

CONGRESS,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

MONDAY, January 21.

The following message was this day received from the President of the United States.

Gentlemen of the Senate, & Gentlemen of the House of Representatives.

ACCORDING to an intimation in my message of Friday last, I now lay before Congress a report of the Secretary of State, containing his observations on some of the documents which attended it.

JOHN ADAMS.

January 21, 1799.

TO THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Secretary of State respectfully submits the following report on the transactions relating to the United States and France since the last communications to Congress on that subject.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

Department of State, January 18, 1799.

REPORT,

Of the SECRETARY OF STATE, on the Transactions relating to the United States and France, since the last communications to Congress on that subject.

THE points chiefly meriting attention, are the attempts of the French government, 1. To exculpate itself from the charge of corruption, as having demanded a douceur of Fifty Thousand Pounds sterling (222,000 dollars) for the pockets of the Directors and Ministers, as represented in the dispatches of our Envoys :

II. To detach Mr. Gerry from his colleagues, and to inveigle him into a separate negotiation ; and

III. Its design, if the negotiation failed, and a war should take place between the United States and France, to throw the blame of the rupture on the United States.

1. The dispatches of the Envoys published in the United States, and republished in England, reached Paris towards the last of May ; and on the 30th of that month, the French minister, Mr. Talleyrand, affecting an entire ignorance of the persons designated by the letters W. X. Y. and Z.—calling them intriguers, whose object was to deceive the Envoys—writes to Mr. Gerry, and "prays him immediately to make known to him their names."

Mr. Gerry, in his answer of the 31st, wishes to evade Mr. Talleyrand's request ; and with reason, for he and his colleagues had "promised Messrs. X. and Y. that their names should in no event be made public." Mr. Gerry in his letter of October 1, in noting the repetition of Mr. Talleyrand's request for those names, states as an objection to giving them up "that they could be otherwise ascertained;" and that Mr. Talleyrand's messenger, admitting the fact that they were already known, immediately mentioned their names. Mr. Gerry nevertheless certified in writing the names of X. Y. and Z. ; with the reserve "that they should not be published on his authority ;" and besides formally certifying to Mr. Talleyrand the names of his own private agents, added, that "they did not produce, to his knowledge credentials or documents of any kind."

"Credentials" in writing were certainly not to be expected to be produced by agents employed to make corrupt propositions ; but Mr. Gerry had Mr. Talleyrand's own assurance that Mr. Y. was acting by his authority. It is recited in the Envoy's dispatches, and upon Mr. Gerry's own report to his colleagues, that on the 17th of December, 1797, Mr. Y. "stated to him that two measures which Mr. Talleyrand proposed, being adopted, a restoration of friendship between the republics would follow immediately ; the one was a gratuity of fifty thousand pounds sterling ; the other a purchase of thirty two millions of Dutch scripions," and after conversing on these topics, Mr. Gerry and Mr. Y. rode to Mr. Talleyrand's office, where "Mr. Gerry observed to Mr. Talleyrand, that Mr. Y. had stated to him that morning some propositions as coming from Mr. Talleyrand, respecting which, Mr. Gerry could give no opinion," and after making some other observations, Mr. Talleyrand answered "that the information Mr. Y. had given him (Mr. Gerry) was just and might always be relied on." This declaration stamps with the ministers authority, all the communications made by Mr. Y. to the Envoys. And Mr. Y. himself, who is Mr. Bellamy, of Hamburg, in his public vindication, declares, that "he had done nothing, said nothing, and written nothing, without the orders of Citizen Talleyrand." The same may be asserted in regard to Mr. X. for he first introduced Mr. Y. to the Envoys ; and his separate communications were substantially the same with those of Y. and both together were present with the Envoys when the communications were more than once repeated.

It also deserves notice, that in stating the preliminary demands of the French government, the private agents, X and Y, and the minister, use a similar language. The agents declare, that the Directory are extremely irritated at the speech of the President, and require an explanation of some parts of it, and reparation for others ; that this must give pain to the envoys, but the directory would not dispense with it : And that as to the means of averting the demand concerning the President's speech, the Envoys must search for them, and propose them, themselves. Being asked to suggest the means, the answer is "money"—the purchase of the Dutch scripions, and "the fifty thousand pounds sterling, as a douceur to the Directory."

The Minister told the Envoys, that the Directory were wounded by the President's speech ; and in his conversation with Mr. Gerry on the 28th of October, said, "the Directory had passed an arret, which he offered for perul, in which they had demanded of the Envoys an explanation of some parts, and a reparation for others, of the President's speech to Congress of the 16th of May, 1797 ; that he was sensible that difficulties would exist on the part of the Envoys relative to this demand ; but that by their offering money he thought he could prevent the effect of the arret. Mr. Z. (the "interpreter") at the request of Mr. Gerry, having stated that the Envoys have no such powers, Mr. Talleyrand replied, they can in such case take a power on themselves ; and proposed that they should make a "loan." But this "loan," as will presently appear, did not mean the "money," which would "prevent the effect of the arret." Mr. Gerry then making some observations, on the powers of the Envoys—that they "were adequate to the discussion and adjustment of all points of real difference between the two nations ; that they could alter and amend the treaty ; or, if necessary, form a new one ;" added, "that as to a loan, they had no powers whatever to make one, but that they could send one of their number for instructions on this proposition, if deemed expedient."—"That as he [Mr. Talleyrand] had expressed a desire to confer with the Envoys individually, it was the wish of Mr. Gerry that such a conference should take place, and their opinions thus be ascertained." "Mr. Talleyrand, in answer, said, he should be glad to confer with the other Envoys, individually, but that this matter about the MONEY must be settled directly without sending to America ; that he would not communicate the arret for a week ; and that if we could adjust the difficulty respecting the speech, an application would nevertheless go to the United States for a LOAN." "Now this matter of the MONEY that must be settled directly, could only refer to the douceur ; for also in the purchase of millions of Dutch scripions, or in any other form, could only be the subject of a stipulation to be afterwards fulfilled by the United States ; but the douceur of fifty thousand pounds sterling, was a sum within the immediate reach of the Envoys ; for their credit would certainly command it : in fact, a mercantile house had offered to answer their draughts ; and this, Mr. Talleyrand unquestionably well knew ; for it was a member of the same house who first introduced the minister's agent, Mr. X, to General Pinckney, in the manner stated in the Envoys' dispatches. A collateral evidence that in "this matter of the money that must be settled directly," Mr. Talleyrand referred only to the douceur, arises from this circumstance : The very next day (October 29th) Mr. X called on the Envoys and said, "Mr. Talleyrand was extremely anxious to be of service to them, and had requested that one more effort should be made to induce us to enable him to be so." After a great deal of the same conversation which had passed at former interviews had been repeated, the Envoys say—"the sum of this proposition was, that if we would pay by way of fees (that was his expression) the sum of MONEY demanded for PRIVATE USE, the Directory would not receive us, but would permit us to remain in Paris as we now were ; and we should be received by Mr. Talleyrand, until one of us could go to America and consult our government on the subject of a LOAN."

Although the Envoy's dispatches, and the facts and circumstances herein before stated, cannot leave a doubt that X, as well as Y and Z, was well known to Mr. Talleyrand, it will not be amiss to add, that on the 2d of December, X, Y, and Z, dined together at Mr. Talleyrand's, in company with Mr. Gerry ; and that after rising from the table the money propositions, which had before been made, were repeated, in the room and in the presence, though perhaps not in the hearing of Mr. Talleyrand. Mr. X put the question to Mr. Gerry in direct terms, either, "whether the Envoys would now give the douceur," or "whether they had got the MONEY ready." Mr. Gerry, very justly offended, answered positively in the negative, and the conversation dropped.

Mr. Z, who has avowed himself to be Mr. Hauteval, was the person who first made known to the Envoys the Minister's desire to confer with them individually, on the objects of their mission : He it was, who first introduced Mr. Gerry to Mr. Talleyrand, and served as the interpreter of their conversations ; and in his letter to Mr. Talleyrand, at the close of Mr. Gerry's document, No. 35, he announces himself to be the agent of the Minister, to make communications to the Envoys.

Mr. Hauteval declares "his sensibility must be much affected on finding himself, under the letter Z, acting a part in company with certain intriguers, whose plan, (he says) it doubtless was to take advantage of the good faith of the American Envoys, and make them their dupes;" yet this person, the avowed agent of the French Minister, apparently so anxious to screen himself from the suspicion of an agency in soliciting the bribe required by Mr. Talleyrand, did himself urge a compliance with that corrupt proposition.

The sensation which these details irresistably excite, is that of astonishment at the unparalleled effrontery of Mr. Talleyrand, in demanding of Mr. Gerry the names of X, Y, and Z ; after Y had accompanied him on a visit to the minister, with whom the conversation detailed in the printed dispatches then passed, and who then assured Mr. Gerry "that the information Mr. Y. had given him was just, and might always be relied on ;" after Z had in the first instance introduced Mr. Gerry to the minister, and served as their mutual interpreter, and when the conversation between them had also been stated in the dispatches ; and after X, Y, and

Z, had all dined together with Mr. Gerry at Mr. Talleyrand's table, on rising from which X, and Y, renewed the proposition about the MONEY!—The very circumstance of Mr. Talleyrand's being continued in office, after the account of these intrigues had been published to the world, is a decisive proof that they were commenced and carried on with the privacy, and by the secret orders of the Directory. It was to accomplish the object of these intrigues that the American Envoys were kept at Paris unreceived, six months after their credentials had been laid before the Directory ; and it was only because they were superior to those intrigues, and that no hopes remained of wheedling or terrifying them into a compliance, that two of them were then sent away—and with marks of insult and contempt.

2. The fact that the French Government attempted to inveigle Mr. Gerry into a separate negotiation will not be questioned : at first it was made privately, and under an injunction of secrecy towards his colleagues : it was afterwards plainly insinuated by the minister, in his letter of the 18th of March, 1798, in which he tells the Envoys that the Executive Directory was disposed to treat with one of the three ; and that one he openly avowed, in his letter of the 3d of April, to be Mr. Gerry. The pretence for selecting him was, that his "opinions, presumed to be more impartial, promised, in the course of the explanations, more of that reciprocal confidence which was indispensable." But when before, have their "opinions" been stated as a justifiable ground for rejecting the ambassadors of peace ? Ambassadors too, of established probity, whose characters were of the first distinction in their own country, and whose demeanor towards the government to which they were deputed, was decent and respectful ? Who had, with a frankness which the candor of their instructions warranted, communicated the important points which they contained ? And who unremittingly, and with the most anxious solicitude, entreated that the negotiations might be commenced ? What more proper or more honorable qualities ought ministers deputed to negotiate with a foreign nation to possess ? But why should a foreign Government question the opinions of the ambassadors sent to negotiate with it on subjects of difference between the two nations ? If wisely chosen, and faithful to the interests of their own country, they must of course possess different opinions from the government, to which they were sent, the differing opinions maintained by the two nations on their respective rights and interests, being the cause and objects of the negotiation. A government really disposed to treat on fair principles would never object to the opinions of foreign ambassadors. It would receive them, and appoint its own ministers with proper powers to treat with them, propose its terms, and receive those offered ; and discuss both, and if then they could not agree, put an end to the negotiation. The French government did not wish to negotiate, it desired to impose a treaty on the United States. To this practice it had been accustomed towards the minor powers in Europe, whom it has subjected to its will : and it expected equal submission from the United States. Hence Mr. Talleyrand's secret declaration to Mr. Gerry "that if he would negotiate, they could soon finish a treaty ; for the Executive Directory were not in the habit of spending much time about such matters." Hence the objections to Gen. Pinckney and Gen. Marshall : they manifested a discernment superior to the intrigues of the French Government, and an invincible determination not to surrender the honor, the interest, or the independence of their country. It was necessary then to get rid of them ; and seeing that neither despair of negotiating, nor studied indignities, could induce them to quit their posts, passports were sent to them to quit France ; it was with difficulty that Gen. Pinckney could obtain permission to stay two or three months for the recovery of his sick daughter, to whom an immediate voyage would probably prove fatal. Unembarrassed by the presence of these Envoys, the French Government, if it really desired a treaty on any terms, hoped to prevail on Mr. Gerry to negotiate separately, although from the first overture he declined and continued to decline it. But after the expulsion of his colleagues, it hoped, by its seductive arts, to prevail over his scruples, and gain his consent to terms which, while they were present, would be rejected ; or at all events to retain him, with the semblance of negotiating, regularly or informally, and thus keep the United States in the torpor of indecision, without preparation for offence or defence. Unfortunately, Mr. Gerry was induced, by the threats of immediate war against the United States, to separate from his colleagues and stay in Paris ; threats, which, viewed with their motives, merited only detestation and contempt. Four or five months before, the threats of immediate orders to quit France, and the terrors of war in its most dreadful forms, had been held up to all the envoys to frighten them into a compliance with the groundless, unjust, and corrupt demands of the French Government. Those threats had not been executed, and the unworthy purposes for which they had been uttered, had been obvious. Happily for the United States, the character of the French government as delineated in the official dispatches of all the envoys, and the knowledge of its conduct towards other countries whose governments it had overturned, and whose people in the names of Liberty and Equality, it had enslaved, so operated as not to leave us exposed to all the evils which suspense was calculated to produce. Mr. Gerry indeed resisted all the arts of the French minister to entice him into a formal negotiation, after that government had driven his colleagues from Paris ; a negotiation which in its nature would have been a surrender of our independence, by admitting a foreign government to choose for us the minister who should represent our country, to treat of our important rights and interests, which that government had itself violated and deeply injured.

The result of these conversations was a plain demonstration of the intention of the minister, that in consequence of his intimation at the close of his letter of the 18th of March, that the "opinions" of two of the envoys were not agreeable to the government of France, Generals Pinckney and Marshall should appropriate to themselves the character which the minister had drawn generally. The envoys, aware of this snare, in their answer of the third of April to the intimation that "the directory was disposed to treat with one of the envoys," declare to the minister, "that no one of the envoys was authorized to take upon himself a negotiation evidently entrusted to the whole," and "that no two of them could propose to withdraw themselves from the task committed to them by their government, while there remained a possibility of performing it ;" but that if "it should be the will of the Directory to order passports for the whole or any number of them," it was desired that such passports might be accompanied with letters of safe conduct, to protect them against the cruizers of France.

The endeavors of the French Government, whether real or affected, to draw Mr. Gerry into a separate negotiation, constitute the substance of the correspondence between him and Mr. Talleyrand. They appear to merit consideration in several points of view. 1. Because if real, it was only in the hope and expectation, that by intrigues and terrors the French government might influence Mr. Gerry to enter into a formal treaty, on the terms which he and his colleagues had repeatedly rejected as incompatible with the interests, honor and independence of their country. For at this time Mr. Talleyrand had not renounced the demands of loans and a douceur as the indispensable preliminaries of a treaty. Accordingly we see Mr. Talleyrand, in his letter of the 3d of April to Mr. Gerry, proposed "to resume their reciprocal communications upon the interests of the French Republic and the United States of America." And in his letter of July 12th, to Mr. Gerry, having mentioned the arrival at the Havre of a packet, the Sophia, from the American government, he says, "until then I never supposed you entertained the design of embarking before we had come to an agreement upon the definitive articles to be ratified by your government."

2. Because if that government had so far succeeded, it would have insisted on its ratification by the President and Senate, on the ground constantly taken by Mr. Talleyrand, that the powers of the envoys being several as well as joint, Mr. Gerry being alone, even after the French government had ordered his colleagues to leave France, were adequate to the formation of the treaty ; and that therefore the public faith would be violated, if it were not ratified. 3. Because under such circumstances, the French government doubtless calculated at least on a division of the public opinion in the United States in favor of the ratification of such a treaty ; by means of which it might enforce the ratification, or effect still greater mischiefs. 4. But these endeavors to draw Mr. Gerry into a formal negotiation are chiefly remarkable because they were persevered in during near five months, against his constant, direct and positive refusals to treat separately : Mr.

On the 9th of October 1797, the day after the Envoys had delivered to the minister a copy of their letter of credence, "cards of hospitality were sent to them and their Secretaries, in a style suitable to their official character." [Dispatches p. 17.] And in the minister's letter to them of the 18th of March, 1798, he calls them "the Commissioners and Envoys Extraordinary of the United States of America." [Dispatches p. 92.]

Extract of a letter, dated June 15th, 1798, from Mr. Kings, Minister of the United States in London, to the Secretary of State. "Col. Trumbull, who was at Paris soon after the arrival there of the Commissioners, has more than once informed me that Hauteval told him that both the douceur and the loan were indispensable, and urged him to employ his influence with the American Commissioners to offer the bribe as well as the loan."

The Directory and their minister Mr. Talleyrand hoped and expected that General Pinckney and General Marshall would voluntarily have quitted France, after the minister's letter of the 18th of March, in which he made the offensive distinction on between them and their colleague Mr. Gerry, on the pretence, that his "opinions" were more "impartial" than theirs. Accordingly Mr. Talleyrand, in his letter to Mr. Gerry of the 3d of April, says,—"I suppose, Sir, that Messrs. Pinckney and Marshall have thought it useful and proper, in consequence of the intimations which the end of my note of the 18th of March last presents, to quit the territory of the Republic." Yet Mr. Talleyrand had given them neither passports nor letters of safe conduct ! The fact is, the French government wished to avoid the odium of sending them away, and the blame of a rupture, which Mr. Talleyrand predicted would be the consequence ; while it was privately intimated to them that they must leave the country. The minister's conduct on this occasion, towards General Marshall (as detailed in his journal) was particularly marked with indignities. When it was observed to Mr. Talleyrand, that this was not the manner in which a foreign minister ought to be treated ; Mr. Talleyrand replied, that General Marshall was not a foreign minister, but was to be considered as a private American citizen ; and must obtain his passport like others through the Consul. To this it was answered, that Gen. Marshall was a foreign minister, and that the French government could not deprive him of that character, which was conferred upon him, not by Mr. Talleyrand, but by the United States ; and though the Directory might refuse to receive or treat with them, still his country had clothed him with the requisite powers which he held independently of France, that if he was not acceptable to the French government, and in consequence thereof it was determined to send him away, still he ought to be sent away like a minister ; that he ought to have his passports, with letters of safe conduct which would protect him from the cruizers of France. Mr. Talleyrand replied, that if General Marshall wished for a passport, he must give in his name, stature, age, complexion, &c. to the American Consul, who would obtain a passport for him : that with respect to a letter of safe conduct, it was unnecessary, as no risk from the cruizers would be incurred.

The result of these conversations was a plain demonstration of the intention of the minister, that in consequence of his intimation at the close of his letter of the 18th of March, that the "opinions" of two of the envoys were not agreeable to the government of France, Generals Pinckney and Marshall should appropriate to themselves the character which the minister had drawn generally. The envoys, aware of this snare, in their answer of the third of April to the intimation that "the directory was disposed to treat with one of the envoys," declare to the minister, "that no one of the envoys was authorized to take upon himself a negotiation evidently entrusted to the whole," and "that no two of them could propose to withdraw themselves from the task committed to them by their government, while there remained a possibility of performing it ;" but that if "it should be the will of the Directory to order passports for the whole or any number of them," it was desired that such passports might be accompanied with letters of safe conduct, to protect them against the cruizers of France.

The endeavors of the French Government, whether real or affected, to draw Mr. Gerry into a separate negotiation, constitute the substance of the correspondence between him and Mr. Talleyrand. They appear to merit consideration in several points of view. 1. Because if real, it was only in the hope and expectation, that by intrigues and terrors the French government might influence Mr. Gerry to enter into a formal treaty, on the terms which he and his colleagues had repeatedly rejected as incompatible with the interests, honor and independence of their country. For at this time Mr. Talleyrand had not renounced the demands of loans and a douceur as the indispensable preliminaries of a treaty. Accordingly we see Mr. Talleyrand, in his letter of the 3d of April to Mr. Gerry, proposed "to resume their reciprocal communications upon the interests of the French Republic and the United States of America." And in his letter of July 12th, to Mr. Gerry, having mentioned the arrival at the Havre of a packet, the Sophia, from the American government, he says, "until then I never supposed you entertained the design of embarking before we had come to an agreement upon the definitive articles to be ratified by your government."

2. Because if that government had so far succeeded, it would have insisted on its ratification by the President and Senate, on the ground constantly taken by Mr. Talleyrand, that the powers of the envoys being several as well as joint, Mr. Gerry being alone, even after the French government had ordered his colleagues to leave France, were adequate to the formation of the treaty ; and that therefore the public faith would be violated, if it were not ratified. 3. Because under such circumstances, the French government doubtless calculated at least on a division of the public opinion in the United States in favor of the ratification of such a treaty ; by means of which it might enforce the ratification, or effect still greater mischiefs. 4. But these endeavors to draw Mr. Gerry into a formal negotiation are chiefly remarkable because they were persevered in during near five months, against his constant, direct and positive refusals to treat separately : Mr.

On the 9th of October 1797, the day after the Envoys had delivered to the minister a copy of their letter of credence, "cards of hospitality were sent to them and their Secretaries, in a style suitable to their official character." [Dispatches p. 17.] And in the minister's letter to them of the 18th of March, 1798, he calls them "the Commissioners and Envoys Extraordinary of the United States of America." [Dispatches p. 92.]

Extract of a letter, dated June 15th, 1798, from Mr. Kings, Minister of the United States in London, to the Secretary of State. "Col. Trumbull, who was at Paris soon after the arrival there of the Commissioners, has more than once informed me that Hauteval told him that both the douceur and the loan were indispensable, and urged him to employ his influence with the American Commissioners to offer the bribe as well as the loan."

Talleyrand asserting and Mr. Gerry denying the competency of his powers. We have seen the envoys, from the 6th of October, 1797, the date of their first letter to the French minister, to the 3d of April, 1798, when their last was delivered to him, expressing their earnest desire to enter upon and prosecute the great business of their mission ; we have seen them during that long period patiently enduring neglect and indignities, to which an ardent zeal to re-establish harmony and peace could alone induce freemen to submit : We have seen them while held in suspense—neither received nor rejected—yielding to the importunities of private agents of the French government, and hearing and discussing their propositions, insulting as they were, in the hope that when these should be shown to be utterly inadmissible, others founded in reason and equity, and in the usual course of diplomatic negotiation, might be brought forward. Doubtless they also wished, when their astonishment at the first overtures had subsided, by listening still longer to such dishonorable propositions, to ascertain the true character of the French government. We have seen them, after waiting five weeks from the presentation of a copy of their letters of credence, entirely unnoticed, "solicit an attention to their mission," and soliciting in vain. Thus denied an official hearing, they hoped by an unusual step to excite the attention of that government : they determined to transmit to the minister a letter representing the views of their own government in relation to the subjects in dispute with France. This letter dated the 17th was delivered the 31st of January, 1798. Waiting near a month without an answer, and "fill being anxious to hear explicitly from Mr. Talleyrand himself, before they sent their final letter, whether there were no means, within their powers, of accommodating our differences with France, on just and reasonable grounds,—on the 27th of February they desired "a personal interview on the subject of their mission ;" and afterwards a second interview. They remark on what passed at these meetings, "that the views of France, with regard to the United States, were not essentially changed since their communications with its non-official agents in the preceding October."

At length they received Mr. Talleyrand's letter of the 18th March, 1798, in answer to theirs of the 17th of January. The minister's letter represented the complaints of France ; as usual, charging the American Government with the inexecution of the treaties with France—with dissimulation—insinuating that our tribunals were subject to a secret influence—holding up the British treaty as replete with evil and injury, and "the principal grievance of the republic"—accusing the American government of a wish to seize the first favorable occasion to consummate an intimate union with Great-Britain, and suggesting that a devotion and partiality to that power have long been the principle of the conduct of the federal government.

To this letter of the French minister, the envoys sent their reply on the 3d of April. This reply and their former letter detect the sophisms and erroneous statements of the minister—expose his naked assertions—refute his arguments—repel his calumnies—and completely vindicate the fidelity, the justice and, as a neutral power, the impartiality of the government of the United States ; and, at the same time, exhibit the weighty and well-founded complaints of the United States against the French republic. Hitherto, instead of a desire to obtain a reconciliation, we can discover in the French government only empty professions of a desire to conciliate ; while it haughtily refused to receive our Envoys, and during six months disregarded their respectful and ardent solicitations to negotiate : And after one of them, whom it induced to remain in France, had declared that "he had no powers to treat separately, that the measure was impossible," then the Directory expelled the other two !

If now we survey Mr. Gerry's individual correspondence, we shall find no solid evidence of any change in the disposition of the French government. In his first letter to Mr. Gerry, Mr. Talleyrand's artifice is visible : he addresses him as "Envoy Extraordinary of the United States of America, to the French Republic ;" and proposes to him to "resume their reciprocal communications." Mr. Gerry, apprehending that the Minister intended to draw him into a negotiation, repeats what he had often before declared, that for him to treat separately was impracticable ; and that he can only confer with him informally.

On the 20th of April, Mr. Gerry addresses a letter to the minister, and presses him to come forward with propositions for terminating all differences, restoring harmony, and re-establishing commerce between the two nations. He receives no answer. On the 28th he confers with the minister, who says he cannot make propositions, because he does not know the views of the United States in regard to a treaty. Mr. Gerry gives him the information. He then promises in three or four days to deliver Mr. Gerry the project of a treaty : This promise was never performed. On the 12th of May, the new instructions of March 23d, sent by the Sophia packet, reached Mr. Gerry ; and he gave immediate notice to the minister that he should return to America in the Sophia, as soon as she could be fitted for sea.

On the 25th of May the minister sent his principle secretary to inform Mr. Gerry, that his government did not wish to break the British Treaty ; but expected such provisions as would indemnify France, and put her on a footing with that nation." Yet this treaty had been made, by the French government, its chief pretence for those unjust and cruel depredations on American commerce which have brought distress on multitudes and ruin on many of our citizens ; and occasioned a total loss of property to the United States of probably more than twenty millions of dollars ; besides subjecting our fellow-citizens to insults, stripes, wounds, torture and imprisonment. And Mr. Talleyrand,

On the 9th of October 1797, the day after the Envoys had delivered to the minister a copy of their letter of credence, "cards of hospitality were sent to them and their Secretaries, in a style suitable to their official character." [Dispatches p. 17.] And in the minister's letter to them of the 18th of March, 1798, he calls them "the Commissioners and Envoys Extraordinary of the United States of America." [Dispatches p. 92.]

Extract of a letter, dated June 15th, 1798, from Mr. Kings, Minister of the United States in London, to the Secretary of State. "Col. Trumbull, who was at Paris soon after the arrival there of the Commissioners, has more than once informed me that Hauteval told him that both the douceur and the loan were indispensable, and urged him to employ his influence with the American Commissioners to offer the bribe as well as the loan."

Extract of a letter, dated June 15th, 1798, from Mr. Kings, Minister of the United States in London, to the Secretary of State. "Col. Trumbull, who was at Paris soon after the arrival there of the Commissioners, has more than once informed me that Hauteval told him that both the douceur and the loan were indispensable, and urged him to employ his influence with the American Commissioners to offer the bribe as well as the loan."

Extract of a letter, dated June 15th, 1798, from Mr. Kings, Minister of the United States in London, to the Secretary of State. "Col. Trumbull, who was at Paris soon after the arrival there of the Commissioners, has more than once informed me that Hauteval told him that both the douceur and the loan were indispensable, and urged him to employ his influence with the American Commissioners to offer the bribe as well as the loan."