



FROM THE  
**Anchor Club.**

To JOHN TAYLOR, of Virginia,  
Author of an Insolent and Seditious address  
to the PEOPLE.

WHEN in the selection of Gallie Agents for a further development of "Diplomatic Skill" you were found amongst the chosen few who could forget their country and become the base hirelings of a desperate and a perjured villain, the choice was acknowledged to be worthy the cunning of Talleyrand by all those who are acquainted with the rancorous hatred, which you have ever borne to the federal government, to federal measures and to federal men: your perseverance in endeavors to effect the destruction of these, so long as your weak and irritable frame may be upheld by your still more feeble though violently jacobinical and malevolent spirit, is doubted by no one.

You commence your desperate essay by telling us that you are "unwilling to shrink" &c. Pray, sir, let me ask if ever you heard of a coward from choice. You say that you "disdain to alarm the people with unfounded jealousies," &c. And why "disdain" good citizen demagogue? Could you find no word in your vocabulary more respectful or more palatable, in immediate connection with information to the people? Beware, sir, or you will be found out. You were rather more collected when you exclaimed so violently against "insinuations of foreign influence"; this is throwing dust in our eyes with a vengeance. You are also on duty when you say that "to prevent sedition is to inflict a death wound on state sovereignty." The assertion is excellent, and novel. Pray how did you remember to forget to offer your proof with your dogma? Was it on a supposition that we the people are to swallow every thing on the bare assertion of a leading demagogue?

You go on and say "it is vicious in the extreme to calumniate meritorious public servants." Heavens! this from a jacobin! But let us see what follows in connection—"but it is more vicious to rouse the public indignation against calumny, &c."—Zounds what a falling off! But what can I say in justice to your talents at comparison? Or how can I do justice to your ideas of what is or what may not be vicious?—I have no jacobinical dictionary by me, and therefore shall proceed. You next object to any distinction between liberty and licentiousness: thus, and by being attached to the former, you become an advocate for both: here again you are consistent with your whole self—This is indeed as strong a characteristic of citizen John Taylor as I myself could have drawn. But how dare you, Sir, to mock the throne of Grace by your canting on the subject of religion, of which neither you nor indeed any one of the leaders of your party either in France or in America possess the smallest spark? What do you know of fiscal arrangements, with a disposition too idle and too disolute ever to have formed a rational calculation on this, or in truth on any other subject?

What do you mean by the following: "Let us not forget the danger from without—let us rise and repel the attack, &c." The whole of this diabolical sentence is worthy the malicious grin and studied obscurity of the Coward,—who, looking big with caution mutters in low accents and in disjointed words, I—shall—find—a—time—damme! It is yet more cowardly; for you tell us, that is to say, WE THE PEOPLE, that although you are "unwilling to shrink from responsibility"—yet while "you acknowledge the right of the people to supervise your conduct," &c. you of course expect that we will come to a decision "bottomed on firmness." If we do decide at all on "your conduct," I hope it will be not by rising against the government of our choice, but by trying the "firmness" of your "bottom" till you become instinctively acquainted with every species of shoe leather, and till you are enabled to distinguish each kind by the touch only;—such are your defects, and such should be your reward.

We know you, John Taylor; and we know all the corresponding associates among

the leaders of your party; they are all as cowardly as they are profligate and abandoned;—and however they or you, may hope to dupe the good people of the United States you will find that we are not such blind fools as you have pretended to make us, when you talk of "taking advantage of the public blindness" which (you say) is allowed to be ingenuous." Let me put on my spectacles to be sure that I am right. Yes—it is so; thus you have publicly acknowledged that you really believe that we the people are blind, and that it is fair to take an advantage of our blindness—all this has been said an hundred thousand times in private among demagogues, but it remained for you publicly to avow this bittern secret article of jacobin faith in the face of the whole world, but was this the effect of candor or of accident? I fear it was the latter, for at your outset you invited us to "supervise your conduct;" if however, you prefer the supervision of the blind "closing darkness rather than light because your deeds are evil" and have really counted on safety from our inability to scan or fathom your designs, it is but fair to say you have deceived yourself only.

Neither your "false alarm" nor your affected religious invocation at the close of that farago of impudence shall occasion your real views to pass unseen; and although from being beneath the notice of government you may perhaps escape the Sedition Law; I cannot promise you the same success with those whom you have so sedulously attempted to alarm and to abuse: as an individual, I freely confess that if I am not enraged at your base and abominable conduct, it is only because you have my pity and my contempt.

**Canal Lottery, No. 11.**

COMMENCED drawing the 7th instant—There are only about 7000 tickets to draw and the Wheel upwards of 30,000 dollars richer than at the beginning.—Tickets, Nine Dollars each, to be had at Wm. BLACKBURN'S Lottery and Brokers Office, No. 64, South Second Street.—Where Check Books are kept for registering and examination in this, the City of Washington Lotteries, &c. &c.—Tickets, from the State of the Wheel and the few that are now for sale, will rise in future after every days drawing; and that the public in general may have an opportunity of becoming purchasers, the drawing is postponed till Saturday, the 26th inst, when it will continue until finished, Jan. 19. 23w

Note.—The business of a Broker duly attended to, in all its branches.

**SHERIFF'S SALES.**

BY virtue of a writ of Venditioni Exponas, to me directed, will be exposed to sale, at Public Vendue, on Saturday the 2d of February next, between the hours of 12 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, of said day, at the house of Casper Farmer Inkeeper, in Bordentown, and County of Burlington, those large and Commodious Buildings and Lot now occupied as an Academy; this Building is also contended that it may readily be divided into three distinct and large Dwelling Houses; Also for sale in said Town another Lot of ground consisting of about ten acres including an orchard, garden and dwelling house; a range of Stone building erected for a Queens ware Potter, a store house, wharf &c. &c. Seized as the property of Burgess Allison and taken in execution at the suit of James Finnimore and others and to be sold by

**JOHN ELTON, late Sheriff of the county of Burlington.**  
Burlington, Jan. 18th, 1799. (22) eodgt

**TO THE PUBLIC.**

AS divers reports have been circulated prejudicial to my character, particularly relative to my medical abilities, I beg leave to inform those who dispute my capacity in the art of medicine, that I am willing at any time in the presence of respectable persons to produce my credentials, from good authority in support of my medical capacity; certifying when and where I passed a regular examination before a board of the king's physicians and surgeons—signed by his Britannic majesty's governor, at the Castle of Saint Lewis, in Quebec.

J. KINLAD.  
Jan. 25. 13t

**NOTICE.**

THE co partnership of JOHN GREEN & Co. is this day dissolved by mutual consent.—All persons indebted to the said Firm are requested to make immediate payment, and those having any demands to present them for settlement to any one of the Subscribers—each being duly authorized to adjust the same.

**JOHN GREEN, EDMUND DARCH, SAMUEL DARCH.**  
N. B.—They have the remainder of their stock of Goods—consisting of  
**Ironmongery, Hardware, &c.**  
At No. 16, North Second Street, which they are selling on very low terms to close the business.  
Jan. 18 taw3w

**SAMUEL PARKER, BRASS AND BELL FOUNDER,**  
No. 137, MULBERRY-STREET.

CONTINUES to carry on the Brass-foundry Business as usual, where his former customers and the public may be supplied with castings for machines to any pattern, radder braces, bolts, &c. for ships.  
It may be proper to add, that as it has been reported he had declined the business, S. P. takes this means of informing the public that he is making arrangements to carry it on still more extensively, hoping thereby to comply promptly with such orders as he may have to execute.  
ALL BILLS of any size, cast for churches and other institutions; printers rules, &c.  
Jan. 23 eodgt

**PRINTING WORK, Of Every Kind, EXECUTED AT THE SHORTEST NOTICE, At the OFFICE of the GAZETTE of the UNITED STATES,**  
OR. 13. 46t

**The Gazette.**  
PHILADELPHIA,

MONDAY EVENING, JANUARY 18.

NOTES.

On the IMPEACHABILITY of a SENATOR of the UNITED STATES.—(Continued)  
adly. But supposing that a private citizen is not impeachable for any offence whatsoever, yet a Senator of the United States being intrusted with Legislative and Executive and Judicial power is impeachable for certain offences. This proposition is so self-evident as to put scepticism at defiance, if it be admitted that a Senator is an officer of honor or trust under the authority of the constitution of the United States. But this is disputed by some, who contend that a Senator of the United States is not an officer of honor or trust under that constitution, and therefore is not liable to impeachment.

I shall consider a Senator of the United States in his three various capacities, as legislator, as vetted with a share of Executive power and as judge.

1st. As Legislator, a Senator of the United States is asserted to be a civil officer of the United States.

The word office is of a most general and comprehensive import, and in relation to public concerns means a public trust; whoever is charged with such a trust is an officer.\*

Among writers upon politics it is universally agreed that legislation is the highest act of power in society and consequently the office of a legislator must be the highest office. Indeed, to ascertain where the supreme power of a state is placed, is the same thing as to ascertain where the power of legislation is placed. All must obey the law, whether in public or private stations, from the highest officer to the most humble citizen.

If the legislative power be placed in a body composed of a number of individual persons, that body is the legislator, and not any individual alone; yet every individual member having a portion of the power vested in the body, fills an office of very high trust and honor.

The legislative powers granted by the constitution, are vested in Congress, which consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. From and under the constitution a Senator derives his political being. The people of America who formed it, established the mode of electing the branch of the national legislature called the Senate, by directing two Senators to be chosen by the legislature of each state; but although a Senator is chosen by a state legislature, he is not the officer of that state which elected him but of the United States. For the people of the United States he is to legislate, and he is bound to consider every measure in a comprehensive view, regarding all parts of the nation. Hence it appears that a member of Congress, whether in the Senate or House of Representatives, being to perform the important duties of a legislator over the United States, is in this capacity vested with an office of honor and trust under the constitution of the United States and is to be considered as their officer. Wherefore then should he not be impeachable? Suppose a member of Congress corruptly engaged by a foreign state to support and vote for measures advantageous to it, though ruinous to his own country; or suppose him bribed by an individual to vote for a private claim of money: ought not such an abuse of trust and violation of integrity to be punished by a future disqualification to hold a place or office of any kind under the government; and ought not the councils to be immediately purified by his instant removal. If he ought, and if the constitution may by any fair construction reach such a corrupt legislator, by process of impeachment, surely such construction should be admitted. Nothing but the most plain and unequivocal expressions should privilege and exempt him; none such are to be found and therefore a legislator should be deemed impeachable for criminal misdemeanors.

2dly. A Senator in his executive capacity is to give his advice and consent respecting treaties with foreign nations and respecting appointments to office after the nomination of the President. These powers are very important.

Suppose a Senator corruptly to refuse or corruptly to give his consent to a treaty; suppose him corruptly to engage himself to a foreign nation to oppose every treaty that shall be disagreeable to such foreign nation; suppose a Senator bribed to reject one man nominated to an office for the purpose of making way for another: Would not such an offender be a suitable object of removal from office and future disqualification. It is only by conviction and judgment on impeachment, that future disqualification can be awarded; for expulsion by a vote of the Senate, is not a bar to a seat in that house or to any other civil office. From these observations it appears that a Senator is peculiarly liable to impeachment for high misdemeanors in his executive capacity, such as for corruptly advising and approving a pernicious treaty, or corruptly rejecting a good one, or for betraying the confidential communications made by the President relative to foreign nations, or for making use of the knowledge thus obtained to break the peace of the United States with any foreign state, great or small.

3dly. A Senator, in his judicial capacity, is to render judgment in all cases of impeachment. It is admitted that the judges of the several courts of the United States may be impeached as civil officers. Upon what principle of reason or policy is it, that a Senator, for criminal misconduct in the discharge of his judicial duties, should not, in like manner be impeachable?

\* The constitution of Kentucky expressly recognizes the word offices applicable to a legislator. It ordains that each Senator, Representative and Sheriff, shall, before he be permitted to act as such, take an oath or make affirmation, that he hath not, directly or indirectly, given or promised, any bribe, or treat, to procure his election to said office. And every person shall be disqualified from serving as a Senator, Representative or Sheriff &c. who shall be convicted of having given or offered any bribe or treat or canvassed for said office.

Thus then it is evident that a Senator is not only a civil officer in one, but in every part of his public character. If he was merely possessed of the share of power in the executive department which has been assigned to him, or if he was merely possessed of the judicial power which the constitution has assigned to him, there would be no doubt of his liability to impeachment. Shall the conjunction in the same person of three distinct offices, render him unimpeachable, when, if he held either separately, he would be impeachable?

But, supposing a legislator privileged from impeachment, shall the accumulation of legislative power in the same person who is intrusted with executive and judicial power, render him unimpeachable for executive or judicial criminality. Such an inference is unreasonable. The process of impeachment was intended to reach offenders in high trust, concerning whom the ordinary tribunals are supposed incompetent or inadequately constituted for a full and fair trial.

In this general view, the proposition that a Senator of the United States is an officer of the United States, and as such impeachable, seems well supported; but it shall be further illustrated and confirmed by some more particular considerations.

1st. The Vice-President only exercises, during his vice-presidential, senatorial duties as President of the Senate, yet he may be impeached: Why should not a President pro tempore be in like manner liable to impeachment? and if he be so liable, why is not each Senator likewise? What can create a distinction?

2dly. By the constitution, "the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President be elected." Article 2. Section 6." Congress, in executing this part of the constitution, have by law provided, that in such a case the President of the Senate pro tempore, or, if there be none, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President. 2 Vol. 25.

Here we see an express declaration of Congress that the President pro tempore of the Senate is an officer of the United States, and the same construction that makes him an officer of the United States, will make each and every Senator in like manner an officer of the United States. His powers, his duties are senatorial. If a Senator is not an officer of the United States, then the President pro tempore cannot, in any event, act as President of the United States. Congress is limited to declare what officer shall, in case of certain events, act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly; but Congress cannot declare that a private citizen, describing him by name or otherwise, shall act as President.

The like observations may be applied to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each member of that house. If a member of the house is not an officer of the United States, and therefore not impeachable, the Speaker who is no more than the presiding member, during the legislative deliberations, is not to be deemed an officer, and must be equally free from, or liable to impeachment with any other member of that body.

3dly. If a Senator is not a civil officer under the Constitution, then judgment of disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States will not exclude from the Senate, any person who may have been attained and disqualified upon impeachment; and thus the Senate and House of Representatives will be open to such attainted persons when they can hold no other office of trust or honor. Thus a man will be capable of filling the highest office in society, that of a legislator, at the same time that he shall be incapable of filling any of the inferior offices. Can any thing be more unreasonable? I know that genuine democracy will say, that the people may be safely trusted in the election of their law-makers, and ought not to be restricted in their choice by the act of any tribunal whatever. But this sentiment cannot be approved in such an extravagant extent. To permit a man to be eligible into the legislature, who has been declared unworthy of all other public trust after a fair trial, seems highly absurd. According to this idea the worst of men may gain admission where the greatest power is placed.

4thly. "No person holding any office of profit or trust under them, without the consent of Congress, except of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince or foreign state." Article 1, Sec. 9, clause 7. Unless a Senator be an officer of trust, this clause does not apply to him, and he is not restrained from accepting of any thing he can get from any king, prince or foreign state: so that this clause is no barrier against foreign influence in the Legislature. Is the Constitution so imperfect?

"No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." Art. 6. It is presumed that the word office as applied to public affairs, is a public trust, and that public trust, means an office relative to public affairs. If a Senator does not fill an office or public trust, then nothing in the constitution forbids a religious test to be required of him. The same may be said of a member of the other branch of the legislature. Ought a construction to be given that renders the constitution so defective, when another may be given and with greater reason.

In opposition to the doctrine that a Senator of the United States is impeachable, some objections may be made, which deserve to be noticed and answered. They arise out of the expressions used in a few clauses in the constitution.

1st. objection. "The President shall commission all the officers of the United States." Art. 2, Sec. 3. But the President cannot commission a Senator, therefore a Senator is not an officer of the United States.

Answer. The indefinite expressions used

here, must necessarily be limited to the officers deriving their appointment from the President, and do not comprehend those whose appointments are otherwise provided for, either in the constitution or by a law. The argument goes too far; it is equally efficacious in proving that the Vice-President, the president pro tempore of the Senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the secretary of the senate, the clerk and sergeant of the house of representatives, the clerks of the courts of the United States, the chief clerk and other clerks in the various departments legislative, executive and judiciary, are not officers of the United States, for none of these are to be commissioned by the President.

In the section immediately preceding it is ordained that "the President shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they shall think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or the heads of departments." Here the power of appointment is given under certain restrictions, and the power of commission however general the words may be, is most reasonably to be considered under the like restrictions. The two powers were meant to be co-extensive; and since the clause of appointment has certainly no reference to a Senator, neither can the clause of commission have any. Therefore nothing solid exists in the objection which these expressions have countenanced.

The Constitution in express terms recognises a number of officers and provides for their appointment independent of the President, and of this description are Senators, Representatives, electors of the President, &c. &c.

2d objection. "The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of the next session." Article 2. Section 2. He cannot supply a vacancy in the Senate, and as he is to supply all vacancies in offices, therefore a Senator is not an officer.

Answer. This objection, and the logic also, is substantially the same with the former, and is entitled of course to a similar reply, which need not be repeated.

3d objection. "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office." Art. 1. Sec. 6. This clause considers a Senator or Representative as different from a person holding an office under the United States, and therefore a Senator is not an officer.

Answer. It is admitted that the words here used do countenance the inference, but on examination, nothing conclusive will be found in them. The clause is plainly divisible into two parts; the first excludes for a certain time a Senator or Representative from any office created or augmented in its emoluments, during the term of his election, intending thereby to render the conduct of the members of the legislature disinterested relative to offices and their emoluments. The exclusion of a senator from certain offices does not necessarily imply that a member of a senate is not an officer. The last clause prevents plurality of offices. To say that no person holding any office shall be a judge of the supreme court, could not be explained to mean that such a judge was no officer. In like manner the expressions that no person holding an office shall be a member of the Legislature, ought not to be interpreted as establishing that such a member was no officer. The obvious meaning is to exclude no high officer as a legislator from holding any other office; and upon fair construction this clause, in no part of it, ascertains, or meant to ascertain, that a Senator was not an officer, and to make an inference from it affecting a question not contemplated by it, may be subtle, but cannot be candid, and is therefore inadmissible.

4th objection. The constitution in several instances, particularly names a Senator or Representative, when it provides concerning them, which it would not do, if they were civil officers, as for instance, in Art. 1, Sec. 2. "But no Senator, Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit, under the United States, shall be appointed an elector."

Answer. Nothing is more usual than this kind of phraseology beginning with some high officers, and subordinating some sweeping expressions. Therefore this must be the lightest of all arguments to prove a Senator to be no officer. Besides is was particularly necessary to guard against the legislators becoming electors of the President, as it would comprize too much power in the same hands, and therefore from abundant caution, they are explicitly disabled.

None of these objections appear conclusive, and to make the several parts of the constitution consistent, they must be abandoned, and a Senator must be considered an officer of the United States, and if an officer, must be impeachable. To say that it is unbecoming the dignity of a Senator to be amenable to impeachment, is to counteract the vital principle of the constitution, which attaches responsibility to every public trust. Such a sentiment exhibits the Senate in an odious point of view, and is productive of jealousy and distrust. True it is a Senator is an officer of great power, high trust and eminent honor. The dignity of his office must emphatically pronounce that he should be liable to impeachment, a process especially designed for the trial of the high officers of state. That such is the constitution of the United States, I trust has been satisfactorily proven; but if such is not the constitution, it cannot be too speedily amended.