colored person, named Margaret Morgan. Upon the trial it appeared that she was held us a slave in the State of Maryland, and that she escaped into theStaleot Pennsylvania in the year 1832— that in 1937, Edward Prigg was appointed, by the owner o( the slave, to seize and arrest her as a fugitive from labor. In pursuance of this authority, and under a war rant issued by a justice of the peace, Prigg cau sed the negro woman to be arrested, and with out having obtained any warrant of removal, he delivered her to her owner in the State of Maryland. These lacts were found by a spe cial verdict, and by the agreement of counsel, a judgment was entered against Prig?- from this judgment a writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court of the State, where A pro forma judgment of affirmance was again, by agree ment, entered, and the case removed to the Su preme Court of the United States. It will be observed that the question, wheth er Edward Prigg was really guilty ot ihe crime of kidnapping, under the Pennsylvania statute of 1826, was never actually passed upon, either bv the court or jury, in the county of York, or by the Supreme Court of the State. Ihe jury merely found the facts, and the action of both courts was but a matter of form. In the argument and defeimination of the case, in the Supreme Court of the United States, it appears to have been taken for granted, that our act of 1826 made it a criminal offence for a master to take his slave out of this State, with out a warrant of removal ; and, upon this con struction, the act was declared unconstitutional and void. This, I submit, was a clear misap prehension of the purport and meaning of our legislation. The first section of the act of 1826 under which the indictment against Prigg was framed, was almost literally copied from the seventh section of the act of 1788, to which a construction had already been given by the highest judicial tribunal of the State of Pennsyl vania, where it was held to have no application whatever to the removal of a slave by the mas ter or his agent, with or without a warrant.— Such was the undoubted law of the State under the statute of 1788, and in re-enacting that stat ute, in the act of 1826, with an increased pen alty, it is manifest that the intention and object of the Legislature was to protect free persons of color, and to punish those, who, by fraud, force or violence, were guilty ol kidnapping, and holding or selling free men as slaves. This the State had a clear right to do ; and nothing but a misconstruction of her act, could have indu ced the declaration that it was forbidden by the Cbostitullfcn of the United States. It is per fectly clear, that Edward Prigg had commitied no crime in removing Margaret Morgan from the State of Pennsylvania to the State of Ma ryland, and delivering ber up to her owner; | and it is equally clear, that no attempt was made, by the statute of Pennsylvania, to declare his act a crime. He should have been discharg ed, not because the act of the State was uncon- j stitutional, but because he had not transgressed its commands. The Supreme Court of the United States not only pronounced the particulat section of the act of 1826, then before them, unconstitution al, but a majority of the court heid that the whole act was void, because the power to pro vide for the rendition of fugitives from labor, was vested exclusively in Congress and the sev eral States were, therefore, incompetent io pass statutes either in aid of, or to hinder, delay or prevent, the delivery of such fugitives. That this was the extent of the decision, as delivered by Judge Story, not only appears from the opin ions of the majority, but also from the dissen ting opinions delivered by the minority of Ihe court. By this unfortunate decision, it was au thoritatively proclaimed that Pennsylvania, in enacting her liberal statute of 1826, making it the duty of her own officers to aid in arresting and delivering up fugitives from labor, had mis taken her constitutional obligation, and that her act was in violation of, rather than obedience to, the Constitution of the United States. Un der such circumstances, it was the manifest du ty of the State to repeal her law thus declared j unconstitutional. This wa3 done by the act of 1847 ; and if that act had contained nothing more than a repeal of the law of 1826, and the re-enactment of the law against kidnapping, it could not have been subject to any just com plaint. But the third section of the acl of 1547 prohibits, under heavy penalties, our judges and magistrates from acting under any act of Con gress, or otherwise taking jurisdiction of the case of a fugitive from labor; and thp fourth section punishes with fine, and imprisonment, the tumultuous and riotous arrest of a fugitive slave, bv any person or persons, uuder any pre tence of authority whatever, so as to create a breach of the public peace. The sixth section, denying the use of the county jails for the de tention of fugitive slaves, was repealed in 1852 and need only be referred to as showing the general spkit of the act. The seventh section repealed the provisions ol the act of 1780, which authorized persons passing through our State to take their slaves with them, and gave to sojourners the right to bung their slaves into the State, and retain them here fur any period not exceeding six months. The provisions of thp third and fourth sec tions of the act of 1547, seem !<> have been predicated upon the language of the Supreme Court in Prigg's case. It is thete admi'ted that the several States may prohibit their own magistrates, and other officers, from exercising an authority conferred by an act of Congress j and that while an owner of a slave, under and in virtue ot the Constitution of the United States, is clothed with power, in every State of the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, he must nevertheless, do so without using any il legal violence, or committing a breach of the peace. It is evident that the frainer of the act of 1847, had closely studied the case of Prigsr vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and had kept his law strictly within tia letter. In many respects, the act is a codification of the principles enunciated by the court ; and more fault may justly be found with its temper than its want of constitutionality. If fugitive slaves were stiff claimed under the act of Congress of 1793, the denial to the mas ter of the aid of of State judges and masistrates, might be a source of greaCinconvenience to him; but the complete and perfect remedv now pro vcded by the act of Congress of 1850, renders htm entirely independent of State officers. And the punishment of arrests without warrant, bv a master in the exercise of his constitutional right of recaption, but made in a violent, tu multuous and unreasonable manner, amounting to a breach of the peare, is but recognizing, by statute, what was before the common law.— fhesp sections Were re-enacted in the revised per.ai code of Pennsylvania, at the last session of the Legislature, and are still the law of the State ; but they are not now of any practical importance, and as their retention on our sta tute booE is calculated to create the impression that the people of this State are unfavorable to ttie execution of the fugitive 6lave law, and the discharge ot their confederate duties, and with the view of removing this subject ot reproach, [ earnestly recommend their unconditional re peal. While a majority of the judges of the Su preme Court of the United States, in the Png> case, held, that a State had no constitutional right to provide by legislation tor delivering up fugitives from labor, a minority were then of the opinion that State laws, consistent with, and in aid of, the constitutional injunction, were valid and proper. And this minority opinion is now the judgment of the present court, as rectify indicated in a case which a rose in the State ol Illinois. There is, there fore, nothing to prevent the revival ot 'he act of 1826, and its restoration to the place in our code to which, by its merits, it is so justly en titled. This would leave it to the optiorr ol the claiman', whether he would seek his remedy under State or National laws. He had this right before the repeal ot our act ot 1826, and, ih my opinion, no good reason can be assigned lor refusing to place him again in the same po i iition. I would also recommend taat the consent of the State be given, that the master, while so journing in our State, for a limited period, or passing through it, may be accompanied by his slave, without losing his right to his service.— While such legislation is due to the comity wnich should ever exist between the different Stales of this Union, it would undoubtedly tend greatly to restore that peace and harmony, which are now so unwisely imperiled. By this Pennsylvania would concede no principle— we would simply be falling back upon our ancient policy, adopted at a time when our people were themselves [struggling tor their rights, and never departed from, until, by a misconception ot its leaning, one of our most important stat utes was declared unconstitutional. From 1780, to 1817, a period of sixty-seven years, Pennsylvania, herself a free State, permitted the citizens of other States to sojourn within her limits, with their slaves, for any period not ex ceeding six months, and to pass through the State, in traveling from one State to another, free frorr. ail molestatiou. Was she injured, or was the cause of human freedom retarded, by the friendly "grant of this privilege! This question cannot be truthfully answered in the affirmative ; but it may be safely avened that by changing our policy in this respect, we have in some degree, at least, alienated from us the feelings ot fraternal kindness, which bound together, so closely, the sisterhood of States.— Let us, then, renew this pledge of amity and friendship, and once more extend a kindly welcome to the citizens of our common country, wnether visiting us on business or pleasure, notwithstanding they may be accompanied by those who, under the Constitution and the laws, are held to service and labor. The Territories of the United States belong j to the General Gov.-e iment, and in those Ter- j ritories the people of the several States un- j questionably have equal rights. They were acquired by means of the common expenditure of blood and treasure. By the Federal Constitu tion power is given to Congress "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States." Whether under this, or any other power confi-rred by the Constitu'i m, Congress can prohibit or pro tect slavery in the Territories, has been seri ously questioned. But, if the power to legis late upon this delicate and important subject . were clearly vested in Congress, in my j.idg- j ment it ought not to be exercised. To declare that slavery shall not exist in the Territories, is j calculated to exclude from their occupancy the ; citizens of the southern or slaveholding States;, while,to make it a legal institution in all the Territories of 'he U. StatPs, by Congressional enactment, and to provide for its continuance during their entire Territorial existence, would be equally injurious to the people of the tree States. The principle adopted in the Compro- I mise measures ot 1850, lor disposing of the \ question of slavery in New Mexico and Utah, i and reiterated in the Kansas and Xebra.-ka bills jof 1854, of non-iuterventio:) by Congress with j slavery in the States and in the Territories, is the true rule. It is the duty of Congress, when j a sufficient number of hardy and adventurous pioneers find their way into our distant Terri | tories, to furnish them a shield of protection and a form of government ; but to the people themselves belongs the right to regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United , States. While these views have been long entertain ed by me, and while I am sincerely of the opinion tnat their general adoption, and faithful enforcement, would have preserved, and may yet restore/peace and harmony to all sections of the country, I am nevertheless not so wedded to them as to rpject, unceremoniously, all other propositions for the settlement of the vexed questions which now threaten to sunder the bonds which for three quarters of a century have made us one people. Forty years ago, our fathers settled an angrv controversy grow ing out of a similar question, by dividing the Territories purchased from France, and pro viding that Slavery, or involuntary servitude, should not exist north of a certain line ; and the whole country acquiesced in that compro mise. In 1854, that restriction upon slavery was reTnoved, and the people of all the Terri tories were left free to decide the question for themselves. Now the sectional issue is again presented, by the dominant party in the North, claifvung that slavery cannot legally go into the Territories, even if sanctioned by Congress, or the Territorial Legislature; and that it is the right anr> the duty of Congress to prohibit its existence. While the doctrine which obtains with a majority of the people in most of the southern States, is, that under the Constitution, the Territories .ire all open to slavery ; that neither Congress\nor the Territorial Lege !.i --ture can lawfully prohibit its existence, aid that it is th duty of Congress to provide for it all needful p.otection. May we not wisely follow the example of our fathers, by re-enact ing the old compromise line of 1820, and ex tending it to the boundary of California ? Not by the means of legislation of doubtful con stitutionality, but by an amendment to the Constitution itself, and thus permanently fix the condition of the Territories, so that those 1 who desire to occupy them, may find a home, at their discretion, either where slaveiv i< tol erated, or where it is prohibited. It the adop tion of such an amendment would peacefully settle the difficulties which now surround us, f am satisfidd that it would be sanctioned ov the people of Pennsylvania. At all events, they should have an opportunity to accept or reject if, if made as a peace offering. I would, there fore, recommend the General Assembly to in struct aud request our Senators and Repre sentatives in Congress, lo support