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## Take your County Papers.

'Twas night—and Sniggle to his wife  
Lay talking, as they were in bed,  
Of all the ills the cares and strife,  
That fell upon his luckless head.  
"Here have we been six years," quoth he,  
"And still we find both ends don't meet;  
I've work'd as busy as a bee,  
And yet we barely live and eat!  
Our children have no schooling yet;  
Indeed, I am ashamed of Ben—  
Poor fellow, I am so much in debt—  
He's had no chance, though now past ten."

"But stop, how is it?" said his spouse,  
"Our neighbor gets along so well?  
Have you not marked that Blowse  
What'er he has can always sell?  
His boys, he says, know far much more  
Than those who've been to school a year,  
And then he always knows the law,  
When goods are low and when they're dear.  
His farm, though not as large as ours,  
Is fast improving every day—  
I'd like to know what magic powers  
He has to help him in his way."

And I would, poor Sniggle thought,  
So next morning forth he went,  
To find where Blowse his bargains bought,  
And how he had so little spent.  
Said Blowse—"dear sir, the thing is plain;  
The question, no matter how you shape  
her,  
Is answered by six simple words—  
I ALWAYS TAKE MY COUNTY PAPER."

## Mexican War.

SPEECH OF THE  
HON. D. WEBSTER,  
Of the United States Senate.

### On the bill to provide for the organization of the Volunteer Force brought into the service of the United States.

Mr. WEBSTER said he was not at all surprised at the introduction of this bill; for aught he knew it was a necessary one; but it showed, at all events, that the law which it was intended to amend and improve was but a piece of patch-work. That law was not passed for calling into the service of the United States the militia of the country, nor was it passed in the regular exercise of the power conferred upon Congress for raising and maintaining an army. It was a mixed, an anomalous, an incongruous system, as he would venture to say, this early occasion for its modification proved it to be, and as would be made abundantly evident before the war with Mexico was ended.

I shall not (continued Mr. W.) oppose the progress of this bill. I cannot say it is unconstitutional, though I think it is irregular, inconvenient, and not strictly conformable to the exercise of the constitutional power of Congress. If those who are charged with the conduct of the war, and are answerable for its results, think it necessary, I shall not oppose it. But I will take the occasion now presented, sir, of the second reading of an important bill respecting the troops called into the service to carry on the war, to make a few remarks respecting the war itself and the condition in which we find ourselves in consequence of that war. The war continues, and no man can say definitely when it will end—no man can say upon any reasonable estimate, what expense it will have incurred before its conclusion.

We have received a very important communication from the President—I mean his message of the 16th of June—setting forth his views and opinions, and the views and opinions of the Secretary of the Treasury, with respect to the means and source of revenue for carrying on the war. Upon this, sir, as well as upon one or two other subjects connected with this bill, I have a few remarks to make.

The executive is responsible for the conduct of the war, and for the application of the resources put at his disposal by the two houses of Congress for the purpose of prosecuting the war. For one, I shall not deny the Government any supplies which may be considered necessary. Whatever may be thought of the origin of the war, the fact that war does exist, is itself a sufficient reason for granting the means for prosecuting that war with effect. Those who condemn the origin of the war, and those who most earnestly long for its termination, will all agree that the refusal of supplies would make no amends for what some lament, and would not hasten what I would desire.

The message of the 16th of June informs the Senate and the country that, for the fiscal year ending July, 1847, there will be, under the operation of the existing law for raising revenue, a deficiency, if the war continues, of twenty millions of dollars, and suggested the ways and means by which it is expected that this deficiency will be made good. I refer to these suggestions for the purpose of making a few observations upon them.

The object is to provide new sources

of revenue, which shall realize a fresh amount beyond that furnished by the provisions of the existing law of twenty millions of dollars between this time and the first of July next year. That is the object. The first suggestion in the communication from the Executive Government is, that five millions and a half may be produced by reducing the rates of duties on certain imported articles, and by laying new taxes on certain other articles now free of all duties; meaning principally, I suppose, by those articles now free, and which are to be taxed, tea and coffee. There is also an intimation or an opinion expressed by the Secretary of the Treasury that a million of dollars will accrue to the Treasury under the operation of the warehouse bill, if that bill should become a law. In the next place, it is estimated that, if the bill for graduating the price of the public lands shall become a law, the augmentation of the sales of the public lands will so far counterbalance any losses incurred in the reduction of price as on the whole to produce half a million of dollars more than would otherwise be obtained from that source.—These several sums put together would leave a balance of \$12,580,000 still to be provided for and a provision for this balance is contemplated either by loans or by an authority to the Treasury to issue Treasury notes, or both, with a distinct recommendation and preference, however, for the authority to issue Treasury notes.

Now, sir, with an anxious desire that the country shall be led into no mistaken policy in regard to this very important subject of revenue—a subject always important, and intensely important in time of war—I will take occasion to suggest for gentlemen's consideration what occurs to me as worthy of being suggested, in very few words, upon these several topics.

In the first place, there is no doubt that a tax properly laid upon tea and coffee will be productive of a clear positive revenue; but this will depend upon two things: first, upon the amount of the tax; and, secondly, upon the mode of laying it. The first is obviously a matter for consideration, and in regard to the second I suspect that gentlemen who are desirous of raising revenue by this means will find their calculations fallacious unless they make the duty specific. In my opinion an ad valorem duty will disappoint their hopes of any considerable amount of revenue. If I mistake not, under such a system it will be soon found that teas made up in Canton for the New York market will become wonderfully cheap. A specific rate per pound will undoubtedly make the duty productive of revenue.

I doubt not that Treasury notes may be available for the uses of the Government to a considerable extent. I do not mean as revenue or income, but as instruments or facilities for the transfer of balances, and as proper to be used in anticipation of taxes or sources of income. In regard to this, I would say, simply, that if it be the purpose of the Government, as has been intimated to us for some time, to resort to the issue of Treasury notes, I think the loss of a single day, especially the loss of a single week, will turn out to be quite inconvenient; that is, if the issue of Treasury notes is considered the best and safest, if they can be used by the Treasury under authority of law, before the money in the possession of the Government is exhausted. All I wish to say is, that I earnestly recommend to the Committee on Finance to bring in a bill by itself for the issue of Treasury notes immediately. I believe it has been as usual as otherwise for such laws to originate in the Senate; there is no constitutional impediment to such a course; and I hope that these and other important measures, such as the modifying of taxes and laying new ones, will not be suffered to lag along through Congress in general omnibus bill. Where the subjects are distinct, they should be kept separated; and where they are simple and plain, they should be acted on promptly.

Having said this much of those two sources of assisting the revenue, the tax upon tea and coffee, and the issue of Treasury notes, both of which I admit to be efficient, and probably certain in their operations, I have now to say that other matters, suggested and relied on in the communication I have referred to, I consider conjectural, uncertain, and not fit to be the basis of provisions incumbent on us to make before we leave our seats here to place the executive in a proper condition to carry on the war. I suppose the calculation will be that a considerable amount will be secured by a reduction of the duties upon articles already taxed, upon the supposition that the importation will be so much increased as to increase the aggregate receipts. I will not say that this is not a well founded opinion. I have all proper respect for the source from whence it comes; but I will venture to say that it is but an opinion; it hardly amounts to the character of an estimate for want of certain and positive foundation. We have no experience from which we can derive a satisfactory conviction that such will be the result. If I were responsible, I should not choose to place reliance to any extent upon this plan.

Well the next increase is to come from the operation of the warehouse system. I consider this equally void of any certain foundation to rest upon. I do not know how a million of money, in addition to the present income, is to be derived from admitting goods into the country to be carried out again without paying any duty whatever. I really do not conceive that the facility of carrying goods through the country without the payment of duty, is going to produce us a million of dollars. This is a matter of which I should like to see minute details; I should like to see calculations made by which this result is expected to be accomplished.—At present, I do not see the practicability of it.

And so in regard to the public lands; it may be that the passage of a graduation bill would so enhance the disposition to buy by reducing the price, as considerably to increase the quantity sold; but that that increase will be so great as to produce an overplus of half a million or any other sum, notwithstanding the diminution of price, is, I think, a matter of opinion which cannot be relied upon. So that these sources of income appear to me to be rather too uncertain to be the foundation of any satisfactory provisions; there appears rather too much risk in making mere opinions, not to say conjectures, the basis of legislation for revenue for the purposes of Government.

The truth is, if this war continues, we must have a substantial taxation, or we must incur a public debt. We cannot look to Treasury notes as revenue; if they assume interest, and are payable at a distant day, they become of course a public debt. There must then, be a substantial tax, or there must be public debt, if the war continues. Our expenses are very great. I do not say they are unnecessary; I make no imputation of that sort at present. I am sufficiently acquainted with the particulars; but I stated here some time ago, upon the credit of others, that of which I am perfectly convinced, that our expenses have been half a million of dollars a day. Forty days ago we passed an act declaring that war existed and authorizing the calling out of fifty thousand volunteers. Well, sir, I have a full conviction that the military expenditures of the Government, the expense of raising, equipping, and transporting the force which has already been called out, will be found to have cost twenty millions, or very nearly that amount, at this moment. Some portions of our warlike preparations are peculiarly expensive—I mean the regiments of mounted volunteers. They are necessary, I suppose, for the nature of the service; but there was a document published here—a communication, I think from the War Department—when Mr. Poinsett was Secretary, in which it was estimated, if I mistake not, that one regiment of mounted riflemen in regular service cost the Government per annum as much as three regiments of infantry, each composed of the same number of men. And there is good reason to believe that these occasional regiments of volunteers will be still more expensive. Almost every circumstance connected with the war is calculated to increase the expense. The vast distance to be traversed makes the cost of transportation very great; and it becomes the duty of Congress to provide for this extraordinary expense. I do not say that the expense ought not to be incurred. I only say that, from the nature of the war, the expense must necessarily be very great. And I take this occasion to say that I have seen with great pleasure the alacrity with which volunteers have rushed to the public service. A spirit of patriotism and devotion to the country's interest has been manifested of which we may justly be proud.

But upon these sources of revenue let me make another remark, though perhaps it is too obvious to require notice. For one-half the deficiency the Government proposes to rely on Treasury notes or loans. Well, if this be so, then, of course I suppose the idea of pressing for the present the Independent Treasury, or Subtreasury, must be abandoned by every one; for, what would be the use of Treasury notes under a Subtreasury administration. The issue of Treasury notes would be perfectly inconsistent with the Subtreasury system. It is quite plain that if the Government, for its own use, is driven to the necessity of issuing paper, it can have no occasion to make provision for locking up its treasures. The Subtreasury system makes it penal to issue any thing but specie. They are therefore entirely inconsistent with each other.

With respect to loans, I beseech gentlemen not to deceive themselves. There is money enough in the country, it is true, and the credit of the Government will be good if we lay such taxes as will produce revenue; but, if gentlemen suppose that a loan is to be contracted in this country for the use of the Government to be paid in specie, in the expectation that the specie is to be locked up, they will find themselves mistaken.—Those who hold capital will consent to no such thing. If the Government makes a loan, it must be made in the ordinary way—payable by instalments or otherwise, under circumstances that will show

that this amount of money is not to be drained from all the operations of private life. I take it for granted, then, if loans are to be made, the new method of keeping the public money must be abandoned.

And now sir having said this much in relation to the ideas communicated to us respecting the mode of raising revenue, I desire to add that, in my judgment, the time has come to ask for the object and character and purposes for and under which the war is hereafter to be conducted. The people of this country, while they were willing to pay all needful expenses; while they are desirous of sustaining the glory of the American arms; while they are ready to defend every inch of American territory, and maintain all the essential rights of their country; the people, if I do not misread their desires, now wish to know the objects and purposes and ends for which this war is further to be carried on. There is not now a hostile foot within the limits of the United States. Our army, at first an army of observation then an army of occupation has become an army of invasion; I will not say unjust invasion; but it is encamped at this moment beyond the limits of the U. States, and within the acknowledged territory of Mexico; and if we may credit the rumors which have recently reached us, a purpose is entertained of marching immediately and directly to the city of Mexico. Well, now, the people, as I have said, appear to me to demand, and with great reason, a full, distinct, and comprehensible account of the object and purposes of this war of invasion. The President, by two messages, one of the 13th of May, and the other of the 16th June, signifies that he is ready to treat with Mexico upon terms of peace; while it appears, at least as far as we know now, that Mexico is not willing to treat. In regard to this, I must say that, in my judgment, if this be the state of the case, Mexico is acting entirely an unreasonable and senseless part, and the Government of the United States to this extent, is acting a proper one; that is to say, as the war does exist, and the American Government is ready to treat, without prescribing terms, so as to show that her terms would be unacceptable, and Mexico declines to treat, why then I say, so far the conduct of the United States is reasonable, and the conduct of Mexico unreasonable and senseless. I would desire on all such occasions, for many reasons, and in this case for two more than the rest, to keep our country entirely in the right, and to satisfy every individual in the country that it is in the right, and that it desires nothing wrong; and I would advise, if I were called on to give advice, that this Government should tender a formal solemn embassy to Mexico. And the two reasons which would influence me are—in the first place, Mexico is weak and we are strong; it is a war therefore, on her part against great odds; and in the next place, Mexico is a neighbor, a weak neighbor—a republic formed upon our own model, who, when she threw off the dominion of old Spain, was influenced throughout mainly by our example; certainly we wished her success; certainly we congratulated her upon her change from a viceroyalty to a republic upon our own model; we wished her well and I think now that the people of the United States have no desire (I think they have no pleasure) in doing her an injury beyond what is necessary to maintain their own rights. The people of the United States cannot wish to crush the Republic of Mexico; it cannot be their desire to break down a neighboring Republic; it cannot be their wish to drive her back again to a monarchical form of Government, to render her a mere appanage to some one of the thrones of Europe.

This is not a thought which can find harbor in the generous breasts of the American people. Mexico has been unfortunate; she is unfortunate. I really believe the Mexican people are the worst governed people in Christendom. They have yet to learn the true benefits of free institutions. Depressed and ruined by a dominant military power, maintaining an army of forty thousand troops, how can a Government, limited in its resources as that of Mexico flourish? It is impossible. She has been unhappy, too in the production or non-production of men to guide her councils. I am sorry to say it of a republic, but it is nevertheless true. Mexico has produced few or none really enlightened patriotic men. I verily believe, and I sadly fear, that history will hereafter record the melancholy truth, that, from the time of the establishment of an independent Government, the people of Mexico have been worse governed a great deal than they were under the viceroyalty. Nobody can wish to see her fall, but Mexico must hear the suggestions of reason. She must listen to terms of peace; this she ought to know. And if her Government be not hopelessly stupid and infatuated, they must be aware that this is her true interest. Nothing can exceed, I have always thought, the obstinacy and senselessness manifested by Mexico for so many years in refusing to acknowledge the independence of Texas.

A correspondence between this Government and Mexico upon that subject took place at a time when I had something to do with the administration, so that my attention was particularly directed to the course of conduct pursued by Mexico, which struck me as resembling—though it was much more senseless—the conduct of old Spain in attempting for many years to reconquer the people of the low countries after they had declared their independence. Mexico must be taught that it is necessary for her to treat for peace upon considerations which belong to the present state of things. We have just claims against her—claims acknowledged by herself in the solemn form of treaty stipulations. She ought to make provision for the payment of those claims; in short, she must be brought to justice: I am not one of those who would do an injustice, but it appears to me that if, after all that has occurred, she still persists in refusing to take an American Minister on the ground that it was through the fault of the United States that she lost Texas, she will by acting a very senseless part. As to her enlisting the sympathy of foreign Powers, I have not the least belief that any Power will stand behind Mexico. I have not the least belief in her possessing the assurance of any Power that, if she will hold on in the contest, foreign aid will be sent to her. I think the whole policy of the Governments of Europe takes a different turn. I believe that they think—and especially England—that it is their interest to have Mexico at peace; and in a state of active industry, cultivating her resources, multiplying her products, and increasing her abilities to purchase from them. I believe that this will soon be the declared policy of the British Government, as it is undoubtedly the true policy of all Governments. I believe, therefore, that if Mexico rests upon any hope that by-and-by aid and succor will come from foreign sources; that hope will entirely fail.

The newspapers speak of mediation.—I doubt whether there is much truth in that; if, however, any offer of mediation be made by the best friend Mexico has, it must come down to this at last, that she must treat for peace. For one, I would vote for a suspension of hostilities to the end that negotiation might take place; and if I were to advise, I would say make her an offer of a formal embassy. I would be for keeping ourselves entirely in the right. We can afford to do so; we can lose nothing in dignity by it. It is not stooping on our part, because all the world knows that the contest is very unequal. If she will consent to this, I say meet her in the negotiation, and in the mean time suspend military operations.—But if she will not do this; if she persists foolishly and senselessly in carrying on the war, then, of course, she must have war, vigorous war, until she be compelled to adopt a different line of conduct.

Mr. WEBSTER having concluded, a brief discussion ensued between Messrs. Benton and Crittenden in relation to the mode of officering the regiments of volunteers; when,

On motion of Mr. CRITTENDEN, the further consideration of the bill was postponed until to-morrow.

### An Indian Rubber Bridge.

The following is a sketch of the Indian Rubber Bridge which was used during the Creek war, in Alabama, some years since.—It consisted of large bags, or pontoons, something like cotton bags in shape, made of Indian Rubber cloth which being filled with air, and attached laterally together, formed a bridge of fourteen feet in width, and of any length, according to the number of bags used; upon these were laid light timber, to support boards placed laterally, which forming a smooth surface, admitted the passage of wagons, horses, &c. A detachment of six hundred men, with all their arms and accoutrements, including the field officers mounted upon horses, marched on it at once, and often remaining a quarter of an hour, going through the evolutions, to test its strength, they countermarched with as much facility as if on the terra firma. Field pieces, with their complement of matrosses, and their caissons filled with ammunition, and loaded wagons, were also driven over it with the same ease. It was said that a troop of horse, arriving at night at a river where this bridge was, and seeing it stretched across the stream, crossed upon it under the impression that it was a common bridge.

The great advantage of this bridge is its portableness, all the pontoons and its cordage for a bridge of three hundred and fifty feet being capable of transportation in a single wagon; whereas the former ponton equipages consisted of cumbersome and bulky pontoons of wood, sheetrock and copper.

### WAGONS FOR THE ARMY.

We are told this morning, by a wagon maker, that there were two HUNDRED ox wagons making in Cincinnati for the army. There are three hundred in Philadelphia. Several of the shops here are at work on them now. The army will need them all to get through the difficult roads on which it proposes to march to Mexico.—Cin. Chronicle.

### From the N. O. Picayune of June 23.

#### LATER FROM MEXICO.

The United States sloop of war Falmouth arrived at Pensacola on the evening of Friday, the 19th instant, from off Vera Cruz, whence she sailed on the 4th instant. The officers & crew were all well. The United States steam frigate Princeton had arrived off Vera Cruz, and with the frigate Raritan was maintaining the blockade of the port. The health of the crews of both vessels were excellent, although the vomito was raging in the city of Vera Cruz.

The Falmouth left at Vera Cruz the British brig of war Rose and the French brig Le Mercure and barque La Perouse. The fate of the barque Eugenia, Capt. Biscoe, from New York—which vessel, it will be recollected, ran the blockade—was uncertain.

Our news from the city of Mexico is later than we gave on Sunday. We are informed that the Mexican Congress was finally organized on the 1st instant, but we do not learn whether a legal quorum was obtained. The reader will recall that when Mr. Diamond, our late Consul at Vera Cruz, left on the 30th ultimo, he was decidedly of opinion that a quorum could not legally be obtained, and such appears to have been the case down to the evening of the 30th ult.

General Paredes had at last determined to leave the capital and take the command of the army of the frontier. The result of the actions of the 8th and 9th of May is said to have made upon him a profound impression. We detect in the tone of the papers which comment upon those actions direct attempts to paliate the extent of the disasters, intended for the Provisional President rather than the public. But Paredes would seem to appreciate the full extent of the calamity, and perhaps he judges rightly that the most certain means to confirm his power in the Republic is to retrieve in person the honors lost at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. He was to leave the capital on the 6th instant, at the head of 3,000 troops, but orders had been issued that large bodies should join him at different points on the line of march, so that his entire force, including Arista's command, should not fall short of 16,000 men.

Although we have now received intelligence by way of Havana and Tampico, and by the Falmouth, that Paredes would certainly take the command of the army in person, yet there was an impression, prevalent among men of sagacity in Vera Cruz, when the Falmouth left, that he would not and could not venture to leave the city of Mexico during the session of Congress. It is said that nearly one half of the country is in open revolt. The news received here a fortnight since of the revolt of Mazatlan is confirmed, and, as we then anticipated, Sonora is now in a state of rebellion against the Central Government.

So ripe for revolution is the department of Vera Cruz, that upon the departure of the Falmouth it was said there were 1,500 men outside the city of Vera Cruz ready to attack it at any moment upon the signal being given. Some of the guns had actually been removed from the Castle of San Juan de Ulua and placed around the city for its defence, and troops had been withdrawn from the castle for the same purpose. The intelligence received from Tampico on Sunday shows how that city was rent by internal dissensions, and, in considering the deplorable state of the country in every quarter and under every aspect, it would by no means surprise us were Paredes compelled to forgo his cherished purpose of placing himself at the head of the Mexican army. But suppose he carries his resolution into effect, what better fate awaits him at the hands of General Taylor and our troops? Truly his chances from every point of view appear desperate.

To illustrate the treachery of Gen. Alvarez towards Paredes, the story is circulated at Vera Cruz that the former, who had the command of the forces at Mazatlan, was supplied with \$1,500,000 with which to act against the American squadron in the Pacific. No sooner had Alvarez obtained the funds than he pronounced against Paredes, kept all the money, and even sold the cannon in the forts.

In a paper from Havana, received since our last, we find a despatch of Gen. Arista to the Governor of Tamalipas, dated from the rancho of La Venada, May 18 which is the latest communication from him we have seen. In this he states that as the means of subsistence for his army are consumed, and its artillery weakened, while the artillery of the Americans had been increased by many heavy guns, so that Matamoros could be quickly battered down, he had determined to withdraw his troops thence before he should be threatened, and while he could retire with honor. He had accordingly done so deliberately, his artillery being drawn by oxen and his munitions conveyed in wagons. His object henceforth, he says, is to defend the soil of the departments entrusted to his command, and he was on his march to points suitable for this purpose, which, however, are not mentioned in the despatch. He directs communications to be made to him by the route of Linares or that of China.