveyed a censure upon Gen. Taylor, what would the striking it out do in reference to the Government? Gen. Taylor entered into a capitulation; the Government disapproved of it. Believing, as he did, that the capitulation was unfortunate in its results, he would vote cheerfully against the motion to strike out the proviso.

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