THH SFOt GWUMTIE II TOLIIHBI> EVENT FRIDIY MORMNO BY B. r. SGYEftS, At thu fbllttwini timu, to wit: sl.iO per annum, CASH, in advanea. ffr.W •" if paid within the yaar. $3.50 << " if not paid witbiu the year. ttyNo countable for the subscription price of newi-papers, if they take them ftom the post office, whether they subscribe for them, or Dot. Letter from Buchanan. HIS REPLY TO GENERAL SCOTT. BEGINNING Of 1 THE REBELLION. To theEditon of t/u: National In.elligencer: On Wednesday last, I received the Na tional Intelligencer, containing General Scott's address to the puolic. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the Administration in re gurd to "the seven (Jottoh States now in rebellion. From our past relations, I was grdutly surprised at the appearance of such a paper, in one subject, however, it was highly gratifying. It has jus tified inc; nuy, it has rendered it absolutely necessary that 1 should no longer remain silent in respect to Charges winch have beeu long vaguely circulating, but are uovv endorsed by the responsible name ot Gen. Scott. 1. Trin first and most prominent among these charges is my refusal immediately to garrison i nine enumerated fortUications, scattered over six of the {southern States, according to the rec ommendation of General Iscott, in his "views addressed to the War Department on the 2'Jtli and 30th of October, 1800. And it has even been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented the civil war. This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the intiueiiee of Governor Floyd. All my Cabinet must hear me witness that Iwas the , President myself, responsible for all the acta ot | the Administration ; and certain it is that du- j ring the last six months previous to the 29th ot j December, 1800, the day on which ho resigned j his office, after my request, he exercised less in-, fluence on the Administration than any other i member of the cabinet —Mr. Holt was imme diately thereafter transferred from the Post Of fice Department to that ol War; so that, irom , this time until the lib of March, idol, which was by far the most important period ol the Administration, lie performed the duties of Sec- j retary of War to uiy entire satisfaction. But why did I not immediately garrison these j nine fortifications, in such a manner, to use the j language of General Scott, ' as to make any j attempt to take any one of them by surprise or ; coup tie main ridiculous (" 1 here is one answer, ! both easy and conclusive, even it other valid j reasons did not exist. There were no available I troops within reach which could be seut to these fortifications. —To have attempted a military j operation on a scale so extensive by any means within the President's power would have been simply absurd. Ot this General Scott himseli seems to have been convinced, for on the day ! after the date of his first "views" he addressed j (on the 30th October) supplemental views to ! the War department, in which he states: "There j is one (regular) company in Boston, one here, i (at the Narrows), one at Pittsburg, ono at Au-, gusta, Gu., one at Baton Rouge;" in all live companies only within reach to garrison or re inforce the forts mentioned in the "views." Five companies—four hundred men—to oc cupy and reinforce nine fortifications in six highly excited Southern States! '1 he force "with- j in reach" was so entirely inadequate that noth-1 ing more need be said on the subject, lo have ' attempted such a military operation with so j feeble a force, and the Presidential election im- | pending, would have been an invitation to col- j lision and secession. Indeed, if the whole A mericau army, consisting then of only sixteen thousand men, had been "within reach," they would have been scarcely sufficient for this pur pose. Such was our want of troops, that al though General Scott, believing, in opposition to the opinion of the committee raised in the llouse of Kepresontutives, that the inaugura tion of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military foree, was only Hble to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th of March, six hundred and fifty-three men, rank and file of the army. And, to make up this number, e ven the sappers and miners were brought from West Point. But why wee there no greater force within reach 1 Tins question could be better answered by Gen. Scott himself than by any other per son. Our small regular many, with the ex ception of a few hundred men, were out of reach,on bur remote frontiers, where it had been continuously stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants, on their way thither, against the attacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and both General Scott and myself had endeavored, in vain, to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regi ments for this purpose. In recommending this augmentation of the army, the General States in his report to the War Department, of November, 1857, that "it would not more than furnish the reinforcements now greatly needed in Florida, Texai, New Mexico, California, Or egon, Washington (T\), Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah." And aguin, in his report of Novembca, 1858, he says: "This want bf troops, to give reasonable se curity to our citizens in distant settlements, in cluding emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be 4eo strongly stated; but I will only add, that as often as wc have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidablcinvasiou." These views of General Scott exhibit the crude notions then prevailing even among intelli gent and patriotic men on this subject of seces sion. In the first sentence the General, whilst stating that "to save timo the right of secession may be conceded," yet immediately says "this is instantly balanced by the correlative right on the part of the Federal Government against an interior State or states to re-establish by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory." —(For this he cites "Paley's Moral and Polit- leal Philosophy, last chaptor." It may be there, but I hayc been unable to find it.) Whilst it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he tenders what he did NOT mean quite etottMlt his supplementary "views." In these bo says: "It Will be seen that the 'views' only % VOLUME 38. NEW SERIES. npply to a case of secession that makes a OAP in the present Union. The falling otf say of Tex as, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Po tomac south, (the very case which has occur red,) was not within the scope of General S. 's "provisional remedies that is to say, to estab lish by force, if necessary, the continuity of our territory. In his 'views' he also states as fol lows: "But breuk this glorious Union by what ever line or lines that political madness may con trive, and there would be no hope of recruiting the fragments except by the laceration and des potism of the sword. To elfeet such result the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the General's opinion, "a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to al low the fragment, of the great Republic to form themselves into new Confederacies, probably four." —He then points out what ought to he the boundaries between the new Unions; and at the end of each goes so far as even to indi cate the cities which ought to be capitals of the three first on this side of the Kocky Mountains, to wit, "Columbia, South Caroliua," "Alton or Quincy, Illinois," and "Albany, New York," excluding Washington City altogether. This indication of capitals contained in the original now in my possession is curiously omitted in the version published in the National Intelligencer. Me designates no capital for the fourth Union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what en couragement these views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have afforded to the secessionists of the Cotton States. I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every miud why I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to re inforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile; Forts l'ickcns and McCren, in Pensacola harbor; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah ; Forts Moultrie and Sumpter, Charleston harbor, aud Fort Mon roe, in Virginia. These "views" both original and supplemen tary, were published by General Seott in the National Intelligencer of January 18, 18(11, at the most important and critical period of the Administration. Their publication, at that time,could do no possible good, and might do mueh harm. To have published them, without the President's knowledge and consent was as much in violation of the sacred confidence, which ought to prevail between the commanding General of the army and the Commander-in- Chief as it wOuld have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his authority What is of more importance, their publication was calculated injuriously to af fect tiio compromise measures then pending lie fore Congress and the country, and to encour age the secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into fragments. For the great respect which I then entertained for the General, I passed it over in silence. If is worthy of remark that soon after the Presidential election representations of what these "views" contained, of more or less cor rectness, were unfortunately circulated, especial ly throughout the South. The editors of the Na tional Itelligcucer, in assigning u reason for their publication, state that botli in public prints and in public speeches allusions had been made to j them, and some misapprehensions of their char acter had got abroad. 11. and 111. General Scott states that he ar rived in Washington on the 12th, and, accom panied by the Secretary of War, held a conver sation with the President on the 15th of Decem ber. Whilst I have no reccollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtles states correct ly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Moulture, who had not then removed to Fort Sumter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who recollect the history of the time But twelve days before, in the annual message of the 3d December, I had urged upon Congress the a doption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the "Crit tenden Compromise." At that time high hopes were entertained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Besides, I believed, and this correctly, as (he event proved, that Major Anderson was then in no danger of at tack. Indeed, he and his command wore then treated with marked kindnesg by the authori ties and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would huve been only to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke collision, and disappoint the country. There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the General's memory must be defective. At present I shall specify only one. I could not have stated that on a future contingent occasion I would telegraph "Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumpter) against attack;" be cause, with prudent precaution, this had already been done several days liefore, through a spe cial messenger sent to Major Anderson for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buell, of the army. The General's supplementary note of the same day, presenting to me General Jackson's conduct in 1833, during the period of nullifica tion, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the cases were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This was, at every hazard to collect the cus toms at Charleston, and outside of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the existing Collector, as 1 had anticipated,resign his office about the end of December, and im mediately thereafter I nominated to the Senate, as his successor, a suitable person, prepared, at any personal risk, to do his duty. That body, however, throughout its entire session, declinod to act on this nomination. Thus without a Collector, it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue. IV. General Scott's statement alleges that Freedom of Thought and Opinion. BEDFORD, PA., FRIDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 14, 1862. "the Brooklyn, with Captain Vodges' company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens a boui January 22d, and on the 29th, President Buchanan, having entered into aif nam armistice with certain leading seecders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toncey to instruct in a joint note the commander of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieut. Slem mer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Capt. Voces' company unless the Fort should be attacked." He afterwards states, within brackets, "Tliat joint note I never saw, but suppose the armis tice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was un derstood to terminate with it." These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part of General Scott. It is scarcely credible that this very joint note, pre sented in such odious colors, was submitted to General Scott on the day it was prepared (20th January,) and met his entire approbation. 1 would not venture to make this assertion if I did not possess conclusive evidence to prove it. On that day Secretary llolt addressed me a note, from which the following is an extract: "I have the satisfaction of saying that on submitting the paper to General Scott he ex pressed himself satisfied with it, saying that there could be no objection to tbe arrangement in a military point of view or otherwise." This requires 110 comment. That the general had every reason to be satisfied with the arrange ment will appear from the following statement: A revolutionary outbreak bad occurred in Florida; the troops of the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and tbe adjacent navy yard; and Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artillery, with his brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens, where he was in imminent danger every moment of being captured by u vastly superior force.— Owing to the interruption of regular communi cations, Secretary Holt did not receive infor mation of these events until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter ad dressed to a third person, lie instantly inform ed the President of the fact, and reinforcement, provisions and military stores were dispatched by tbe Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a mo ment's unnecessary delay. S'h° ' e ' l fortress Monroe on the 24th of January. Well-founded apprehensions were, however, entertained at the time of her departure that the reinforcements, with the vessels of war at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive iu time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of suspense, and whilst Lieutenant Slemmer was in extreme peril, Sen ators Slidell, Hunter and Bigler received a tel egraphic despatch from Senator Mallory, of Flo rida, dated at Pensacola, on the 28th January, with the urgent request that they should lay it before the President. This dispatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain the peace, us well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made on Fort Pickens it the present status should be preserved. This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort and to the unhappy effect which an actual collision, either at that or any other point, might produce on the Peace Convention then about to assemble, at Washington. The result was, that a joint , despatch was carefully prepared by the Secreta ries of War and Navy, accepting the proposal, with important modifications, which was trans mitted by telegraph, on the 29th January, to Lieutenant Slemmer and to the naval command ers near the station. It is too long for trans cription; suffice it to say, it was caret ally guar ded at every point, for the security of the fort and its free communication with Washington. The result was highly fortunate. The Brook lyn had a long passage. Although sho lett Fortress Monroe on the 24th January, she did i not arrive at Pensacola until the fitli hebruary. | In the meantime Fort Pickens, with Licuten ! ant Slemmer, (whose conduct deserves high commendation,) and his brave little baud, were placed by virtue of this arrangement, in per fect security until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our possession. Well might Gen. Scott | have expressed his satisfaction with thisarrange- I ment. The General was correct in the suppo i sition that the arrangement was to expire on the termination of the Peace Convention. V. But we now come to an importaut peri od. when dates will be essentially necessary to disentangle the statement of General Scott. — The South Carolina Commissioners were ap pointed on the 2id, and arrived in Washington ion the 27th December. The day after their | arrival it was announced that Major Anderson | had removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sum ; ter. This rendered them furious. On the same j day they addressed an angry letter to the Pres- I idont demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter, j The President answered this letter on the 30th ! December by a peremptory refusal. This brought forth a reply from the Commissioners on the 2d I January, 1861, of such an insulting character that the President instantly returned it to them j with the following endorsement: ''This paper, i just presented to the President, is of such a char acter that he declines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, political and person al intercourse finally ceased between the revo lutionary Senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coolest character ever since the Persidont's anti secession message at the commencement of tho session of Congress. Under these changed circumstances. General ! Scott, by note on Sunday, the 30th December, 1 addressed the following inquiry to the Presi dent : "Will the President permit Gen. Scott with out reference to the War Department, and oth erwise as secretly as possible, to send two hun dred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinfor.ee Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition and subsist ence f It is hoped that a sloop-of-war and cut ter may be ordered for the same pnrpose 'to morrow'.'' The General seems not to have then known that Mr. Floyd was opt of office. Never did a request meet a more prompt com pliance. It was received on (Sunday evening, December 80th. On Monday morning I gave instructions to the War and Navy Department, and on Mon lay evening General Scott came to congratulate me that the Secretaries had issued the necessary orders to the army and navy offi cers, and that they were in his possession. The Brooklyn, with troops, military stores and pro visions, was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe for Fort Sumter. I am therefore ut terly at a loss to imagine why the General, in his statement, should have asserted that "the South Carolina Commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no movement of defence (on the part of the United States) was These Commissioners arrived in Wushington'bn the 27th December; Gen. Scott's request was made to the President on the 30th. It was complied with on 31st, and a single day is all that represents the "many days" of the General. Again, General Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, that the President refused to allow any attempt to be made —to reinforce Fort Sum ter—because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina Commissioners. And still again, that "afterwards Secretary Holt and mysell endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship ol-war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer Star of the West." Will it be believed that the substitu tion of the Star of the West for the war steam er Brooklyn, of which he now complains, was by the advice of Gen. Scott himself ? 1 have uever heard this doubted until I read the state ment. At the interview already referred to between the General and myself, on the evening of Mon day, the 31st of December, I suggested to him thai, although I had not received the South Carolina Commissioners in their oificial capaci ty, but merely as private gentleman, yet it might be considered an improper act to send the Brook lyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day ; that the delay could not contiuue more than forty-eight hours. He promptly concurred in this suggestion as gentle manly and proper, ami the orders were not trans ferred to tbe Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January I received their insolent riote, and sent it back to them. In the mean time, however, the General had becouio con vinced, by tho representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success and reach the fort, would be to send a vast side-wheel mer cantile steamer from New York with the rein forcement. Accordingly the Star of the West was selected tor this duty. Tbe substitution of this mercantile steamer for the Brooklyn, which would have been able to defend herself in ease of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgement of General Scott. The change of programme required a brief space of time; but the Star of the West left New York for Charleston on the evening of tiie 4th January. On the very day, however, when this ill-fated steamer left New York, a telegram was dispatched by Gen. Scott to Col. Scott to countermand her departure; but it did not reach its destination until after she had gone to sea. The re:ison for this countermand shall tie stated in the language of Secretary Holt, to bo found iu a letter addressed to him by Air. Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior, on the 6th March, 1861, ami published in the National Intelligencer. Mr. llolt says : "The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thomp son) was not more cordially sanctioned by the President than it was by General Scott and myself; not because of any dissent from tbe order on the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day from Major An derson, stating, in effect, that he regarded him self secure in his position; and yet more from intelligence which late oil Saturday evening (6th January, 1861,) reached the Department, that a heavy .battery had been erected among the sand hills, at the entrance to Charleston harbor, which would probably destroy an unarmed ves sel (and such was the .Stat of the West) which might, attempt to make its way to Fort Suin ter. This important information satisfied the Government that there was no present necessi ty for sending reinforcements, and that when sent they should go, not in a vessel of com merce, but of war. Hence the countermand was dispatched by telegraph to New York ; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it reached the olficer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was ad dressed." A statement of those facts, established by dates, proves conclusively that the President was not only willing but anxious iu tho briefest period to reinforce Fort Sumter. Ou tho 4th of January, the day before the departure of the Star of the West from New York, as General Scott in his statement ad mits, succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key West, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security. He nevertheless speculates on tbe consequences which might have followed, hail the reinforce ments not reached their destination in due tune; and even expresses the extraordinary opinion, that, with the possession of these forts, "the Rebels might have purchased an early recog nition." I shall next advert to the statement that tlie expedition under Captain Ward, "of three or four small steamers belonging to the Coast Sur vey," vras kept back by something like a truce or armistice [made here,] embracing Charles ton and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon be- WHOLE NUMBER. 3030 tween the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &c. And this truce lasted to the end of the Administration." Things altogether distinct in tiieir nature are often so blended in this statement that it is difficult to separate them. Such is eminently the case in connecting the facts relative to Charleston with Pensacola. Having already treated of the charge of hav ing kept hack reinforcements from Pensacola, I shall now say something of the charge of hav ing also kept them back from Charleston. Nei ther a truce, nor quad truce, nor any thing like it, was ever concluded between the President and any human authority, concerning Charles ton. On the contrary, tlie South Carolina Com missioners. first and last, and all the time, were informed that the President could never surren der Fort Sumter, nor deprive himself of the most entire liberty to send reinforcements to it whenever it was believed to be in danger, or re quested by Major Anderson. It is strange that Gen. Scott was not apprised of this well known fact. It was then, with some astonishment, that I learned from the statement of the Gen eral, that he had, on the 12th March, 18til, advised that Major Anderson should be instruc ted to evacuate the fort as soon as suitable transportation could be procured to carry him self and liia company to New York. A mili tary necessity for u capitulation may have ex isted in case there should be an attack upon the fort, or a demand for its surrender; but surely none could have existed for its voluntary sur render and ab.m loament. Probably that to which the General means to refer was not the quasi but the actual truce of arms concluded at Charleston, on the 11 th of January, 1881, between Governor Pickens and Major Anderson, without the knowledge of the President. It was on the 9th of January that the Star of the West, under the Aincrioau flag, was tired upon in the harbor of Charleston, by order of Governor Pickens. Immediately af ter this outrage, Major An lersou sent a flag to the Governor, stating that he presumed the act had been unauthorized, and for that reason he had not opened lire from Fort Sumter on the adjacent batteries; but demanding its disavow al, and, if this were not sent in a reasonable time, he would consider it war, and fire on any vessel that attempted to leave the harbor. Two days after this occurrence, on the 11th Jauuu ry, Governor Pickens had the audacity to de mand of Major Anderson the surrender of the fort. In his answer of the same date, the Ma jor made the following proposition: "Should your Excellency deem tit, previous to a resort to arms, to reter this matter to Washington, it would afford me the sincerest pleasure to de pute one of my officers to accompany any mes senger you may deem proper to be the hearer of vour demand." This proposition was prompt ly accepted by the Governor, and, in pursuance thereof, he sent, on his part, Hon. J. W. llayne, the Attorney General of South Carolinu, to Washington, whilst Major Anderson deputed Lieut. Hail, of the United States army, to ac company him. These gentlemen arrived togeth er iu Washington, on tho evening of the 13th January, when the President obtained the first knowledge of the transaction. But it will be recollected that no time intervened between the return of the Star of the West to New York and the arrival of the messenger bearing a copy of the truce at Washington, within which it would have been possible to send reiulorccments to Fort Sumter. Both events occurred about the same time. Thus a truce, or suspension of arms, was concluded between the parties, to continue un til the question of the surrender of the forts should bo decided by the President. Until this decision, Major Anderson had placed it out of his own power to ask for reinforcements, and equully out of tho power of tho Government to send them without a violation of public faith. This was what writers on public law denomi nate "a partial truce under which hostilities are suspended only in certain places, as between a town and the army besieging it." It is possi ble that the President, under the laws ol war, might have annulled this truce upon due notice to the opposite party; but neither Gen. Scott uor any other person ever suggested this expe dient. This would have beeu to cust a reflec tion on Major Anderson, who, beyond question, acted from tho highest and purest motives. Did Gen. Scott ever propose to violate this truce during its existence? If he did, I am not now, and never was, aware of the fact. Indeed I think he would have been one ol the last men in the world to propose such a m insure. Col. Hayne did not deliver the letter which he bore from Col. Pickens, demanding the sur render of the fort, to the President until the 31st of January. The documents containing the reasons for this worrying delay were com municated to Congress in u special message of the Bth of February, to which I refer the read er. On the oth of February the Secretary of War, under the instructions of the President,, gave a peremptory refusal to this demand in an able and comprehensive lettor, reviewing the whole subject, explaining and justifying the eon duct of the President throughout. His conclu ding sentence is both eloquent and emphatic: "If (says Mr Ilolt,) with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for pence, and of the onrnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sumter and imperil the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our couutry into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility. The truce was then ended, and General Scott is incorrect in stating "that it lasted to the end of that Administration." An expedition was qtrietly fitted out at Nmv York, utider the supervision of Gen. Scott, to be ready for any contingency, lie arranged its details, and regarded tlie reinforcements thus j provided for as sufficient. This was ready to I sail for Fort Sumter on five hours' notice. It j ! flcrttof One Squtre, three ween or lal>. . .-. . . , 41 OS One Square, e*rh additional iaiartion leas than three inontha . . . ....... jj 3 MONTHS. S MONTHS. 1 rajLK One tquara ....... $3 09 f3 00 3&{00 no squires ....... 300 506 100 Three squares ...... AOO 700 13 TO i Column ........ 300 09® 13 00 | Column 800 13 00 30 00 i Column . 13 00 18 00 30 00 One Colaron ...... 10 00 30 00 SO 00 The spice occupied by ten lines ef this site of type counts one square. All fractions of a square under five lines will be measured as a half square t and all over five lines as a full square. All legal dvertisements will be charged to the person band ing tbem in. Transient advertisements should be paid for ia advance. VOL. 6. NO. 15 is of this expedition that Gen. Scott thus speaks; "At that time, when this (the truce) had passed away, Secretaries Holt andToucey, Capt. Ward, of the Navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President, settled upon the employment, under the Captain, of three or four steamers belonging to the Coast Survey, but he waa kept back by the truce." A strange inconsistency. The truce had ex pired with Mr. Holt's letter to Colonel Hay no on the sth of "February, and Gen. Scott, in hie statement, says: "It would have been easy to re inforce this fort down to about the 12th of Feb ruary." Why, then, did not the reinforcement* proceed? This was simply because of commu nications from Major Anderson. It was most fortunate that they did not proceed; because the three or four small steamers which were to bear them would never have reached the fort, and in the attempt must have been captured or destroyed. The vast inadequacy of the force provided to accomplish the object was demon, strated by informutien received from Major An derson at the War Department on the last day of the Administration. I purposely forbear at present to say more on this subject, lest I might, however unintention ally, do injustice to one or more of the parties concerned in consequence of the brevity required by the nature of this communication. The facts relating to it, with the appropriate accompani ments, have been fully presented in a historical review, prepared a year ago, which will ere long be published. This review contains a sketch of the four last months of my Administration. It is impartial; at least such is my honest convic tion. Thatithasnot yet been published has arisen solely from an apprehension, no longer enter tained, that something therein might be unjust ly perverted into an interference with the gov ernment in a vigorous prosecution of the war for ihe maintenance of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union,which was far, very far, from my intention. After a careful retrospect, I can solemnly de clare before God and my country that I cannot reproach myself with any act of commission or omission since the existing trouble commen ced. I have never doubted that my country men would yet do me justice. In my special message of the Bth of January, 1861, I pre sented a full 'and fair exposition of the alarming condition of the country, and urged Congresa either to adopt measures of compromise, or, fail ing in this, to prepare for the last alternative. In both aspects my recommendation .was dis regarded. I shall close this document with a quotation of the last sentence of that mes sage, as follows: "In conclusion, it may be permitted me to remark that I have often warned my country men of the dangers which now surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly, per formed i and whatever the result may be, 1 shall carry to my grave the conciousness that I at least meant well for my country. , r Your obedient servant, ' JAMES BUCHANAN. Wheatland, near Lancaster, Oct. 28, 1862. To YOUNG MEN. —Two young men commen ced the sail making business, at Philadelphia. They bought a lot of ducks from Stephen Gi rard on credit, and a friend had engaged to en dorse for them. Each caught a roll and waa carrying it off when Girard remarked: "Had you not better get a dray!" "No, it is not far, and we can carry it our selves." "Tell your friend he needn't endorse jroor note. I'll take it without." AN ENROLLING OFFICER SHARPLY AN SWERED.—One of the enrolling marshals, the other day,in the Quaker City, received strong hints from a down town female. Stop ping at the lady's bouse, he found Jier be fore the door endeavoring to effect with ft vegatable huckster a 20 per cent abatement in the price of a peck of tomatoes. "Have you any men here, madam?" "No," was the gruff reply. "Have you no husband, madam?" "No." "Nor brothers ?" "No." "Perhaps you have a son, Madam ?" "Well what of it ?" "I should like to know where lie is?" "Well he isn't here." "So I see dear madam. Pray, where is he?" "In the Union army, where you ought to be." The crest fallen marshal hastened around the corner, he didn't further interrogate the lady. One day a simple farmer who had just buried a rich relation, an attorney, was com plaining of the fat expense of a funeral cav alcade in the country. "Why, do you bury your attorneys here?" asked Foote. * "Yes, to be sure we do; how else?" "Oh, we never do.that in London." "No!" said the other, surprised, "how do you manage ?" "Why, when the patient happens to die, we lay him out in a room over night by himself, lock the door, throw open the sash, and in the morning he is entirely oft" "Indeed! 'said the other;, "what become* of him." "Why, that we cannot tell; all we know there's a strong smell of brimstone in the room the next morning." . Below par—Abolitionists since thft eke- feentown - '