which money flowed j nto thetreafnry—how that
money was applied—under what antbority, and
to enquire at different times what balance actual
ly remained in the treasury. This he conceived
could be(t be done by appointing a committee
periodically to examine the books of the Trea
su rer, fee what balance appeared on the facc of
them, and enquire whether that balance was re
ajly in the treafurj'
He mentioned the practice of the former Con
gtefs to appoint four committees to infpeift the
operations of the four departments under them.
These departments, he observed, however, now
belonged more to the executive ; but Hill as the
i eprelcntatives were by the conffitution, made
the guardians of the public money, they had a
right and it was their dnty to infpcdt the opera
tions of the treasury department. This light
could not be conveniently exercised, in liis opi
nion, by the whole body, but fhouldby a detach
ment from it who would report the neceflary in
formation. This mode of proceeding wasufual,
—he inflanced the practice of the Britifii Honfe
of Commons, and of several Hate legislatures.
Even if these enquiries procured no more infor
mation than was obtained by means of reports
from the different officers ofgovernment, yet be
ing made by the immediate representatives of
the people they would give more fatisfaiftion.
So far as it was tifeful to afcertaiu the real ba
lance in the treasury, so far these periodical com
mittees would be of the firft utility. A queftiou
aro<e, whether the progress of the bill before the
committee fiiould be flopped t'l make those en
quiries, or whether it should be fuftered to goon,
on the supposition that all was right. He wiih
ed the proper regulations on this fubjeifl fettled,
as Handing regulations, and to be adopted before
any idea of their necelfity should arise from sus
picious circumftnnces.
Mr. Lawrance wilhed to proceed in the bill as
far as the information already in the pofleffion
of the House would carry them.
,Mr\ Gerry made some observations to (how that
acc&mits i'rom the trea(Wy could never give the
information wanted—they generally stated Turns
of,money paid to individuals, without mention
of particular,objetfVs to which they were meant
to be applied. This was a favorable opportuni
ty. he-ohferyed, to eftabiiih some fuc'i regulati
ons as were contemplated by me' ioe " s ~ O-uv nflS.
cers have and deserve the ci'lidence of the peo
ple ;—it would be too l<> ce t0 attempt to make
those regulations when there were reafotis for
suspicions, the influence of fufpec r ted officers
■would be exerted to oppose therrr,
Some further remarks were made by . MeUVs.
Baldwin, Giles, and Fitzfimons, after which the
question was put, and the committee rose to fit
again.
TUESDAY, December 6
IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.
On the Pojl-Office Bill.
Mr. Sedgwick moved to strike ont all that
clause which delignated the roads and toinfert,
instead thereof, rhefe words, " by such route, as
the President of the United States Jhall, frotn time to
time, cause It be eflablijhed."
It had appeared, he said, co be the fenfeof the
House, when this fubjeot was formerly under
coniiderdtion, that the demarcation of the par
ticular roads should be entrusted to the execu
tive :—the only difference had been with refpecft
to the mode of expression ; but the effeift was
ffill to have been the fame ; fotne gentlemen
thinking it bell to leave the details of this bu
siness entirely to the fupreirie executive, orhers
wifiling to name the poftmafte'ii-general. The
members ot the house, he observed", could not be
ftippofed to possess every information, that might
be requilite, on this fubjeJi ; and their opinions
were liable to be bialled by local interefls : he
had ever considered it as highly incumbent on the
house to give the people every poflible informa
tion on public concerns :—but in this, as in eve
ry other fubjec'i, he thought it fufficientthat the
house should eftabliih the principle, and then
leave it to the executive to carry it into effect.
Mr. Livermore \cbferved, that the legislative
body being empowered by the conftiru;ion << to
establish poll-offices and-p'oft. roads" it is as clear
ly their dnty to designate the roads, as to efta
blifli the offices ; and he .did not think they
could with proptietjydelegaie that power, which
they were themselves/ appointed to exercile : —
some gentlemen, h<f knew, were of opinion,
that the biifinefs of the United States conld be
better tranfafied by a single person, than by ma
ny ; but this was not the intention of the Con
ftitutton but that, it was provided, thatthe
government Ihould be adminillered by represen
tatives, of the people's choice ; Co that every
man, who has the right of voting, (hall be in
lonie meafnre concerned in making every law
for the United States—The eftablillimet.tof pofl
roads heconfidered as a very important objetfl ;
but he did not wish to fee them so diffufed, as to
become a heavy charge where the advantage re
fairing from them would be bnt fmn!l ; nor on
the other hand, for the lake of bringing a reve
nue into the treasury, consent to straiten them
foas to check the progress of information.
If the pott-office were to be regulated by the
will of a single person, the dissemination of in
telligence might be aad the people
kept entirely in the dark with refped: to the
tranfadions of government , —orthe post matter,
if veiled with the whole power, might branch
out the office to i'uch a degree, as to make them
prt>ve a heavy burden ta the United States.—in
many instances, the exptnfe is productive of a
benefit fufficient to counterbalance it : in others,
no public benefit ante? ; . but some individuals
reap a private advantage from the institution,
whilst it is injurious to others.—The most mate
rial point in his opinion, was to determine the
road itfelf if the house gave up that, they
might as well leave all thereit of the business to
the discretion of the pott-matter, and permit him
to fettle the rates of pottage, and every other
particular relative to the pott-office, by faying at
once " there shall be a pod-matter general, who
(hall have the whole government of the pott-of
fice, under fnch regulations, as he, from time to
time, shall be pleased to enai't.
Mr. Sedgwick felt liimfelf by 110 means dispo
sed to resign all the bofmefs of the House to the
President, or to any one else ; but he thought
that the executive part of the bufmels ouglit to
be left to executive officers :—he did not, for
his part, know the particular circuinftances of
population, geography, ire. which had been ta.
ken into the calculation by the feiecl committee,
when they pointed nut the roads delineated in
the bill ; but he would ask, whether they under
stood the fubje»si so tho'oughiy, as the executive
officer would, who beitg refponlib'e to the peo
ple for the proper difciarge ot the trult reposed
in him, mil ft tile his utnoft diligence in order to
a fatisfartory execution of the delegated power?
—As to the conftitutioaality of this delegation,
it was admitted by the Committee themselves,
who brought in the bill :—for if the power was
altogether indelegable, no part of it could be
delegated ; and if a pare of it could, he law no
rea/on why the whole could not :—the second
'feiflion vvas as unconstitutional asthefirfi: ; for
it is there laid, that " it shall be lawful for the
post-matter-general to eflablilh l'uch other roads
«is poil-roads. « to lym seem rieceilaty."
Congrels, he otfeffrved, are authoiifed not on
ly to ettablifli poft-offic«rand polt-roads, but also
to borrow money :—But is it nnderiiood thai
Congress are to go in a body, to borrow ever*'
Turn ihat may be recpiifite ? is it not ratner j|l#ir.
office to determine the principle on wltic* the
buflnefs is to be conducted; and del.gate
the power of carrying their, refoH."ei*into execu
tion ? They are also cmpcwcmsJ tf coiff money;
and if no part of their he
did not know but they to turn
coiners, and work in the mint :—nay
they nuift even act the part of eJHkfipfcners, in
punching .piracies committed on seas.—
In the delegation of power, the wh«le purpose,
in his opinion, is answered, when me rules, by
which the business is to be point
ed out by law :—nor could hedifcover anything
in the constitution, to restrict the house froui
adopting this mode of conducting bufinels.
Mr. Hartley.—l cannot agree with the gentle
man from Mafiachufetts, that as often as thisbu
finefs had been agitated, there had been a majo
rity in the house in favor of leaving it to the ex
ecutive to designate the post-roads—Nay, so far
as my recolleiftion (which is perhaps not so good
as that gentleman's) serves me, we uniformly
have had a majority for Congress to point out
the post-roads.
The Constitution seems to have intended that
we {hotild exercile all the powers respecting the
'eftabli/hing post-roads we are capable of, but
the gentleman fays we are not competent to this
;duty—that it must be entrusted to the executive.
Sir, In many questions, concerning the pro
perty or geography of the United States, we had
full information on this floor from every quarter.
The people's interests and circumstances have
been known, however diltinJtly or differently
situated.
On tile fubjedl of the poft-officc there has been
much discussion—almost the whole of the roads
here stated, have appeared in bills before, and
though the gentleman (who made the motion for
(Inking out) may not perfectly nnderftaird all
the roads, yet ifhe will be so good as to attend
to the gentlemen who represent the different parts
of the Union, he ought to be fatisfied.
Unless they are prejudiced they can certainly
give the best information.
If it was leu to the President or Poft-MafVer-
General, neither is acquainted with all the roads
contemplated, they niult depend in a gr#at de
gree upon the inforiv.ation others.
We reprelent the people, we are conflitution
ally vested with the power of determining upon
the eflrablifhmenj; of pail-roads, and as I under
stand at pre lent, ought not to delegate the pow
er to any other person.
258
A general podr-officc is intended to be establish
ed by the bill, and the collection of tlie reverse
is put under the fuperintendance of a Poll-Mas
ter-General, the minutiae is submitted to hir.i
I (hould imagine there ought to be a limitation
of the law in point of time, fay three, four or
five years—when we come to the proper place a
motion to thatpurpofe may be made.
No one in the United States has a orearer ref
peei for the President than myfelf, and I hold
that the several departments are filled with ~er>
tleiufn of the firlt abilities and fitnefs, but we
are not to confine ourselves to a view of the mo
ment—this bill has the complexion of a perpetual
law ; we mini have some regard to consequences.
If the amendment takes place the office as
we'll as revenue will be thrown into [he power
ofthe executive, who may iucreafe the roads and
offices as far as the revenues go. The revenue
of the pod office is at present not great, but if
proper feeds are now sown ic may hereafter be
productive.
In Great Britain much has been obtained from
the po!l-o(Iice, and inoitofthe European nations
count upon it as a considerable branch of reve-
mie
Will ic be prudent for us to grant this power
to the executive in the latitude conrended.for—
we mil ft not suppose that this country will always
remain incorrupt, we fliall lhare the fateofothe-r
nations.
Through the medium of the poft-ofiice a weighty
influence may be obtained by the executive this
is guarded against in England by prohibiting of
ficers in the poll-office department from inter
fering at elections. There is no such guard or
caution in the present bill.
By the amendment we are unnecefiarily part
ing with our revenues, and throwing an impro
per balance into the executive scale, and which
our confticucnts do nor expetfl from us.
The Senate heretofore have disagreed with us,
but if they will take the fame pains w'e have,
the means of information is within their reach —
upon a review they may probably change their
l'cntiments.
This is a law of experiment, let us try it'a'
few years—if upon experience we find mirfelves
incompetent to the duty, we mud (if the condi
tmion will admir_) grant the power to the exe
cutive, or if the conflitution will not allow
fubinit the article for amendment
hi a constitutional way. lam against the amend
-IOTIU.
'■Mr. if. Bourne was 111 favor of the amend
ment, wßich hg thought both expedient and con
liituticuial.—i» freaking of pofl-officts andpojt
roads, thl;. conftltution, he observed, fpenks in
general terms, as it-does of a mint, excises, &c.
i-c.—Jo palling the excise law, the house, not
thinking themlelves pofleffed of fufflcient infor
ination, empowered the President to mark out
the diUriels and surveys : and if they had aright
to delegate such power to the executive, the fur
ther delegation of the power of marking out the
roads for the conveyance of the mail, could
hardly be thought dangerous : the constitution
meant no more than that Congress should poftefs
the exclusive right of doing that, by themselves,
or by any other person, which amounts to the
fame thing : the business he thought much more
likely to.be well executed by the President, or
the Poft-Mafter-GeneraJ, than by Congress. Ke
had himfelf been of the committee who framed
the bill ; but eould not tell whether the roads,
marked outinir, were better than ex
cept so far as relates to the State repre
sents ; and he imagined the other of
the committee were in a similar predicament :
The President, l;e observed, having opportuni
ties of obtaining information from the different
members of the house, from the Post-Master-Ge
neral, and from others, will be more competent
to determine the proper road : it will be occa
sionally neceflary to change the route, and lay
out new roads : and he could fee no inconveni
ence from entrufiing either the President or the
Pofl-Malter-General with the neceflary powers
for these purpofer, :—at all events, the house
could guard againlV any apprehended danger,
by the insertion of such a claufeas had been pro
posed [by Mr. Hartley] limiting the operation of
the bill to three, four or five years : at the expi
ration of that term the power would revert to
Congress, and they might then retain the exer
cise of it in their own hands, if they found that
any improper use had been made of it.
Mr. White made several observations on the
the expediency and constitutionality of the mea
sure. No individual, he said, could poflefs an
equal f,lare of information with that House on
the fubjecft of thegeography of the United States.
He disapproved of the amendment for many
other reaf'ons, and particularly its approximat
ing to the cuflom of England. Such advances
towards monarchy, if not checked in season, he
was apprehensive would tend to unhinge the pre
sent government. If this government retains its
present republican form, it will be owing to the
members of this House. It is easy to fee what