s!r tss. WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1865. m ran ran Minority Report on Banks’ Respon sibility for its Failure. The Orders to him from the War De partment and Instructions ' from Gen.Hallcck. TEXAS TO HIVE BEES THE CULMINATION 01? THE ADVANCE. General Banks Alleged not to be Re sponsible either for the Plan or its Failure. BIS ARMIES SMALL AND THE DIF FICULTIES GREAT. History of the Advance, the Battles, and the Retreat. ALLEGED NATURAL AS WELL AS OFFICIAL REASONS FOR THE LATTER. The undersigned, being unable to eonenr in the report of the majority of the Committee on the Bed Elver Expedition, respectfully submits the follow ing: The first question presented is, Upon whom does the responsibility of that expedition rest, and what were the objects expected to be accomplished there by! In order to answer both branches of this question satisfactorily, it becomes necessary to examine the correspondence between General Hillock, then go* nexaMn-cbtef, and Generals Dinks, 'Grant, Sher man, and Steele, In relation to tnis subject; and that this may be done, the material portions of that correspondence are made a part of this report. General Banks assumed command of the Dapart* ment of the Gulf on the 16th of December, 1662, With the following Instructions: << Hkacqitabtbbs of thb Abict, “ Washikgtow, D. C., Not, 9, 1862. « Gknxsal/ : The President of the United States having assigned you to the command of the Depart ment of the Gulf, yon will immediately proceed, with tho troops assembling in transports at Fort Monroe, to Naw Orleans, and relieve General But ler. An additional force of some ten thousand men will be sent to you from Boston and New York as soon as possible. - •* The first military operations which will engage vour attention on year arrival at New Orleans wiu be the opeoingof the Mississippi and fcbe reduction ol Fort Morgan or Mobile city, in order to control that bay and harbor. In these expeditions you will have the CO the rear admiral command ing the naval forces in the Gulf and the Mississippi river. A military and naval exoedition Js or ganizing at Memphis and Cairo to move down the Mississippi and co-operate wish yon against Vicks burg and any other point which the enemy may occupy on that river. As the ranking general in the Southwest, you are authorized to assume con trol of any military forces from the Upper Missis sippi which may come within your command. The line of division between youx department and that of Major General Grant is therefore left undecided for the present, and you will exercise superior au thority as far north as you may ascend the river. %Th 6 Proficient regards the oposing of the Mis sissippi river as the first and most important of all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped that yen wIU not lose a moment in accomplish ing it. “ This river being opened, tho question arises how the troops and naval forces there o&n be employed to the best advantage. Two objects are suggested as worthy ol your attention: «First, on the capture of Vicksburg, to send a military force directly east to destroy the railroads at Jackson ana Marion, and thus Cue off all connec tion b> rail between Northern Mississippi and Mo bile and Atlanta. The latter place is now tho chief mWtaiv depot of the rebel armies in the west. “Second, to ascend with a naval and military f jrce the Bed river as far as it is navigable, and thas open an outlet for the auuar and cotton ol Northern Louisiana. Possibly both of tneße objects may be accomplished If the circumstances should be favo rable. “ It is also suggested that having Rod river lu our possession, it would form the best ease for operations In Texas. “It is believed that the operations or General Bosecransin East Tenh6St?ee, of General Grant in Northern Mississippi, an* of General Steele ia Ar kansas, will give lull employment to tae enemy’s troops in tie west, and thus prevent them from con centrating in force against you; should they do so, yon will be reinforced by detachments from one or more of these commands, ti lu^r operations ia the slightest degree. So far away from headquarters, you mast Tiecgßsarllvexsrcise yoar g7n view that the opening of the Missis sippi river is now the great and primary object of your expedition; and 1 need not assure you, Geue* jal, that the Government has unlimited confidence not only in your judgment and discretion, but also In your energy and military promptness. 11 Very respectfully, yvur obedient servant, «H W. Haclkok, “ GeneraldU'Ohier. “ Major General N. P. Bakus, Commander.’’ Vicksburg was captured on the 4th and Port Hud son on the Bth Of July, 1803. Oh the 18th oi' the «ame month Gen. Banks wrote to Gen. Grant, and «D July 26th. to Gen Hallecfci from New Orleans : * * * * * * “There is still strength at Mobile and in Texas Which will constantly threaten Louisiana, and which ought to be destroyed without delay. The possession of Mobile and the occupation of Texas would quiet the whole of the Southwest, and every effort ought to be made to accomplish It. “Its Importance can hardly be overestimated.” * # * * * * a gain, on the 30th of July and on the Ist of Au gust, Gen. Banks wrote Gen. Halleck as follows: “The possession of Mobile gives the Government the control of the Alabama river and the line of railways, east and west from Charleston and Sa vannah, to Vicksburg, via Montgomery, and places the whole of the State of Mississippi and southern Alabama in position to return to the Union. If the rebel Government loses this position, it has no out let to the Gulf except Galveston. The operation need not last more than thirty days, and can scarcely interfere with any other movements east or west. I understand it-to meet wlca General Grant’s approval, if it be consistent with the feneral plant* of tbo Government, upon which oon* itlon only I urge it. I send this from Vicksburg, having arrived here at 9 o’clock this morning, and return to New Orleans tblß evening.” On the 6th of August, General Ha-Hock sent the following telegram: Major General Banks, New Orleans: 11 ThCrO are iJEp&rt&ntre&soßß why our flag should bo restored in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Bo this by land, at Galvostos, at ladlanola, or at any other point yon may deem pre ferable. If by sea. Admiral Farragut will co operate. “ There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible. H. W. Kallhok, “ Geuoral-in- Chief.” And on the 10th the following: “GijMKRAL: In my despatch to you of the 6th In- Etsnt, sent by the direction of the Secretary of War, it was leit entirely to ycur own discretion to seleot aty point for occupation in Texas, either on the seaboard or in the interior, the only condition im posed being that tbe flag of the United States Should be again raised and sustained somewhere within the limits of that State. “That order, as I understood it at the time, was ofa diplomatic rather than of a military character, and resulted from some European complications, or, more properly speaking, was intended to prevent such complications. “The effect and force of that order are left pre cisely as they were on Us issue. “The authority conferred on you by it is not in •the slightest degree changed. “You will, therefore, consider the following ret marks as suggestions only, and not as Instructions: “ In my opinion, neither Indlanola nor Galveston Is the proper point of attack. If it Is necessary, as urged by Mr. Seward, that the flag be restored to spyne one point in Texas, that can be best and most salely effected by a combined military and naval movement up tbe Red river to Alexandria. Natchi toches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation Of Northern Texas. L. “In the first place, by adopting the Un9 Of the Red river you retain your qpnnectlon with your own base, and separate still more the two points or the rebel Confederacy. Moreover, you cut northern Louisiana and southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and retaiuxoemems from Texas. They are already out off' from the rebel States east of the Mis- JtlßSlppi. “If yon occupy Galveston or Indianola you di vide your own troops. “ I write this (-imply as a suggestion, and not as a military instruction.” On the 15th of August Gen. Banks replied to Gen. Balleek’g letter, saving : “ Measures have been already taken to carry into ♦fleet your orders. We shall plant the flag in Texas within a week, I hope. My plan has been to move against Galveston upon the laud side via the Sabine Pass, and from Berwick’s Bay, via VermlUionvllle and Nlblett’s Muff, to Houston and Galveston, for the transportation and artillery. We shall be ready, I think, as soon as Gen. Grant’s corps can reach us. The route indicated Is that followed by the Texans in their invasion of western Louisiana. *We can move eight thousand (8,000) men at once to the Sabine Pass, and thence concentrate rapidly on Galveston, tertifylr g and holding a position on the main land, < r the island only, as may be deemed ex pedient. From thence operations are practicable in any direction. v - _ “Isdiancla Is too far distant; does not command the important communications of the State, ana, if occupied, would leave the forces of the enemy be tween us and New Orleans. -■ , r “No movement oan be made from the guii against Galveston with a certainty of success. Our naval forces are not strong enough, and the ene my’s works are too extensive and thorough. The enemy fear only an attack from the land, via Nio- Jett’s‘Muff, the route I propose, or Alexandria. From that point our success Is certain* “ If General Grant sends me ten thousand men, 1 can throw twenty thousand immediately into Texas. The force should be larger, if possible.” On the 26th ot August, Gen. Banks sent Gen. Halleck the following : * “ I have made all possible exertions to get a suffi cient force into tbe field to execute the order, but encounter eeilcus difficulties in the preparation. Gen. Ord'e corps d’armee has not yet arrived. There Is very great deficiency of transportation for movement by water, either by sea or Ue river. The liver boats sent up with the ninamontos troops are detained above, and return slowly. By t&e gulf we are able to move, after all possible exertions, but one-third of our forces at one time. This is serious misfortune. “Toenter Texas from Alexandria or Shreveport WOUld bring us at the nearest point to Hernvilla. in Sabine county, or Marshall, In Hantsus, flue west of Alexandria and Shreveport, resp-otiveiy. These points ore accessible only by heavy marches, for Which tbe troops are hardly prepared at this sea son of the year. ' “The serious objection to moving on this line In the present condition of the forces of thi.< depart ment Is tbe distance It carries us: rota New Or* lease—our base of operations necessarily—and the great difficulty and the length or time required to return, in the event dr long absenee, Johnston threatens ns from the east. The enemy .will eon centrate between Alexandria and Franklin, on the Tech©, until our purpose is developed. As soon as we move any distance, they will operate against the river and New Orleans. U A movement upon toe Sabine accomplishes . these objects: Ist* Jt executes your order.,by. plant ' tag the nag at a prominent and commanding dobl tlon In Texas; 2d. It Is accomplished by water: It Is safely made wlth'a comparatively small lores, and without attracting attention of the enemy nm: the service may require. If the enemy moves In 5®. ro A^ poil . N ® w Orleans* we oan return from Sabine or Galveston in suoh time and la such Btr«ogth as to out off his retreat by the bay on the Atohafa laya. The advantages to he gained by the destruc tion of the rebel boats on the Sabine, in Galveston bay, and on the Trinity and Brazos rivers, would be very great. This oan be effected only by a move* ment upon Galveston, from the Sabine, by Bean* mont, Liberty, and Houston. If the enemy is la such stiength aB to defeat this, by oooupyiog a p >*l - between the Sabine and Neoaes, we shall make available the fortifications of the enemy at Orange, and be supported by the navy, whose light boats oan run up to Orange or to Beaumont. If these-son were different, the northern lino would be doubtless preferable on many grounds.” General Basks, finding it Impossible to establish the fiag in Texas, by an Inland movement,£in the then condition of the riven, attempted to accomplish that object by operations on the coast. On Ihe 7th Of December General H«*’t*ek seat the following communication to General -Kinks: “Gb»b»ax: I have just received roar letter of November 18. * off Arkansas Pass.* In this you say the ‘beet line of defence for Louisiana* as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick’s bay aid the AtchafaJaya. 1 I fully oonour with you In this opinion. It is the lino which I advised you from the beginning to adopt. Iu regard to your ( Sablne’and *E!o Grande’ expedition,no notices of your intention to make them were received here till they were actually undertaken. The danger, however, of dividing your army, with the enemy between the two posts, ready to fall upon either with his entire force, was pointed out from the first.” **** * . * To which General Banks replied, December 23, aq follows; “cianßßix: Your despatch bf December 9 1 re? owed yesterday. Si? itfoers from the department were to establish the flag of the Government la Texas at the earliest possible moment. I under- Stood that the point and the means wore left at my discretion. It was implied, if not stated, that time was an element of great importance In this matter, and that the object should be accomplished as Speedily ss possible. In addition to the insti actions received from your department upon this subject, the President addressed me a letter, borne by Brigadier General Hamilton, military governor of Texas, dated September 19 1863,1 a which he ex pressed the hope > hat I had already accomplished the object ecr much desired. Iu the execution of thlß order, my first desire was to obtain pos session cl UoußtGn, and the expedition which filled to effect & landtag at tbe Saolnewftß designed to secure that object. Tbe failure of that expedition mBde it impossible to secure a landing at that pvint. i immediately concentrated ail my disposa ble force upon the Tecoe, with a view to enter Texas by the way of Nibletb’s Bluff, on the Sabine, or by Alexandria, at seme more northern point. “Assisted by the commander of the naval forces. Commodore Bell, a reconnolssanoe of the coast of Texas as far as Brazos Santiago. A return from this reconnolssance was made October 16. and my troops being in readiness for movement somewhere, without the delay oP'a single day, except that which the state of the weather made necessary, I moved for the Brazoß. 4 “I repeat my suggestion that the best line of de fence for Louisiana, as well as foroperatioas against Texas, is by Berwick’s bay and the Atch&ftiaya, and I also recall the suggestion made by you upon the same subject. But that line was Impracticable at the time wnen I received your orders upon the subject of Texas. I ought to add that the llaeof the .dtcbefeiaya is available for offensive or defen- Mve purposes only when the'Btate or t.ae water ad mits ;he operations ol a strong naval 10700.” .* * » * ■ * * On the soth of December General Banks wrote General Halleck: “It Is my desire, If possible, to get possession of Galveston. This, if effected, will give us control ot the entire coast of Texas, and require but two small gairisons, one on the Rio Grande and the other on Galveston Island, unless it be the wish of the Department of War that extensive operations should bo made in the State of Texas. A sufficient number of men oan probably be recruited in that State for the permanent occupation of these two posts. It will relieve a very largo number of naval vessels, whose service is now iadiapeosible to us, on the Mississippi and in the Golf. To 00 operate with General Steele in Arkansas, or north Of the Red river, will bring nearly the whole rebel force of Texas and Louisiana between New Orleans and my command, without the possibility of uLpersing or defeating them, aB their movement would be directed south, and mice to the north. It is neces sary that this force should be first dispersed or de stroyed before I can safely operate in conjunction with General Steele. Once possessed of the coast "of Texas, and the naval and land forces relieved, I can then operate against the forces in Louisiana or Texas,” ****** January 4, 1864, General Halleck urged upon General Banks the movement by way of Red river, and on the Bih General Halleck wrote to General Grant: “In regard to General Banks’ campaign against Texas, it fe proper to remark that it was undertaken less for military reasons than as a matter of State policy. As a military measure simply, It perhaps S resent dd less advantages than a movement on Mo lle and the Alabama river, so as to threaten the enemy’s Interior lints and effect a diversion in favor Of our armies at Chattanooga and in Bast Ten nessee. Bat, however (his may have been, it was deemed necessary, as a matter Of political or State policy* connected with onr foreign relatione, and especially with France and Mexico, that our troops gt ould occupy and hold at least a portion of Texas. The President so considered, for reasons satisfactory to himself and to his Cabinet, and It was, therefore, unnecestarv for us to Inquire whether or not the treops could have been employed elsewhere with greater military advantage.” •♦.■* * * * * On the lith General Halleck again strongly urges upon General Banks the movement by the Red river: “lam assured by tie Navy Department that Ad miral Porter will be prepared to co-operate with, von as soon as the stage of tho water la the south west will admit the nse of his flotilla there. General •Steele’s command Is now under the general orders of General Grant, and It IS hoped that he and ShdOnaß-jniUjelso-ba-ama *— * * —oeos"' ’itr" uiv-*-— — yjotedHiat your troops wouldoper&te north ol the Bed river,unless the rebel forces In Texas should be withdrawn Into Ar kansas ; bat it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Bed river, if he conld relj upon four co-operation, and conld be oertaln of receiving supplies upon that line. Being uncertain on these points, he determined not to attempt an advance, bnt to oocnpy the Arkansas river as his line of defence. “The best military opinions of the generals in the West seem to favor operations on the Bed river, provided the stage of water will enable gunboats to co-operate.” On January 16 General Sherman, in a letter to General Banks, wrote as follows; “ I think this movement and one similar on Shreveport, as soon as the river rises, would pretty well settle the main question In the Southwest, hut 1 expect soon to he required by General Grant to hasten beck to HuntsviUe, where I feft the Army of the Tennessee.” On January 23 General Banks sent the following to General HaUeck: “ With the forces you propose, I concur In your opinion, and with Generals Sherman and Steele, ‘that the Bed river Is the shortest and best line of defence for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas.’ Bat it would be too muon for General Steele or myself to undertake separately. With our united forces and the assist* ance of General Sherman the success of movements on that line will be certain and important. I shall most cordially eo operate with them in executing your orders. With my own command I can operate with safety only on the coast of Texas; but from the coast 1 could not penetrate far into the interior, nor secure control of more than the country west of San Antonio. On the other line, with commensu rate forces, the whole State, as well as Arkansas and Louisiana, will be ours, and their people will gladly renew allegiance to the Government. The occupation of Shreveport will be to the country west of the Mississippi what that of Chattanooga is to the east; and as soon as this can be accomplished the country west of Shreveport will be in condition for movement into Texas. “J stall be ready to movo to Alexandria as soon as the rivers are up, most probably marching by Opelousas. This will be necessary to turn me rorts on Bed river and open the way lor the gunboats. From that point I can operate with General Scotlo, north or south of Ben river, in the direction of Shreveport, and from these© await your Instruc tions. Ido not think operations will be delayed on my account.” ****** January 29 Gen. Banks wrote to Gen. Holleck: “I shall be ready to co operate with General Sherman and General Steele as soon as I receive definite information of tho time when they will be ready to move. I oan take possession of Alexandria at any tune, but could not maintain the position Without the support offerees on the liver,” * * * * * * On February l General Halleck sent the follow ing communication to General Banks: “Gbhubal: Your despatches of January 23, transmitting report and map of Major Houston, are received, This report and map contain very im* portant and valuable information. “The geographical character of the theatre of war west of the Mississippi indicates Shreveport as the most important objective point of the operations of a campaign for troops moving from the Teohe, the Mississippi, and the Arkansas rivers. “If the Bed river Is not navigable, and it will re quire months to open any other communication to Shreveport, there seems very little prospect of the requisite co-operation or transportation of supplies, It has, therefore, been left entirely to your discre tion. after investigating the question, to adopt this line or substitute any other. It was proper, how ever, that you should hare an understanding wlcn GeD6r&l6 SU ele and Sherman. “So many delays have already OQOtirred, and tho winter is now Eoiar advanced, that l greatly fear no important operations west of the Mississippi will be conduced in time for General Grant’s proposed campaign In the spring. This is greatly to' be re* gretUd, but perhaps 1b unavoidable. “ Have you not overestimated the strength of the enemy west of the Mississippi river? AH the in formation we can got makes the whole rebel force under Magruder, Smith, and Price much less than ours, under you and General .Steele. Of course you have better sources of information than we have bete.” The following is an extract from a communication sent by General Banks to General Halleck, Feb. 2: * * * * * *.*'.",* “ I enclose copy of eommunloatlos from Admiral Porter, which shows the condition of Red river and. the Atcbafalaya. From this it would appear that some delay would ooour before any extensive opera tions can be carried out in that direction.” *.*** * * * * February II General Halleck wrote to Genoral Banks: “Gbssbaz : Your despatches of January 29 and February 2 are received Is the former you speak of awaiting ‘orders’ ar.d‘instructions’in regard to operations on Bed river. If by thiß Is meant that you are waiting for orders from Washington, there must bo some misapprehension. The substance of my despatches to you on this subject was communi cated to the President and Secretary of War, and it was understood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consideration of the subjaot, deem best.” “My last communication from Genoral Sherman 18 dated January 29. 18C4, and received lxere to-day. He eaye the Stage of water m Red river Is such that he caßDofi operate in that direction earlier than March or April, and that in the meantime ho would operate on the east side of the Mississippi river.” General Banks wrote to General Halleck on the “Gbhkeai.: Captain Robert T. Dunhim, of my jjtaiii returned this evening from a visit to General Steele, at Little Pock, Arkansas, to whom he had been sent to eommurlcdte upon the subject of the movement up Red river. , “ This route is said to be practicable oarßer than hv wav of Camden or ArkadtJpkla, though he states that there are serious objections to It. He will be able to advance with ten thousand wolbappointed troop 9 * leaving a fore© sufficient to hold the lino of the Arkansas.” „ On the loth General Halleck wrote to General to General Banks’ last despatch (February 7). Admiral Farragut was to threaten Mobile in order to draw the eoemy from Sherman and Thomas. The time of movement would depend upon stage of water in Bed river. It was under stood that as soon as Steele and Banks had effected a junction on that river, Sherman’s army oould all be withdrawn to operate oast of the Mississippi* Banks reports hia foroeteoweak to advance without Sherman’s aid." . „ . On the i7(h General Halleck again wrote to General Grant: _ “Ihave given no orders to General Sherman In regard to bis movements, hnt requested him to com* municate ireely with Generals Banks and Steele regard to conoert of action,” On the 23d General Halleok wrote to General Banks: »* Gbkbbal : Your dospatoh of February 12 is re ceived. It contains our latest Information from Generals Sherman and Steele, It 1b hoped that vonr arrangementfor the oo*operatlon of these gene* rals may prove successful. “Several additional regiments are ready for transportation to your command, but are delayed for went of suitable vessels. I hope, however, to g»t them off lathe course of a few days.” February 25, General Banks wrote' to General Halleck: “ Gbubrai. : Your despatch of February 11 is re* eelved. My allusion to the expectations entertain* ed of instructions from Washington, to which it re* fers, relates to the paragraph, of your despatch of January 4, which says tnat I so long as your plans are not positively decided Upon, no definite lastrue tions can be given to Generals Sherman and Steele.’ I replied, immediately upon receiving this despatch, thahJ would be reaoy to move In conjunction with Generals Sherman ana Steele on the Ist of March, or as soon as they could move, or navigation would J>cnnit the movement. I Immediately put myself n communication with General Sherman and Gene ral Steele, receiving from them despatches the sub stance of which has been transmitted to you, and stating that the; would be ready to co-operate with me in the movement up the Red river by the Ist of March. “I had Informed them that I would be ready to move at that time, and have sent au officer to com* munic&te with Genera) Sherman, if he oan be found, or General Steele, and Admiral Porter, upon the fame subject, and to tbe same effect. lam ready to move tbe moment I can hear from either of those officers. If General Steele alone can oo*operafce With me, I shall move my column by the 6th of March. lam daily expecting despatches lrom him upon this subjeot. ' • . , _ “I am very gTeatly embarrassed and depressed by the demand which Admiral Farragnt makes upon me for troops to assist fcimlua movement against Mobile, and also oy a the Idea impressedupon the public mind that I am to oo* operate with Gsha ral Sherman against the same point. This would be my desire, if St wero consistent wUk from tbe Government. General k3t^je replies, Id conformity with hts Cvspateh, that ho oan move' by the first week in March in the direction of Shreveport, I shall start i*>y column with, as neor'fifteen thousand (15000) men aa-lcah make It,"at the same tune, it wm b« impossible for ttift to go into that country alone, as I have not a sufficient force to make myscltsaoure sgalnst tbe concentrated force of the enemy, which Is- much stronger than mine “ I co not expect instructions from Washington beyond what I have received, except it relate to the movements of General Sherman or General Steele. It either one of these will cooperate with .me, I shall move at once. . * * * * * * * March 6, General Halleck wrote General Banks **** * * * « When General Sherman left Vicksburg he ex pected to morn there by the Ist of-March to co operate with you west of the Mississippi, bat he was of opinion that the condition of the river would not be favorable till a later period. I think it most probable that before this reaches you he will have returned to Vicksburg, or some other point on the river.” A '■ * * * * * * March 12, General Steel® B®nt the following d«r spatoh to General Halleck: “ General Banks, with seventeen thousand (17,000) and ten thousand (10,000) of Sherman’s, will bs at Alexandria on the 17th instant. This is more than equal for anything Kirby Smith can bring against him. Smith will run. By holding tbe line of Ar kan t&B secure, I can soon iree this State from arm ed rebels. Sherman Insists upon my moving upon Shreveport to co-operate with the above-mentioned forces with all my effective force. I have prepared to do so, against my own judgment and that of the best-informed people here. Tbe roads sire most if not quite impracticable; the country is destitute of provisions on the route we should be obliged to take. I made a proposition to General Banks to threaten ihe enemy’s flank and rear with all my ca valry, and to mase a Joint with Infantry ou the Washington road. I yielded to Sherman and Blunt 6G far as this plan Is concerned. Blunt wished me to move by Monroe to Red river; Sherman wants me to go by Camden and Overton to Shreveport. The latter 1b impracticable, and the former plan Wfuld expose the line of the Arkansas and Missouri to cavalry raids. Holmes has a large mounted force. I agreed to move by Arkaaeipma or Hot Springs and Washington to Shreveport. I can move with about seven thousand (7,000), Including March 33,' General Halleck replied to General Steele, as follows: , . . “ J Wrier General Sleele, Little Rock, Arkansas: “1 advise that you proceed to co-operate In the movement of Banks and Sherman on Shreveport, unless General Grant orders differently.” On the 15th of Maroa general HaUeck, as chief of staff, stilt the following to Lieutenant General Grant: «Lieutenant General Grant , Nashville: “A despaob just received from General Banks, dated March 6. He expects to effect a junction with Sherman’s forces on Red river by the 17 th. He desires that positive orders be sent to Gen. Steele, to move In conjunction with them for Rea river with all his available force. Sherman and Banks are o! opinion that Steele can do much more than make a mete demonstration, as he last proposed. A telegram from you might decide him.” **.* * * 4 The facts set forth show that the objects of the ex pedition were, as stated by Gen. Halleck, “to take and hold possession of the. Red river and Shreve port, os the most important objective point of the operations of a campaign of the troops mov ing from the Teche, the Mississippi, and the Arkansas rivers,” and “to establish a better line of defence lor Arkansas and Missouri than that occupied by General Steele, shorten the line of dc» fence on the western side oL the Mississippi river,” and •* establish a position within the State of Texas, which should. be permanently held,” “it being con sidered an important ObjeQt by the executive branch, of the Government, at that time, that a post should be held, at ail consequences, within the State Of Texas,” and “at the same time onsn an outlet for the sugar, cotton, and slaves of Northern Louisi ana and Southern Arkansasand that the Gene ral* in-Ghief, who first proposed the expedition, with lull knowledge of all . the facts and circumstances ielating to it, who directed the co-operation of three separate armies and secured the assistance of the navy* was the responsible author- Although the General-in*Chief, on the 11th 0 i February, 1884, says to General Banks, “It was understood that, while stating my own views, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as voa might, (tiler free consideration, deem best,” it is evident that General Banks felt heWftSDUt com plying with the withes of the General the Governmenti«-“-«»-^- v ' Bankß probabl, renaffifaffißfl 4Wf&**ftop©rlant reasons why our flag should be, restored in some point of Texas with the lease pos sible delay.” And when he had found It impossi ble to comply with views expressed M as suggestions only, and not as tnrirticriona,” he was told, by way of censure, “In regard to your Sabine and Rio Grande expeditions, no notices of your intention to make them were received here until they were ac tually undertaken.” He had probably come to the conclusion that the difference between a military instruction and a military suggestion, made by a superior to his inferior, often repeated, urgently pressed, and pertinaciously persisted In, was more in form than substance, rather imaginary than real, General Banks Bays: ; . . “In the iDßtruotlons I received from the Govern ment it was leit to my discretion whether or not I would join in this expedition, but I was directed to communicate with Genoral Sherman, Gen. Steele, and Admiral Porter upon the subject I expressed the satisfaction I Bhouia find in co-operating with them iu a movement deemed of so much importance by the Government, to which my own command was unequal, and my belief that with the forces de signated ibwould be entirely saooesßful. Having re ceivedfrom them similar assurances , bolk my discretion and my authority $0 far as the organisation of the ex pedition was concerned , were at e* end. ” It was estimated that the enemy had about 25>000 effective men. For the proposed expedition General Sherman was to furnish 10,000 men, General Steele 10,0c0 men, and General Banks from 15,000 to 17,000 men. The forces of General Sherman and General Banks were to concentrate at-Alexandria on tho 17th of March, when they were to unite with a naval force uncer Admiral General Steele was expected to move forward ana unite with them. The troops from General Sherman’s army, under General A. J. Smith, arrived at the moutrof Bed river, and from thence marched to Alexandria, cap turing Fort lie Ruesey on their way up, ana arrived at Alexandria on the 16th of March. Admiral Por ter and the gunboats reached there about the same time. General Banks says: “ My force was placed under command of General Franklin, who was an officer of high rank, and, as I supposed, of great capacity. I supposed him lobe perfectly competent for the organization of his force of 15 000 men, and the march up the Bed river to Alexandria. When we were engaged in these ope rations at Pass UftV&llo, and preparing tor move meets against Galveston, the President had written me a letter iu regard to civil affairs in Louisiana which, required my personal at tention in New Orleans. We had suspended operations at Puss Cava.Ho, and moved all our forces, except thoße necessary to hold Matagorda Bay, upon the Teche, for tbe land movement under General Franklin. He had the 19 :h Army Corps, two divisions of the 13th Army Corps, and 5,000 cavalry, making about 16,000 troops. Ho was to move os the sth of March, and be at Alexandria on the 15th or 17th, whore we were to meet General sterman. Ho failed altogether to get his troops ready for the movement at the time. He was not ready to move until the 13th of March. “ I kept myself informed of the movements of the troops, and left New Orleans and Port Hudson in season to be at Alexandria before my commihd was there. I reached Alexandria on the 24th of March. The navy took possession of the place on the 16th or 17(h of March. General Sherman’s troops, under command of General A. J. Smith, arrived there on the 16th of Maroh. The oavalry advance of my tore© reached Alexandria on.the 19th, and tbe main force on the 25th and 20th of Maroh. This was eight days later than we had expected. But, as it hap pened, It was not material, beoause It was impossi ble for tbe gunboats to pass above Alexandria The river, instead of being high, as it waß supposed It would be at this se&Bon of the year, was unusually “We were detained at Alexandria for eight days. As soon as it was possible to get the boats and transports over the falls,-we moved on to Natchi toches (Grand Bcore), but we could not asoend .the river from that point for some days.” General Franklin saye: . . _ it General Banks first informed me that he had promised to meet Gen. Sherman’s forces at Alex andria on the 17th of March.. This Information J received on the 10th of March. As Alexandria was 175 miles from Franklin, of course It was impossible to fulfil Ms promise, so far as my troops were con cerned. We started, however, on the 13th and 14th of March, and without any accident my advance arrived at Alexandria on the Ssth of March- The cavalry was placed under my command about the time we left Alexandria.” General Lee says: “ About the 7th or March the farces were ordered to move from Franklin, but were detained .for two or three day: by a storm which rendered the roads almost impassable.” It will be seen that this delay, whoever may have been responsible for It, did not affect the forward movement from Alexandria, as the gunboats oould not be taken over the falls until several days after the arrival of the last of Gen. Banks’ army. A portion of General Smith’s force consisted of a marine brigade of 8,010 men, under General fillet. These treops had no wagon trains. General Mo Fherson, commanding at Vicksburg, sent Informa tion that the enemy were attacking his forts, and that it was necessary this brigade should return Immediately, which they did, thus reducing the force of the Bed river expedition. It was found Impossible to get some of the gun boats and transports over the falls; it became no cesßary to establish a depot of supplies at Alexan dria and General Grover’s division of 3 000 men were left to defend that point, thns reducing the land force to abont 80,000 men. On the 28th of Maroh the army moved forward from Alexandria, smd arrived at Natchitoches and Grand Ecore, whlca is the post of Natehltcches, frejn the 2d to the 4th of April, about eighty miles from Alexandria. ■ The distance from Natobltoohes to Shreveport Is nbout one hundred miles, through a barren ooantry, being mostly an unbroken forest. The first day no enemy was encountered. On the Beoond day tho cavalry under Gen. Lee moved to and through Pleasant Hill, meeting a regiment or two of the enemv, and abont noon came upon a pretty strong force about three miles beyond Pleasant Hill. Gan. Lee says; “We met the ©Demy op a little till. They were mostly cavalry and mounted Infantry, but had dis mounted there. We went Into action, patting In a brigade at first. The enemy drove that brigade oaefe about a hundred yards. I then put In the other two brigades dismounted, and drove the enemy* w# lest about seventy-five killed &ud wounded there, oaptured about twenty five prisoners, and the enemy loft, on the around about the same number as we loBt” General Banks remained at Grand Eeoore to su perintend the departure of the forces, until the morning or the 7 h, and shon rode to Pleasant Hill that day, reaching there In the evening, aod. learn ing that Genera* Lee had requested of General THE PKESS-PHILADELPHIA, WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1866. Franklin that » brigade ofinfantry be ordered to the front, and that Genaral Franklin had declined to comply with Mb request, directed that a brigade should be cent to him, He directly to the front, ound General Lee at Sabine Crossroads, and a strong force of the enemy In his frost ana tame dlately sent ant order to General Franklta to harry forward the troops as fast as possible. In order that there might be no delay or miscarriage In the mat ter, he also rent a member of his staff to General Franklin* General-Franklin sayg these orders reached him about three o’clock. Between four and five o’clock General Franklin, with General Came ron’s division or the 13th Army Corps, reached the front. At the time when General Franklin arrived oar forces had been driven back from their position to the woods In. the rear of the open field. The in fantry wasforctd back upon the wagon train of the cavalry, and an immediate retreat commenced. General Emory .'commanding the first division of the 19th Army Corps, had advanced and formed a Use of battle at Pleasant Grove, some two or three miles from Sabine Crossroads. The enemy attacked this line $ the aotlon lasted more than an hour, and the enemy* Were decidedly repulsed ’ with' serious lose. After this engagement, it was deoidefl that the army should fallback to Pleasant Hill, which it did, reaching there about nine o’olook in the morning of the 9th, there meeting the troops under command of General A. J. Smith: A line of battle was formed, end about five o’olook In toe afternoon tbe enemy attacked with great vigor, but were repulsed at all points, and pursued as long as daylight would per mit. It was urged by General A. J. Smith, and at ftf3t determined by General Bankß, to commence a for waid movement the next morning $ but subsequent ly It was decided to return to Grand Eiore. . on that evening a reconuolssauae watch had been sent to the river returned and reported that they had not been able to discover tbefleet, or learn from the people of Its paesaueup tbe river. There was no water at Pleasant Hill, and tbe want of rations for some of tbe troops made it Imperative that the army Ehould advatoe or retire Wfcfire It could com municate with tbe fleet, The difficulties already experienced In apcendlcg, with the fact that that no Information conld be obtained as to ti&ifjtit the fleet had gone, made the return to Grand Ecore a neces sny. The dead we*; purled, and the wounded Who 00 S»r n ?* - moved were to hospital, Ahe retursfed to Grand Ecore oh the loth. *ftfor£E,tion had.been received by General Backs .uafc General Steele woulJ not probably be able to co*operate, and also a request tor the return of the forces under General Smith to General Sherman, which request General Banks, owing to the condi tion of the army and navy, refused. On tbe 220 of April, the whole fleet having passed below Grand Ecore, with much difficulty, the army moved towards Alexandria General Franklinsays: 4 ‘ General Banks had directed nie to take charge Of the movement, and I did direct the retreat from Grand Ecore to the vicinity ot Alexandria. Tua advance and rear guard had constant skirmishing, and in crossing Oane river a serious fight occurred, in which two brigades of th© 19th Corps; and two divisions of tbe 18tu Corps, wereb&gaged, Brigadier General Emory commanding the whole movement. Tbe enemy retreated about nightfall- General Smith was the rear gn&rd, and uad one or two se rious affairs with the enemy, although the loss was not great. He arrived at Alexandria on Tuesday, the 23th of April.” . Tbe Eastport, the largest gunboat of the navy, after having been frequently on shore in consequence of the low stage of water, was blown up to prevent Aer falling Into the hands of the enCmy. All tbe Tjther vessels of the fleet, though attacked by the enemy,.arrived at Alexandria the 28tq of April. The water bad been falling, and.it!was found Im possible for tbe gunboats to pass the falls. General (then lieutenant oolooel) Joseph Battey proposed the construction or dams for the purpose or raising the' water so that the boats could be floated over t&O rapids. A dam at the foot of tbe rapids was first con structed under his direction, and finished about the eighth, when two gunboats passed over. A portion of this dam was carried away. This portion was partially repaired, and two wing dams on each side of tbe river, above the rapids, were constructed, and on the morning of the I3h of May the entire fleet went over the rapids la safety. These dams weie constructed almost wholly by the army, two or three thousand men being detailed at a time. On the I3ih, the army marched from Alexandria, end reached Slwmsport on the 10th, having had a sharp skirmish with the enemy at Mansura. From this point General Smith’s oorps returned to Missis sippi and General Oanby arrived at Simmsport on the JO**, and assumed command of all forces west of the Mississippi, This expedition having failed to accomplish the object proposed, It is necessary to inquire what pro duced the failure. Tbe repulse or disaster as Sabine Crossroads, whoever may have been responsible for it, was not of sufficient Importance to cause it. Bat as there is diversity of opinion as to the responsibility. It may be well to Inquire what causes produced it,- and upon whom the responsibility rests. General Franklin, who directed the orderof march from Grand Ecore, placed the cavalry train, of more than three hundred wagons, between the oavalry and tbe infantry. General Lee, commanding the cavalry, had repeatedly asked that his train, or the larger portion of it, might be placed in rear of the LUuMr>. G..mlLt»sa;s: ‘-On tlie evening before tbe battle of Sabtae Crossroads I wrote to General Franklin a eomtim. nloatton. in whloh I said tbat while I respectfully deferred to bis jndun>ont—and I used tbat la iguage beuause-l bad Insisted on my view so often tbat I did not dare do so any longer—l tbotxgbt If I met with an obstinate resistance my trains should go i baok. “ Question. Yon say that when you met the ene my at Sabine Crossroads they were four or five to your one 1 _ “ A. They bad abont 20.000 men, and I had from 4 000 to 5,000 , “ Q.. Was It not possible to have eondnoted the 1 advance of our army so as to avoid suoh a contln gency 1 “ A. I think there Is no question of that. «q, Then was It not unmiUtary not te have ar ranged your march differently 1 “A. I believe that the theory was pretty well ; seated in the minds of tbe commanding officers that ! we weaanot to have any fighting until we got to i Shreveport. I was laughed at for Insisting that we t would have a fight before we got to Shreveport. • Gen. Franklin used to send me word that the caval- j py -was in the way; I think the impression was tbat I waß slow: it Is a simple thing to march a column behind a heavy advanoe guard chat is dolQg all th* flahtlng. v B: ” About 12 o’olook, General Ransom e&metomy mr with a brigade of Infantry which had been sent forward to relieve the brigade of infantry with me. . Jußfc after he had reported to me we came on a large open field of perhaps a mile in extent in each direc tion. The road ran over ahi!), which was an admirable position, and I waß surprised, as we came out of the woods, to find tbat the enemy had abandoned it. I deployed a regiment, skirmished up the hill, found no enemy there, and took possession ofthe hiU. We advanced the skirmishers abonfrhalf a mile further, and found the enemy in foroe. They were there, In fantry and cavalry, In line of battle. I then put these two brigades of infantry in position on this hill.” Jcet at this time Gen. Banks and his staff arrived on tliß field, it will be seen that both Gen. Lee and Gen- Banrom regarded the position held by onr foroes as a good one; that, In addition to the caval ry and artillery which had composed Gen. Lee's advance, there were on the field also, two brigades of Infantry, and that the balance ef the 18th and 19'h Army Corps were respectively about five and seven miles In the rear. Under these circumstances Gen. Banks, when he arrived upon the field, was obliged to decide Ukabanden this favorable posi tion, and withdraw hfß artillery and the large hag gsge train Of the oavalry, In the presanoa of a supe rior Idrce or the enemy, or remain upon the field and order up to his assistance the troops of the 13th and 19th Army Corps from the points heretofore mentioned. He deetdod to iremain upon the field and take the chanceß of a battle. Had the enemy deferred the attack one hour longer, or had It been possible for onr troops to reach the field one hour earlier, the result oi that battlelwoold have been re versed, for, even after having driven from the field 'the artillery, cavalry, and two brigades of Infantry, and hroken the line formed with the a9Blstanoe of General Franklin and his troops, the enemy weie repulsed by the line formed by General Emory, with serious loss, after repeated attacks. * * * * * # * A careful examination of the testimony In rela tion to ttilß expedition will show that prominent among the causes which contributed to Us failure are the following r From the outset It was under* stood that it could only be accomplished as a com*' blued military and naval movement, and that the nav hi movement could only be made when the Rad river should be full; having, in the opinion of General Sherman, in the neighborhood oi twelve ieet ot water on the rapids at Alexandria, whtoh he supposed it would have from March to June. This river did not have les usual rite in 1861, The want of water in the river delayed the movements of both the army and the navy. Some of the boats conid not be taken over the rapids. The condition of the river when our troops returned to Grand Ecore made it a necessity that the gunboats should be taken below the falls at Alexandria. It was origi nally proposed that from 35,000 to 37,000 men should be engaged tn the expedition. The facts that 9,000 of the troops sent by Gen- Sherman were with drawn ; that Gen. Steele, with his 10,010 men, found himself wholly unable to advance to Monroe, or to any point on the river below Shreveport, as was do* sired and expected by Gen. Banka 5 and that Gen. Grover, with 3,000 men, was obliged to remain at Alexandria, thus reducing the force of the expedi tion l early one half, also contributed to its failure. Over these things the general commanding had no control. On the 27th of March, as the expedition was on the point of moving from Alexandria, Gen. Banks received the following from Lieut. Gen. Grant: * * “I regard the success of our present move as,of great importance in reducing the cam ber of troops necessary for protecting the naviga tion of the Mississippi. It is also Important that Shreveport should be taken as soon as possible. Seed Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith’s command back to Memphis as soon as possible. This Is necessary for movements east of the Mississippi. Should you dud that the taking of Shreveport will occupy more time than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent, you will send them back at the time speci fied in his note of March even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition?' .•** * * * * Had General Banks known that the river would not rise, and the forces of General Steele would not be able to cooperate, prudence, perhaps mlaht have required him to abandon the expedition. Bat this river was rising at the time our forces reached Alexandria, and continued to do bo until our fl<>et was taken above the rapids'. At this time it was expected, both by Gen. Banks and the authorities at Washington, that General Steolo would bo able to operate, and It was hoped that within the time al lowed the troops from Gen. Sherman’s army, a i auc tion between the forces composing the expedition erd Gen. Steele might be formed, and Shreveport reached. This done, and the river being open and &&T}pab?e, with the gunboats to maintain the Hue, It was supposed that Gen. Sbenn&u’e, troops could he spared, ar-d General Bank*- and General Steele’s forces, united, could commence operations nr operate east of the Mississippi, if required by Che Lieutenant General. Ip relation to the failure ol the expedition, Gen, Franklin says: “ I think the great reason for Its failure was that the point of; emotion of the two armies which had been designated, to wit • Shreveport, WOS two han dled miles within the enemy’s dOUfitry. Of epuretv It was the policy of the enemy, if he had an army ** large as either one of the two armies which were to meet at Shreveport, to attack one of them ana check or beat it, and then tarn around and attook the other; and that Is precisely the course which was adopted. The point of juuotloQ of the two lorces ought to have been nearer to our lines, where tbe two armies oould have joined without any dan ger.” General Banks says: . u The difficulties of navigation, the imperreot con centration of forces, the incautious march of the Bth ot April, and tbe limited time allotted to the expe dition, were tbe causeß of Its failure.” It appears from the testimony that the extent of the disaster to tbe army at Sabine Crossroads was greatly exaggerated at the time. It seems that the only loss our army sustained daring the expedition, except in killed and wounded, was at Sabtae Cross roads, when a portion of the train and batteries or the oavalry were abandoned; several of the guns captured were retaken the next day at Fleasant Hill. • _ . General Banks says: ... (< £b eveiyoneof these engagements, except that of Sabine Cross Eoade, we bad been successful. The failure to accomplish the main object of tno expedition was due to other considerations than the actual superiority of the enemy in the field. In these operations, in whloh my own command hod marcheu by land nearly four hundred miles, the total loss sustained was 3,980 men, of whom 259 were killed, 1541 wounded, and 2160 miflfllng. A large portion ol the latter wore captured, and have been fcince exchanged, bat'aooDsiderable portion returned to the army curing its operation on Bed river. No loss of artillery, or of trains, or any army material whatever waß sustained, except that whloh oourrea At Sabine Cross Hoads. "We lost there Nitns’bat tery and a section of the Missouri howitzer battery, 160 wagons and 800 mules, captured by the enemy on account of the position ol the train near the field of battle. All the ammunition wagons were saved. Tbe errby had captured, up to this time, from tbe enemy twenty-three guns and fifteen hun dred prisoners. The losses in killed, wounded, ana prisoners—officers and .men—were much greater than onrs, Amorvr tbe former were some of the Didst efficient rebel commanders. Up to this time, April 26tb, no other loss of men or material had been sustained by our army, and none was sustained during the subsequent part or the campaign ” When Gen. Oanby arrived at Simmsporb, and met the army on its return, be sent the following: ”The troops from Red river arrived at Simms port, on tba Atdhafalaya, In the course of yester day, and will reach Morg&nzla, on tbe Mississippi, to.day. This army is in better condition than I supposed, and will soon be ready for offensive ope rations.” " ' * * * * * * * * It will be seen, by referring to the original letter or instructions of General H&Ueok to General Banks, that one oi the advantages expected to be gained by an expedition up Red river was the open ing tt" an outlet for the sugar and ootton of North ern Louisiana. 5 ’ The navy, it will he remembered, went up Red river »b far as Alexandria, and under tbe direction of Admiral Porter, immediately com menced eeJzlDgeotton at that pteco and other points on ?he river below. Admiral Potter says he sent 3 000 halts from Alexandria and 3,000 bales from Wachlta. A number of prominent oltizeDS, claim ing to be Union men, called on Admiral Porter and told him if he continued to seize ootton as he was then doing, the rebels would burn all private as well as Confederate cotton; but the Admiral soemed to think otherwise and west on with the seizures, and In a short time the rebels began to burn all ootton within their reach. The property thus seized by Admiral Porter was taken as naval prize, but It is not shown by the testimony what final disposition was made of it. This seizure of cotton, with the expectation on thfi part Of the offioere that they were to receive lar?e sums of prize money.from lt ( B6&Q1B to have occasioned ill feeling between the army and navy. ; Tho officers ol the array felt that the navy was en gaged In a business that did not belong to it, and de sired Gen. Banks to put a stop to it; but, as he had no knowledge of the instructions from the Navy De partment, and desired to avoid all conflict with the naval arm of the expedition, he deeli&ed to do so. There vreie a number of civilians who accompanied the expedition, who were believed by many of the witnesses to be cotton speculators, but it does not appear tbat moTe than two of these hod any autho rity or permit tjr do sq. Two men, Casey and But ler, presented to Admfral Porter and General Banks a pass or permit, dattd several months before, and signed by the President of tho United States, di recting military and naval authorities to grant them facilities in going where they pleased, and mention ing particularly Red river. This permit General Banks and Admiral Porter felt bound to MBpeot, and each directed the officers under them to grant the facilities required. ' ..' __ The following la tbe statement which Gen. Banks makes In relation to the seizure of cotton: u Under the general prize law, the naval authori ties, upon their arrival at Alexandria, commenced the capture of cotton on both sides of the river. “ "Wagon trains were organized, ootton gins pat in operation, and the business followed up with, great vigor while the fleet lay at Alexandria. Some diffi culty occurred with the marines, who insisted upon their right to pass the lines of the army, who threat ened at one time to turn their guns against the troops. I was Informed by parties claiming property wbioh bad been taken by the naval authorities, to whom I referred th«D, that upon application for ro ller their property had been released to them by the commander of the fleet. The army did not enter into competition with the navy in the capture of this ‘4 order to remove all the products of the coun try which might under any circumstances be used to aid the rebellion, General Grover,in command of the pest at Alexandria, and the quanermaster of that post, were directed to collect suoh property as should remain there after Its departure, and trans- mlt it to the quartermaster at New Orleans, who was instructed to turn It over to the officers of the Treasury- to be disposed of according to the orders of the Government and the laws of Congress. Notice was also given to the supervising agent oi the Treasury at New Orleans that no trade would be allowed In that portion of the State until it should bo completely and permanently occupied by the army. No person was allowed to accompany tbe army upon this expedition as re porter. or for any other purpose, without a distinct and written declaration that BO trade by private parties, or for personal purposes, would be permit ted. and that ro property, on private aocount, would be transportod by public or private vessels to New Orleshß: but that all property sent to Now Orleans would be consigned to the ohlof Quartermaster, and by Pirn turneb over to the treasury agent, and held SDbieot to snoh claims and orders as should be ap. proved by the Government at Washington. Pre vious to my departure from New Orleans the ohlef Quartermaster,Ool. S. B. Holablrd,had been Instruct ed tbat no privileges would bo given to any party whatever, under any circumstances, to trade in, to dispose 01. or to transport privato property; that all tho property that came down from.that country, so far as the army was concerned, would be turned over to him, and by him to the proper treasury officers. No permission was given to any person to atfoom pasy the army except upon these express conditions, 'UTfrJpOry xwpjPftßtatbas, m_a,dg_tuf.l#lßat- r foere would be difficulty In receiving such property ex cept under tbe treasury regulations of the 26th of January, 1864, those regulations were officially pro mulgated at Alexandria and at New Orleans. There was no permission whatever given to any person to trade, to dispose of or transport private property. Every dollar’s worth of property that cams Into the hands of the army during this campaign was either appropriated to Its nse in kind by the proper officers of the commissary and Quartermas ter's departments, receipts being given there for, or transmitted to the chief quartermas ter at New Orleans, and by him turned over to the. treasury Bgents, to be disposed of according to the laws of Congress and the orders of the Government. When ootton or other property interfered with the transportation of any material of the army, or of refugees, negroes, or troops, upon the evacuation of the country, it was thrown from the boats and abandoned uaon the river levee to the enemy. I intend this statement to be as compre hensive upon the snbjeot as language oan matte it, and to cover all possible methods, eirect or Indirect, by which officers or citizens, public or private par ties, or any persons whatever, oould evade or violate these orders, on the river or at New Orleans, or ap propriate by any means public or private property to private uses or personal advantage, or to deprive tbe Government or Individuals of any property which, by any Interpretation of military orders or publlo laws, could be considered as belonging justly and properly to thorn. Copies of the Instructions to General Grover, commanding the- post, 001. S. B, Holablrd, ohlef quartermaster at New Orleans, and Hon. B. F. Flanders, supervising special agent Treasury Department, accompany this report, ail of whom will be able to account to the Government for publlo or private property Doming Into their hands during this campaign.” Most of tbe witnesses seemed to take It for granted that every civilian who accompanied the army did so for the purpose of speculating in cotton. Whatever there may have been of feeling between the army and the navy in relation to the selzare of cotton, an examination of all the testimony will show that the military operations were not delayed or Interfered with by any operations tn ootton. The delays at the points where these operations were oairled out were occasioned wholly by other oansss. During the progress of the expedition, meetings were bold at two places (Alexandria and Grand Ecore) for tho eleotion of delegates to a Convention then abont to meet, (or the organization of a State Government In Louisiana. It does not appear that any clßcer or private, or anybody connected with the expedition. In any way interfered with, or par ticipated In these elections, or that they oaused the slightest delay to the movements of the army or navy, or Influenced or controlled the expedition In tbe slightest degree. D. W. Gooaa. INSURANCE. pfSTJRANCB AGAINST ACCIDENTS EVERY DESCRIPTION. BY THE mmiEßS’ ESSUBAJfCE COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONN. Capital ssoo*ooo. ®'KL W. ALIEN, Agent, 404 Walnut Street* PHILADELPHIA. OEHBRAL ACCIBBET POLICES For Five Hundred Hollars, with $3 per week compen sation, can be had for $3 per annum, or any other sum between $5OO and $lO,OOO at proportionate rates. TEST DOLLARS PREMIUM Secure* a Policy for $2,000, or $lO per week compcnca tioi for all and every description of accident-travelling or otherwlne—under a General Accident .Policy, at the Ordinary Sate. THIRTY DOLLARS PREMIUM Seeurtsafull Policy for $5,000, or s2sper week com pensation, a* above, at ike Special Sate. FOREIGN RISES. / Policies Issued for Foreign, West India, and* Galitor nla Travel. Rate* can be learned by application to the SHOE 7 TIMS TICKETS. Arrangement* are in course of completion by which the traveller will be able to purchase, at any Railway Ticket Office. Insurance Tickets for one or thirty days' travel Ten cents will buy a ticket for one day’s travel, Insuring $5,000, or $l6 weekly compensation. Ticket may be bad for 8. 0, and 12 months, In the same manner. _ , _ „ . Haza/doue Risks taken at Bazardoa* Rates. Polls!** issued for G years for 4 years premium. INBUCBMENTB. The rates of premium are le«» than those of any other ootup*L7 covering the same rick. Ho medical .xsn.ln.tlos is rsqulMd. and tooßMnd. of those who have been rejected by Lire Companies, in ws.eijnenos of horedltor, or otboi diBOMo.. «ffs.t iitiur.nce In the TRAVULLBIIS at tha lowest rates. Life Ireuran.o Companies pay ?<>»»«wSIfVSH! •om until the death of theMEumd. The raAYBLI.BRB 9*y the lose or damage sustained by personal Injury whenever it occurs. „. , , . The feeling of security which such an Insurance gives w those dependent upon their own jabor for support 1* ♦worth more than money. No better or more satisfac tory use can be made of so small a sum. 7 J. G BATTBBSQN, President. RODNEY DENNIS. Secretary. G. F. DAVIS, Vise President HENRY A. DYER, General Agent. Applications received and Policies issued by WILLIAM W ALLEN, mhia-mwfrSm No. 40* WALNUT Street H, JAMES, (Pormerlyof rhil.dfjphis,) ATTORNEY AT LAW, FRANKLIN} VENANGO COUNTY, PKMKA. attention given to the examination of Titles. FHxnanm.lrHXA Gha*. B, Lex, Ssq., •on J. lions Snowden. Jaioec R Little, Ssq., T, T, •'ssker, Bc.ubrifivt, A Co.. J. 2. DeH&ven, * resident 7th National Btnh. mhj ASI T JEL, W- HOIWMAK, ATTOBNHT Vs/sXLShT YSSAWeS^OBJm?S , ESffA. flat* of Philadelphia. > SBYBBB 70 SBmrlea S )-Mc. Sw., , B. it W. O. 5!«.!e & Oa. 3. 0. Kalzht 4 Co., Br. B, 8. K»ok»i»t*. Jmhiw il. tiiiu, I W. H. To.ton & o®, ’nhE-ifcn fOBHUA T. OWEN, ATTORNEY, ' OOOKBBLLOK AT LAW, AJSD SOLHOTO* 01 CURT AIM GOODS. [ X. WALKAY-BN, MASONIC HAIiI4 719 CHESTNUT STRUCT, BAS OPENED BIS SPBI N Gt STOCK WINDOW SHADES, OJ JMTIMLY nw DKIGKK tACE CTIKTAINB. or nw AMD RICH FAHKBKS. NOTTINGHAM CURTAINS, IXTSXDKD MPBOULLI TOE SLEKFUKJ lOOKB. BELOW GOXa> 1026 CHBBTHCT STRBBT * 1026. CURTAII STORE. CURTAINS, CORNICES, AND SHADES. o. M. STOUT A GO., f.ie-fmwf ULK & PRY GOOD 8 JOBBERS JAMBS, KENT, SANTEE, & CO., IMPORTERS AND JOBBERS DBY GOODS. Nos. 239 «ttd 241 Norths Ttslrd street, PHILADELPHIA. Clcth., Prists, Casilmens. Delates., Sattinets, Alpacas. Jems, Fancy Drsss (foods. „ Cottonodes. Brown sna sheeHanii, Denims. Brown and BloactasA SnlftlUgß, Stripes, Orai-h Ohambras. Check*, Omteh Tweeds* Girihsm*, Flannels, Haver*, Linens, FUBNISHING GOODS. fegg.3m WHITE GOOPg, SOTIOMS, Sts ■ be. REMOVALS. MADAME ADOLPH HAS REMOVED ±vJL t 0 419 north BLEVafITH Street, aboTe Callow hlU._ • • * mylfi-ot* JJEMOYAL. WILLIAM YABSALL Has Eemored from Ho. 1030 to JfO 1339 OHBST NUT fctreel, 8. B. earner Of THIRTBBUTfI street "Where he Invites the attention of hoawkeeper* and those cosmeneint housekeeping, te his extensive as sortment of useful HOCBB FUBBISHFTO GOODS, Superior Refrigerator*, Table Cutlery, FamllyHard- V*re. Oblldren’s Carriages* &«■ ap24 im COPARTNERSHIPS. THE FIRM OF ADAMS & LEVIS IS A thlt day dissolved by matral onnst at. ..... Tb* bnsliKss of the late firm will be settled by CUfKLIH, LEVIS, & CO., who will continue she ba staess as heretofore. TMODO iE AD 4MS. thVieTflm 1 . 11 "*“* " rO TTfIODOSI M.‘° The undersigned have this day formed a copartner ship for a General Ban»tng and Brokerage Business, under the Btyieof COKKLiD. LBVIS, St CO., at the Old Stand, Mo. 305 CBSSTStIT Sweat, Philadelphia. B. K- COSKIu Vi , GBOBGBH LBVIS. Philadelphia. May 18. 1835 my 19 6t PROPOSALS. Notice.— sealed proposals, endorred “PBOPOSaL^FOE FORHISSTHG TBB PUBLIC SCHOOLS WITH LEHIGH OB 30HULKILL COAL,” v*ill bn received by the undersigned, at the Controllers* Office, southeast corner of MXTH and ADBLPHI Streets, until TtJBSDAI, June 0,1855, at 13 ° The Proposals \rhieh will inc’nde the storage of th« Coal, man b 3 for separate Districts, ae follows: First PisTKicT*-ijonipTi&inctbe First, Second, Third, Founh. end'i wenty tixlh wards * , feicoND Dibteict— Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Third District— Sixth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth wards. _ ' . Fourth Dib-jkict—Teeth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twentieth Fjsth District—Sixteenth, Seventeenth,Eighteenth, and hiee’Penth WOTdB. Sixth DISTRICT-Twenty-firet ward. Seventh District—Tweniy'*ocond word. Ejohtj? District—Twenty- third waid. Ninth District— Twenty-fonith ward* Tenth District— I Twenty-fifth ward. There wiU be two sizes required, Egg ana Stove, and the ton to be 2.250 pounds. „ , . * 4 4 Each and every ton of said coal shall be weighed a! the place of delivery, In the pretence of a proper tot* son, to be deputed by each Sectional Board as veighe; (subject to the approval of the President of this Bow£L. who shall keep an accurate.account o Ye Street approved for such coal, nn- Irb* an affidavit of the weigher Bhail accompany such ton, »ettsxiff forth by what contractor the coal was de> live red, the date of delivery of each loac, the number of tone, and the quantity of coal delivered,and whether Weighed at thepittca of delivery. ” Piopoealswill be received at the same time for the CHARCOAL and KINDLING WOOD that may he required. By order of the Committee on Supplies. HENRT W. HaLLIWBLL, myl3 «nwilt Secretaiy Oontaoiieia Public Schools. JfREBH BEEF AND VEGETABLES. Saw Detabthbnt, Bureau of Provisions and Clothin#, Hay 20, 1865. SEALED PROPOSALS, endorsed '* Proposals for Freeh Beef and Vegetables, 11 will be received at this Bureau until 2 o’clock P. tf., on the sixth day of June next for tie supply of 60,C00 pounds of Froth Beef and 60,C00 pounds of Fresh Vegetables, at the Philadelphia Navy laid and Station, as required. The Beef and Vegetables must he of good quality, and the best, the market affords, and each article must be offered for by the pound. The Beef to be in equal proportions, fore ana bind quarters. Bonds with approved sfcnrlly, will be required in one i alf the eitlmitad amount of the contract, and twenty per cent, in addition will be withheld from the amount of each payment to he made, as collateral secu rity for the due performance of tee contract, which Will, on no aocount, be paid until it ie fully complied with. Every offer made must be accompanied by a written guaranty, signed by one or more responsible persona, that the Didder or bidders will, if his or their bid be accepted, enter irto an obligation within five days, with good ana sufficient sureties, to furnish the articles pro posed. Ho proposal will be considered unless accompanied by such guarantee, and by satisfactory evidenoa that the bidder is a regular dealer in the articles proposed and has the license required by law. The Department reserves the right to reject any pro* po»ai »ot considered advantageous to the Government*. hitS* iQfc • LE6AI.. jj^OTICE.—SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, At an Orphans’Court held at Pottsvllle. in 5 _ j, 1 and for &ala county, on Samrd *y, the 11th a»y nbl l fl cutlery, scis sors* housekeeping articles, and many othec.desfrabie goods, •%” K JSP The goods wlJl bo *OJd in lot* adapted to city And country retail trade. Also, the iood-wIU, eheivinK, counters, and other store fixtures. ■ my!9 fit PHILIP FORD & 00., AUCTIONEERS, X ME MARKET and 68» COMMERCE Streets. LABOR BALE OF 1.300 CJBBB BOOTS AND SHOES. We will sell by cat&loene. for cash, 0I» TfIOBSDAY MORBIJO, Hay 25tfa- comouiccic* at in o'clock, 1,300 ctsee men’s, boys', and youths’ boots, shoes, brogann, balmorals, gaiters, t’xford tits, &c., with a large assortment for inlimm millulil ilren’s wear, PANCOAST & WABNOCK, AUC A TIOFESHfi, »4G MARKET Street LARGE FORITIYB SAT.U OF 800 L*TB AMERICAN AWDIWPORTRDDBt GOODS, «IC,hI»BKTOOOD3, RIBBOB g. BOSIhRY GOOD@» EMBROIDERIES, Ac.. &t -‘ ntMoga %m S u o Hmm. ~ , n May 24. commencing at 10 o’clock, comprising a fall and general assortment of freeh and desirable goods, »uit lo l l ’ l r |gQj f g i! |Jf l) iriLLiNURY aooj>a. Included In onr sale this morning—- __ Dew spring colors bonnet and trlmroicg ribbons, Hob. 4@fio; bugle anditnoy trimmings, drees.battons, oim* meats, Ac. Also. 2CO cases Parti artificial flowers. Also, bonnes silks, mslinea, nets, laces, tailetons, Ae.. f c Also, drees goods* domestics, alpacas, linen goods, &< LIH£R CAMB HI)KFS. AKD HOSIERY QOOD3. Also, ladle?’ and gents' L. G. bdfs , lluea towels, Faris lece veils, embroideries, ladies* and gents ho fiery, glovM. &g., Ac . ' ... Also, a full line of gents' nsw-style silk ties, butter fly ties, ana Ac . &c _ Hoop. SKIRTS, 00R3B T S, AND JSOTIOKS. Also, 500 dozen ladies' and xxiU««s* hoop-skirts, or best xnftkes. Also, 2CO dozen ladies' mechanical whalebone corsets. Also, notions, spool cotton, pact nt thread, sewing silk- pocket wallets, table cntlrry, stock good*, A*.»&c. LARGS SPECIAL SALS OF 350 GASES STRAW GOODS BY CATALOGUE, OR FRIDAY, May 26, cowmenc’ns at 10 o’clock, comprising a full line of latest shapes bonnets and hats for ladles, misses, and children. _ _ MBIT'S AND BOY4’ HATS. 300 cases latest drift? men's and bays' straw, Leg horn, and fancy braid hats. BfcCOTT, Jb m AUCTIONEER, • 1090 OHBSTEUT Street MB. JOS. RIGHARDSOB’S PEREMPTORY SALE OF VALUABLE lOKBIOW AHD AstfiSICAE OIL PAIKTIEGS, Mostly purchased bv him from the artists direst, coni' x>rlsing2?6 specimens Of a great variety of yUartne sub. justs ot high art. among which are the works «f Henil* >tta Bonner. Broadecaan, George G»le, Von Leiben, Comßß. Ds Brackleaer, Merle, uarrabeln, 0 Boon, blOney Percy. Kjonsemau, Plumet, btrobel, Williams, De Vogel. A J Hoovvnball. Wiliens, Kock-Kock, Han* rent de Beni. Andrews. Guido Sohmltt, Hulk, A VU l»*ns, Paul Webar, J Hamilton. B Moran, BoAlngUn, Van Bam me. Woutermartens, BonleUe, De Beni, Jr, J Peel. This collection of fine Paintings will hare to be care fully examined to be appreciated, as they have been collected wltn great care. They will a)l be sold positive ly without reserve Ihe sale will lake place at ’ SOGTT’S ART GALLbRY, (Diiectly opposite the Penn*ylvanla Academy of Tine Arts,) ' Ojf TBB BVESIHGS OF TBORBDAY, 26th, FRIDAY, 261 h« and SATURDAY, 37tn May, At half past 7 o'clock- , The Paintings are now on exhibition, with dSWnp live Catalogues. Open Day and Evening until night* of wl«- • BHIPPXN6. BOSTON AND FHILADBL* tfsjiTiii iwMli PHI A STEAMSHIP LIES, sailing port on SATURDAYS.' from flrrt wharf above PLSI Strcot, Philadelphia, asd Long Wharf, Boston. The steamship NORWAY, Cant. Baker, wIU ss& from Philadelphia for Boston, on eatordsy. May 27, si 10 A M., and steamship SAKOD, Gap*.Matthews* from Boston for Philadelphia, on the s&mo day at 4 P, M. These new and substantial ste&xushspa form a ieg«3»< line, sailing from eaeh port punctually on Saturdays. Insurances attested at ona-haif the premium ekaigeif on the vessels. Freights taken at fair rate*. Shippers are requited to send Blip Receipts and 9UL of Lading with their goods. For Freight orFuiage (havine.fine Apply to BftBRY WIYSOR&OO., mhVtf 883 South DELAWARE Aveaua. STEAM WEEKLY TO LI VSSPOOL. touching vt QUSBBTSTOWK (Uerk Harbor). Tha well known Stdamera of the Livet yool, Rew York and Philadelphia Steamship Compa ny (lnman Line), carrying the united an Intended to sail as follows; _ - And *v«nr moceding Saiorday at Moon, from Pier 44 korth River. „ ■ . RATES OF PASSAGE? Favable in Gold, orlts equivalent in Gurreuy. First Cabin**...sBB 00 Steerage (H to Ifondon.B6 00; * * to London.. 34 ff " toFart*..««.. 06 00 j to Part*”, 8 S toHambnr, ... 90 00 to Hamburg 81 ft Fuusien fotwitro.4 to Havr., Bremsn, Sot ter dam, Antwerp, 2t>.. ,t egaall. low nt... ./are* Irojn Elyerpool or Qn..o.town: Ist Cabin, {K 9SS, fioo. ixnn from LlTen>ool or Qnooaitowx, 9H *k«« ? ho ?'"■> to sond for Ui«lr fri«sd> »»n i&f ticket, ler« at then rates. for further Information applr at fh* OfflMfc JOHIT 0. DALE, Aaent, m>J3-tj«10 111 PfALgUT Stre.t, fill. £l*o NEW EXPRESS LINE, TO •HOHi ALEXANDRIA, QgOEQBTO WJf, AR, WAbHINGTOR, Yia Cben&pe&ke end Delaware 6uuL Steuneralesye flnt Wharf above MARKET Strati every WBDRSSDAY and SATURDAY, at JS 3. For Freight apply to Agenta, WM. P. CLYDE * 00,, 14 Forth and South Wbarve«,Phila. B. DATIBSO* Georgetown.D.o.; FLOWERS & BOWER, Alexandria. V»- mhU-tet —»«—A. NOTICE .—FOR NEW iBII'MiBIIB TORK.-The PHILADELPHIA ARE RBW YOkK.EXPRESS STBAMBOAT COMPART. Tit Delaware and Raritan Canal. Steam era leave DAILY, Brit wharf halow MAEKYI Street, at 10'do.kP, M. WM. P. CLYDE* CO., US. WHAKVHB.PhII*. _ JAMBS HARD. 117 WALL Street, eihia.Bn - ■ Hew Tor, J)ALTON’B FAMILY ARD MARUFAOTDRIRa KNITTING- MACHINES, Patented 1861. Perfected 18M. A YARD OF PLAIR OB BIBBBD WORK KNIT IH TEH MINUTES I KBITS UPWARDS OF TWENTY DIFFERENT ARTI CLES OF APPAREL 1 They are ilmple, rellaHe. perfeet, and wonderful In the amount and variety of work they perform USUAL SFEBD SIX THOUSAND STITCHES PER MIhUTB. It oan be made, in the hande of a woman, to earn with eaae and comfort SlO to S4O per week. EVERI FAMILY SHOULD HAVE ONE. A few active, enterprising Arente wanted, to Whom llberatlndnoemente will be (Iren. To pnbiishera of newspapers who will par one-hair money, we will allow the remainder to he paid in advertising at the reaolar ratea. Send for circular and camples, enclosing stamp. , General Agency lor Pennevlyanla, Ohio, Western New York, Virginia. Weet Virginia, and Maryland, No ay »:FTH street, Pittsburg, Pa mydlrn s e. carpenter. f>UXTBRFIELD r 8 t> OVBBLAND DBBPATGH. Office, Vo. t VK B? Street, Vow York. Offlse, No. 40 South FIFTH Street, Philada. rfHAUBCSY VIBBBaBD. Prasidant. W. E. KITCHEN, Treasurer. This Company, now fn.Ur organized, with ample sapital, owns Its Transportation os the Plains, and is propare:? to contrast Frolcht to all points In Colorado, iJttn, Idaho, Montana, fie w Mexico. and Arison* Ter ritories; also to Eeese riven Nevada. Through Contracts and Bills of Lading given from New York, Bouton, rhUa&BlpMa, l Pitt»bttTf, Whee Ling, OlnelKUiU, GfeltAfo* and si. Louis. WH. MARTIN, Agent, mew York. WM H. MOORE. Ro. #0 Sonth K»V. tr MS|i| 1 £g ta aylQ- tf general Superintendent. J SOMERSET, 581 CHESTNUT • Btroet> Engraver and Dealer in Army Corps Badges. Emblems, Fire Badges, and marks of every description Koldiere returning Dome will find it ad vantageous to possess as a memorial one, of my fine goid or silver Badges. Gendina 10 karat gold Corps Bings always enhand. All goods warranted. mylo lm TXBLMBOLD'S EXTRACT OF BAR. JCX SAPAEILLA cleanses and renovates the blood, instils the vigor of health into the *y«em. and purges out the humor* tha* make disease. pOTTON AND FLAX BAIL DUCK Aj ARD CANVAS of all numbers and brands. Tout Awning,Trank, and Wann-oover Dnok. Also, Paper Manufacturers’ Drier Felte. from one to lye foot wide* Pinlina. Bolting Bail Tiria*. &e wioe. raanuo, w EVSBMIH S CO , BOS-a Ro, 103 JONES’ Alley. tIBLMBOLD’S EXTRACT BUCHC A-A ,i T . a health and vigor to th, frame and bloom t« the pallid ehcek. Debility it accompanied by man* alarmlni eymptoais, and lino treatment ie eabnalttei to. ronenmntlon. tneanltv ov enllentl. Etc enene n He GABDBN & CO., NOS. 600 AND 603 MARKET Street, Manufacturer* of and Wholes&lo Dealers In HATS, GAPS. FDSS, BONNETS, B7BA* GOODS, ARTIFICIALFLOWED, ROOHBB. Ac t «o. The largest and most complete stock, and the hfßt terns. Country Merchants and the Trade sup- rotl-3m jOBWARE OP COUNTERFEITS AND ** UNPRINCIPLED DEALERS endeavoring to dis pose ofihelr own and other preparations, on the vspu* »tion attained by GENUINE FRRPA KATOHSr PHILADELPHIA SUB BAHDAOB INSTIDUTB, Ro. 1* R. NINTH Street, abeve Market —E. 0. EVERETT, alter thirty years’ practical experience, gnaanteea the skilfnl adlnstment of his Premium Pa tent Graduating Pres,art Truce, Supporters, Elsatli Btoeklnge, Shoulder Braeea, Orntohee, Ac. Ladle,' apartment! conducted by e Lady. apl3-ly MONEY TO ANY AMOUNT (-1 LOANED UP3R DIAMONDS, .WATCHES, 6 »WELRYjPLAm CLOTHIRO. A,..at old established loam offiob, Gomel TfilßD and GABKU/L fits., below Lombard* ap3B«a» » EVANS « WATSON’S S TOtt LI,aTO, ® BA ' , ** IraiEADBLPHIA, B fiI BBT- A large variety of ms-FROOF SAFES slwayc hand. MBMSL MALCOLM MACNEILL’S *LJ BPROTACLE STORE. IHo. SIC Solti: FIFTH Stmt, hel^wsgr^ SW Glaeeea reltud to cult all agee, utd all mannar oi repairing eareftilly and promptly attended to. miu-bt gesaj 3E@'X'3B3Y v @i’ _ fTBr COTTAGE ORGANS 'sWffi^S^?SaKfl?SftosS2 Se a »d fc Driiwfii , . Ro. II Worth fto AUCTION SAl&s, JOHN B. MYBRB & CO., v EBBS, In. »3a i>3* mahkrv gVHW j LAHOK POSmV* SALE or BRITISH bJT |1 _ OEBMAH, AHJ> miMK«TIO DAT o6nr? e »ir WewUlhold * large Ml. of Foreign end rV [/ ' | t£b,'Z£*»* “ • WBd ‘* .OH THTJBSDAt MORBIIg '| attention of de»ler». n ' 10<,tt<,Il8 ’ of the same will be arm* . *• £Fu n t?v a * ? » •»**l«Kne*4 early on th**!?* 1,1 4 «JJe rf when dealer. will fini it to ttoU LABOH HALE OF »o« * *» *. J . , v DOMEVTICii. 1 —M«t brown and blotch*! mnaltnt and d,n, -baleewool, Canton, Domet, tad m.hil-fr . plaidt. B6 * DCy F*^ lB * Manchester —eaeee Hentnckr j«an», coltonader, . —Mceebluedenime. tick., stripes, and ci-’,,.'• catee cambrics, Blletlaa, paver ran.li, , —cases satin. a. meltons, tweeds, easslmers, ~ _ MEBCBaHT TAILORS’ 000 js ‘ 4 ‘ ynuitnea cloths, oottlnaa. mu tone, doeskins a, Poll L.„ Itafcaa. satin de.Hnes. vesting hhVrMn p^' t^ r f rD< ’ 151 Bsrnslej ltnen eheetinas, ds ra , 4 ESJ DRESS BILKS. Pisces ante do Shires,taffetas, trosisain. .... ronlt de so.es, grosde Kapies e.dridM. fan”,-’'..Jv, LABGE SPECIAL SALE OF FASHtOFARt HADg CLOTrIUjG * ,B “ S bill „ „ OH FhIUAT MOKMRo MaiM, will he aold, withoutrsao.ve a,.., , on fonr rgmths' credit, at 10 o’clock, er .y,'C c .V' "’*k ot ready-made summer clothing, mi,,,.?;,, ’ eL u, sarletTof ma f >n„ itSltf bo, “’ Wa,,k “ a f " w »„ frJKafff 1 ~05', ’ “** “ 4 tnn Men’s and boys’ drap d’6t6 and c&Sßlmera a.., fty,. T animation, with catalogues, oarlv oa tb* moaiu,..; the sale* when dealers will find it to their ii t (s ; „ 1 v attend. LARGE POSITIVE SALE OF BOOTS, SHOES. Rv; l WM aOODIi * May SOth, at 10 o'clock* will he aoto, fay cuticm on fonr months credit aooat 1,200 huVJ •faces, farogant,Ac,,embracing apriij eand >r«*faa>iv meat of seasonable goods of city and Ertes, by dii.'i; Davis, ACo .and others, three flneFreroh pUtf niv tie and pie,- mirrors, hind some Brussels and others pete, beds, bedding, k<3. VALUABLE LAV LIBRARY. ON TBUBhDAY AND FRIDAY AFTERNOON, May 25 Xo«*^4BT?. TTPWA.HDB OF TmRTTTTHOTSA^ nrllllMtM u< moaunndkton % j ,’T rmlvik,jlUftlu th* meriUof aBLMIHJJjI' * itomb bht (h# hSgbwi hou£*#m» bislitunc gyam. tonraow. lUU hditt. *»• ■ARB. AMMOHIA—CASKsTfS® O, J per ••Kblne,” bond or duty paid. BEtrQAL omOER-2Cobaj« prime. ~ v„rt- BfNGAL TUBHBAIC Mtwwtnow dueser Atpß. ** efilitil" BAD JALAP—“Vera Croz," to attlvo “" U M “Propontl*,” at tbit port. ImE® r i? d M n wTLSdS' myao.dt mrautgj!!^ ■C'OB HON-RETENTION OR XV nimroß of urine, irritation, la«»»S of uleeratlon of the bladder or kldueps, dj4W*®f proeute glandi* stone In the bladder* **}*!£* hie'Hifl or hrtek-dust deposit, and all diseases of 8 ENFEEBLED AND DBIiIOAT® BTITUTIOS'd, of both attet, .=“* BXTIiAOT BTTOF.S. It wIU liM !«*■* •"* . haltam »»d anaSle won to rtaabwi- r - g T)RJtSEST GOLD PSctt; A PITCHERS, Walters. Oobleto, and “unKj. , tf-M*”*- mas oatflJg*jj; D‘BLMBOLD'*B FLUID BS.WA‘J ( TBW>B,-A Swartor mhlB. If 157 Md 198 *BlB® S '