He would Hot encroach upon the timeof the
House by protradling the debute,which had alrea
dy swelled to an immoderate extent. Upon the
whole, he said that this was a great queition,
wherein attention ftiould be paid to the people,
and a strict eye kept towards the public good,
divetted of prejudice ; but he had heard with
pain how much had been said to divert the Houle
an attention to fractions, from the true ob
ject of general welfare—yet-he hoped that the
government would be equally administered—that
none of those predictions or threats thrown out
in the course of the debate, that 110 mutilation of
the union, would take place ; but on the contra
ry, that harmony would guide the decilion ol
this ( queftion, free from every local considerati
on.
Mr. Hillhoufe.—lt lias often been said this go
vernment is a government of confidence—an<l tak
ing this for granted, can it ever be supposed that
a plan of repiefentation, which is unequal and
unjust, can excite this confidence. This ratio of
30,000 throws an additional weight of 7 repreien
tatives into the fcalc of the large states. If this
principle can be established on this occasion, it
may be also extended to taxation. Notthern and
southern interests have been mentioned—he was
sorry the idea had ever been suggested—but as it
had, there was 110 impropiiety in adverting to it
let a line then be drawn at any given place,
and a ratio established which will do equal jus
tice to the members on both fides of that line—a
repiefentation that will deviate from such a prin
ciple, it cannot be expeifted, will give fatisfatlion
or be chearfully fubuiiued to by the people.—
The ratio of 35,000, figures will (hew it, will
give a more equal repiefentation than that of
30,000, —and there has not, aijd, in his opinion,
lie said, could not be any good reason alligued
■why it ftiould not be adopted.
Mr. Boudinot said he was pleased when gen
tlemen were desirous of appealing to candid and
fair argument, in determining important quefti
ons.—ln the present cafe, he thought there was
propriety in examining the principles of the bill
and amendment, by the terms of the constitution
—It had been said by gentlemen, that the ratio,
when adopted, must be applied to the number of
citizens in the individual states, and that no re
gard was to be paid to the fractions occasioned
thereby, because not regarded by the conllituti
on—This he thought, was no means conclu
live.—The House of Representatives was to con
sist of members'chofen every second year, by she
people of the several states—these members not
to exceed the proportion of one to 30,000. —It
appeared to him that the whole number of repre
sentatives, to be chosen by the whole people of
the union, was the fubjeift contemplated by the
constitution ; as eonftituting this branch of the
legislature, while by another part of the confti
tu;ion, it becomes the duty of Congress, t» appor
tim them when so afcertained,among the several
states in proportion to their refpediive numbers—
As an instance, suppose for arguments fake, the
aggregate number of the citizens of the United
States, to be exactly three millions, by applping
the ratio of 30,000, the constitutional number of
this House would be found 100 —Congress fliould
then proceed to apptrtio?i (for he could apply no
other meaning to the word) the too members a
mong the States, as their rcfpecftive numbers bore
a proportion to the whole number of three milli
ons—Thus the representatives from every state
would bear an exatft proportion to each other,
according to the number of inhabitants in the
state ; and the whole repi efentation would stand"
on principles of perfect equality. An equal re
presentation appears to have been the desirable
objetft of the framers of the constitution—it is the
very spirit of our government. He infilled that
this was the only mode of applying the ratio,and
making the apportionment that would hold good
at all times, and under all circumstances. hcan
not be said with propriety, that the constitution
does not proceed on principles of perfect equali
ty in this House, yet if the ratio be applied to
the numbers in the individual states, it will al
ways produce (as has been fully ihewn by seve
ral gentlemen) very great inequality, by large
fractions being unavoidable—in one state we now
find one upwards of 29,000. He acknowledged
the amendment did not proceed 011 this prin
ciple any more than the bill, for which rea
foil he fully approved of neither, but as the ratio
of 33,000 in the amendment produced a much
greater equality, and came in efFecft nearer to his
principle,.(by reducing the fractions made by
the bill nearly two thirds) he should prefer it,
as he must vote for the one or the other.
It had been (aid that they were making distinc
tions between the north and the fonth—between
the large and finall states—He observed in an
swer, that if gentlemen would introduce princi
pies of inequality, that bore unconstitutionally
hard on individual states, they ought not* to take
it amiss, that the fuffering states would complain
of the injustice—The injured must complain,and
the fault, if any, lies with the firft trainers of
the principle.
If gentlemen wiflied for equality, let them ad-
here to the principles of the constitution. Ap
ply the ratio to the whjle number ot citizens, by
which you find the number of representatives to
constitute this House, and then apportion those
representatives among the individual' Rates ac
cording to their refpeiftive numbers.
When gentlemen advert to the Senate, and
fay that the equal representation ot the final!
states there, (hould be taken into the account,
they do not consider the relative situation of the
states as reprefentcd in that House—there the lo
vereignty of eacli state is represented, and not
the individual citizen—sovereignty is perfectly
equal in every state—As sovereigns there are no
great or (inall, and if his information had been
right, it was on that principle that the Senate
was originally constituted, but that House was a
representative of every individual citizen. On
the whole, he was of opinion that by agreeingto
the amendment of the Senate, they would secure
the great principle of equality better than by the
bill.
Mr. Boudinot thought the construction he had
given the constitution was a true one—lt support
ed the spirit of (the confederation between the
states, which was on the footing of perfedt equa
lity in proportion to numbers—lt coincided with
the Ipirit of our government, which was equality
—And although by it, the number of members
constituting the House was firft ascertained from
the whole people aggregately considered, with
out refpedt to the division of states, in their poli
tical capacity, yet by the after apportionment a
mong the refpeiftive states in that capacity, the
wisdom of the constitution appealed in thus pro
viding a general government for general purpos
es, and at the fame time making each individual
state (as a state) eflential to the exiltence of that
government, thereby preventing in the nioft ef
fectual manner an unneceflary entire consolida
tion of the union. Mr. B. said he had originally
objected to the bill on account of a toa numerous
and expensive representation, as well as of an
unequal one, but chiefly relied on the last as un
constitutional, and therefore should (till prefer a
1 concurrence with the Senate.
Mr. Gerry observed, that it had been fafhiona
ble to speak of the ratio of 30,000 as a federal
number ; he did not know what name to give to
the amendment of the Senate, unless it were call
ed the fractional number. He then took notice
of an argument which had been used to create
suspicion, that was danger to be apprehend
ed from a combination of the larger Hates ; but
this would appear a weak argument when it was
confidere'd that the power and influence of the
smaller dates are equal in the Senate to ihofe of
the greater ltates—the thing is impossible, and if
attempted it could not succeed.
He wiflied to know whether it was the opinion
of gentlemen, that there was less judgment and
less firmnefs in the House of Representatives than
in the Senate ? He hoped an equipoise would be
preserved in the two branches, and that the ba
lance would not be destroyed by conllantly giv
ing up the judgment of the House to every whim
of the Senate. If a latitnde be now admitted,
that we lyay increase the ratio, before the expi
ration of the firft ten years, the gentlemen in fa
vor of the Senate's amendment may infill on a
ratio of 50, or 60,000 ; but this is ground they
know they cannot yet touch upon ; and the fame
reason that (hould prevent us from adopting this
extreme, operates against the amendment. The
whole expence of Congress, from adopting the
ratio in the bill, will not amount to two cents up
on each citizen of the United States annually,and
as population encreafes it will be lessened, Sure
ly the gentlemen in favor of the amendment can
not obje<S to this trifling expence. They speak
of a liberal policy ; 1 wish they would (hew us an
example by agreeing to the bill with a better
grace than they seem to have exhibited hitherto.
Mr. Murray. The fubjecfl has gone through a
very ample difcufiion. When the question of re
presentation firft came on, the theory of the go
vernment was ably resorted toby those who urg
ed a large representation. Sir, I most heartily
agreed in the principle on which by a large ma
jority this House made 30,000 the ratio. As I still
am of that opinion, I (hall be indulged by this
House while I give my reasons for adhering with
a firmnefs which may be deemed by some tenaci
oufnefs, to a rejection of the amendment of the
Senate.
I voted for 30,000 because I saw in that ratio
the constitutional wishes and expectations of the
people. I deemed the largest possible ratio al_
lowed by the constitution to he the source of na
tional government, and its bell security, "No
thing, fir, which I have yet heard has convinced
ine to the contrary. It is unnecellary to recapi
tulate whatever has been said 011 this point. I
inuft remark, however, that during the difcuilion,
the members of this House who suggested that
principle appeared to me to be convinced. They
seemed to be matters of their own opinions, and
to agree in this idea, without adverting to the
dodirine of fractions, that the sole question was
a point of theory rather than a meal'ure of ex
pedience ; and they decided by a very large nia
290
jority, that in this House, immediately warm
from the very bosom of the people, the ratio ot
30,000 was theoretically correct and practically
ulefiil. The bill was lent up to the Senate, who
returned it with an amendment of 13,000 as the
ratio. 1 voted against that amendment, because
it was an attack upon the principle of an enlarg
ed representation ; and because the idea of frac
tional representation aimed at by the amend
ment, was but a commutation of the evil of frac
tions from one State to another, from the eastern
on the southern j and contained a fuj'tender ot
the principle without an of conve
nience.
Sir, it has been in the 'course of debate
foretold, that that honorable body would be a -
verse to an enlarged representation here. What
ever has been augured, has been verified by ex
perience ; nor can any nun be at a lols to lee
that the temper against large representation,
though not openly avowed, for t-hat would have
been impolitic, has been covertly and luccefsful
ly exerted under the semblance of 1 -quality of re
presentation, by this doiftrine of fractions, it
was sent down into this House in the form ot
jealousy and ful'picion—and it has produced its
effeifts. It has roused the latent and local inter
ests from their plans, and we have had debates
entirely conftrudted 011 the tenets of northern
and southern interests and influence.
A proposition was made by a member from
New-York, ( Mr. Benfon ) and reiterated by
the gentleman from Delaware. The object ot
rhis proposition was to sum up the fractions, and
from the aggregate take seven .members. Sir, if
1 was furprilied, I confefs I was deligliied to fee
men who a few days before had opposed in the
ory the idea of a large representation, come down
with moderation, and fugged this great princi
ple even in a bad form. 1 imagined they were
converted. I voted aj>aind this proposition, be
cause 1 thought it, firft, unconstitutional, inaf
mucb as it could have been contemplated but in
the consolidation of dates ; and because I tho't
it contained a solecism in politics. 1 deemed it
unconditional, as the conditution calls for a
representation of the people of the rtfpsßive
states in a ratio of 30,000 ; and if this had ob
tained it was to be done by collecting the frag
ments of condiments from dates widely separate,
and giving a representation of their fractions
thus divided to that date which had the largest
fraction. Thus, fir, the two from Delaware
would be chosen by less than the condiiution
contemplates, as there are not 60,000; and it is
in vain to fay that the member chosen by 25,000
is elected by the addition of 5,000 in any other
date in order to complete his proper number of
condituents, for they do not eltß him : and if it
be laid that he nevertheless does repiefent them
as his condituents, it can only be by the idea of
a consolidation having pre-exided, which no man
has yet openly averred to be the doctrine on this
subject. The very, firft and mod intelligible
principle of representation in government is that
the representative is rcfponfible to his conditu
ents ; bur, fir, this, though an abdract truth,
mud be shown to the people not in a fiction, but
in a solid and practical mode, congenial with
their habits,and palpable to their underdandings.
In the adoption of this extraordinary proposi
tion, the idea of virtual representation is the on
ly one which at all protects it. No man, howe
ver, who knows the country, will tamper and
trifle with so solid a part of government as that
of actual representation and actual responsibility.
I never, fir, could consent to commute a known
and practical meal'ure of good, for a flimfy (pe
culation which could only have been invented to
serve particular views, and was never thought of
till it was difcovcred in what manner the fracti
ons would affect particular dates.
For these reasons, Sir, I voted against that pro
pofitioti. I (hall now vote against the amend
ment of the Senate, because 1 find no cute, but
a partial one, for the inconvenience of fractions ;
and even this is to be obtained at the expence of
principle. Though this amendment may gratify
some States, as New-Jersey, that may have large
fractions, it throws off the evil from them on
other Slates. The fracftion of Maflachufetts may
be (mailer, but the State of Maryland loses a
member and will have a large fraction. Sir, I
can find nothing in this amendment but the de
sign to accomplish what I humbly conceive an
uuwholefome end by improper means, and (hall
therefore vote against the proposed amendment.
(to be continued.)
WEDNESDAY, January 4,
Several petitions for compensations, pensions,
&c. were read and referred to the Secretary of
War.
Mr. Lawrance from the committee to whom
was referred the petitition of Brigadier-General
Jofiah Harmar, in behalf of himfelf and a num
of other conuuillioned nfficers, praying an aug
mentation of their ]>ay, made a report in favor
of the petitioners, which was read and laid on
the table.