

NEGOTIATION AT LISIE.  
Continued from yesterday's Gazette.

I informed him, that on all former occasions a separate article had been agreed to, which appeared to me to answer every purpose they required, and which it was my intention, as the treaty advanced, to have proposed, as proper to make part of this.

The article (the first of the separate ones in the treaty of 1783) was then read; but they objected to it, as not fully meeting their views. It was to the title itself, as well as to any right which might be supposed to arise from it, that they objected. I could scarce allow myself to treat this mode of reasoning seriously. I endeavoured to make them feel that it was cavilling at a mere word; that it was creating difficulties where none existed; and that if all the French monarchs in the course of three centuries had allowed this to stand in the preamble of all treaties and transactions between the two countries, I could not conceive, after its having been used for so long a period without any claim or pretension being set forth in consequence of it, how it could now affect either the dignity, security or importance of the republic—that in fact such titles have ever been considered as indefensible and as memorials and records of former greatness, and not as pretensions to present power—and I quoted the titles of the kings of Sardinia and Naples, &c. as examples exactly in point. I argued however in vain. They treated it very gravely, and made so strong a stand upon it, that I could not avoid taking it for reference, which I thought it better to do, than, feeling as I did at the moment, to push the conversation farther.

The second insulated point was a very material one indeed, and which, although it has been adverted to as a proposal that might possibly be brought forward, I confess came upon me unexpectedly. It was to ask either a restitution of the ships taken and destroyed at Toulon, or an equivalent for them. They grounded their claim on the Preliminary declaration made by lord Hood on his taking possession of Toulon, and on the eighth article of the declaration of the committee of the sections, to him. They said, peace they hoped was about to be re-established; that his majesty, in acknowledging the republic, admitted that a sovereignty existed in the French government; and of course that the ships held only as a deposit by England, till this legal authority was admitted, ought now to be restored. I replied, that this claim was perfectly unlooked for, that it was impossible for me to have been provided for it in my instructions, and that I could only convey my own private sentiments on it, which were, that they could not have devised a step more likely to defeat the great end of our mission. One of the French plenipotentiaries said, that he sincerely hoped not; that without a restitution of the ships, an equivalent might be found to effect the purpose desired, since their great object was, that something should appear to prove that this just demand had not been overlooked by them, and was not left unsatisfied by us. I told him fairly, I did not know how it could be appreciated; and that, considering the great advantages France had already obtained by the war, and those she was likely to obtain from the act of concession I had already intimated his majesty was disposed to make in order to restore peace, I was much surprised and deeply concerned at what I heard. I trusted, therefore, that this very inadmissible proposal would be withdrawn. They said it was not in their power; and one of them, from a written paper before him, which he said were his instructions, read some words to the effect I have already stated.

Their third question was as to any mortgage we might have upon the low countries, in consequence of money lent to the Emperor by Great Britain. They wished to know if any such existed, since, as they had taken the low countries, charged with all their incumbrances, they were to declare that they should not consider themselves bound to answer any mortgage given for money lent to the Emperor, for the purpose of carrying on the war against them. I told them, that without replying to this question, supposing the case to exist, the exception they required should have been stated in their treaty with the Emperor, and could not at all be mixed up in ours; that if they had taken the low countries as they stood charged with all their incumbrances, there could be no doubt what these words meant; and that if no exception was stated in the first instance, none could be made with a retroactive effect.

The French plenipotentiaries, however, were as tenacious on this point as on the other two; and as I found to every argument I used that they constantly evaded their instructions, I had nothing to do but to desire that they would give me a written paper, stating their three claims, in order that I might immediately transmit it to your lordship; and on this being promised, our conference broke up.

Between four and five P.M. yesterday, I received the enclosed note (No. 16), and I have lost no time since it is in my possession, in preparing to send away a messenger, as independent of the disagreeable subjects brought forward in this last conference, and which it is material should be communicated without delay. I am anxious his majesty should be informed of what has passed in general up to this day, as it may perhaps furnish some ideas as to the possible event of the negotiation.

No. 17. The project of the British minister as published in Saturday's Gazette.

No. 14. A note from lord Malmesbury to the French plenipotentiaries, proposing to retain the island of Trinidad in his majesty's full possession, as a counterpoise to the acquisition by the French of the Spanish part of St. Domingo;—and also that after the words "before the war," in the 14th article of the proceeding project, the

following addition should follow: "With the exception of the town, fort, and establishment of the Cape of Good Hope, and of the possessions belonging to the Dutch before the war, in the island of Ceylon, and of the town and fort of Cochin, which shall be ceded to his Britannic majesty, in exchange for the town of Negapatnam and its dependencies."

No. 15. From the French plenipotentiaries, July 9, in reply to the foregoing, promising a speedy and serious consideration of the points stated, as well as to the project of a treaty itself, and requesting a conference at one o'clock next day.

No. 16. From the French Plenipotentiaries to lord Malmesbury, dated Lisle.

The ministers plenipotentiaries, of the French republic, in complying with the wish expressed to them by the minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty by transmitting to him a note on the three points which were the subject of their conference this day.

1. They have positive orders to require the renunciation of the title of king of France borne by his Britannic majesty. Lord Malmesbury is requested to observe that the question is not only a renunciation of the rights which might be pretended to be derived from this title, but further and formally of the title itself. The establishment of the French republic, and the acknowledgement of this form of government by the king of England will not allow of his retaining a title which would imply the existence in France of an order of things which is at an end.

2. The ministers plenipotentiary of the republic are ordered to demand the restitution of the vessels taken or destroyed at Toulon. Great Britain has publicly and formally declared that these vessels were taken in trust for the king of France. This trust is sacred. It incontestably belongs to the Republic, which exercises the rights and the sovereignty that Great Britain attributed to Louis XVII, at the period of the capture of Toulon. His Britannic majesty cannot, therefore, in acknowledging the French republic deny its right to the restitution required, or to refuse either to make the restitution, or to offer an equivalent for it.

3. The ministers plenipotentiary have orders to demand, and do demand the renunciation, on the part of his Britannic majesty of the mortgage on Belgium. That country was mortgaged for the loans made by the Emperor in England. It has become an integral part of the French republic, and cannot remain burdened with such a mortgage.

The ministers plenipotentiary of the French republic request lord Malmesbury to accept the assurance of their high consideration.  
(Signed) LETOURNEUR  
PLEVILLE  
HUGHES B. MARET  
COLCHEN, Sec. Gen. of Legation.  
Lisle, le 22 Messidor, 5th year of the Republic, July 10, 1797.

No. 17. A dispatch from Lord Grenville to Lord Malmesbury, July 11, expressive of the British claims on the French. It states, that any explanation on the subject of the Austrian loans cannot necessarily be introduced into the pending negotiation; that the king neither forms nor has any intention of forming any demand on the French government for the payment of any part either of the interest or capital of these loans. It is to the Emperor alone, to the Austrian government and its revenues, that his majesty and individuals concerned, look for the performance of the Imperial engagements. It concludes without adding any thing on the two other claims of the Republic.

No. 18. Dispatch from Lord Malmesbury to Lord Grenville, July 16, containing an account of the special conference which he held with the French plenipotentiaries on the 10th inst. the object of which was to resume the discussion of the article of the project, to which the latter had objected in their last conversation. One of the plenipotentiaries, who observed this, then particularly mentioned the 11th article, and expressed their repugnance to the renewal of the treaties therein mentioned, from various reasons; first, because most of them were irrelevant to the present negotiation; and secondly, because they were in contradiction to the new order of things in France, by acknowledging the King of Great Britain as possessed of a portion of the royal authority of France. To this one of his colleagues added, a protestation, that their only object in wishing not to renew these treaties, was to give permanency to that which they were about forming: that by adopting such a number, *en masse*, without examination, might hereafter occasion difficulties. To which the British minister replied, that as the treaties alluded to were the only acknowledgements of the tenure by which the sovereigns of Europe, and particularly the French Republic held their dominions, and had become the law of nations, it was unwise and unsafe not to renew them in the present negotiation. A "conciliatory and even amicable" conversation ensued: The French ministers being willing to renew such of those treaties as were connected with the condition of Europe, and the British desirous of adopting them *in toto*. They parted to meet again on the same subject.

No. 19. From the same to the same, dated at Lisle, July 16, mentioning the receipt of a note from the French plenipotentiaries, (which is sketched in No. 20) to which he returned, No. 21; to which No. 22 is a reply.—A conference was the consequence of these notes.—Lord Malmesbury reopened the conversation by observing that if he understood the intention of the Directory it required as a *fine qua preloinary*, that his Britannic majesty should restore to each and all of his enemies every thing that had been conquered during the war. If he was correct in this idea, it would not only pre-

vent the treaty from beginning, but would deprive his majesty of every means of treating; for it could not be expected a treaty of all concession and no compensation would ever be agreed to. One of the plenipotentiaries then assured his lordship, that so far from wishing to break up the negotiation, it was the sincere wish of the Directory that it should proceed happily, and end successfully; and that any proposals which were not incompatible with their sacred engagements, should be carefully listened to.—Lord Malmesbury after receiving assurances that the Directory would listen to stipulations of mutual concession and compensation, departed from the conference to dispatch the result to his court.

No. 20. The note from the French plenipotentiaries to lord Malmesbury, alluded to above. It states that having just received instructions and orders from the Directory on the subject of his lordship's note, it is necessary to make this declaration— "There exist in the treaties by which France is allied to Spain and the Batavian republic, articles by which the three powers respectively guarantee to each the territories possessed before the war." The Republic therefore establishes as an indispensable preliminary of the negotiation with England, the consent of his Britannic Majesty to the restitution of all the possessions which he occupies not only from the French republic, but of those of Spain and Batavia. The French plenipotentiaries in consequence of this, desire lord Malmesbury to explain himself with regard to the subject of restitution and if he is not sufficiently authorized to consent to it, to send a messenger to his court to procure the necessary powers.—The conference for this day was deferred on account of this communication.

No. 21. From lord Malmesbury in answer to the foregoing. He declares himself not authorized to accede to the proposition contained in their note; but that in order to avoid the possibility of misunderstandings on so important an occasion, solicits an interview for to-morrow, after which he will dispatch a messenger to his court.

No. 22. From the French plenipotentiaries agreeing to the proposed conference for to-morrow.  
No. 23. Dispatch from Lord Grenville to Lord Malmesbury dated London, July 20, 1797. It begins with expressing a concern at being obliged to observe that the claim of the French plenipotentiaries is so extraordinary in itself, and so inconsistent with their former professions, as to afford but little hope of a happy termination of the present negotiation. Although the most natural step would be to terminate at once a negotiation which, on the footing proposed by the enemy, precludes the possibility of mutual concession and restitution; yet as the French plenipotentiaries have intimated a willingness to listen to proposals of reciprocal restitution and compensation, and in order to leave untried nothing that can promote the return of peace, it is his majesty's wish that at the next conference your lordship represent to the plenipotentiaries of the French republic, that "France, treating in conformity with her own principles, cannot, with any pretence of justice or fairness, oppose her treaties with them as obstacles in the way of a reasonable proposal of peace in which they are included." "It never can be allowed, that France, Spain, and Holland, negotiating jointly for a peace with Great Britain, can set up, as a bar to our just claims, the treaties between themselves."—"This principle even if it were admitted to operate could not extend to private treaties, or to secret articles."—Then follows a number of observations to prove that this pretence set up by France is altogether frivolous and illusory; that if she were disposed to negotiate, the treaties of Holland and Spain need be no impediment;—and concludes with requesting his lordship to demand of the republic a *contre-projet*, explicitly stating the whole of what they have to ask instead of bringing forward separate points one after another contrary to the avowed principle of negotiation proposed by themselves. In complying with this demand, to which they cannot reasonably object, the directory will place the business on its real issue, and bring distinctly into question the several points on which the conclusion of peace or the prolongation of war, will really depend.

No. 24. From the same to the same, with the same date. It consists of animadversions on the assertion respecting the Portuguese ships at Toulon, made by one of the French plenipotentiaries, and on that respecting the treaty of Pilnitz. Several observations are made on these topics, which having no connection with the progress of the negotiation, but made to remove the misunderstandings of the parties, we omit.

No. 25. Dispatch from lord Malmesbury, to lord Grenville, July 25, acquainting his lordship, that on the receipt of his dispatches, Nos. 19 and 20, he had obtained a conference of the French republic, and related to them in the words of his instructions, that the terms proposed as a preliminary article, were inadmissible by the king his master; and that having already, on our part, freely stated in a detailed project our conditions, it was but reasonable that we should expect a *contre-projet* from them. On the inadmissibility of their terms, one of the plenipotentiaries remarked, that they could do no more than "take them for reference"; that such were the orders of the directory, and requested his lordship to state in writing the several grounds on which his majesty rejected their proposition.—On the second point, he conceived that the best method for accelerating the business would be for the directory to furnish his lordship with a plan of a *contre-projet*; and that till further instructions from the directory the negotiation could not proceed.—Here his lordship remarked, that he understood at a former conference, that the French plenipotentiaries were empowered to enter into explanations concerning mutual restitu-

tion and indemnity;—if so, he should be happy to proceed to the consideration of any proposition agreeable to the basis laid down in the project delivered.—After some hesitation, one of the French ministers replied, that as the present was an important juncture of the negotiation, and perhaps would be decisive of its fate, it would be best to wait an answer on this subject from Paris. A mutual declaration of wishes for a speedy and happy termination of the negotiation followed, and the ministers parted, agreeing on the propriety there was of each advancing a separate project.

No. 30. Note from lord Malmesbury, to the French plenipotentiaries.  
The minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty has transmitted to his court, the note which was delivered to him the 5th of this month, by the ministers plenipotentiary of the French republic; and having received the orders of the king his master, on this subject, he listens to repeat to them, in writing, conformably to the desire which they have expressed to him, the following reflections, which he had already stated to them verbally, in consequence of his most positive instructions.

He observes, in the first place, that to require, "as an indispensable preliminary of negotiation for peace with England, the consent of his Britannic majesty to the formal restitution of all the possessions which he occupies, as well those of the French republic, as further and formally those of Spain and the Batavian republic," is to wish to establish a previous condition, which excludes all reciprocity, refuses to the king all compensation, and leaves no object of ulterior negotiation.

That the French republic, formally authorized by its allies to negotiate the articles of peace in their name, cannot fairly set up its partial treaties with them, in opposition to reasonable proposals of peace, since it is universally understood that the contracting parties always preserve the power to modify, by mutual consent, the conditions by which they may be engaged to each other whenever their common interests may require it; consequently the proposition made to the king of a general and gratuitous restitution as an indispensable preliminary, would necessarily impute to his catholic majesty, and to the Batavian republic, dispositions far less pacific than those which animate the French republic.

That, moreover, in consequence of what passed in the first conference, lord Malmesbury has always thought himself entitled to expect that the king, his master, would find a compensation for the sacrifice he was ready to make for peace, in retaining a part of his conquests; and he was the less able to foresee any obstacle on account of the secret articles of the treaties which bind the French republic, as the principle of compensation was acknowledged by a formal and positive declaration made in the name of the Executive Directory, and communicated in an official Note, dated the 27th of November, 1796; a declaration posterior to the execution of those treaties.

It was, therefore, in order to remove, as much as possible, every difficulty, that, in the project of a treaty which lord Malmesbury has delivered to the ministers plenipotentiary of the French republic, the alternative was left to France, to settle this compensation on its own proposals, or on those of its allies: But the absolute refusal of this alternative appears to do away the possibility of settling every difficulty, and of arriving at an honorable and permanent peace.

Lord Malmesbury, persuaded that such cannot be the intention of the French government, hopes, that in consequence of the reasons herein stated, a condition will not be insisted upon, to which his Britannic majesty can by no means consent.

He again requests the ministers plenipotentiary of the French republic to accept the assurance of his high consideration.  
Lisle, 24th July, 1797.

No. 27. Extract of a dispatch from Lord Malmesbury to Lord Grenville, dated Lisle, Sunday, August 6, 1797.

I fully expected, when I received the enclosed note of Friday, the enclosure proposed was to accompany me with the instructions the French plenipotentiaries had received from the Directory, on the 10th I had given in nearly a fortnight ago, as an answer to that, in which the restitution of the whole of his majesty's conquests from each of his enemies is required as an indispensable preliminary to all negotiation.

tion mutually suggest ideas which might be of use I readily consented to this.

(To be continued.)

The Gazette.  
PHILADELPHIA,  
THURSDAY EVENING, JANUARY 9.

For the Gazette of the United States.  
REFLECTIONS ON MONROE'S "VIEW."  
No. V.

At most of this translation I am not astonished, as it may have proceeded from violent prejudice in favor of France, from a disregard of the opinions of the executive, and a desire to appear all-important in the eyes of his favorite nation; but I am astonished to find, that while Mr. Monroe insists, and insists with great strength of reasoning, that a compliance with the treaty would be highly beneficial to France, and equally beneficial to the United States, that he did not demand a compliance. Both countries being interferred in its execution, it was inexcusable not to have demanded it. But he attempts to excuse himself by saying he was afraid France would have in turn demanded a compliance with the guarantee stipulation. This was a vain fear: France knew well that the cause of freedom had not occurred, and in the state of the present war and of public affairs, that such a demand could not be made with justice or reason—Above all, Mr. Monroe should have borne in mind that his country is always animated with the purest sentiments of honor and good faith, and always ready to meet the claims of foreign nations, and by these principles to try them. He should have reflected that at the helm of American affairs was placed a man who well understood the interests of his country, as well as the extent of the national engagements; and he should not have presumed to neglect or counteract the obvious intentions of the executive. From whence did Mr. Monroe take up the notion that he was not to complain of the decree contravening the treaty? His predecessor remonstrated against it: The injuries arising from it had reached every part of the continent; it was neither the will of the President or of the people that they should be continued; wherefore then did he encourage France to continue the system of perfidy and depredation? Why did he debate his country at the feet of France, by telling the republic to trample on our commerce, and we would smile under our indignities and losses? What offence had his country done him that he should take this severe revenge? Why should its minister prostrate it in the dust by a declaration no less subject than pernicious—by a policy which, while it exposed the United States to utter contempt, became the source of present and I fear of future ills.

These instances of misconduct being fully evident, let us next see what the President did when they became known to him. It is to be lamented he had not then displaced him. He only reprimanded him, as appears in his letter dated 2d December, in the following terms: "In your letter you say that you have not been inclined to desire a repeal of the decree which violated the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty of commerce: That you did not know but it had been tolerated from the founded motives of political expediency, left the demand for the rescinding it might produce a call for the guarantee. Indeed you have gone further; having declared in your memorial that you were under no instructions to complain of or request the repeal of the decree authorizing a departure from those articles, and that if upon re-consideration after the experiment be made, the committee of public safety should be of opinion that it produces any solid benefit to the French republic, the American government, and your countrymen in general, would not only bear the departure with patience, but with pleasure."

The fourth head of injury stated in your letter, shews that you were possessed of cases which turned entirely upon the impropriety of the decree, and such case was certainly the fact. Now, without the objection of the decree so far as it respected those cases, the decrees which you were instructed to demand could not be obtained. In truth, there was no cause or pretence for asking relief but upon the ground of that decree having violated the treaty. Does not this view lead to the inevitable conclusion that the decree, if operative in future instances, would be no less disagreeable and consequently that its operation in future instances ought to be prevented, a circumstance which could be accomplished only by a total repeal? The papers of the ship Laurens retained a reference to one or more representations of Mr. Morris against the decree: so that the business had been actually broken to the French government. Neither these representations, nor yet your application, appears to have suggested a requisition of the guarantee.

But, my good Sir, let these things be as they will, it is necessary to intimate that an indifference prevailed in our government as to these articles, by a declaration that you were not instructed to complain of the decree? I confess I am unapprized of the data upon which such an opinion could be founded; and undoubtedly the president himself would not undertake that the people of the United States would bear with patience a departure from stipulations which are generally believed to be important to us. (page 116)

It is true it happened soon after this, in January 1795, that the French republic lawfully repealed the decree, and perhaps this occasioned the President to take no further notice of the misconduct of the minister relative to this subject. But surely, after reading the foregoing documents, few will pretend that Mr. Monroe's misrepresentations or concessions contrived to produce that effect. I know he has had the assurance to ascribe to himself the merit of a repeal, which without any doubt, was the consequence of the then state of affairs in France.—On the other hand, I subscribe his doctrine of implicit submission to the will of a foreign power, which the French have been made to believe influences America with regard to them, their present system towards us a system which having modified our treaty with France on this principle, is so harmful to our commerce, and so dishonorable to our national character. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that Mr. Monroe exposed himself to the committed "not only frankly but liberally" as he says, when he agreed that France might dispense with certain articles of the treaty, if it appeared to them advantageous to do so. To what length the republic will carry this concession, is beyond my power to predict. It shall be left to the unfolding hand of time.

SCIPIO.  
To be Sold.  
The time of a Negro Man,  
Who has three years to serve; he is a good hatter, or coachman, and with fine attention would make an excellent Cook. He is sold for no fault, but for want of constant employ. The price for his time, to prevent needless enquiries, is £30. Enquire at No. 88 Netherfield street.  
At said place may be had a few tons of choice fresh cod Fish.  
1st month 9th.