Of the courts have decided that persons are accountable for the subscription price of newspapers, if they take them from the post office, whether they subscribe for them, or not.

Letter from Ex-President Buchanan. HIS REPLY TO GENERAL SCOTT. BEGINNING OF THE REBELLION.

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer:

On Wednesday last, I received the National Intelligencer; containing General Scott's address to the public. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the Administration in regard to the seven Corton States now in rebellion. From our past relations, I was greatly surprised at the appearance of such a paper. In one subject, however, it was nighly gratifying. It has justified me; nay, at has rendered it absolutely necessary that I should no longer remain silent in respect to charges which have been long vaguely circulating, but are now endorsed by the responsible name of Gen. Scott.

1. The first and most prominent among these charges is my refusal immediately to garrison

1. The first and most promuent among these charges is my refusal immediately to garrison nine enumerated fortifications, scattered over six of the Southern States, according to the recommendation of General Scott, in his "views" addressed to the War Department on the 29th and 30th of October, 1860. And it has even been alleged that if this had been done it might have presented the civil war.

been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented the civil war.

This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd. All iny Cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the Administration; and certain it is that du-ring the last six months previous to the 29th of December. 1860, the day on, which he resigned December, 1860, the day on which he resigned his office, after my request, he exercised less influence on the Administration than any other member of the cabinet—Mr. Holt was immediately approximately the cabinet and the c member of the cabinet —Mr. Holt was immediately thereafter transferred from the Post Office Department to that of War; so that, from this time until the 4th of March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the Administration, he performed the duties of Secretary of War to my entire satisfaction.

But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications, in such a manner, to use the language of General Scott, 'as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup de main ridiculous?' There is one answer,

attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup de main ridiculous?" There is one answer, both easy and conclusive, even if other valid reasons did not exist. There were no available troops within reach which could be sent to these feetiles. troops within reach which could be sent to these fortifications.—To have attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive by any means within the President's power would have been simply absurd. Of this General Scott himself seems to have been convinced, for on the day after the date of his first "views" he addressed (on the 30th October) supplemental views to the War department, in which he states: "There is one (regular) company in Boston, one here, (at the Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at Au-gusta, Ga., one at Baton Rouge;" in all five companies only within reach to garrison or re-inforce the forts mentioned in the "views."

Five companies—four hundred men—to occupy and reinforce nine fortifications in six highly excited Southern States! The force "within reach" was so entirely inadequate that nothing more need be said on the subject. To have ng more need to said on the subject. To make the safety of lision and secession. Indeed, it the whole A-merican army, consisting then of only sixteen thousand men, had been "within reach," they would have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want of troops, that although General Scott believing, in opposition House of Representatives, that the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln night be interrupted by military force, was only able to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th of March, six bundred and fifty-three men, rank and file bundred and fifty-three men, rank and file of the army. And, to make up this number, even the sappers and miners were brought from West Point.

But why was there no greater force within reach? This question could be better answered by Gen. Scott himself than by any other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a few hundred men, were out of reach, on our remote frontiers, where it had been continuously stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants, on their way thither, against the attacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and both General Scott and myself had endeavored, in vain, to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regiments for this purpose. In recommending states in his report to the War Department, of November, 1857, that "it would not more than furnish the reinforcements now greatly needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Or-egon, Washington (T.), Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah." And aguin, in his report of November, 1858,

he says:
"This want of troops, to give reasonable se curity to our citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add, that as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion."

These views of General Scott exhibit the orude notions then prevailing even among intelli-gent and patriotic men on this subject of seces-sion. In the first sentence the General, whilst may be conceded," yet immediately says "this is instantly balanced by the correlative right on the part of the Federal Government against an interior State or states to re-establish by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory." difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he renders what he did nor mean quite class in his supplementary "views." In these he says: "It will be seen that the 'views' only!

In the personal risk, to do his duty. That body, however, throughout its entire session, declined to act on this nomination. Thus without a Collector, it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue.

IV. General Scott's statement allows the revenue. ical Philosophy, last chapter." It may be there, but I have been unable to find it.) Whilst it is

## Bedford Gazette.

VOLUME 58.

Preedom of Thought and Opinion.

WHOLE NUMBER, 3030

NEW SERIES.

BEDFORD, PA., FRIDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 14, 1862.

VOL. 6. NO. 15

apply to a case of secession that makes a GAP in the present Union. The falling off say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Potomac south, (the very case which has occurred,) was not within the scope of General S.'s "provisional remedies;" that is to say, to establish by force, if necessary, the continuity of our territory. In his 'views' he also states as follows: "But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of recruiting the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the General's opinion, "a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragment, of the great Republic to form themselves into new Confederacies, probably four."—He then points out what ought to be the boundaries between the new Unions; and at the end of each goes so far as even to indiplay." In the General's opinion, "a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragment, of the great Republic to form themselves into new Confederacies, probably four."—He then points out what ought to be the boundaries between the new Unions; and at the end of each goes so far as even to indicate the cities which ought to be capitals of the three first on this side of the Rocky Mountains, to wit, "Columbia, South Carolina," "Alton or Quincy, Illinois," and "Albany, New York," "I have the satisfaction of capitals contained in the original now in my possession is curiously omitted in the version published in the National Intelligencer. He designates no capital for the fourth Union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what encouragement these views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have afforded to the secessionists of the Cotton States.

I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every mind why I did not,

cessionists of the Cotton States.

I trust I have said enough, and more than nough, to convince every mind why I did not, enough, to convince every mind why I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile; Forts Pickens and McCrea, in Pensacola harbor;

These "views" both original and supplementary, were published by General Scott in the National Intelligencer of January 18, 1861, at the most important and critical period of the Administration. Their publication, at that time, could do no possible good, and might do much harm. To have published them, without the President's knowledge and consent was as many think of the second confidence. much in violation of the sacred confidence, which ought to prevail between the commanding General of the army and the Commander-in-Chief as it would have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his authority. What is of more importance, their publication was calculated injuriously to affect the compromise measures then pending before Congress and the country, and to encourage the secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into fragments. For the great respect which I then entertain for the General, I passed it over in silence.

It is worthy of remark that soon after the Presidential election representations of what these "views" contained, of more or less correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially throughout the South. The editors of the Natanul Helligencer, in assigning a reason for their publication, state that both in public prints and in public speeches allusions had been made to them, and some misapprehensions of their character had got abroad.

II. and III. General Scott states that he arrived in Washington on the 12th, and, accompanied by the Secretary of War, held a conversation with the President on the 15th of December. Whilst I have no recollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtles states correctly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Moulture, who had not then removed to Fort Sunter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who recollect the history of the time But twelve and this correctly, as the event proved, that

contingent occasion I would telegraph "Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts

The General's supplementary note of the same day, presenting to me General Jackson's conduct in 1833, during the period of nullification, as an example, requires no special notice Even if the cases were not entirely different, had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This was, at every hazard to collect the customs at Charleston, and outside of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the existing Collector, as I had anticipated, resign-his office about the end of December, and immediately thereafter I nominated to the Senate, as his successor, a suitable person, prepared, at any personal risk, to do his duty. That body,

Florida; the troops of the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and the adjacent navy yard; and Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artillery, with his brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens, er Brooklyn, of which he now complains, was where he was in imminent danger every moment Fort Pulaski, below Savannah; Forts Moultrie and Sampter, Charleston harbor, and Fort Monroe, in Virginia.

These "views" both original and supplementations, Secretary Holt did not receive information of these events until several days after mation of these events until several days after mation of these events until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter addressed to a third person. He instantly informed the President of the fact, and reinforcement, provisions and military stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a mo-

ment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress
Monroe on the 24th of January.

Well-founded apprehensions were, however,
entertained at the time of her departure that the reinforcements, with the vessels of war at no great distance from Fort Pickens. could not

This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort and to the unhappy effect which an actual collision, either at that or any other point, might produce on the Peace Convention then about to assemble at Washington. The result was, that a joint despatch was carefully prepared by the Secretaries of War and Navy, accepting the proposal, with important modifications, which was transmitted by telegraph, on the 29th January, to Lieutenant Slemmer and to the naval commanders near the station. It is too long for transcription; suffice it to say, it was carefully guarded at every point, for the security of the and its free communication with Washington.

The result was highly fortunate. The Brookreason for this refusal is manifest to all who lyn had a long passage. Although she left recollect the history of the time But twelve Fortress Monroe on the 24th January, she did days before, in the annual message of the 3d December. I had urged more Congress, the second of the sec December, I had urged upon Congress the a- In the meantime Fort Pickens, with Lieutendoption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the "Critenden Compromise." At that time high hopes were entertained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Besides, I believed, that the corrective were entertained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Besides, I believed, that the corrective were entertained throughout the country that the security until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our possession. Well might Gen. Scott way expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement, that there were the constitution of the commendation, and his brave little band, were head to be a constitution of the commendation, and his brave little band, were placed by virtue of this arrangement, in perfect security until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our possession. Well might Gen. Scott still in our possession. Well might Gen. Scott have expressed his satisfaction with this arrange-ment. The General was correct in the suppo-

And this correctly, as the event proved, that Major Anderson was then in no danger of attack. Indeed, he and his command were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would have been only to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke collision, and disappoint the country.

There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the General's memory must be defective. At present I shall specify only one. I could not have stated that on a future contingent occasion I would telegraph "Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumpter) against attack;" because, with prudent precaution, this had already been done several days before, through a special messenger sent to Major Anderson for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buell, of the with the following endorsement: "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, political and person-al intercourse finally ceased between the revo-lutionary Senators and the President, and he

to employ the passenger steamer Star of the West." Will it be believed that the substituer Brooklyn, of which he now complains, was by the advice of Gen. Scott himself! I have never heard this doubted until I read the state-ment.

ment.

At the interview already referred to between the General and myself, on the evening of Monday, the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina Commissioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentleman, yet it might be considered an improper act to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day; that the delay could not continue more than forty-eight hours. He promptly concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not transferred to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning no great distance from Fort Pickens. could not arrive in time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of suspense, and whilst Lieutenant Slemmer was in extreme peril, Senators Slidell, Hunter and Bigler received a telegraphic despatch from Senator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola, on the 28th January, with the urgent request that they should lay it before the President. This dispatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made on Fort Pickens if the present status should be preserved.

manly and proper, and the orders were not transferred to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January I received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the meaning, which is representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success and reach the fort, would be to send a vast side-wheel mertal to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January I received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the meaning, who is representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success and reach the fort, would be to send a vast side-wheel mertal to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning. forcement. Accordingly the Star of the West was selected for this duty. The substitution of this mercantile steamer for the Brooklyn, which would have been able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgement of Genera Scott.

The change of programme required a brief space of time; but the Star of the West left New York for Charleston on the evening of the 4th January. On the very day, however, when this ill-fated steamer left New York, a telegram was dispatched by Gen. Scott to Col. Scott to countermand her departure; but it did Scott to countermand her departure; but it did not reach its destination until after she had gone The reason for this countermand be stated in the language of Secretary Holt, to be found in a letter addressed to him by Mr. Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior, on the 5th March, 1861, and published in the National Intelligencer. Mr. Holt says:
"The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thom

President than it was by General Scott and myself; not because of any dissent from the order on the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day from Major Anderson, stating, in effect, that he regarded him self secure in his position; and yet more from intelligence which late on Saturday evening [5th January, 1861,) reached the Department, that a heavy battery had been erected among the sand hills, at the entrance to Charleston harbor, which would probably destroy an unarmed ves-sel (and such was the Star of the West) which might attempt to make its way to Fort Sum-ter. This important information satisfied the Government that there was no present necessi-ty for sending reinforcements, and that when sent they should go, not in a vessel of commerce, but of war. Hence the countermand was dispatched by telegraph to New York; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it reached the officer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was addressed."

A statement of these facts, established by dates, proves conclusively that the President period to reinforce Fort Sumter.

On the 4th of January, the day before the departure of the Star of the West from New York, as General Scott in his statement ad-I lutionary Senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coolest character ever since the Persident's antisecession message at the commencement of the session of Congress.

Under these changed circumstances, General Scott, by note on Sunday, the 30th December, addressed the following inquiry to the President:

(Will by Mr Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coolest character ever since the Persident's antisecession message at the commencement of the session of Congress.

Under these changed circumstances, General Scott in his statement admits, succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key West, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security. He nevertheless speculates on the consequences which might have followed, had the reinforcements not reached these points in time for their security. He nevertheless speculates on the consequences which might have followed, had the reinforcements not reached these points in time for their security. He nevertheless speculates on the consequences which might have followed, had the reinforcement of the possession of the consequences which might have followed, had the reinforcement of the possession of the consequences of the consequences which might have followed, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security.

dent:

"Will the President permit Gen. Scott without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with some

tween the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &c. And this truce lasted to the end of the Administration." Things altogether distinct in their nature are often so blended in this statement that it is difficult to separate them. Such is eminently the case in connecting the facts relative to Charleston with Pensacola.

Having already treated of the charge of hav-ing kept back reinforcements from Pensacola, I shall now say something of the charge of hav-ing also kept them back from Charleston. Neither a truce, nor quasi truce, nor any thing lik it, was ever concluded between the Presiden and any human authority, concerning Charles-ton. On the contrary, the South Carolina Com-missioners, first and last, and all the time, were informed that the President could nover surrender Fort Sumter, nor deprive himself of the most entire liberty to send reinforcements to it most entire liberty to send reinforcements to it was believed to be in danger, or requested by Major Anderson. It is strange that Gen. Scott was not apprised of this well known fact. It was then, with some astonishment, that I learned from the statement of the General, that he had, on the 12th March, 1861, eral, that he had, on the 12th March, 1861, advised that Major Anderson should be instructed to evacuate the fort as soon as suitable transportation could be procured to carry himself and his company to New York. A military necessity for a capitulation may have existed in case there should be an attack upon the fort, or a demand for its surrenden; but surely none could have existed for its voluntary surrender and aban loament.

Probably that to which the General means

to refer was not the quasi but the actual truce of arms concluded at Charleston, on the 11th of of arms concluded at Charleston, on the 14th of January, 1831, between Governor Pickens and Major Anderson, without the knowledge of the President. It was on the 9th of January that the Star of the West, under the American flag, was fired upon in the harbor of Charleston, by order of Governor Pickens. Immediately after this outrage, Major Andersou sent a flag to the Governor, stating that he presumed the act had been mauthorized, and for that reason he had not opened fire from Fort Sumter on the adjacent batteries; but demanding its disavow-al, and, if this were not sent in a reasonable time, he would consider it war, and fire on any vessel that attempted to leave the harbor. Two vessel that attempted to leave the harbor. Two days after this occurrence, on the 11th January, Governor Pickens had the audacity to demand of Major Anderson the surrender of the fort. In his answer of the same date, the Major made the following proposition: "Should your Excellency deem fit, previous to a resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford me the sincerest pleasure to desire the commany any messent control of the officers to accommany any messent control of the officers to accommand the officers the officers to accommand the officers that the office pute one of my officers to accompany any mes-senger you may deem proper to be the bearer of your demand." This proposition was promptly accepted by the Governor, and, in pursuance thereof, he sent, on his part, Hon. J. W. Hayne, the Attorney General of South Carolina, to Washington, whilst Major Anderson deputed Lieut. Hall, of the United States army, to accompany him. These gentlemen arrived together in Washington, on the evening of the 13th January, when the President obtained the first knowledge of the transaction. But it will be recollected that no time intervened between the return of the Star of the West to New York and the arrival of the messenger bearing a copy of the truce at Washington, within which it would have been possible to send reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Both events occurred about

Thus a truce, or suspension of arms, concluded between the parties, to continue un-til the question of the surrender of the forts should be decided by the President. Until this should be decided by the President. Until this decision, Major Anderson had placed it out of his own power to ask for reinforcements, and equally out of the power of the Government to send them without a violation of public faith.

This was what writers on public law denominate "a partial truce under which hostilities are in a partial truce under which hostilities are in the lady's house, he found her before the door and avarying to affect with a partial truce under which hostilities are in the lady's house, he found her before the door and avarying to affect with a partial truce under the lady's house, he found her before the door and avarying to affect with a partial truce under the lady in the lady's house, he found her before the door and avarying to affect without. suspended only in certain places, as between a town and the army besieging it." It is possible that the President, under the laws of war, might have annulled this truce upon due notice to the opposite party; but noither Gen. Scott nor any other person ever suggested this expedient. This would have been to cast a reflection on Major Anderson, who, beyond question, acted from the highest and purest motives. Did Gen. Scott ever propose to violate this truce during its existence? If he did, I am not now, and never was, aware of the fact. Indeed I and never was, aware of the fact. think he would have been one of the last men in the world to propose such a measure.

Col. Hayne did not deliver the letter which he bore from Col. Pickens, demanding the sur-render of the fort, to the President until the render of the fort, to the President until the S1st of January. The documents containing the reasons for this worrying delay were communicated to Congress in a special message of the 8th of February, to which I refer the reader. On the 5th of February the Secretary of War, under the instructions of the President, gave a peremptory refusal to this demand in able and comprehensive letter, reviewing the able and comprehensive letter, reviewing the whole subject, explaining and justifying the conduct of the President throughout. His concluding sentence is both eloquent and emphatic:

"If (says Mr Holt,) with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's exist.

proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sumter and imperil the lives of the andful of brave and loyal men shut up within bandful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those

horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility.

The truce was then ended, and General Scott is incorrect in stating "that it lasted to the end of that Administration."

An expedition was quietly fitted out at New York, under the supervision of Gen. Scott, to be ready for any contingency. He arranged its details, and regarded the reinforcements thus provided for as sufficient. This was ready to sail for Fort Sunter on five hours notice. It

Rates of Advertis

s of this expedition that Gen. Scott thus "At that time, when this (the truce) had passed away, Secretaries Holt and Toucey, Capt. Ward, of the Navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President, settled upon the employment, under the Captain, of three or four steamers belonging to the Coast Survey, but he was kept head; by the truce."

belonging to the Coast Survey, but he was kept back by the truce."

A strange inconsistency. The truce had expired with Mr. Holt's letter to Colonel Hayne on the 5th of February, and Gen. Scott, in his statement, says: "It would have been easy to reinforce this fort down to about the 12th of February." Why, then, did not the reinforcements proceed? This was simply because of communications from Major Anderson. It was most featurest that they did not proceed. the three or four small steamers which to bear them would never have reached the and in the attempt must have been captured or destroyed. The vast inadequacy of the force provided to accomplish the object was demon-strated by information received from Major An-derson at the War Department on the last day

of the Administration.

I purposely forbear at present to say more on this subject, lest I might, however unintentionally, do injustice to one or more of the parties concerned in consequence of the brevity required by the nature of this communication. The facts by the nature of this communication. The facts relating to it, with the appropriate accompaniments, have been fully presented in a historical review, prepared a year ago, which will ere long be published. This review contains a sketch of the four last months of my Administration. It is impartial; at least such is my honest conviction. That it has not yet been published has arisen solely from an apprehension, no longer entertained, that something therein might be unjustly perverted into an interference with the government in a vigorous prosecution of the war for the maintenance of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union, which was far, very far, from my intention.

for the maintenance of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union, which was far, very far, from my intention.

After a careful retrospect, I can solemnly declare before God and my country that I cannot reproach myself with any act of commission or omission since the existing trouble commenced. I have never doubted that my countrymen would yet do me justice. In my special message of the 8th of January, 1861, I presented a full and fair exposition of the alarming condition of the country, and urged Congress either to adopt measures of compromise, or, failing in this, to prepare for the last alternative. In both aspects my recommendation was disregarded. I shall close this document with a quotation of the last sentence of that message, as follows:—

"In conclusion, it may be permitted me to remark that I have often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly, performed; and whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the conciousness that I at least meant well for my country.

shall carry to my grave the conciousness that I at least meant well for my country.

Your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

Wheatland, near Lancaster, Oct. 28, 1862.

To Young Men.—Two young men commenced the sail making business, at Philadelphia. They bought a lot of ducks from Stephen Girard on credit, and a friend had engaged to endorse for them. Each caught a roll and was carrying it off when Girard remarked:

"Had you not better get a dray?"

"No, it is not far, and we can carry it ourselves."

"Tell your friend he needn't endorse your ote. I'll take it without.'

between a fore the door endeavoring to e vegatable huckster a 20 per cent abatement in the price of a peck of tomatoes.

"Have you any men here, madam?" "No," was the gruff reply.
"Have you no husband, madam?"

"Nor brothers?"

" No." "Perhaps you have a son, Madam ?" "Well what of it?"
"I should like to know where he is?"

"Well he isn't here." "So I see dear madam. Pray, where is

"In the Union army, where you ought

The crest fallen marshal hastened are the corner. he didn't further interrogate the lady.

One day a simple farmer who had just buried a rich relation, an attorney, was com-plaining of the fat expense of a funeral cav-alcade in the country. "Why, do you bury your attorneys here?"

asked Foote.

"Yes, to be sure we do; how else?"
"Oh, we never do that in London."
"No!" said the other, surprised, "how

do you manage?"
"Why, when the patient happens to die we lay him out in a room over night by himself, lock the door, throw open the sash, and in the morning he is entirely off."
"Indeed! said the other; "what be

of him."
"Why, that we cannot tell; all we kee
there's a strong smell of brimstone in
room the next morning." of him."

Below par-Abolitionists sin tion two countries remained connectedti

Applies M. Otten would live here redurned in which the Course were to