

From the Pittsburgh Christian Advocate.  
PROFESSOR MCCLINTOCK.

One of our city paper has been able to account for the acquittal of Professor McClintock, by a jury of his country, at Carlisle. The following statement of that gentleman may add something to the finding of the jury in his favor.

In our country the public mind is generally content with the action of the tribunals. They are the last and only legitimate resort for either private or public wrongs here, and a sound state of society will generally feel satisfied with their decisions.

How far the Judge, who presided at the trial may have overstepped the proper function of his office, we cannot undertake to determine.

#### TO THE PUBLIC:

Although my trial has been connected with the Criminal trial of Dr. Jones, by the public prints in nearly all parts of the country, I have thus far made no statement of the case in my own behalf.

Notwithstanding the exaggerated and even false reports which have given rise to the trial, it did not appear proper to make any such statement until the trial itself should have been held; & had I supposed it would be necessary even then, as from my knowledge of the facts, and not rationally led on by any one else, but which, as before stated, (at least in other than criminal trials) has been generally deemed among civilized men, satisfactory proof of innocence. But as I find that attempts are still made in certain newspapers, especially in the South, to mislead the public, I will add a few words for the consideration of all honorable (not to say Christian) men, whether north or south of Mason and Dixon's line.

With the entering into my minute details; I now simply state, upon my own personal veracity, that my first knowledge of the case was obtained while accidentally passing the Court House, at about 1 P.M., although the slaves were not arrested until 10 A.M., in the morning; that I entered the Court House under the impression that there was no sufficient proof that the woman and child were slaves; that I knew nothing of the conduct of the slaves, or of the claimants of the slaves; that no efforts in the case were directed to legal proceedings and none other; that no word or act of mine was uttered or done with reference to a forcible or riotous resistance; that the trial was conducted by the professed law to its end, so far as I could see.

My unhappy consequences more deeply myself.

This statement, I say, is made upon my own personal veracity, which will, I know, be a sufficient guarantee for its truth, to all who are interested in the South, as well as in the North, States.

The substance of what is simply proved upon the trial, and on that proof the jury acquitted me, as no intelligent jury could have failed to do. I think the right of the slaves, which will examine testimony on both sides, etc., as given in the imperfect newspaper reports, (that of the Carlsbad Democrat being the most complete, though even that is very imperfect) will be able to exonerate me, in accordance with the above statement. I have no disposition to complain of the witnesses for the prosecution; least of all, to charge any of them with perfidy. My acts and words were misunderstood by them, and even words, testifying to the fact, bore witness to the same. I am under a wide variety of my objects, to which you can give the coloring of their own feelings to what they saw and heard. All men are liable to do this, especially in cases suggestive of prejudice or passion; and every one knows that questions involving the interest of the slaves, are to be considered as self-evident.

In the recent trial, acts and even words, testifying to the fact, bore witness to the prosecution, bore a very different aspect when stated by those for the defense; that verifying the same sent the mass of the audience to a dead silence.

Many of the witnesses for the Commonwealth are personally unknown to me; but I do not think that any of them would charge me with intending to excite a riot.

It is very true that so far, the Judge is openly publicly announced, after the trial, and since widely circulated in the newspapers, can go, I stand before the American public branded as a rioter.—But I have the satisfaction to know that men learned in the law, older and wiser than myself, have examined the evidence presented in the witness testimonies, who carefully attended to the trial through, with no interest in my conviction or acquittal beyond the interest of truth and justice, were satisfied that my conduct was vindicated by the evidence, and that the verdict of the jury was just and righteous.

One. That some mistakes were committed by the jury, and that the trial was conducted by the defense, and the Court, without separating the defendant from that of the colored defendants, on the ground that the minds of the jury must necessarily be confined to the colored defendants, as the only persons tried.

Moreover, the Grand Jury returned a wrong name in finding a bill against Richard Johnson instead of Richard.

The Traverse Jury, upon the information of the Court, and of the defense, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

I leave, for all impartial men to decide; especially when it is added that their attorney, and the defense, had a great extent, and concentrated upon myself, throughout the trial by the course of the pleadings.

The result of this concentrated attention was a verdict of acquittal in my behalf. Even if my statement of the case were not understood, the two trials were unexceptionable in their entire course.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

As far as I can learn, the defense, and the Court, had a mistrial, and the trial had to be re-tried.

With the same reasoning, therefore, the Jury, can be blamed for accidental error in their verdict.

sure that all reasonable men, in Pennsylvania, Maryland, or elsewhere, will be induced to do me justice. That I have been injured, is not true; but I have no revenge to gratify; and therefore in this statement I have simply defended myself. To go further, I might as well go to heaven, as remain here, and waste my time in strange places connected with this whole case, which would give rise to strife, which I am determined to avoid.

My judicial thanks are due to the citizens of Carlisle, who have shown me every kindness during the progress of this trial, and also to the editors of various newspapers in Maryland and Virginia, who have taken the pains to give both sides of the story. I trust that not only they, but the public mind, will generally feel satisfied with their decisions.

How far the Judge, who presided at the trial may have overstepped the proper function of his office, we cannot undertake to determine.

John McClintock.

Carlisle, Sept. 29, 1847.

MEDICAL.

IT NEVER FAILS!

DR. CULLEN'S INDIAN VEGETABLE PANACEA.

DR. CULLEN'S INDIAN VEGETABLE PANACEA